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Abstract
Using the Post Keynesian approach, this study investigates the evolution of money 
and banks in transition economies in general, and in Uzbekistan in particular. By 
emphasising the role and importance of institutions in the economic process, the study 
argues that the evolution o f money and banks during transition is a necessarily 
complex and time-consuming process. By analysing functional differences of money 
and banks and their evolutionary path in a market economy and in a centrally planned 
economy, the study suggests that, to reach necessary maturity and to become effective 
financial intermediaries and creators of new credit, transition banks have to go 
through several evolutionary phases. This is explained by the historical distinction 
between cash money and non-cash money, underdeveloped banking habits of the 
general public, slow and inefficient payments system inherited from the past, and 
more importantly hyperinflation during the early years o f transition.
Taking Uzbekistan as a case study, we also argue that the speed of this 
evolution can vary from country to country depending upon a number o f important 
factors such as the number of years spent under central planning, the degree of 
centralisation o f the economy, the starting date of reforms and their consistency, 
proximity to large and dynamically functioning market economies, and more 
importantly entry of foreign banks. Uzbekistan was very slow in reforming its 
economy and therefore is still far from developing into a market economy. In spite o f 
some positive changes undertaken during the transition period such as establishment 
of a two-tier banking sector, formal abolition of the distinction between cash money 
and non-cash money, modernisation of the payments system, controlling inflation, 
and the establishment of the deposit insurance fund, the banking sector failed to
regain the general public’s confidence. We argue that weak development of money 
and banking in Uzbekistan is largely explained by the current structural organisation 
of the economy and some sector-specific issues associated with it. The implication of 
these arguments is that, in order to capture the objective reality o f the situation, 
theories must be developed in particular ways in the context o f history, institutional 
factors, and policy frameworks.
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Introduction
Persistent macroeconomic imbalances that cost huge output loss in post-communist 
economies during the years of transition have proven that reform packages designed 
in the framework o f mainstream economic theories were a failure. After so many 
years only very few post-soviet transition countries have reached their pre-transition 
income levels. With hindsight, now we can tell that this failure was the result of an 
ahistorical approach, which ignored the time needed for the evolution and further 
development of true market institutions. Transition countries’ economies had been 
analysed using the standard method to assess market economies, meaning more than 
70 years o f central planning experience was not properly taken into account.
It was most naively expected that market institutions would spring up as soon as 
central planning was abolished. Indeed, ignorance of previous experience and neglect 
of the necessary time for the evolution of market institutions proved to be costly. The 
newly created banking sector failed to fill the gap left by the monobank system. The 
result was a credit crunch, massive output loss and the development o f inefficient 
money surrogates.
The reason for the failure to duly recognise the role of institutions and the 
necessary time needed for their evolution during transition is implicitly embedded in 
the chosen methodology of orthodox theory. Economic variables are divided between 
the real and monetary sides, the latter of which does not play any active role in the 
economic process. In particular, money and banks are depicted as a veil and seen as 
neutral. Interestingly enough, if  one agrees with this opinion, then there is no need to 
study the evolution, and the role and importance of money and banks during 
transition.
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The fact, however, is that, in the real world, institutions, including money and 
banks, play an important role in the economic process. The importance o f institutions 
and conventions is explained by the fact that they are developed to Tull our 
disquietude’ about the uncertain future. The serious shortcoming o f the orthodox 
approach in not addressing this reality necessitates adoption of a different approach: 
an approach that takes into account realities of the past and uncertainties about the 
future and gives enough weight to the historical process o f evolution of the 
institutions. For these and other reasons, we chose to employ an alternative approach 
to analyse the process o f economic transition, drastically different from the orthodox 
one. Hence, the main arguments of this work are built on the Post Keynesian 
approach, which emphasises the role of institutions, particularly of money and banks, 
in the economic process.
This study investigates the evolution of money and banks in Uzbekistan during 
transition. The arguments of the study are rather simple, but fundamental. The role 
and importance attached to money and banks differ radically in a market economy 
and in a centralised planned economy. Therefore, we argue that in order to understand 
the true nature o f development of money and banks during transition, one must 
analyse functional differences o f these institutions and their evolutionary path in two 
different systems. In other words, we have to know how money and banks evolved 
through time and what are the reasons for their functional differences. This will be of 
paramount importance in understanding the complex nature of transition and 
assessing the possible evolutionary path for institutional developments during 
transition. Moreover, we also argue that the speed of institutional developments varies 
from country to country depending upon a number of important factors such as the 
degree o f institutional distortions inherited from the past, fundamental structural
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reforms that promote the general public’s confidence in money and banks, the current 
structure of the economy and system-specific issues associated with it, and the way 
institutional and technological developments are adopted. The implication of these 
arguments is that in order to capture the objective reality o f the situation, theories 
must be developed in particular ways in the context of history, institutional factors, 
and policy frameworks.
In this sense, based on these arguments that, we will analyse the current state of 
development of money and banks, and their evolutionary path in Uzbekistan. The 
Uzbek case is of particular interest for research purposes because in the context of 
neoliberal reforms Uzbekistan is considered to be among the worst reformers, yet 
paradoxically it turns out to be among the best performers in terms o f both achieving 
better macroeconomic results and maintaining a better social safety net. Reflecting 
upon this extraordinary performance, which is known as the ‘Uzbek puzzle’ in the 
literature, we will show the importance of policy frameworks and institutional factors 
in understanding both the economic performance, and the current state and the 
evolutionary path of money and banks during transition.
Hence, the study is organised as follows. Starting our analysis with a market 
economy, in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 we will explore the role and importance of 
money and banks in the economic process. We will investigate in more detail such 
issues as what constitutes money in a market (monetary) economy, what 
characteristics it possesses, its changing nature, its functions, and motives for holding 
it. Since the entire financial superstructure of the contemporary advanced market 
economies is built on the issue of having trust in money, these issues are o f paramount 
importance for our analysis. We will also consider how money is created
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endogenously by the private sector in a market economy, given there is a strong trust 
in outside money.
In Chapter 3, we will look at the special role o f banks in the economic process 
and analyse the evolutionary nature of institutional development. We will address 
issues such as why banks are special, how they can finance investment before saving 
takes place, and more importantly how banks develop through time. Particular 
attention will also be given to the critical review of the literature on finance and 
economic development.
In Chapter 4, we will examine the same issues, but now in the context of 
centrally planned economies. The purpose behind this exercise is to juxtapose the said 
phenomena in two different economic systems and to make necessary inferences for 
our case study. In Chapter 5, we will look at the reform choice, the transition path, 
and the current structure and performance of the Uzbek economy during transition. 
This exercise will be helpful in analysing macroeconomic problems and obstacles that 
inhibit banking sector development in Uzbekistan. In Chapter 6 , we will analyse 
generalised pattern o f development of money and banks during transition. Chick’s 
stages of banking development framework will be employed to assess the nature of 
banking development in transition countries.
Given this, in Chapter 7, we will investigate in detail the evolution of money 
and banking in Uzbekistan. Using all the arguments put forward in earlier chapters, 
we look at the issue of institutional development, i.e. what kind o f financial system 
Uzbekistan has inherited from the past, how it went about reforming it, and what is 
the current state o f development. In addition, the issue of cash money and non-cash 
money, their nature, role and necessity for retaining such a distinction during the
4
years of transition will also be discussed. Finally, in Chapter 8 we will briefly 
summarise main findings and conclusions of the study.
In short, we can say that the organisational structure o f this thesis has not come 
into view spontaneously; rather it has emerged as a natural outcome of the chosen 
methodology.
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1. The Role of Money in Capitalist Economies. A Post Keynesian Perspective
1.1 Introduction
As was outlined in the general introduction to this study, the main purpose of the first 
three chapters is to analyse the role and importance of money, banks and the banking 
sector in the working of a mature capitalist economy. This chapter commences our 
investigation into the nature of money and its peculiar role in the economic process. We 
will look at issues such as what makes money special, and why money plays peculiar role 
in the economic process in a capitalist economy. We will show that the very 
organisational structure of a capitalist economy explains why money plays a facilitating 
as well as a constraining role in the economic process.
In short, the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 1.2 methodological issues 
concerning the monetary analysis of the working of a capitalist economy will be 
explored; the specification and importance of uncertainty and time in understanding 
money will be examined. Non-neutrality of money in the economic process will be 
discussed in Section 1.3. This will be shown using Keynes’s argument about the working 
of a co-operative economy, a neutral entrepreneur economy and an entrepreneur 
economy. In Section 1.4 we will argue that a monetary economy as such develops only 
in property based societies.1 Finally, in Section 1.5 we will cover essential properties of 
money and motives for holding it. Also in this section we will start our detailed 
discussion of the notion of liquidity preference. The concept of endogenous money and
1 Here and hereafter by property based economy/society we mean private  property based economy/society
unless we expressly state otherwise.
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importance of liquidity preference in endogenous money analysis, then, will be continued 
in the next chapter.
1.2 Money, Uncertainty and Time in Post Keynesian Analysis
Neoclassical macroeconomic theory distinguishes between the real and monetary sides of 
the economy. Indeed a real exchange economy of the neoclassical world is modelled as a 
barter economy operating under conditions of certainty. ‘There is no provision for a 
monetary system interacting with the real sector of the economy’ (Rousseas, 1992: 19). 
Money is ‘dropped’ into the model ‘either in the form of manna from Heaven or,...,[as a 
technical input] from a helicopter’ (ibid). In such an economy only the medium of 
exchange aspect of money is emphasised (Davidson, 1978: 141). Introduction of money 
into the barter society eliminates the hassle of ‘double coincidence of wants’ thus 
reducing search and transaction costs, speeds up the pace of trade, and also enhances 
trade opportunities and causes specialisation in production. Indeed, Drake (1980) 
emphasised the last channel to be the most important in bringing economic efficiency. 
Once it is introduced, however, money becomes ‘neutral’. In the long run money affects 
only the price level, leaving other real variables unaffected.
The neoclassical method of approaching the economic system is based on dualism 
(Chick, 2003: 323). Dualism then is the central feature of Cartesian/Euclidean mode of 
thought (Dow, 1996a: 16). According to this tradition knowledge is represented by 
information. Facts about the events are classified as either known or unknown. Further, 
even unknown facts about the future are knowable, at least probabilistically. Herein
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comes the classification of uncertainty as something quantifiable by means of frequency 
distribution (ibid: 18).
In a dualistic mode of thought the absence of perfect knowledge is interpreted as no 
knowledge (Dow, 1993: 18). In the theory of expectations, for example, ‘dualism 
emerges in the contrast between known and not-known; there is no room for “expected to 
be likely, with a low degree of confidence’” (ibid: 12). This approach in its turn leads to 
another fallacious conclusion. Since information regarding the uncertain events of the 
future is available, individuals are rational in the sense that they make perfect use of it. 
Therefore, ‘behaviour which is irrational in relation to known information, according to 
the orthodox economic sense of rationality..., is the province of the psychiatrist, not the 
economist’ (Dow, 1996a: 18). In this way, true understanding of the working of the 
economic system requires thinking beyond dualism. In the real world time necessarily 
leads to uncertainty and uncertainty to partial knowledge (Chick, 2002: 9). Hence, when 
perfect knowledge pertaining to the future is unobtainable, partial knowledge does 
matter.
In neoclassical economic theory ‘probabilistic risk and uncertainty are 
synonymous’ (Davidson, 1991: 129, emphasis in the original). Probabilistic risk, 
however, ‘pertains to what is in principle insurable -  it can be described by a probability 
distribution -  and uncertainty is whatever falls outside such a description’ (Knight, 1937, 
in Chick, 1983: 214). Hence, while risk in principle can be classified as measurable, 
uncertainty cannot. It follows that true uncertainty is non-quantifiable, non-measurable 
(Knight, 1935: 20). ‘[T]rue uncertainty by definition cannot be modelled 
deterministically; herein lies its significance for decision making. It refers to an absence
of knowledge, a lack of confidence in one’s predictions’ (Dow, 1993: 16). Because the 
future cannot be known, ‘it involves a dialectic that is open-ended and a priori 
indeterminate’ (Rousseas, 1992: 18). About uncertain future events ‘there is no scientific 
basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know’ 
(Keynes, 1937a: 214). In this sense, Davidson (1978, 1982-3, 1991) makes the 
distinction between ergodic and non-ergodic processes. By ergodic process he means the 
situation in which ‘the probability distribution of the relevant variable calculated from 
any past realization tends to converge with the probability function governing the current 
events and with the probability function that will govern future outcomes’ (Davidson, 
1987 in Lawson, 1988: 51.) He associates uncertainty with a non-ergodic process, which 
can be characterized only as one of numerically immeasurable probability (Lawson, 
1988:51).
From the other point of view, the static method adopted in neoclassical analysis 
assumes away historical time as such (Chick, 2003). As a corollary, information about 
‘the dark forces of time and ignorance which envelop our future’ (Keynes, 1970: 155) 
can be guessed with certainty in advance and therefore uncertainty can be reduced to a 
calculable risk. Hence capital markets are assumed to be perfect: lenders and borrowers 
accept the ongoing market interest rate without any fear of capital loss. Indeed, 
timelessness of the system is the result of the assumption of perfect knowledge held with 
certainty (Chick, 2003). This method jeopardises the proximity of the model to the real 
world and consequently makes it irrelevant.
Notions of expectation formation and intertemporal choice do involve time. But 
because of the assumption of perfect knowledge under certainty, time refers only to
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logical rather than historical time (Dow, 1993: 16). Therefore, ‘within logical time, a 
deterministic model requires that expectations also be deterministically formed’ (ibid: 
18). Logical time operating under the general equilibrium analysis framework can ‘flow 
backwards as well as forward’ (Rousseas, 1992: 16). This framework eliminates the time 
consuming price setting process, which involves uncertainty, and allows the auctioneer to 
establish ‘the prices by tatonnement, with recontracting wiping out false trades’ (Dow, 
1993: 15). In contrast historical time is irreversible. Within historical time production 
and other economic events also take place in an irreversible fashion so that false trades 
cannot be recontracted (Dow, 1993: 18, and Rousseas, 1992: 13). In this environment 
‘[s]ome experiments are crucial in Shackle’s terms; in other words, acting on a particular 
expectation itself changes the environment for the next set of observations, so that no 
sample can be compiled on which to base quantitative probability estimates’ (Dow, 1993: 
18).
All the above arguments indicate the dangers of oversimplification of modelling of 
the working of the economic system. As Keynes put it elegantly:
It may well be that the [neo]classical theory represents the way in which we should like our
Economy to behave. But to assume that it actually does so is to assume our difficulties away.
(Keynes, 1970: 34, emphasis added)
Understanding the core of the problem, Keynes changes the framework of the 
analysis of the working of the economic system. Keynes’s approach is completely 
different from the neoclassical one. He uses a different method and mode of thought and 
thus produces different theory (Chick, 1983 and 2003). The atomism and dualism of the
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Cartesian/Euclidean mode of thought, central in neoclassical analysis, is replaced by 
organicism and a move beyond dualism2 of the Babylonian mode of thought. Hence, the 
neoclassical dichotomy between monetary and real variables is rejected ‘in favour of a 
vision of the economy in which the influence of money is pervasive’ (Chick, 2003: 315). 
The static method, then, with its corollary of certainty and perfect knowledge, is replaced 
by historical time, uncertainty and partial knowledge. As a result, the monetary theory of 
production is developed. This theory Us built on the unique properties o f  money, on 
expectations formation under uncertainty, and on historical rather than logical time, 
each o f which necessarily implies the other two; any analysis which involves only one or 
two o f the factors is both logically incomplete and irrelevant to a monetary economy’ 
(Dow, 1993: 6 , emphasis added).
When making decisions about future investment plans, agents take into account 
their productive capacities inherited from the past and expectations about the future. The 
latter account means that they necessarily face an uncertain future and act upon partial 
knowledge at hand. However, this in no way means that they act upon the ‘weighted 
average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities’ (Keynes, 1970: 
161). Indeed, some of the decisions are made based just on ‘spontaneous optimism’ and 
thus are the ‘result of animal spirits -  of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction’ 
(ibid).
In the real world not only decisions made in the realm of time and uncertainty but 
also expectations regarding the future can affect the level of output, investment and 
employment (Rousseas, 1992:18). Therefore, Keynes in his General Theory, argued that 
‘as soon as we pass to the problem of what determines output and employment as a
2 Chick (2003) notes that using the term non-dualism itself would again represent dualism.
whole, we require the complete theory of a Monetary Economy’ (Keynes, 1970: 293). 
He then defines the monetary economy as ‘essentially one in which changing views about 
the future are capable of influencing the quantity of employment and not merely its 
direction’ (ibid: vii).
In a monetary economy money becomes central in analysing the working o f  the 
economic system. Money comes into this system in ‘an essential and peculiar manner’ as 
‘a subtle device linking the present to the future’ (ibid: 294). ‘One important argument in 
favour of incorporating money is that it is the outlet for expression of uncertainty in a 
monetary economy’ (Dow, 1993:19). As was noted earlier already, in neoclassical theory 
money as a means of exchange facilitates exchange. Fortunately, money’s role does not 
end with this. If it were the only reason why money mattered, then no one would hoard 
money beyond a certain amount only because it minimised transaction costs (Amadeo, 
1995: 98).
In a neoclassical world where other assets yield some positive return, and money is 
‘barren’ in this respect, ‘[w]hy should anyone outside a lunatic asylum wish to use money 
as a store of wealth?’ (Keynes, 1937a: 215-16). In a monetary economy when 
expectations regarding future economic activities are weak, money enables individuals to 
keep their purchasing power over other assets for later periods. In this sense, money can 
create a constraint on economic activity. Moreover, because contracts and debt 
instruments are denominated and discharged in money, money also plays facilitating role 
in the economic process. All in all, money becomes ‘non-neutral’ in all senses.
Hence, in Post Keynesian thought the role of money in a market economy is seen as 
an essential one. Money is capable of affecting the level of investment, employment and
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total production. It is an integral and inseparable part of capitalist economic production 
‘existing in historical time and facing an uncertain future’ (Cottrell, 1994: 598). Thus in 
a market economy ‘it is the very existence of money that is ‘non-neutral’, rather than 
simply variations in its quantity: an economy with actual money works quite differently 
from a barter economy with an arbitrarily selected numeraire labelled ‘money”  (ibid: 
590, emphasis in the original). Nevertheless, it is ironic that even ‘the best developed 
[neoclassical] model of the economy cannot find room for it’ (Hahn, 1982: 1).
1.3 Keynes’s Co-operative and Entrepreneur Economies and a Monetary Analysis
As a theoretical thinker Keynes was unhappy with the classical ‘real’ and ‘monetary’ 
dichotomy. Even though his Treatise on Money was an early attempt to analyse the role 
and importance of money in the economic process, Keynes was already dissatisfied with 
the Treatise even at the time of its publication (Rotheim, 1981: 572). In the preface to 
the General Theory he admits that he ‘made some progress towards pushing monetary 
theory back to becoming a theory of output as a whole’ (Keynes, 1970: vi) after the 
Treatise had been published. Hence, for Keynes the General Theory in principle was a 
monetary analysis. Keynes’s fundamental idea behind analysing the economy as a whole 
in monetary terms was to refute ‘the second postulate of the classical doctrine and to 
work out the behaviour of a system in which involuntary unemployment in the strict 
sense is possible’ (Keynes, 1970: 17). He wanted to prove that the fluctuations in 
effective demand were unavoidable in a real world monetary economy. Keynes’s
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posthumously published works clearly revealed how his ideas about monetary analysis 
were developed between his Treatise on Money and General Theory.
For Keynes the economy as a whole could not be analysed except in monetary 
terms. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the first 1933 draft table of contents of the 
General Theory shows that initially Keynes named his new book, the General Theory, as 
The Monetary Theory o f Employment (Keynes, 1979: 62). Furthermore, the last (1933) 
draft table of contents of the General Theory (Keynes, 1973: 421) indicates that at the 
beginning Keynes intended to include two chapters, namely The Distinction between a 
Co-operative and an Entrepreneur Economy, and The Characteristics o f  an Entrepreneur 
Economy, in his book that would clearly distinguish his theory from that of the 
neoclassical school. However, in the final version of the book these two chapters were 
replaced by The Postulates o f  the Classical Economics and The Principles o f  Effective 
Demand (Torr, 1980: 429).3
As will be discussed below, these two chapters, which were dropped from the final 
version of the General Theory, would have better explained Keynes’s method of analysis 
of the monetary economy. In fact, Dillard (1963), Torr (1980 and 1988) and Rotheim 
(1981) suggest that the General Theory would have been more successful had Keynes 
included these early chapters in the final version of the book. We quote from Rotheim:
Had Keynes retained the earlier part o f his 1933 outline concerning the methodology o f a 
monetary economy, much o f the criticism heaped on the General Theory could have been
3 According to Rotheim (1981: 572) Keynes made changes to this work taking into account the comments 
of his critics. However, Torr (1988: 26) suggests that the reason why Keynes never published these 
chapters could be that Keynes might have been afraid o f  being accused o f  plagiarism because D. H. 
Robertson had already been working in a similar direction.
14
avoided. How we think about economic problems would have been different. (Rotheim, 1981: 
571)
In the 1933 draft of the General Theory (i.e. in the chapter entitled The Distinction 
between a Co-operative Economy and an Entrepreneur Economy) Keynes makes the 
distinction between three types of economy: co-operative (or real wage) economy, neutral 
entrepreneur economy, and entrepreneur (or money wage) economy (Keynes, 1979: 77- 
8). In a co-operative or real wage economy ‘the factors of production are rewarded by 
dividing up in agreed proportions the actual output of their co-operative efforts’ (ibid:
77). In a neutral entrepreneur economy ‘the factors are hired by entrepreneurs for money 
but where there is a mechanism of some kind to ensure that the exchange value of the 
money incomes of the factors is always equal in the aggregate to the proportion of current 
output which would have been the factor’s share in a co-operative economy’ (ibid: 78). 
In contrast, in an entrepreneur economy ‘the entrepreneurs hire the factors for money but 
without such a mechanism as the above’ (ibid). The role of money in this, real world, 
economy is seen as such that it is not only a convenient means to facilitate life, but also 
‘capable of influencing’ the level of employment, investment and thus output as a whole.
As we have noted above, Keynes’s main goal was to refute the second postulate of 
the ‘classical doctrine’, according to which ‘the marginal utility of output is equal to the 
marginal disutility of effort’ (Keynes, 1979: 101). Acceptance of the validity of this 
postulate, Keynes believed, would necessarily mean the possibility of perpetual full 
employment (Rotheim, 1981: 575). Therefore, his main effort is directed to attacking the 
classical analysis of the real world economy on its own grounds, where ‘an entrepreneur 
economy [is] made to behave in the same manner as a co-operative economy’ (Keynes,
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1979: 79). To accomplish this task he starts his analysis with a hypothetical ‘pure barter’ 
society, compares it to a neutral entrepreneur economy and only then develops his 
entrepreneur economy, which cannot be analysed except in monetary terms.
To avoid complexity he starts his argument by explaining the functioning of a pure 
barter economy in which output is created by ‘co-operative efforts’. In a pure barter 
economy, where goods are exchanged fo r goods, there would not be effective demand 
failures as long as the ‘price’ ratios were perfectly flexible (Dow and Earl, 1982: 107-8). 
In this society uncertainty would be dealt with ‘by holding on to one type of producible 
good as a store of value, before deciding when and how to exchange it for other goods’ 
(Dow, 1993: 19, emphasis added). Any change in the relative ‘price’ of a particular good 
would make the production of that good more profitable and thus would attract more 
employment. As a consequence, the value of the wage would automatically adjust with 
the market value of the current product. Any unemployment would be temporary due to 
time lags (Keynes, 1979: 102) and therefore persistent unemployment would not result 
(Dow, 1993: 17). Hence in this type of economy perpetual full employment is 
obtainable: ‘only miscalculation or stupid obstinacy can stand in the way of production, if 
the value of the expected real product exceeds real costs’ (Keynes, 1979: 67).
In the next step, using this line of reasoning, he shows that continuous full 
employment is also obtainable in an entrepreneur economy, if it is ‘made to behave in the 
same manner as a co-operative economy’ (Keynes, 1979: 79). As we noted earlier, 
Keynes calls this economy a neutral entrepreneur economy where ‘the starting up of 
productive processes largely depends on a class o f  entrepreneurs who hire the factors of 
production for money and look to their recoupment from selling the output for money '
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(Keynes, 1979: 77, emphasis added). So far the description of this economy complies 
with the real world economy, where the concept of recoupment in terms o f  money is of 
crucial importance. Keynes argues that this economy is made to work as a co-operative 
economy by assuming that ‘the whole of the current incomes of the factors of production 
are necessarily spent, directly or indirectly on purchasing their own current output from 
the entrepreneurs’ (Keynes, 1979: 77). Like in a co-operative economy, in a neutral 
entrepreneur economy unemployment would only be temporary due to time lags in the 
adjustment of demand in different sectors of the economy as long as everything that was 
earned was spent: there could not be ‘general’ unemployment (Rotheim, 1981: 576). 
Traces of this argument can be found in the General Theory too.
As a corollary o f  the same doctrine [i.e. supply creates its own demand], it has been supposed 
that any individual act o f  abstaining from consumption necessarily leads to, and amounts to the 
same thing as, causing the labour and commodities thus released from supplying consumption to 
be invested in the production o f  capital wealth. ... The doctrine is never stated to-day in this 
crude form. Nevertheless it still underlies the whole classical theory, which would collapse 
without it. (Keynes, 1970: 19)
Hence in this economy the role of money is limited to facilitating exchange only 
and indeed money can be seen as a ‘veil’.
A co-operative economy and a neutral entrepreneur economy employ two 
completely different modes of production. In the former economy the production process 
is accomplished by ‘co-operative efforts', i.e. this is just a hypothetical or conceptual 
communal barter society, while in the latter economy the production process depends
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upon capitalists and entrepreneurs, as well as propertyless free workers.4 The clear 
difference between these two modes of production lies in the existence of private 
property rights in an entrepreneur economy. As will be discussed in more detail later in 
this section, this notion is of central importance in strengthening our understanding of the 
emergence of the need for money as such in property-based economies. For the time 
being, before reverting to our main discussion, we note that Keynes was aware of this 
fact, although it is only implicit in his analysis.
In a nutshell, despite fundamental differences in the chosen mode of production, a 
neutral entrepreneur economy and a co-operative economy act in the same way: 
unemployment will not result; perpetual fu ll employment is possible and thus the second 
postulate of the classical doctrine is satisfied. This can be observed more easily in the 
former economy than in the latter one. The latter economy works as the former does i f  
the role of money is limited to facilitating exchange and all of the current monetary 
income is spent on purchasing current output. When this is shown it becomes easy to 
perceive that a co-operative economy and a neutral entrepreneur economy are, in 
principle, barter-like economies.
Because we will be using the term ‘barter-like economy ’ in this broader sense 
throughout our analysis, perhaps it is time to distinguish it from iapure barter economy’ 
where basically goods are exchanged for goods. Our use of the term barter-like economy 
implies that money is employed in the economic process but is treated as being in some 
sense neutral. In this economy everything that is earned is necessarily spent and money 
‘is regarded as a mere link between cloth and wheat, or between the day’s labour spent
4 In the sense that workers do not own the means o f  production and they are not held liable to the risk o f  
any material loss in the process o f  production.
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building the canoe and the day’s labour spent on harvesting the crop. [Money] is not 
supposed to affect the essential nature o f  the transaction from being, in the minds o f  those 
making it, one between real things, or to modify the motives and decisions o f  the parties 
to i f  (Keynes, 1973a: 408, emphasis added). Thus it becomes clear that in a barter-like 
economy there is no room for fluctuation in effective demand, no room for chronic 
unemployment. In this sense through the examples of ‘a pure barter’ (or co-operative) 
economy and a neutral entrepreneur economy, Keynes was able to demonstrate that the 
classical analysis of the economy was essentially dealing with a barter economy. In 
Chapter 4 we will show that centrally planned economies fit the description of a barter­
like economy.
Once Keynes shows that the second postulate can hold only in a co-operative 
economy and a neutral economy, he starts depicting the special features of an 
entrepreneur economy in which ‘we actually live to-day’ (Keynes, 1979: 78). An 
entrepreneur economy is a money-wage economy for the factors of production are hired 
for money and thus the notion of recoupment in terms of money is important. In this 
economy, unlike in a neutral entrepreneur economy, however, money’s role is not limited 
to facilitating exchange only and thus money is not held just for ‘temporary 
convenience’. Rather, in an entrepreneur economy ‘money plays a part of its own and 
affects motives and decisions and is, in short, one of the operative factors in the situation, 
so that the course o f  events cannot be predicted, either in the long period or in the short, 
without a knowledge of the behaviour o f  money between the first state and the last’ 
(Keynes, 1973a: 408-9, emphasis added). Hence, because money becomes non-neutral
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in a non-neutral entrepreneur economy, in which ‘we actually live to-day’, the working 
of this economy cannot be analysed but in monetary terms.
In an entrepreneur economy the process of production ‘will not be started up, 
unless the money proceeds expected from the sale of the output are at least equal to the 
money costs which could be avoided by not starting up the process’ (Keynes, 1979: 78). 
The object of an entrepreneur in starting up production, then, is nothing but to end up 
with more money than s/he started with. This concept, according to Keynes, is an 
‘essential characteristic of an entrepreneur economy’ (ibid: 89) or in general it can be 
described as a Taw of production in an entrepreneur economy’ (ibid: 78). Keynes 
acknowledges that these notions are similar to ‘a pregnant observation made by Karl 
Marx’ (ibid: 81). Keynes agrees with Marx that the concept of exchanging commodity 
for commodity in order to obtain another commodity, i.e. C-M-C', is not ‘the nature of 
production in the actual world’ (ibid). Rather, according to Keynes, this concept may 
reflect ‘the standpoint of the private consumer’ (ibid). For Keynes this type of economic 
organisation at most can be likened to a neutral entrepreneur economy (Rotheim, 1981: 
576). The production process in an entrepreneur economy then requires ‘the attitude of 
business, which is a case of M-C-M', i.e. of parting with money for commodity (or 
effort) in order to obtain more money’ (Keynes, 1979: 81, emphasis in the original). It is 
in this economy that the second postulate of the ‘classical’ doctrine is not satisfied (ibid:
78).
These observations, however, do not yet clearly expose Keynes’s refutation of the 
second postulate. This task is accomplished in the discussion of the fluctuations in 
effective demand. Description of the essential features of the entrepreneur economy lays
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the foundations for showing how effective demand can fluctuate in the real world 
economy. Unlike in a neutral economy, in an entrepreneur economy ‘the volume of 
employment, the marginal disutility of which is equal to the utility of its marginal 
product, may be ‘unprofitable’ in terms of money’ (Keynes, 1979: 79). The reason is that 
in an entrepreneur economy some part of the current income may not necessarily be spent 
and thus a part of the production might remain unsold. In this economy an entrepreneur 
is not interested in ‘the amount of the product, but in the amount of money which will fall 
to his share’ (ibid: 82, emphasis in the original). Furthermore,
there is a further feature o f  our actual monetary system which makes a deficiency o f  effective 
demand a more frequent danger than the opposite; namely the fact that the money in terms o f  
which the factors o f  production are remunerated will ‘keep’ more readily than the output which 
they are being remunerated to produce, so that the need o f  entrepreneurs to sell, i f  they are to 
avoid a running loss, is more pressing than the need o f  recipients o f income to spend. This is the 
case because it is a characteristic o f  finished goods, which are neither consumed nor used but 
carried in stock, that they incur substantial carrying charges for storage, risk and deterioration, 
so that they are yielding a negative return for so long as they are held; whereas such expenses are 
reduced to a minimum approaching zero in the case o f money, (ibid: 86, emphasis added)
Thus the instability of effective demand is a monetary phenomenon. ‘Money,’ 
emphasises Keynes, ‘is par excellence the means of remuneration in an entrepreneur 
economy which lends itself to fluctuations in effective demand’ (Keynes, 1979: 86, 
emphasis in the original). In this type of economy agents do not necessarily spend their 
entire current incomes on current output. Rather during a period of low confidence 
regarding the uncertain future they can prefer to hold money. Therefore, only in a
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monetary economy, ‘a decision not to have dinner to-day... does not necessitate a 
decision to have dinner or to buy a pair of boots a week hence or a year hence or to 
consume any specific thing at any specific date. Thus it depresses the business of 
preparing to-day’s dinner without stimulating the business of making ready for some 
future act of consumption. It is not a substitution of future consumption-demand for 
present consumption-demand, - it is a net diminution of such demand’ (Keynes, 1970: 
210, emphasis in the original).
‘[T]he classical theory,’ concludes Keynes, ‘fails us at both ends, so to speak, if we 
try to apply it to an entrepreneur economy. For it is not true that the entrepreneur’s 
demand for labour depends on the share of the product which will fall to the 
entrepreneur; and it is not true that the supply of labour depends on the share of the 
product which will fall to labour’ (Keynes, 1979: 83). Therefore the classical way of 
reasoning that does not take into account the peculiar role money plays in the economic 
process leads to a wrong conclusion that rules ‘out altogether the possibility of chronic 
unemployment as distinct from temporary unemployment due to time lags ' (ibid: 102, 
emphasis added) which is an inherent feature of a monetary economy.
1.4 Money and Property Rights
It is obvious that Keynes’s monetary analysis and Post Keynesian debate concerning this 
issue refers to the capitalist society in its ‘mature’ stage of development. In this respect, 
the mode of production - the relationship between the owners of the capital, the 
middlemen class -  entrepreneurs, and the ‘propertyless’ free workers and several other
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aspects of the institutional framework of capitalist society are taken for granted. Of 
course, Keynes, as we noted earlier, was aware of the importance of these phenomena in 
explaining the need for monetary analysis. For instance, in the chapter entitled The 
Characteristics o f  an Entrepreneur Economy in an earlier draft of the General Theory, 
Keynes makes several references to the dependence of the process of production upon the 
relationship between entrepreneur firms, capitalists and workers (Keynes, 1979: 91-2). 
However, Keynes’s conclusion in favour of a monetary analysis of the working of the 
economic system can be further strengthened if we try to make explicit the idea of why 
money matters in property-based societies. The notion of property rights, in its full 
meaning, is the cornerstone of the capitalistic mode of production.
To accomplish this task first we have to go back to Keynes’s Treatise on Money 
where Keynes makes explicit the distinction between a money o f account and a money 
thing/proper (Keynes, 1970: 3-4). A money of account is a description or a title, whereas 
money proper is a thing. For the purpose of clarity we may state that a title could be any 
particular name for a money o f  account in general, i.e. dollar, pound, rouble etc., whereas 
examples of money things could be reserves and currency, demand deposits and private 
bank notes etc. (Wray, 2001: 1). For Keynes, in the Treatise on Money, it is a money o f  
account that is of crucial importance and it ‘is the primary concept of a theory of money’ 
(Keynes, 1970: 3). Keynes’s money o f account, then, ‘comes into existence along with 
debts, which are contracts fo r  deferred payments, and price lists, which are offers o f  
contracts fo r  sale or purchase’ (ibid, emphasis added). Contracts in turn, be they for 
deferred payments or for sale or purchase, become important only in a property-based 
economy.
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Since the concept of the origins of money is not within the scope of our research we 
will limit our analysis to the importance money acquires with the development of private 
property rights during the evolution of capitalism from feudalism.
Heinsohn and Steiger (2000: 68) distinguish three types of mode of production. 
They are associated with: the customary or tribal society; the command or feudal society; 
and the property based society. In the first society the economic process is regulated by 
reciprocity or by putatively altruistic transactions and thus it is of the type of a co­
operative economy where ‘collective efforts’ dominate the economic process.
In the second type of society the economic process is regulated by coercive 
redistribution. If in a feudal society ‘coercive redistribution’ is done by ruling castes or 
aristocracies, in a command economy ‘the nobility is replaced by a proletarian avant- 
garde which maintains the loyalty of unfree peasants and workers by guaranteeing them a 
permanent share of the planned production’ (ibid). The implication of the term ‘coercive 
redistribution’ needs further attention because, as a result of the very method of 
redistribution, property rights are severely weakened in feudal economies, while they are 
non-existent in command economies. Indeed, in one way or another the functioning of 
this society is a mixture of Keynes’s co-operative economy (in which ‘co-operative 
efforts’ dominate) and a neutral entrepreneur economy (in which everything that is 
earned is spent).
The third type of society is dominated by free individuals, in the sense that the 
traditional rules of reciprocity and command are abolished. Heinsohn and Steiger (2000: 
68) argue that it is in this society that the role of various contracts and hence money 
become predominant factors.
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Heinsohn and Steiger (1984: 52) liken the origins of ‘individualistic capitalism’ to 
that of ‘private property’. They argue that creditor-debtor contracts become important 
only in property-based societies. These various types o f contact are crucial in explaining 
the emergence of money as a ‘money of account’ initially and as a ‘thing’ afterwards. 
According to the same authors early traces of a monetary economy can be found in pre- 
feudal property-based societies.
The abolition o f  collective security provided by tribe and estate forces the private proprietor, 
who now suffers from an individualized existential risk — i.e. one essential to his very survival as 
an isolated proprietor -  to work more and harder so that -  in a way as his own debtor -  he 
obtains an individual security or liquidity stock, a collection o f assets in kind which will protect 
him, when unforeseeable large emergencies occur, from indebting him self to other private 
proprietors. At the same time this stock can be lent as credit. ... Thus, at the very beginning.of 
this new economic system the essential elements o f  a monetary economy are embedded -  in 
particular money as liquidity and the rate o f interest as “liquidity prem ium ” (Keynes) and 
completely independent from the fact that creditor-debtor operations at this stage are still made 
in kind. (Heinsohn and Steiger, 1984: 52-3, emphasis in the original)
With the fall of pre-feudal property-based economies and the emergence of a new 
social order, feudalism, ‘the coercive redistribution’ mode of production became 
dominant for more than a thousand years in Europe (Heinsohn and Steiger, 1984: 57). 
During this period property rights as such were weakened and consequently the need for 
mass-scale debtor-creditor relations diminished. As a result, the importance of a money 
of account weakened too. Wray (1990: 8) goes one step further and explains the 
disappearance of banks around the third century A.D. by the same phenomenon. Another
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reason why money became less essential in a feudal economy is that, because of the same 
‘coercive redistribution’ method of production, most of the production was not marketed. 
Wray (op. cit.) admits that although most of the production was fo r  own use, and 
responsibilities were shared by communal organisations, money did not completely 
disappear from a feudal economy:
Even though exchange occurred in feudal society, a monetary economy did not re-emerge until 
feudal society began to disintegrate in the late fourteenth century, when private property (and 
free, but landless, laborers) reappeared. ... In the absence o f  private property, money as a unit o f  
account is unnecessary because the community (or at least a portion o f  the community) is 
responsible for the well-being o f  individuals. Exchange may occur (e.g. the ceremonial 
exchanges o f  tribes), and payments may occur (e.g. the payment o f  a portion o f  the peasant’s 
produce to the lord), but these societies have no need fo r  money. (Wray, 1990: 8, emphasis 
added)
Both Heinsohn and Steiger (1985) and Wray (1990) argue that the importance of 
money as such re-emerged with the development of private property rights and a class of 
propertyless workers during the evolution of the capitalist mode of production. Heinsohn 
and Steiger (1985: 91) call the re-emergence of the importance of money in capitalist 
economies ‘the modern monetary economy.’
The modern monetary economy, however, emerging in XlVth century English agrarian 
capitalism with free  wage-labour, allowed the heavily indebted private proprietors, or those thus 
threatened, to maintain their freedom. Thus, the number o f private owners o f  labour was not 
reduced as in antiquity. Bankruptcy then merely implied a new start, with the pressure to find
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some other source o f  income as a property owner. (Heinsohn and Steiger, 1985:91, emphasis in 
the original)
Wray (1990: 6-7) argues that the earliest money actually was not created to 
facilitate exchange but was created as part of a forward contact after the development of 
private property. According to Heinsohn and Steiger (1989) money and interest were 
developed at the same time -  when private property and futures contracts were 
developed. It follows that, in line with Keynes’s argument in the Treatise on Money, for 
both Wray and Heinsohn and Steiger, a money o f account (not a money proper) is of 
paramount importance in understanding the essence of money in a modern economy. 
Money of account in terms of which contracts, price lists, and debt obligations are 
expressed becomes essential in property-based economies.
Thus, money as an anonymized title to property can be created only in property-based societies.
It is issued in a credit contract in which the creditor establishes a money o f  account as a standard 
o f measurement and valuation. Money proper owes its very existence to the money o f  account. It 
has to be kept in mind that this contractual money o f account has nothing to do with the 
neoclassical unit o f account or numeraire, which refers to a good as the standard. (Heinsohn and 
Steiger, 2000: 97)
Heinsohn and Steiger, and Wray’s argument regarding the emergence of the need 
for money in a property-based mode of production indeed strengthens our understanding 
of the essence of money in the economic process. However, there is still room for a 
caveat in this argument. Below we argue that the term ‘monetary economy’ in Heinsohn 
and Steiger’s use does not necessarily imply Keynes’s representation of this term and that
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the existence of property rights is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
development of a monetary economy in Keynes’s sense.
As became evident Heinsohn and Steiger’s, and Wray’s argument is concentrated 
mostly on the role of money as a money o f  account, which becomes paramount only in 
property-based societies. The implication of this argument then is that property-based 
societies are monetary economies. This is very interesting point because Keynes himself 
in his earlier analysis of this phenomenon seems to be supporting Heinsohn and Steiger’s, 
and Wray’s line of reasoning. In the Treatise on Money Keynes states that 'the age o f  
money had succeeded to the age of barter as soon as men had adopted a money o f  
account’ (Keynes, 1971: 4, emphasis added).
However, these authors do not account for the fact that by emphasising only a 
money o f account function of money they are necessarily acknowledging the role of 
money merely as a convenient tool that would facilitate life in a broader sense. In fact, if 
this is the only reason why money matters, then, indeed money can be seen as a ‘veil’. 
This point is made clear in Keynes’s later works. In one of his articles, while defending 
the General Theory, Keynes makes clear that with all its importance a money o f  account 
cannot expose the reason why money matters in the real world:
Money, it is well known, serves two principal purposes. By acting as a money o f  account, it 
facilitates exchanges without its being necessary that it should ever itself come into the picture 
as a substantive object. In this respect it is a convenience which is devoid o f  significance or real 
influence. In the second place, it is a store o f  wealth. So we are told, without a smile on the face.
But in the world o f  the classical economy, what an insane use to which to put it! For it is a 
recognized characteristic o f money as a store o f wealth that it is barren; whereas practically 
every other form o f  storing wealth yields some interest or profit. Why should anyone outside a
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lunatic asylum wish to use money as a store o f  wealth? (Keynes, 1937a: 215-16, emphasis 
added)
It is clear that at this stage Keynes employs the term ‘money of account’ in a much 
broader sense. Being used as a thing on the spot it directly facilitates exchange of goods, 
and being used as a title in contracts, price lists, and debt obligations it facilitates 
economic life in general. Yet, this still implies that even in its broader sense a money of 
account is only ‘a convenience which is devoid o f  significance or real influence’. Now, 
to paraphrase Keynes, if money of account is the only reason why money matters in our 
lives then ‘we have scarcely emerged from the stage of barter.’
Although the Treatise on Money was a groundwork for the development of 
Keynes’s later monetary theory of production, as we already noted at the beginning of the 
section, it was far from perfect; Keynes himself was already dissatisfied with it. The 
Treatise on Money better explains the question of how and why money acquires its 
importance in a capitalist mode of production. It is very interesting to see how Keynes’s 
ideas regarding the theory of monetary production developed after the Treatise on 
Money, when Keynes’s concern was concentrated more on the question of ‘why money 
mattered’ in a capitalist economy:
An economy, which uses money but uses it merely as a neutral link between transactions in real 
things and real assets and does not allow it to enter into motives or decisions, might be called -  
for want o f a better name -  a real-exchange economy. The theory which I desiderate would deal, 
in contradistinction to this, with an economy in which money plays a part o f  its own and affects 
motives and decisions and is, in short, one o f the operative factors  in the situation, so that the 
course o f events cannot be predicted, either in the long period or in the short, without a
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knowledge o f  the behaviour o f  money between the first state and the last. And it is this which we 
ought to mean when we speak o f  a monetary economy. (Keynes, 1973 a: 408-9, emphasis added)
In Keynes’s monetary economy the role of money is not limited only to facilitating 
economic activity. Money as such becomes a time machine that connects the necessarily 
uncertain future to the present so that it becomes a source of trust, a means of security to 
preserve one’s purchasing power during a period of economic instability and low 
confidence. I f  as a means o f  convenience it facilitates economic activity, as a means o f  
securing purchasing power over time it may actually constrain economic activity (Chick, 
1983: 293). Money affects the decisions and motives of agents and becomes an integral, 
inseparable part in the economic process so that it ‘plays a part of its own’ as one of ‘the 
operative factors in the situation.’
In this sense Keynes monetary theory of production refers to a fully 
commercialised economy. The term commercialisation implies that agents produce for  
the market so that they are not merely ‘interested in’ but rather ‘dependent on ’ selling 
their product in the market (Chandavarkar, 1977: 668). In this respect developed 
countries are fully commercialised and thus are fully monetised (in the sense that the 
transactions that do not include the use of money are of marginal significance).
However, this is not the case in less developed countries (although property rights 
might be well in place in these economies). In the subsistence sector of many industrially 
backward modem day dual economies individuals receive a sizeable part of their income 
in kind and production fo r  own consumption is dominant. Ghosh (1986a; 1986b) argues 
that the savings behaviour in the subsistence sector of the economy is completely 
different from that in a monetised economy. In this sector farmers save, if they can, in
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kind rather than in cash. In this sense, Borpujari (1980: 93) argues that the concepts 
developed to analyse highly monetised economies are not applicable to the analysis of the 
working of the subsistence sector.
Hence at this point it becomes clear that Heinsohn and Steiger, and Wray’s line of 
reasoning does not deal well with the central question of why money matters in the 
capitalist mode of production. However, it explains well the need for the emergence of 
money as such in a capitalist economy. If we take into account the fact that the twentieth 
century capitalism was the ‘playground’ for Keynes’s monetary analysis then we can 
easily perceive that the peculiarity of money in Keynes’s sense is partly due to the 
existence of the well-functioning (not necessarily stable) financial infrastructure in a 
mature capitalist mode of production. This in turn means that money as an institution 
went through its own stages of development.
1.5 Functions of Money, Its Essential Properties and Motives for Holding It
In the previous sections we have discussed the issue of why money matters in a real 
world economy from a more general perspective. In particular, we emphasised three 
essential characteristics of a monetary entrepreneur economy, namely, the future is 
unknowable and thus uncertain in a Knightian sense; the production process takes place 
in an irreversible historical time; and ‘money and contracts are intimately and inevitably 
related’ (Arestis, 1988: 42). In this section we will have a closer look at such general 
notions as the functions of money, its essential properties and motives for holding it.
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1.5.1 Functions and Essential Properties o f  Money
Despite the fact that money is one of the few economic categories most heavily written 
on, its definition still remains disputed. Perhaps the continuing dispute is due to the 
changing nature of money as an institution. There seems to be some consensus, however, 
in defining money according to its functions (Chick, 1992: 144). As a famous quote from 
Hicks states ‘Money is defined by its functions: anything is money which is used as 
money: “money is what money does’” (Hicks, 1967: 1).
Jevons in his classical work Money and the Mechanism o f Exchange (1875: 13-18) 
counts four functions of money. They are a medium of exchange, a common measure of 
value, a standard of value and a store of value. In fact, the second and the third functions 
can be united into a broader function, which Keynes called a money o f  account, and thus 
these four functions are reduced into three basic textbook functions.
Nonetheless, even in this approach some difficulties arise. Although none of the 
functions of money is less important, different authors emphasise different functions of 
money. For instance, Hawkins (2003: 26) emphasises the unit of account and store of 
value functions. For her ‘the medium of exchange is the least important function of 
money’ (ibid). Of course, as we already discussed in pervious sections, the unit of 
account and store of value functions are of great importance in a property-based 
monetary economy in which uncertainty is an inherent feature. However, it would be 
misleading to state that a means of exchange/payment function (or any other function of 
money) is of least importance. For as a generally acceptable means of payment, money, 
due to its impersonal nature, reduces transaction costs and creates favourable conditions
to broaden multilateral trade and thus specialisation in labour (Chick, 1992: 155), all of 
which in turn brings economic efficiency.
Another example is a famous debate between Clower and Shackle. Clower (1971) 
emphasises the medium of exchange function of money and thus advocates to include 
trade credit in the definition of money. Shackle (1971: 32), commenting on Clower’s 
suggestion, insists on a means of payment function of money:
If we are allowed to take the meaning o f payment as known we can, for example, define money 
as the means o f  payment. Then the quantity o f money existing at some moment, the stock o f  
money, can be defined as the means o f strictly simultaneous payment. ... Simultaneity must be 
insisted on here, lest we mix up quantity and velocity. A single coin circulating fast enough can 
carry a payments flow o f  unlimited size. (Shackle, 1971: 32, emphasis in the original)
In this sense Shackle rejects Clower’s suggestion. He argues that trade credit can 
be a medium of exchange but not a means of payment. For when trade credit is extended 
the transaction is not yet completed. There should be another transaction by which the 
credit is to be discharged. Hence, trade credit does not complete the transaction, rather it 
postpones the payment for a later period. In Shackle’s analysis the emphasis is on the 
time horizon (Chick, 1992: 146). Because time is not involved, exchange is 
instantaneous in the case of money. Meanwhile credit involves time; payment is delayed 
and the transaction is not fully completed.
The instantaneity characteristic of money in exchange can be helpful in determining 
the stock of money at a particular point in time. However, if we emphasise merely the 
instantaneity feature, then we can note that money reduces uncertainty over the
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transactions across space only. In this regard, this approach fails to capture the finance 
feature of money (not necessarily of credit), which necessitates the involvement of time. 
The finance feature of money allows postponement of purchase until the disquietude 
surrounding a particular transaction is faded away; as a ‘time machine’ money preserves 
the purchasing power for a later period, thus reducing uncertainty across time and space 
(Dow, 1993: 20). Moreover, as Chick (1992: 130) puts it, ‘It is in the financial sphere 
that Keynes differs from the quantitative theory, and for a purpose -  to refute Say’s law.’
Leaving different emphasis aside we will opt for a broader definition of money. We 
define as perfectly liquid any asset that has a stable value and is readily exchangeable for 
all goods as money (Dow, 1998:9). In fact, this approach does not contradict the 
approach of defining money according to its functions. For an asset is a good store of 
value only if it has a stable value. And if it has a stable value, and thus is a good store of 
value, then it follows that it is also a good unit of account and thus it is accepted as a 
generally accepted means of payment (ibid: 10).
Once money is defined by one way or another there is a further need to clarify what 
item can serve as money, i.e. what kind of qualities it must possess. For instance, Jevons 
(1875: 31) reckons that money must have the following qualities: utility and value, 
portability, indestructibility (durability in modem terminology), homogeneity, 
divisibility, stability of value, and cognisablity. According to Chick (1992: 147) this list 
of qualities (along with the relative inelasticity of supply and the like, as will be discussed 
later in this section) is the ‘only non-circular approach’ to predicting which asset will 
ultimately be chosen as money. Of course, some of these qualities have technical, while 
others have theoretical and fundamental importance. Since the utility and value, and
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stability of value characteristics of money have a direct relevance to the notions of 
liquidity preference and endogenous money supply we would like to devote some time to 
exploring them in more detail.
Let’s start with the utility and value characteristics. Jevons believed that any 
substance that does not have its own utility and value could not serve as money. He also 
did not believe in government’s role o f ‘writing the dictionary’.
The essential point is that people should be induced to receive money, and pass it 
on freely at steady ratios of exchange for other objects; but there must always be some 
sufficient reason first inducing people to accept the money. The force of habit, 
convention, or legal enactment may do much to maintain money in circulation when once 
it is afloat, but it is doubtful whether the most powerful government could oblige its 
subjects to accept and circulate as money a worthless substance which they had no other 
motive for receiving. (Jevons, 1875: 32)
To make our counter-argument clear, perhaps, it is necessary to distinguish between 
the Metalist and Chartalist approaches to money at this point. In line with Goodhart’s 
definition (see Wray, 2000b) let us refer to Metalist approach as the M-form approach 
and to the Chartalist approach as the C-form approach. In a nutshell, according to the M- 
form approach money was invented to facilitate exchange. The natural search for a 
unique specie -  difficult to produce and easy to carry -  that would serve as money, 
eventually led the precious metals, and later representative paper money, to be chosen as 
a generally acceptable means of payment. The further distinction of this approach is that 
at the initial stage money’s value was determined by the value of the metal it was made 
from. Even paper money, introduced later, was backed by some sort of precious metals or
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other valuables. ‘It is only much later that evil governments came along and duped the 
public into accepting a fiat money with no backing’ (Wray, 2000b: 1).
The C-form approach5 emphasises the role of government in the evolution of 
money. To put it succinctly, according to this approach the State determines what thing 
should serve as money, i.e. in Keynes’s terminology the State not only ‘writes the 
dictionary’ but also may decide to ‘re-edit’ it from time to time. How can the historical 
existence of full-bodied money be explained? Wouldn’t the kingdoms of earlier times be 
better off in choosing the cheapest possible metal, abundant in supply and easiest to 
produce, as money? Goodhart (1975: 10-11) explains the issue as follows. If the supply 
of the metal used in the production of money was plentiful and the techniques for 
stamping the emblem of power of the state on currency were crude and easy, then to 
prevent forgers from counterfeiting coins it would be necessary to raise measures of 
punishment. Since in earlier times the power of kingdoms was weak geographically, the 
task of continuous high vigilance to catch forgers across the entire country was far from 
attainable. As a corollary, in these circumstances money ‘created’ in this way would fail 
to become a generally acceptable means of payment.
The evidence for Goodhart’s argument can be found in one of the most ancient 
analytical works in human history - the Arthasastra of Kautilya. Debasement and 
counterfeiting of coins is perhaps as old as metal coins themselves. Shastri (1999: 495), 
based on the Arthasastra, reports that until the Kautilyan state (circa third-second 
century BC) was sufficiently strong, the fraudulent activities of counterfeiters of coins 
remained unchecked. It was only after ‘the establishment of a major empire covering a
5 The term is used in a broader sense here and includes the neo-Chartalism (or nC-form) as discussed in 
Wray (2000b).
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large portion of the Indian sub-continent brought about a great change in the outlook of 
political economists who naturally saw a great danger in the activities of economic 
criminals and took necessary steps to counter them, forgers of coins being one such’ 
(Shastri, 1999: 495).
Hence, the use of gold or other precious metals in earlier times can only explain 
how the general acceptability of money might have been ‘established prior to the 
development of the well-organised sovereign national states of modem times’ (Lemer, 
1947: 313). It is in this sense that Keynes (1971: 4) argues that today ‘all civilised money 
is, beyond the possibility of dispute, chartalist’ and thus the right to create money ‘is 
claimed by all modern States and has been so claimed for some four thousand years at 
least.’
All that we have said so far on the C-form approach means that the central 
argument is built upon the notion of legal tender laws. However, as Lemer clarifies, this 
is not sufficient:
It is true that a simple declaration that such and such is money will not do, even if  backed by the 
most convincing constitutional evidence o f  the state’s absolute sovereignty. But if  the state is 
willing to accept the proposed money in payment o f  taxes and other obligations to itself the trick 
is done. (Lemer, 1947: 313)
Hence, the fact is that the state not only announces what the legal tender is, but also 
requires that the levies, fees, fines and taxes imposed be paid in the legal tender it 
declares. As the power of the state increases the share of these payments in total income 
is also expected to increase. As a consequence, it becomes ‘a reason for employing the
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same money in private transactions’ (Goodhart, 1975: 11). In this respect Lemer (1947: 
314) argues that before the tax-collecting function of the state was strong, the best it 
could do was to tie its currency to gold or other precious metals, which had their own 
stable value.
It is obvious that in this approach the value of money is not related to the substance 
it is made from. As Keynes puts it, ‘money is the measure of value, but to regard it as 
having value itself is a relic of the view that the value of money is regulated by the value 
of the substance o f which it is made, and is like confusing a theatre ticket with the 
performance’ (Keynes, 1983: 402). The theatre ticket is valuable because it entitles the 
holder to watch the performance, not because it is made from a precious substance. The 
same logic applies to a modem money.
To put it briefly the ‘tax-driven money’ paradigm is the central feature of the C- 
form approach.6 However, this approach has its shortcomings too. For example, 
Davidson (2000) notes that if trust in the ability of the government to enforce contracts 
falls then agents accept the ‘state’ money only to pay taxes. Other stable currencies or 
even barter exchange may be used for private transactions. Another case that weakens 
this argument to a considerable extent is the example the Scottish Monetary-Banking 
System, the evolution of which did not require any substantial involvement from the 
State. Last but not least, the currency of local exchange trading systems, first developed 
in Canada and now widely used in many countries, performs the functions of money but 
is not used to pay taxes and levies. (See Dow, 1998: 13.)
6 Although Wray (2000b: 4) notes that the modem Post Keynesian view on money is actually based on this 
approach, many representatives o f  this school would not necessarily agree with him. For example, please 
see Davidson (2000) and Dow (1998).
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It is also important to note that the ‘tax-driven money’ approach partly explains the 
emergence of industrial barter ‘woes’ in the post-soviet economy of Russia. Sutela 
(2001: 4) states that in the late 1990s about half of the industrial production in Russian 
economy was based on barter. He argues that this highly pathological phenomenon is 
partly due to the inability of the government to collect taxes in monetary form. (The 
regional and local governments sometimes collect taxes in kind.) Therefore, he suggests 
that the government cannot overcome the situation unless it declines to accept anything 
but money in tax collection.
While the certain characteristics, which we discussed above, explain well why a 
particular asset becomes widely acceptable as money, there is still one more 
characteristic, no less important than any other, yet to be mentioned. It is confidence. As 
Chick (1992: 146) puts it, ‘Money relies on confidence -  confidence in its continued 
acceptability by virtually everyone in the economy.’ The value of money, among other 
things, partly depends on the general public’s confidence in it. In fact the entire financial 
system is built upon the notion of confidence. Dow (1998: 22) elegantly shows that the 
whole financial system can be seen as an inverted pyramid (Figure 1.5.1 below), built 
upon the confidence in outside money, held as reserves in the central bank by commercial 
banks.
The distinction between outside and inside money, originally made by Gurley and 
Shaw (1970: 72-73), is as follows. Inside money is both an asset and liability of the 
private sector, whereas outside money is only an asset for it. Outside money may be a 
pure assets (such as gold) or an asset that is the liability of the government (Dow, 1998:
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23). For instance, while the fiat money of the central bank and gold can be classified as 
outside money, bank deposits can be classified as inside money.
Figure 1.5.1. Outside Money and the Financial Superstructure
Bank
Deposits
NBFI Deposits
NBFI Reserves
Bank Reserves with the 
Central B ank-the
Outside Money
As a rule, commercial banks hold their reserves with the central bank, whereas the 
non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFI) hold their reserves with the commercial banks. 
The expansion of the pyramid in Figure 1.5.1 can be understood as financial 
development. As the advancement of the financial sector continues inside money starts 
performing the role of money; more liabilities of the NBFIs will be treated as money 
(Dow, 1998: 23). Loss of trust in outside money may put the general public’s confidence 
in the whole financial sector in jeopardy.
Now, once we realise that both a commodity money system and a paper money 
system are built upon the notion of confidence in the value of a particular item that serves 
as money, it is easy to conceive why its value must be stable. However, we should also
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bear in mind that the concept of stability o f  value of paper money or even the 
‘invariability of the value of the precious metals’, the concept central in Ricardo’s 
analysis (Dobb, 1973: 77), is a relative notion. The truth is that money’s value may 
fluctuate but still prices are more stable in terms of money than in terms of any other 
producible asset (Keynes, 1970).
In the General Theory Keynes (1970: 230-232) argued that whatever that is used as 
money must have the following characteristics. First, and foremost, it must have a zero 
(or a very small) elasticity o f  production both in the long period and in the short period. 
A zero elasticity of production means that when demand for money increases, additional 
labour cannot be employed to increase its supply. At the same time, Keynes also warned 
that ‘even though the quantity of money cannot be increased by diverting labour into 
producing it, nevertheless an assumption that its effective supply is rigidly fixed  would be 
inaccurate’ (Keynes, 1970: 233, emphasis added).
While discussing the same characteristic, Davidson (1972: 109) further clarified 
that the private sector can create money endogenously, i.e. creation of bank liabilities, 
provided that (i) these liabilities are denominated in terms of the monetary unit, (ii) there 
exists developed clearing arrangements and (iii) assurance that liabilities are converted 
into the enforceable medium of exchange at a known parity. Davidson (ibid) also stresses 
that since this process does not require the use of real resources, it does not directly 
increase employment of labour.7 Depending upon ‘what the increment in bank money is 
used for’ (ibid: 112), newly created ‘bank money’ can affect employment only indirectly.
7 As was noted by Chick (1983: 299) the process ‘does not contribute to aggregate income, except to the 
extent o f the services o f the engravers, printers and merchant bankers, the latter o f  which market the 
“product”’ (Chick, 1983: 299).
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It will create jobs only if ‘it moves ... into the “industrial circulation” where it will be 
used to accept offer contracts for new production’ (ibid).
Now, assuming that ‘the ability of the private sector to create bank money’ refers to 
endogenous money creation by the private sector, we can suggest that the concept of low 
elasticity of production of money, which emphasises the stability of the value of the 
currency, and the concept of money supply endogeneity have different meanings, but do 
not necessarily contradict to each other. Bearing this distinction in mind, when we 
discuss the degree of money supply endogeneity in the next chapter, we will refer to the 
ability of the private sector to create money endogenously under different conditions.
Second, money must have a zero (or nearly zero) elasticity o f  substitution for 
liquidity purposes between liquid assets and producible goods (See also Davidson, 1994: 
94-95). It means that as the price of money relative to other goods rises (due to higher 
demand for it as a store of value) individuals do not use other producible assets as a 
substitute for money to store their wealth. The third characteristic of money, noted by 
Davidson (1978: 145), is that ‘the cost of transferring money from the medium of 
exchange function to the store of value function or vice versa must be zero (or 
negligible)’ (ibid).
In describing money’s special features and distinguishing it from other assets 
Keynes also uses the portfolio choice for holding money. Indeed, this approach helps to 
explain money’s ‘relative desirability compared to other assets’ (Hawkins, 2003: 29) and 
thus assists to expose its ‘peculiarity’. The natural start in portfolio analysis is the 
identification of the rates of return agents expect from holding money or any other 
particular asset. The net benefit to be received from holding an asset can be identified
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through analysis of three main elements (Keynes, 1970: 225-227). i) An asset can 
produce a yield, q. It can be either in the form of a flow of income to be received from 
the sale of its product or in the form of direct satisfaction an individual enjoys from its 
services, ii) Irrespective of the fact whether they are used for productive purposes or not, 
the original quality of most assets deteriorates through the mere passage of time. 
Therefore, the maintenance and preservation of their quality involve some carrying costs, 
c. iii) Furthermore, the power of disposal over an asset may offer individuals ‘a potential 
convenience and security’ (ibid). The amount individuals are willing to pay for ‘the 
power of disposal’ of an asset Keynes calls a liquidity premium, I.
Liquidity premium refers to the marketability of an asset (Chick, 1983: 298), ‘the 
ease with which an asset can be exchanged for other assets’ (Dow, 1998: 10). The ease 
of marketability or exchangeability of an asset, then, depends upon the degree of market 
organisation. The higher is the degree of market organisation for a particular asset, the 
more liquid it gets. However, institutional arrangements are not the only criterion in 
determining the degree of liquidity of an asset, the notion of ‘perceived risk of capital 
loss’ (ibid) also plays an important role.
Thus in a nutshell, the total benefit expected from owning an asset over some 
specified period can be written as
q-c+l.
Since q, c and I are in terms of ‘own rates,’ there is a need for a common standard 
of measurement to convert these ‘own-rates’ into a comparable unit. If money is used as 
a standard of account in this connection, then, the factor a indicates expected appreciation
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(or depreciation) o f an asset in terms of money. ‘The reason money seems a natural 
choice as a numeraire is also the source of an aspect of liquidity not exhibited by other 
assets, deriving from money’s function as the medium of exchange’ (Chick, 1983: 305, 
emphasis in the original). Thus a+l gives us ‘the more common definition of liquidity: 
the ease of conversion into money without loss’ (ibid: 298, emphasis added).
Consumer goods or capital assets may yield some positive return in terms of the 
services they render or marketable output they produce. As described above, the 
maintenance and upkeep of these assets does involve some carrying costs but, in general, 
the return they yield usually exceeds the carrying cost they incur. The issue of the 
liquidity of an asset is a different matter. An asset’s liquidity varies depending on the 
nature of the asset and the degree of market organisation for it.
As to money, it is ‘barren’; it yields no explicit return. However, money’s carrying 
costs are negligible and it is the most liquid of all assets. Money’s liquidity premium 
exceeds its carrying costs and thus ‘zY is only in having the former high relatively to the 
latter that peculiarity o f  “money” consists' (Keynes, 1970: 239, emphasis added). Even 
though money cannot compete with other assets in terms of the explicit yield it earns, 
individuals still hold it simply because of its liquidity, exchangeability for other goods. 
However, the concept of liquidity is a probabilistic matter. Since prices of goods in terms 
of money vary, the exchange value of money also varies. Thus we cannot talk of money 
as an absolutely liquid asset (Chick, 1983: 302). Keynes (1970: 240), too, acknowledges 
that the scale of liquidity may change from time to time depending upon social practices 
and institutions.
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Thus the most liquid of all assets is money, which serves as a unit of account, a 
means of payment and a store of value. A particular form of money remains important in 
the economic process as long as confidence in it is maintained (Hawkins, 2003: 25). 
Therefore, during a period of low confidence regarding the uncertain future, people hold 
the most liquid asset, which as we have seen by definition is money.
1.5.2 Motives fo r  Holding Money
Keynes in the General Theory (1970) considers three motives for holding money, 
namely, transactions, precautionary and speculative motives. According to Hicks (1967) 
this ‘triad’ explains ‘why money is required’ and it ‘fits together’ with the second ‘triad’,
i.e. three functions of money.
The transaction motive is associated with ‘the need of cash for the current 
transactions of personal and business exchanges’ (Keynes, 1970: 170). Households and 
businesses make some of their money spending on a regular basis within their income 
period. These expenditures range from contractual payments to basic spending on food 
and other goods of primary necessity. Because of the routine nature of these 
expenditures, the transaction demand for money is highly predictable. Moreover, since 
transaction balances are held ‘to bridge the interval between the receipt of income and its 
disbursement’ (ibid: 195), the agents can ‘be described as willing to run [their] 
transactions balances down to zero by the end o f the income period’ (Chick, 1983: 195, 
emphasis added). Chick (ibid) also notes that even though transactions balances are held 
idle for a short period of time within the income period, they are not counted as savings.
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This line of reasoning then implies that the transaction motive has no particular 
connection with uncertainty (Runde, 1994).
The precautionary demand for cash is associated with optimistic expectations 
regarding the possible future ‘bargains’, as well as pessimistic expectations concerning 
unpredictable contingencies. Precautionary balances are held ‘to provide for 
contingencies requiring sudden expenditure and for unforeseen opportunities of 
advantageous purchases’ (Keynes, 1970: 196). One of the distinguishing features of 
these balances from transactions balances is that they are not spent in the same income 
period in which they are accumulated and thus can be classified as ‘saving’ when they are 
accumulated and ‘dissaving’ when they are spent (Chick, 1983: 195-6). As to the 
speculative motive, the reason for agents to hold speculative balances, Keynes explains, 
is to secure ‘profit from knowing better than the market what the future will bring forth’ 
(Keynes, 1970: 170).
Uncertainty about the course of future events is a necessary condition for both the 
precautionary motive and the speculative motive. However, this condition ought to be 
explained two different ways (Runde, 1994 and Dow, 1996b).
The decision to hold or not to hold money on speculative grounds requires certainty 
equivalence (Dow, 1996b: 39). In other words, ‘speculators do not choose particular 
levels of speculative balances because they are uncertain about future price movements. 
They do so because they regard future price movements in one direction as more 
probable than in the other’ (Runde, 1994: 134). For example, speculative demand for 
money rises when speculators act as if they know for sure that the return on alternative 
assets, discounted by risk, will be low. Speculators’ decision to hold money reflects their
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belief that expected return on alternative assets, discounted for risk, is low, not that 
money’s liquidity premium is high (Dow, 1996b).
In the meantime, the desire to hold precautionary balances is the direct consequence 
of having low confidence in expectations about the future. In other words, agents are 
uncertain about the direction of future price movements. Therefore, in order to avoid any 
capital losses, agents hold their wealth in money. The reason for holding precautionary 
balances, then, is explained by the fact that the liquidity premium offered by money 
exceeds the expected return offered by alternative assets, discounted for risk. This in turn 
means that ‘it is precautionary demand, rather than speculative demand, which is the 
barometer o f the degree of uncertainty’ Dow (1996b: 39).
In his post-General Theory writings Keynes (1937a, 1937b, and 1937c) develops 
the fourth motive for holding money, namely, the finance motive. Unfortunately, the 
introduction of this motive becomes the centre of further controversy among the 
academics. Davidson in several instances (1965, 1978, 1994, etc.) argues that the finance 
motive is the further development of the transactions motive, which, according to him, 
was misspecified in the General Theory. Chick (1983: 198) argues that it is not 
necessarily so, and the finance motive represents the fourth motive for holding money. 
She states that there was a communication failure between him and his critics. For while 
Keynes, in his writings, had in mind the demand to hold money, Ohlin meant demand for 
credit. According to Chick the finance motive is different from other motives ‘in that it is 
not a motive for retaining income and holding it in the form of cash (which if held for 
more than an income period is a kind of ‘saving’) but for money to hold temporarily in 
anticipation of exceptional spending’ (Chick, 1983: 199).
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It was also suggested that while the transaction motive refers to holding money, the 
finance motive refers to borrowing money (Hawkins, 2003: 28). The fact is that the 
demand for additional finance arises only when the investment activity is optimistically 
increased and therefore should be seen only as a temporary phenomenon (Bibow, 1995: 
664). In this respect, banks become essential in providing the necessary liquidity for 
entrepreneurs to carry on with their investment plans. ‘This means that, in general, the 
banks hold the key position in the transition from a lower to a higher scale of activity’ 
(Keynes, 1937c: 668).
However, the question of whether banks always choose ‘to make finance available’ 
(Keynes, 1937b: 248) is a different issue. Keynes noted that the finance motive, as a 
temporary demand for money, puts upward pressure on the interest rate provided that the 
state of liquidity preference of the banking system remains unchanged (Keynes, 1937c: 
667).
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we examined several important issues that are of paramount importance 
for our future analysis. We discussed methodological and theoretical issues concerning 
the monetary analysis of a market economy. A property-based market economy is an 
incentive-driven, decentralised system in which production takes time and the future is 
uncertain. Uncertainty and historical time in turn explain not only the importance of 
money but also its peculiar character in the economic process.
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The functioning of a market economy depends upon successful operation of 
institutions and social conventions, which enable millions of autonomous agents to 
cooperate in equal terms. Time consuming nature of production implies that in order to 
protect themselves against uncertainty, agents need to have an agreement of cooperation 
that secures their rights. In this sense, labour contracts, debt instruments, and price lists 
introduce an element of certainty to an uncertain environment and thus facilitate the 
functioning of a market economy. In other words, social institutions are essential in 
reducing uncertainty and establishing an attractive environment for mutually-beneficial 
cooperation amongst millions of autonomous entrepreneurs and households.
What is more important is that money and these institutions are necessarily and 
inevitably related. It is because contracts and price lists are specified and obligations and 
exchanges are discharged in money. This shows why money is an important and integral 
part of the economic process in a market economy, which Keynes calles a monetary 
production economy. We also showed that this type of economic organisation takes shape 
only in societies where private property rights are well defined and protected.
The characteristic of facilitating economic activity is not the only reason why 
money is peculiar in a market economy. Money offers liquidity that no other asset can 
do; it has stable value and is immediately exchangeable for all tradable goods and 
services. As a result, agents use money as a convenient tool to deal with their concern 
and disquietude regarding the uncertain future. Analysis of the motives for holding 
money showed that fluctuation of effective demand during the time of increased 
uncertainty is most likely to occur due to the precautionary demand for money. As 
uncertainty increases, agents use money as a means of transferring purchasing power
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over time, which translates into lower demand for goods and services. This shows that 
money can also play a constraining role in the economic process by causing fluctuations 
in effective demand. The implication of this conclusion is that the real world monetary 
economies are inherently unstable.
When reaching these conclusions, however, we did not pay any particular attention 
to the institutional development of a market economy. The fact is that in an advanced 
market economy with a mature banking sector, banks can create credit endogenously. In 
other words, in modern-day market economies the supply of money is endogenous. Now, 
the question of whether money and liquidity preference associated with it can retain 
constraining tendency under the conditions of endogenous money creation will be 
discussed in the next chapter. In addition, when discussing the possibility of fluctuations 
in effective demand in the current chapter, we did not explain the transmission 
mechanism of the process in detail. This issue will also be discussed in the next chapter.
2. Endogenous Money, the Rate of Interest and Liquidity Preference
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we discussed the role and importance of money in a modem 
market economy, which can also be seen as a property-based decentralised system. 
The importance o f money in the economic process is explained by the fact that the 
successful functioning o f this system depends upon labour contracts, price lists, and 
debt instruments, which are denominated in money. This means that as a unit o f 
account money facilitates the economic process. At the same time, the discussion of 
the nature and characteristics of money revealed that as a generally acceptable asset 
and a good store of value, money can offer its holder liquidity that no other asset can 
match. Surprisingly enough, the very same quality of money explains why effective 
demand is prone to fluctuations. That is to say, during the times of increased 
uncertainty agents hold money and postpone their spending decisions. As a result, 
effective demand goes down and this negatively affects output and employment 
prospects.
Now, to avoid unnecessary complexity, in Chapter 1 we did not make any 
explicit reference to the way money was created in a market economy. The fact is that 
in modem market economies money is created endogenously in response to changes 
in demand. Hence, this chapter can be seen as the natural extension of the previous 
chapter in that it deals with the issue of endogenous money creation by the private 
sector, the banking sector being the core of the analysis. By complementing the 
analysis of the previous chapter, the discussion of this chapter gives us an opportunity 
to evaluate differences in the nature and characteristics of money and the process of
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money creation in two different economic systems, i.e. a market economy and a 
centrally planned economy. This will be very important in understanding the complex 
nature of transition process.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 we will briefly discuss the 
main arguments o f two alternative Post Keynesian views on the degree o f credit 
endogeneity. In Section 2.3 we will address the question of whether the theory of 
liquidity preference is valid under the conditions of endogenous money creation. In 
addition, we will show that the supply of credit is not always fully accommodating. In 
Section 2.4 we will discuss importance of liquidity preference in determining the rate 
of interest and thus setting the pace o f investment. We will also look at the 
interactions of the money and credit markets and give more detailed analysis of the 
process of credit creation. Finally, in Section 2.5 we will summarise main findings of 
the chapter.
2.2 The Concept of Endogenous Money in Post Keynesian Thought
The orthodox neoclassical school treats, sometimes explicitly and sometimes 
implicitly, the supply of money as exogenously determined by the authorities. 
Although the modem orthodoxy recognises some degree of endogeneity in money 
supply (e.g. variations o f money supply within the range o f the multiplier due to 
portfolio decisions of the private sector, etc., see Cottrell, 1994), they retain, in 
general, the idea that the monetary authorities are capable o f exogenously changing 
the supply of money if and when they wish to do so. Thus the textbook vertical 
money supply curve is seen as a simplified approximation of this view.
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In contrast to the neoclassical orthodoxy, Post Keynesians argue that the supply 
of money is endogenously demand determined. As the Post Keynesian literature on 
monetary economics developed, the concept of endogenous money creation became 
known as the trademark o f this school of thought. In this view the concept of 
endogeneity of the money supply has a much broader meaning. Demand pressures for 
finance emerging endogenously within the private sector are seen as the essential 
determinants of fluctuations in the money supply and thus the availability of credit 
(Pollin, 1991: 366).
Initially inspired by Keynes, Post Keynesians stress that a modem capitalist 
economy is a monetary entrepreneur economy, not a cooperative or neutral economy 
where money is seen just as a neutral link between transactions and thus has no 
significance of its own. Therefore, Post Keynesians believe that a new, 
fundamentally different, approach, ‘not just an amendment, no matter how drastic, of 
orthodox economics’ (Carvalho, 1995: 18), is necessary to understand the working of 
a monetary economy. Hence, the Post Keynesian school employs a different 
approach, a different method and mode of thought to analyse the working of the real 
world economic process and consequently draws different conclusions. As these 
methodological issues were already discussed to some extent in Chapter 1, here we 
would like to note two fundamental issues that have direct relevance to the notions of 
liquidity preference and endogenous money. The first point, put forward by Minsky 
(1982), is that the capitalist mode of production is inherently unstable and thus the 
assumption of private sector stability, upon which orthodox theory is built, is in fact 
flawed (Dow, 1993: 28). The second point, a natural extension o f the first, is that 
cyclical movement rather than stability is seen as a norm for a monetary economy; 
‘there is no need therefore to identify any one cause of stability’ (ibid.: 38). As will
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be discussed later in our analysis, these two concepts play an important role in 
understanding o f the working of modem economies.
Although the issue of non-neutrality of money in the economic process is 
widely accepted within the Post Keynesian literature, there is a disagreement with 
regard to the degree o f the endogeneity of the money supply. Usually two different 
approaches are distinguished -  the accommodationist view and the structuralist view 
(Pollin, 1991). Sometimes these approaches are labelled as the horizontalist view and 
the endogenous liquidity preference view respectively. (See Moore, 1988, and 
Hawkins, 2003.) While Kaldor (1986), Moore (1988) and Lavoie (1984) are 
considered to be the major contributors of the former approach, Dow and Dow
(1989), Dow (1996c, 1997, 1998), Chick and Dow (2002), Davidson (1978), Wray
(1990), Rousseas (1992) are seen to be the influential contributors to the latter 
approach.
As was noted above, there is no dispute between these approaches on general 
notions. Both approaches share the concept of ‘loans make deposits and deposits 
make money’. Thus, in general, the Post Keynesian approach emphasises the finance 
feature of money creation. These two approaches also share the view that the supply 
of credit is endogenously determined by private sector financial institutions in 
response to demand pressures and that ‘in the real world banks extend credit, creating 
deposits in the process, and look for the reserves later’ (Holmes, 1969 in Pollin, 1991: 
367).
The disagreement, however, seems to arise concerning the degree of 
endogeneity o f the money supply. The horizontalists (e.g. Kaldor, 1986 and Moore, 
1988) accept complete endogeneity of the supply of money. Kaldor and Moore’s 
argument is built upon the following notions (Dow, 1996c: 498). First, the modem
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banking sector is capable of innovating new financial instruments. It can be so much 
so that, as captured in Goodhart’s Law, if  the monetary authorities attempt to control 
any particular monetary aggregate, the banking sector creates new financial 
instruments or starts using the existing ones more efficiently than before in response 
to this policy. As a result, the monetary authorities cannot establish full control over 
the supply of money. This makes monetary targeting an ineffective policy tool.
Second, the successful working of the entire financial system depends on how 
much trust people put in the banking system. Since the NBFIs keep their reserves 
with the commercial banks, banks play a special role in the financial system; the loss 
of confidence in the banking system automatically spills over to the NBFI sector and 
thus the entire inverted pyramid of the financial system collapses. ‘Precisely because 
the monetary authorities cannot afford the disastrous consequences o f a collapse of 
the banking system’ (Kaldor, 1986: 47), the central bank, as a lender o f last resort, 
supplies confidence to the system by pumping in reserves when needed. Third, 
because of the very nature of the overdraft system and lines o f credit, banks 
themselves may not be in a position to control the supply of credit.
Furthermore, another distinguishing feature of this view is that while the 
authorities cannot control the supply of money, what they can control is the rate of 
interest. No market force plays a role in the determination of the base interest rate; it 
is determined bureaucratically (Lavoie, 1996: 278). The horizontalists retain 
Keynes’s interest rate transmission mechanism. However, since they view the supply 
of money as fully accommodating and the rate of interest exogenously determined by 
the authorities, they declare the liquidity preference theory of interest rate 
determination as irrelevant to the modem financial system. As Kaldor put it, ‘once 
we realise that the supply of money is endogenous (it varies automatically with the
55
demand, at a given rate of interest), ‘liquidity preference’ ... ceases to be important’ 
(Kaldor, 1986: xvii.). From the other point of view, they suggest that the concept of 
low elasticity o f money supply refers to commodity money, not to credit-money and 
thus should also be abandoned (Moore, 1988: 8). While we may leave the discussion 
of the compatibility of liquidity preference and bank-created money to the next 
section, below we will show that the concept of low elasticity of money supply is not 
alien to the environment o f endogenous money creation.
First o f all, despite its innovative ability to create credit on demand, the private 
sector can expand the supply of money endogenously only during an economic boom. 
But the problem is that ‘the incentive, the profitability of expanding money and credit 
or creating new financial institutions, is absent in a slump, when it is most needed’ 
(ibid.: 308). Thus, the notion o f perfect elasticity, rather than low elasticity, o f money 
supply seems to be improperly specified.
Second, the central banks’ ability to maintain the most liquid characteristic of 
money is the most important factor in understanding why it still remains desirable to 
hold money under conditions of endogenous credit creation (Hawkins, 2003: 32). The 
reason why the liquidity status o f money is not affected (at least not sharply), even 
when the financial institutions have ‘the incentive’ and thus willingness to create 
credit during the upswing, is that the expansion of the supply of money during this 
period occurs in response to the needs of investment, employment and thus output 
growth. Therefore, the credit created endogenously in response to effective demand 
does not cause the problem of sharp1 depreciation of the value of the national 
currency.
1 The absolute invariability o f  the value o f  money is not a question we are emphasising here. Rather the 
emphasis is on the relativity o f  the depreciation o f  the value o f  the currency. Indeed, as Minsky (1982) 
showed the banking system w ill not always expand credit to finance productive investment projects,
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In fact, arguments put forward by horizontalists do not necessarily imply a 
perfectly elastic money supply curve (Dow, 1996c: 498). Representation o f their 
view as a horizontal supply curve is rather a rough approximation and thus the direct 
consequence of a dualistic approach inherited from the neoclassical school (Chick and 
Dow, 2002: 588). In this regard the conditional endogeneity view2 takes a middle 
ground. In this view both the central bank’s accommodative functions as a lender of 
last resort and the commercial banks’ innovative capabilities are duly recognised. 
Moreover, the proponents o f this approach agree that the base rate may be determined 
by the monetary authorities (at least in the short run) and the mark-up over the base 
rate is the business left for the commercial banks to decide. Their opinion diverges 
from that of the horizontalists with regard to the fluctuations o f the mark-up over the 
base rate. The conditional endogeneity approach stresses the liquidity preference of 
the entire financial system. Thus they argue that since the liquidity preference of the 
banking sector, as well as the other economic groups, is not stable, neither is the 
mark-up over the base rate. They suggest that since the changes in the state o f the 
liquidity preference o f the banking sector are counter-cyclical, so must be the mark-up 
over the base rate. Indeed, Rousseas’s (1992: 57-59) empirical observation of the US 
economy covering the period starting from 1955 to 1990 confirms that the mark-up 
over the base rate changes counter-cyclically. Hence the opponents of the conditional 
endogeneity view argue that the money supply curve might be horizontal to start with 
but as the liquidity preference of the banking system increases, reflecting the
rather at times bank credit extended to the private sector based on euphoria or overoptimism might in 
fact be used for speculative purposes.
Since the critique o f  all existing views within the Post Keynesian literature is not the task o f  this 
research, we w ill use the term conditional endogeneity in a much broader sense to include structuralist 
view (as in Pollin, 1991) and liquidity preference view ( as in Hawkins, 2003). Furthermore, as more 
emphasis will be put on the notion o f  liquidity preference, starting from the next section the terms 
conditional endogeneity view and liquidity preference view will be used interchangeably.
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increased perceived risk of lenders, the shape of the supply curve might become 
steeper and steeper and at its extremity may even become vertical (Dow, 1995 and 
Hawkins, 2003).
In another version of conditional endogeneity (Arestis and Howells, 1996) the 
graphical representation o f the concept of endogeneity is criticised. According to this 
view the endogenous approach differs from the exogenous one in that it treats money 
as a flow, rather than a stock, concept in its analysis. Therefore, the graphical tools 
designed for stock analysis are inappropriate to flow analysis of the endogenous 
approach. They argue that the money supply curve should be understood as a curve 
sloping upwards but moving rightwards as time passes. The problem with this view, 
however, is that eventually, in the long run, ‘[t]his path approximates horizontal 
money supply curve’ (Chick and Dow, 2002: 588).
In our analysis we will emphasise the liquidity preference endogenous money 
approach (liquidity preference view for short), which views the degree o f endogeneity 
of money supply as conditioned upon the state of the liquidity preference o f the 
economic system as a whole in general and of the banking system in particular.
2.3 Liquidity Preference in the Endogenous Money Approach
At the beginning o f this chapter we addressed the issue of how the horizontalists view 
the process of interest rate determination under the conditions o f money supply 
endogeneity. In this section we will argue that the concepts o f bank-created money 
and liquidity preference are compatible with each other and these factors, as well as 
the monetary authorities, play a crucial role in the process of interest rate 
determination. This in turn shows that the liquidity preference approach to money
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supply endogeneity is in line with Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference. Indeed, as 
will become evident from our discussion below, this approach is a further 
development of Keynes’s theory.
We will begin our analysis from the basics, i.e. the treatment of money in Post 
Keynesian thought. At the beginning of this chapter we already mentioned that the 
Post Keynesian analysis of money supply endogeneity was based on ‘credit-generated 
money’. Since the terms credit and credit-generated money are sometimes conflated 
in many Post Keynesian writings we need to make the distinction between these two 
terms clear. In general, the Post Keynesian school treats money in a much broader 
sense than notes and coins issued by the central bank. Money in this school of 
thought refers to notes, coins as well as bank liabilities, i.e. deposits. Since in this 
school the notions of general acceptability and unit of account for debt contracts are 
closely related, these features are seen as the distinguishing characteristics of money 
in this broader sense.
As we know, while the term credit refers to the asset side of the bank balance 
sheet, the term deposits necessarily represent the liability side of it. This conventional 
wisdom in turn helps us to understand why the terms ‘credit’ and ‘credit-generated 
money’ represent necessarily different concepts. Moreover, apart from being distinct 
from deposits representing the asset side of balance sheet, credit does not possess the 
quality of multilateral acceptability. Chick (2000) puts this argument in a few words 
as follows:
I may not speak for all Post Keynesians, but in my view, the feature which distinguishes 
money from credit is the general acceptability o f  deposits, as against the personal quality o f  
credit. The central mystery o f  modern banking is that expenditure against a bank credit 
agreement gives rise to deposits, which transforms a bilateral contract into a liquid,
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multilaterally accepted, asset. In Post Keynesian thinking, the status o f  money is given to 
banks’ liabilities, not their assets. This does not diminish the importance o f  credit, but while 
the circuit and Schmitt schools aver that credit is money, the Post Keynesian school argues 
that it is the proximate cause o f  money. (Chick, 2000: 131, emphasis in the original)
Thus, when agents utilise credit created by banks, it will return to the banking 
system as deposits, which by definition is money in Post Keynesian terminology. It is 
in this sense that we can talk o f credit as ‘the proximate cause’ of generally acceptable 
money.
Although the proponents of the horizontalist view agree that money in their 
analysis refers to bank liabilities, they fail to make any explicit distinction between 
credit and credit-generated money, i.e. deposits. As a corollary, in the analysis of the 
horizontalist school money and credit markets are conflated. However, as we have 
shown, the proponents of conditional endogeneity view treat credit and credit­
generated money as methodologically distinct notions and therefore look at both sides 
of the bank balance sheet in their analysis. This in turn implies that in the conditional 
endogeneity approach the money market and the credit market are examined as 
different but mutually-concurrent markets. Moreover, in this approach the role of 
liquidity preference in determining the shape of the money supply curve and thus the 
rate of interest is emphasised. Therefore, we will first discuss the issue o f why this 
approach stresses the concept of liquidity preference and then will continue our 
discussion with the analysis of the money market and the credit market in Section 
2.4.2.
As we have been arguing so far, the concept of liquidity preference is the 
cornerstone around which Keynes’s monetary economy is built. Keynes argued that 
the state of liquidity preference and the quantity of money at times can become a
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constraining tendency in determining the level of investment, employment and output. 
In a monetary economy investment decisions can be brought to a premature halt even 
well before the economy reaches the full employment level. To put this in Shackle’s 
words ‘If we sought to condense Keynes’s whole thesis concerning employment into 
a single sentence, we might say that he ascribes the possibility of involuntary general 
unemployment to the existence of a liquid asset in a world of uncertainty’ (Shackle, 
1973 in Dow and Dow, 1989: 149). Unfortunately, the horizontalist view to 
endogeneity not only states that the quantity of money is no more a constraint but also 
rejects the importance o f liquidity preference in the economic process.
Keynes’s liquidity preference is re-emphasised in the writings of Davidson 
(1978, 1994, etc.), Chick (1979, 1983, 1992), Wray (1990, 1998), Rousseas (1992 to 
some extent), Dow and Earl (1982), Dow and Dow (1989), Dow (1996c, 1997, 1998), 
Mott (1985-86), Wells (1983), Carvalho (1995), Chick and Dow (2002), and others. 
The instability o f the financial system and thus the entire monetary economy was 
emphasised by Minsky (1975, 1982). In fact, these Post Keynesians extended 
Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference a step further. To generalise this extended 
view and, to put it in Mott’s words, the Post Keynesian theory o f ‘liquidity preference 
is a theory of the desire to hold short- versus long-term assets’ (Mott, 1985-86: 230).
Thus, in the conditional endogeneity view of the Post Keynesian school, 
liquidity preference or demand for hoards is treated as a demand for cash as well as 
short-term liquid assets. In this regard, from the perspective of this approach, in its 
broadest sense liquidity preference can be expressed as ‘a preference for a liquid asset 
over any illiquid asset’ (Dow and Dow, 1989: 148-9). Dow and Dow (1989) 
examined the issue thoroughly by looking individually at consumers’ liquidity 
preference, firms’ liquidity preference, the role of financial structure, banks’ risk
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assessment o f firms, liquidity preference of financial institutions, and international 
sources of credit and liquidity. Thus since the concept of liquidity preference is the 
core of our overall analysis, here we will bring forth the three most important aspects 
of liquidity preference from Dow and Dow (ibid.); namely, the liquidity preference of 
consumers, firms and banks.
Consumers' liquidity preference. It is generally believed that a rise in 
consumers’ liquidity preference as a consequence of lack o f confidence in 
expectations regarding the future is associated with a fall in their propensity to spend. 
Dow and Dow (ibid.) connect this phenomenon with the profitability and retained 
earnings of firms. When consumer demand falls, to reflect the increased state of 
liquidity preference of the public, the situation leads to a fall in retained earnings of 
firms. Consequently, the profitability of business decreases, resulting in unplanned 
increase in stocks. As a corollary, firms’ demand for credit to finance working capital 
goes up. As a result o f a weaker consumer demand the marginal efficiency of 
investment goes down and thus the demand for credit to finance new investment 
decisions also shrinks.
Firms' liquidity preference. Let us assume that consumers’ liquidity preference 
remains intact, but rather liquidity preference of the firms changes to reflect their 
pessimistic expectations. What happens next is that firms start positioning their 
portfolios in more liquid form. This option in turn translates into lower demand for 
new illiquid capital goods. As a consequence, again, the demand for credit to finance 
new investment projects will diminish.
Banks ’ liquidity preference. In the above two instances we took the liquidity 
preference of banks for granted, i.e. in our analysis we assumed that it remained 
invariable. As an intermediary between borrowers and lenders banks’ activity can be
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generalised as borrowing short and lending long. In other words, banks’ assets are less 
liquid than their liabilities. That is to say in order to stay successful in their business 
in their portfolio choice, banks have to aim at profitability and liquidity 
simultaneously (Carvalho, 1995: 27). Therefore, banks are very sensitive to the 
notion of risk attached to a particular investment project they are considering to 
finance. During the downswing in the business cycle when the liquidity preference of 
different economic groups is high, liquidity preference of banks also increases and 
thus they will reposition their credit portfolios. They reconsider their assessment of 
risk. Risk assessment, in turn, involves valuation of collateral as well as the expected 
return on or the profitability of the project. During the economic downturn the value 
of the collateral and the expected profitability or ‘credit-worthiness’ o f the project will 
likely be assessed downwards. As a corollary, ‘projects that would previously have 
been judged to be creditworthy are now rejected and so supply of credit is not 
forthcoming’ (Hawkins, 2003: 40). That is to say, ‘while a high assessment of risk 
theoretically generates a credit offer with a correspondingly high risk premium, in 
practice credit may simply be refused’ (Dow and Dow, 1989: 154). Or in the best 
scenario, credit may be rationed, only the most established and financially sound 
firms being given access to credit. Thus, banks’ liquidity preference is the most 
important one of all. ‘This means that, in general, the banks hold the key position in 
the transition from a lower to a higher scale of activity’ (Keynes, 1937c: 668).
In a nutshell, the analysis of the liquidity preference of the individual groups in 
economy shows that the supply of money is not fully accommodating. This in turn 
indicates that, as in Keynes’s analysis, even in an environment of endogenous money 
creation, liquidity preference and quantity of money can become a constraining 
factors in determining the level of new investment. Thus Keynes’s (1937c: 669)
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‘fundamental conclusion’ that the investment market ‘can never become congested 
through a shortage o f saving’, rather it ‘can become congested through a shortage of 
cash’ holds in the environment of endogenous money creation by the private sector. 
The matter of conditional endogeneity of the money supply hopefully will be clearer 
in the following sections.
2.4 The Rate of Interest and the Interaction of the Money and Credit Markets in 
the Conditional Endogeneity View
2.4.1 Keynes, Classics, Neo-classics and the Rate o f  Interest
The rate o f interest is the transmission channel through which investment decisions 
and thus the level of employment and output are affected. In general, most schools of 
thought accept this transmission mechanism in one way or another. However, 
opinions diverge with regard to the central question of how the rate o f interest is set, 
what factors play a crucial role in its determination, and also the details of the 
transmission mechanism.
In the analysis o f the classical school, the rate of interest was seen as a factor 
equilibrating the level of saving to that of investment (Keynes, 1970: 175-85). 
Investment decisions represented demand for investable resources and the saving 
decisions the supply o f them. The rate of interest was seen as a ‘price’ at which 
saving was at a par with investment. Interest was a reward for waiting, i.e. for 
abstaining from consuming; it was not a reward for ‘not-hoarding’ (ibid.: 182). 
Moreover, the rate o f interest was understood to be a ‘real’, not a monetary,
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phenomenon. The classical economists confused it with the marginal efficiency of 
capital. They believed that the rate of interest ‘was determined by the potential 
productivity o f investment, which determined the demand for funds, and the 
thriftiness of the population, which determined their supply’ (Chick, 1983: 207). 
Furthermore, another distinguishing feature of this school of thought was that saving 
always preceded investment.
The ‘neoclassical’ approach, without much success, attempted to bring 
‘monetary matters’ into the analysis. The loanable funds theory of this approach 
emphasised the sources and uses of investable resources (Chick, 1983: 178). In this 
analysis the main issues, such as the process of interest rate determination, its role in 
equilibrating saving and investment, and the concept of precedence o f saving over 
investment remained unchallenged; rather they were taken for granted from the 
classical school. The proponents of the loanable funds theory made the distinction 
between the ‘saving proper’ -  that is loanable funds, and hoards or the ‘forced saving’ 
-  that is non-loanable funds. Hence, their conclusion was that saving might, but not 
necessarily, be equal to investment. Ironically, Keynes preferred the classical view 
on this issue (Keynes, 1970: 183). He borrowed the idea of equality of saving and 
investment from the classical school in his analysis. The loanable funds theory 
considers ‘hoarding’ as a temporary phenomenon. Thus as long as the supply of 
money is fixed, this method approximates the classical approach (Chick, 1983: 185). 
Indeed, the loanable funds theory is based on the following assumptions: perfect 
information, fixed money supply, constant prices, and full employment (Howells and 
Bain, 1998: 47).
Interestingly, in the contemporary orthodox literature the classical view of the 
equality of saving and investment prevails. Furthermore, the priority o f saving over
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investment is still stressed. In this respect, modem macroeconomics textbooks do 
well in explaining why saving must be equal to investment, and how it must precede 
investment. To depict the picture vividly we are asked to imagine the Robinson 
Crusoe household in the uninhabited island of Juan Fernandez. Cmsoe decides not to 
consume seed-com this season so that he can sow it next season; this is exactly 
equivalent to his saving to be invested next year. It is as simple as that: saving is not 
only equal but also prior to investment.
In sharp contrast with the loanable funds theory of the classical/neoclassical 
school Keynes developed a new - liquidity preference - theory of interest rate 
determination. Keynes refuted two of the three conclusions o f this approach - 
namely, the belief that saving was prior to investment and the rate of interest was 
determined by the interaction of these two factors. Keynes disagreed that the interest 
rate was a reward for waiting as such, the sole purpose of which being to equilibrate 
the demand for and the supply o f investable resources. He also disagreed that saving 
was prior to investment.
However, Keynes accepted the conclusion of the classical school that 
investment was equal to saving. He not only accepted this belief but also emphasised 
that they were in fact identical. He argued that 4 [t]he supply curve of savings and 
demand curve for investments [had] no determinate point o f  intersection, since they 
[lay] along one another in all conditions throughout the whole o f their length’ 
(Keynes, 1973: 552, emphasis added). Keynes’s acceptance o f the classical 
conclusion that saving was equal to investment generated a heated debate among 
academics before final agreement was reached: although saving and investment 
decisions are made by different agents, they are always equal ex post (Chick, 1983:
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180 and 2000: 133; and also Sawyer, 1996: 50). The ex ante magnitudes o f saving 
and investment may not be equal unless by accident (Chick, 1983: 180).
Since Keynes borrowed the concept of ex post equality of saving and 
investment from the classical school, this notion was not a novelty he was putting 
forward:
The novelty in my treatment o f  saving and investment consists, not in my maintaining their 
necessary aggregate equality, but in the proposition that it is, not the rate o f  interest, but the 
level o f  incomes which (in conjunction with certain other factors) ensures this equality. 
(Keynes, 1937b: 249, emphasis added)
Thus, Keynes argued that the level o f saving was not determined by the rate of 
interest, rather it was determined by the level o f  investment through changes in 
income (Wray, 1990: 157-8). This argument in turn means that causation runs from 
investment to saving, not from saving to investment. Unlike in the analysis of the 
loanable funds theory, in Keynes’s analysis saving and investment is brought into 
equality by income, not by the rate o f interest (Chick, 1983: 183).
As to the saving-interest rate relationship in the loanable funds theory, Keynes 
makes two basic arguments to reject the idea that saving is a positive function of the 
rate of interest (Chick, 1983: 182). The first argument is that a change in the rate of 
interest has both a substitution effect and wealth effect. While the former effect alters 
the relative incentive to consume now or in the future, the latter is reflected in the 
change in the value o f most capital assets. Since these two effects operate in opposite 
directions, the final outcome is ambiguous.
The second argument is rather simple, yet strong. Keynes argues that agents 
can save even though the rate of interest is zero or negligible if  their income exceeds
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the subsistence level. After all, people can hoard, accumulating wealth in coins and 
notes, and may decide not to lend regardless of how high the rate of interest is. Under 
these circumstances the role of the interest rate in determining the level o f saving 
would likely be very negligible. Thus, to put it in other words, it follows that the rate 
of interest can be high or low depending on the ‘mood’ of the public to lend (in other 
words, to buy assets -  banks deposits and securities for instance), not on the stock of 
the available saving. Saving ‘may not depend on the rate of interest but lending likely 
does’ (Howells and Bain, 1998: 51). However, this is not the end of the story. Keynes 
calls this line of reasoning just a ‘firm and intelligible ground from which to proceed’ 
(Keynes, 1937b: 250). He shows that the rate of interest reflects the degree of agents’ 
willingness to part with liquidity now in return for some kind of pecuniary premium in 
the future. The rate of interest is in no way a reward for waiting or abstaining from 
consuming as such. Rather it is a reward for running a risk o f uncertainty, parting 
with liquidity or the power of disposal (Keynes, 1970). This he puts simply as 
follows:
The liquidity-preference theory o f  the rate o f  interest... makes the rate o f  interest to depend 
on the presen t supply o f  money and the demand schedule for a presen t claim on money in 
terms o f  a  deferred claim on money. (Keynes, 1937b: 241, emphasis added)
Thus, according to the liquidity preference theory of interest rate determination 
the rate of interest is purely a monetary phenomenon. It has nothing to do with the 
level of saving or the marginal efficiency of capital.
Now, once it is shown that the rate of interest is a monetary phenomenon, not a 
‘real’ one, it is also necessary to demonstrate how the rate of interest can affect the 
level of investment, employment and thus output. Keynes’s marginal efficiency
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schedule relates the rate of interest negatively to investment (see Keynes, 1970: 182 
and Chick, 1983: 183). However, in explaining how the level o f investment can be 
affected he goes a step further. Since he makes the distinction between the rate of 
interest and the marginal efficiency of capital, he argues that ‘the rate o f  interest on 
money plays a peculiar part in setting a limit to the level of employment, since it sets a 
standard to which the marginal efficiency of a capital-asset must attain if it is to be 
newly produced’ (Keynes, 1970: 222, emphasis in the original). Keynes shows that 
the new investment decision will be carried out as long as the rate of interest is lower 
than the marginal efficiency of capital. Only when the rate of interest is equal to the 
marginal efficiency o f capital, will there then be no profit incentives for businesses to 
continue new investment activities. This condition, of course, is satisfied when the 
economy reaches the level of full employment.
However, Keynes (1970: 236) goes on to argue that in a monetary economy it is 
possible that the condition of the convergence of the rate of interest and the marginal 
efficiency of capital can occur even well before the full employment level is reached. 
As is well known, Keynes in his liquidity preference theory of interest did not accept 
the full employment assumption of the loanable funds theory. By doing so he was 
able to show that in the actual, real world income was prone to large fluctuations. As 
was already shown in the previous chapter, money is the most liquid of all assets. As 
the return on other producible assets in terms of money falls, agents hold money for 
its liquidity (Dow and Earl, 1982: 105). Thus, unlike the return on other producible 
assets, the return or rate o f interest on money falls slowest due to money’s non­
reproducibility characteristic. Therefore, in a monetary economy it is possible that the 
rate of return on producible assets (or marginal efficiency of capital in Keynes’s 
terminology) can fall below the rate of interest on money. As a consequence
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investment decisions and thus output growth can come to a premature halt well before 
the economy reaches the level of full employment (see Keynes, 1970: 236 and 
Hawkins, 2003: 32).
Another distinctive facet of the liquidity preference theory of interest is that in 
this analysis investment is prior to saving, not the other way around. This argument 
was implicit in Keynes’s analysis. To prove the argument that in fact investment 
precedes saving, one must first abandon the ‘Robinsone Crusoe seed-corn’ paradigm 
of the loanable funds theory. The issue of why we should abandon the seed-corn 
paradigm and what approach instead we should take was elegantly explained by 
Chick (1983:184-91) as follows. Indeed, this line of reasoning is in compliance with 
the argument we made in Chapter 1 concerning the emergence of a monetary 
economy in a property-based society.
In the feudal mode of production based on agriculture, property rights were 
weak and so were lending and borrowing relations. Therefore, although the notions 
of saving and investment were not contrastingly different from each other, in this 
society saving decisions are a precondition to any act of investment as in the seed- 
corn paradigm.
With the evolution of capitalism, especially after the industrial revolution, 
economic relations started changing gradually: property rights strengthened, the 
monetary economy started taking shape. As a corollary, saving and investment 
became separate acts. However, at this stage these conditions still were not sufficient 
for investment to precede saving. The emergence of intermediaries (what later 
became banks and securities markets) between lenders and borrowers did speed the 
pace of investment, but saving was still prior to investment.
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The only non-circular approach to explaining the concept of precedence of 
investment over saving is to look at the stages of banking development from a 
historical perspective. This perspective also shows the special role o f the banks in the 
economic process. Although we will come back to this issue once again in the next 
chapter and devote considerable time to its discussion, here we will note the 
importance of this approach in a few words. In the early stages of their development 
the working of banks was not very well organised and established as a system. The 
size of the banks was small, the number of them was too many and their liabilities 
were not yet well recognized as a generally accepted means of payment. Indeed, at 
this stage the credit activity of banks was constrained by the availability of saving 
they could attract from the general public. Organisation of the fractional reserve 
requirements and interbank lending operations enabled the banks to work as a united, 
established system. Only at this stage we could talk about the precedence of 
investment over saving. At this stage of their development banks were already in a 
position to create credit in excess of saving to a considerable extent so that ultimately 
investment decisions were no longer constrained by the saving decisions. As Chick 
concludes, ‘The accuracy of the proposition that investment precedes saving thus 
depends on the stage o f  development reached by the banks’ (Chick, 1983: 190, 
emphasis in the original).
Now, we can put our argument in a few words. Because of the special role 
banks could play after a certain stage of banking development, they were able to 
finance new investment independent of saving. Thus bank lending could cause 
investment and money income to increase by the same amount, the resulting increase 
in money balances constituting ex-post saving (Chick, 2000: 133). Hence since ‘[t]he
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banks of the 1930s could finance investment independently of saving’ (Chick, 1983: 
191), no wonder that Keynes was able to capture this moment in his theory.
2.4.2 The Rate o f  Interest in the Conditional Endogeneity View and the Analysis o f  the 
Money Market and the Credit Market
In Keynes’s analysis the quantity of money and the state of liquidity preference 
determine the rate of interest. Although Keynes’s Treatise on Money shows that 
Keynes was well aware of the extent of credit creation by the banking sector (see 
Moore, 1988 and Wray, 1990), in the analysis of the General Theory he took the 
supply of money as given. Dow (1997) convincingly argues that by taking the supply 
of money as given Keynes never meant that it was an exogenous variable in the more 
general system. Our argument about Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference in 
Section 2.4.1 also shows that he had a good reason to take the supply o f money as 
given, i.e. to convince his critics, by putting more emphasis on liquidity preference to 
refute the philosophy o f loanable funds theory. Indeed, by doing so ‘Keynes rendered 
his argument about liquidity preference more palatable’ (Dow, 1997: 64).
Thus in the General Theory it is liquidity preference that ‘rules the roost’. 
Higher liquidity preference raises the rate of interest and lowers the propensity to 
spend. In Keynes’s words ‘an increased propensity to hoard raises the rate of interest, 
and thereby lowers the prices of capital assets other than cash’ (Keynes, 1937b: 251). 
However, a change in the state of liquidity preference does not affect prices directly, 
rather any effects on prices are ‘produced by the repercussion as an ultimate 
consequence of a change in the rate of interest’ (Keynes, 1937a: 216). The lower
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demand for consumer goods, then, spills over to capital goods sector as well. This 
hampers the retained earnings of firms and hinders their profit expectations. Thus the 
initial increase in the state of liquidity preference raises the rate of interest and 
through the marginal efficiency of capital negatively affects investment.
In a letter to Hicks, Keynes indicated that the concept of liquidity preference 
was a centre around which his monetary theory was built (Hicks, 1967: 30, f.n.3). 
The main purpose o f the story of liquidity preference, then, was to emphasise the 
instability of liquidity preference (Chick and Dow, 2002: 594). By doing so Keynes 
was able to show that in a monetary economy effective demand was prone to large 
fluctuations and thus inherently unstable.
The liquidity preference approach to money endogeneity has been developed in, 
and retains the spirit of, Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference. The approach takes 
into account the evolution and behaviour of the entire financial system since the time 
the General Theory was published. Therefore, in this analysis the concept of liquidity 
preference has a broader meaning and implications; it represents a preference to hold 
short- against long-term assets. Generally speaking, the process of interest rate 
determination, too, is pretty much the same as in Keynes’s analysis. The Post 
Keynesian analysis only clarifies the details of the process taking into account 
institutional and structural changes that naturally occurs in the economy through mere 
passage of time.
As we noted earlier, the liquidity preference view examines both sides o f the 
bank balance sheet in the analysis of the endogenous money creation. Thus reverting 
to this issue in this section we look at the interaction of the money and credit markets 
and consequently study the process of determination of the rate of interest, this time 
from the viewpoint of the liquidity preference approach. Our analysis, based mainly
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on Dow (1997: 70-78 and 1998: 48-51), will hopefully clarify two main issues at 
stake: first, the extent o f the limits to the elasticity of money supply; and second, the 
determination of the rate o f interest.
In the previous sections we already distinguished between money and credit. 
Here we will discuss the credit market and the money market as distinct but mutually- 
interrelated markets. We will refer to Figure 2.4.1 on the next page as an analytical 
tool used in this analysis. Since in the Post Keynesian view credit makes deposits, not 
the other way around, the starting point o f the analysis is the credit market. The 
model is built on the notions of endogenous money creation, decision-making under 
uncertainty and liquidity preference. The further distinctive feature o f the model is 
that the emphasis in the analysis is not on the market equilibrating points or states of 
rest, rather on the process of interactive movements in the credit market and the 
money market respectively.
The credit market. Since central banks as a lender of resort provide liquidity to 
the banking sector when it is needed, in the contemporary world banks are no longer 
constrained by reserve requirements. Rather because commercial banks now have to 
observe capital adequacy requirements, their credit activity is constrained by the 
availability and thus cost of outside funds. The oligopolistic nature of the banking 
business implies that interest rates on loans are determined as a mark-up over the 
marginal cost o f funds.
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Figure 2.4.1 Interaction between the Credit M arket and the M oney M arket
The interest rate on loans, il, reflects this idea. Graphically the credit supply 
curve can be drawn as initially horizontal but after a certain time sloping upward. 
This is explained by the fact that as the volume of credit increases the perceived risk
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of the lenders also increases and thus the credit supply curve becomes less and less 
responsive to demand. The downward sloping credit demand curve is a function of 
expected return on investment and liquidity preference. Willingness o f the firms to 
take a less liquid position, i.e. going into debt to finance long-term investment 
projects, determines the state of liquidity preference of the business sector. Thus the 
slope of the credit demand curve depends on the notions of liquidity preference and 
perceived risk of borrowers.
The money market. While the finance motive enters the credit market as a 
demand for credit, the preference to hold assets in liquid form, i.e. liquidity 
preference, enters the money market analysis as a demand for money. In the money 
market the wholesale rate of interest, iw, is seen as a marginal cost o f funds for banks. 
‘It is assumed that the wholesale rate is tied to the repo (repurchase) rate’ (Hawkins, 
2003: 38). In this analysis the rate on loans, il, is a mark-up over the wholesale rate, 
iw. Therefore, this linkage is seen as a channel through which changes in the money 
market affect the credit market, and vice versa. Since in the endogenous money 
analysis loans make deposits, the money market and the credit market can be seen as a 
balance sheet identity. Hence the amount of credit determined by the supply of and 
demand for credit in point A of the credit market diagram is exactly equal to the 
amount of money in point C in the money market diagram, which is determined by 
the interaction of the demand for and the supply of money. Money demand is drawn 
in a conventional way as a downward sloping curve. The money supply curve is 
vertical. However, this shape in no way represents the idea that the money supply is 
an exogenous variable in the model. Rather in this analysis the vertical representation 
implies that money supply is ‘given’. That is to say ‘the stock of money is exogenous
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to the money market as a subsystem, but is endogenous to the credit market as a 
subsystem’ (Dow, 1998: 50).
To analyse the interaction between the credit market and the money market let 
us initially consider the period of economic upswing in business cycle. In the upturn 
when the borrowers’ perceived risk is low and their expectation regarding the future 
prospective yield on investment is high, their demand for credit, the finance motive 
for demanding money, naturally rises. Consequently the credit demand curve shifts to 
the right from Cdo to Cdi. The credit demand curve does not simply shift to a new 
position, but also its slope becomes flatter. In general, during the upswing in business 
cycle the slope of the both curves - the demand for and supply of credit curves -  gets 
flatter, representing lower liquidity preference and perceived risk of the banks as well 
as the firms.
The effect of this change on the rate of interest, as Keynes (1937b) noted, 
depends on the state of liquidity preference of the banking sector, i.e. the willingness 
of the banks to accommodate the new demand for credit. It is fair to assume that 
during the expansion banks also share the optimistic view of the business firms and 
readily accommodate the new demand at the ongoing rate o f interest. This is shown 
as a point B in the diagram. As the credit is newly created the supply of credit 
increases from Co to Ci. Since banks decide to meet the credit demand at the ongoing 
rate of interest, the credit supply curve does not shift. Rather the new level of credit 
supply is seen as a movement along the initial supply curve.
As soon as the new credit is created, creation of deposits, i.e. money, 
automatically follows suit and thus the supply of money shifts from Mo to Mi. 
Provided that the liquidity preference of the wealth-holders remains intact, the 
increased supply of money puts downward pressure on the wholesale rate and reduces
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it to iwi, the point D in the money market diagram. The lower marginal cost of funds 
for banks, ceteris paribus, enables the banks to meet the increased credit demand at a 
lower loan rate. As a result, the supply of credit shifts from Cso to Csi. Because during 
the expansion banks’ perceived risk and liquidity preference tend to fall, the slope of 
the new credit supply curve, Csi, is flatter than the slope of the Cso one. As long as 
the liquidity preference of the wealth-holders, firms and banks does not rise (or at 
least does not change) the process of credit creation can proceed in this scenario until 
the business cycle matures and thus uncertainty increases. Hence, if  we may 
generalise, during the upturn in business cycle the credit supply is highly demand 
elastic.
Now let us consider the opposite scenario, i.e. the slump, and see whether credit 
supply is highly elastic in economic downturn. To make our example even more 
distinct from the previous one let us suppose that this time changes originate from the 
money market. As the business cycle matures uncertainty regarding the future yield 
on prospective investment is likely to rise putting upward pressure on the liquidity 
preferences of the different groups of economic agents. For the time being let us 
suppose that the liquidity preference of the wealth-holders change first. When the 
uncertainty about the future asset prices rises, the liquidity preference of the wealth- 
holders also rises (represented as an increased inducement to hold higher 
precautionary liquid stocks). As a corollary, the higher demand for money at a given 
stock of money puts upward pressure on the wholesale rate. This automatically spills 
over to the credit market pushing up the cost of funds for banks. Hence, the lending 
rate goes up and the credit supply curve shifts upward. It is likely that now banks also 
share the pessimistic view of the wealth-holders. The higher perceived risk and the 
increased liquidity preference of the banks will be reflected in the slope of the credit
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supply curve - it becomes steeper. The lower credit supply consequently shrinks the 
stock of money even further. Hence the wholesale rate and through it the loan rate 
and thus again the credit availability will be affected.
In the downswing the liquidity preference of all economic agents is most likely 
to rise. The lower income of households implies that their consumption expenditures 
and thus their demand for money for transaction purposes are likely to fall. At the 
same time, however, the households are more than likely to want to increase their 
precautionary liquid stocks. Furthermore, as the rate of interest starts rising, 
speculators are also likely to raise their speculative demand for money expecting 
lower future price for financial assets. On the other hand, lower consumption 
demand, accompanied with the pessimistic mood of the business sector, makes the 
new investment projects unpromising. Therefore, it is more probable that in the 
slump not only the banks are unwilling to extend long-term credit for investment 
projects, but also firms themselves are not asking for bank credit to finance their 
investment decisions. Firms may only demand credit to finance working capital or to 
re-shape their liquidity positions.
Thus in a nutshell, our analysis once again shows that although in the upturn in 
business cycle the supply o f credit might become highly responsive to the credit 
demand, in the downturn this is not the case. Rather in the downswing the supply of 
credit becomes highly inelastic. Therefore, to claim that the credit supply is fully 
accommodating would be highly inaccurate. Hence, contrary to the horizontalists’ 
claim, the notion of liquidity preference around which the whole idea of Keynes’s 
monetary economy is built is not irrelevant to the analysis of money supply 
endogeneity. Indeed, the liquidity preference of the various economic groups in
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general and of the banking sector in particular plays a crucial role in determining the 
degree of the elasticity of the credit supply in modem monetary economies.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we extended our analysis of a monetary economy to the environment 
of endogenous money creation. It is tme that in modem advanced capitalist 
economies the supply o f credit (and thus the supply of money) is responsive to the 
credit demand of the private sector. However, there are limits to the extent of 
demand responsiveness, or elasticity of the supply, of credit. Banks and the central 
bank are not passive players in the market creating whatever amount o f credit the 
private sector wishes. In fact, the elasticity of credit supply depends mostly on the 
‘mood’ or the liquidity preference of the banking sector. During the boom banks’ 
liquidity preference tends to fall and they actively increase the supply of money by 
extending credit to finance mostly investment activities of the private sector.
However, since there is no way to predict when the cycle matures, banks may 
fail to note it and thus may continue extending credit to the private sector based on 
their past euphoric expectations. When real investment expectations are not thriving, 
the private sector may use these credit resources for speculative activities. As a 
corollary, the entire financial system may become fragile. Once the banking sector 
realises that the cycle is already ripe, banks’ liquidity preference will rise and thus the 
suPPty of credit will be sharply contracted increasing the volatility o f the financial 
system even further. Contraction of the credit supply in no way means that the 
demand for credit will fall. In fact, cash-strapped firms’ demand for credit to finance 
their working capital is likely to be higher than usual times. However, at this point
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the supply of credit is not responsive to the credit demand of the private business 
sector. Rather the banking sector determines not only the price of credit but also the 
quantity of it.
Hence, even in the environment of endogenous money creation, money’s ‘low 
elasticity of production’ feature still holds. It means that as long as there exists a non- 
reproducible liquid asset, and as long as sundry groups of economic agents can hold it 
as an abode o f purchasing power when their expectations regarding the uncertain 
future is low, the quantity of money and liquidity preference will retain their 
constraining potential in the economic process. Consequently, effective demand in 
such economy remains to be prone to large fluctuations. Thus our main conclusion is 
the same as in Chapter 1: so long as liquidity preference and the quantity o f money 
retain the capability o f being major constraints, involuntary unemployment in its 
strictest sense is possible in a market economy.
One more important thing, although implicit in our analysis so far, is the stages 
of the banking development. Both in the discussion of the precedence o f investment 
over saving and the analysis of the money market and the credit market we assumed 
that the banking system was moderately developed. (That is to say we assumed that 
the banking system was at least in its second stage of evolution.) In the next chapter 
we will have a closer look at the historical evolution of the banking sector in a market 
economy. We will discuss the importance of the banking system in facilitating 
economic activity. Also particular attention will be given to the vulnerability of the 
modem financial system to cyclical shocks.
In short, in this chapter we have completed our analysis on the nature and 
characteristics of money and the process of money creation in modem monetary 
economies. In the next chapter we will turn our focus to the discussion of the role of
81
finance and financial superstructure in facilitating economic efficiency and growth. 
We will relate the stages of banking development theory to this particular issue and 
examine how the evolution o f banking sector can shift the financial constraints of the 
economy to a certain degree by enabling investment to precede saving.
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3. Finance, Banks and Development
One of the most important problems in the field o f  finance, if  not the single most important one, almost 
everyone would agree, is the effect that financial structure and development have on growth.
Goldsmith (1969: 390)
3.1 Introduction
In the first two chapters we studied the working of a contemporary market economy 
and the role and importance money and banks play in it. In Chapter 1 we made two 
major conclusions. First, the existence and further development of property rights 
explains the very evolution of monetary economies, as we know them today. As a unit 
of account in labour contracts, price lists and debt instruments money facilitates the 
economic activity. Second, money plays a very vital yet peculiar role in the economic 
process. As a convenient abode of purchasing power it ‘lulls our disquietude’ during 
the period of increased uncertainty about the future. Paradoxically, however, because 
of the same virtue of money aggregate effective demand is prone to large fluctuations.
In Chapter 2 we analysed the process of money creation. We showed that in 
advanced market economies the quantity of credit supplied by the banking system 
changes endogenously in response to changes in demand. However, although banks 
are able to create credit ahead of saving, the supply of credit is not always fully 
responsive to changes in demand. As long as the quantity o f money and liquidity 
preference retain the capability of being major constraints in the way of production, 
fluctuations in effective demand and thus involuntary unemployment are possible in 
contemporary monetary economies.
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In short, the discussions of these two chapters will be of crucial importance in 
analysing and assessing fundamental differences in the nature of money and the 
process of credit creation under central planning.
Now, in this chapter we will investigate the process of evolution of banks in a 
market economy. A special attention will be given to the time-consuming nature of 
banking development from pure intermediation to credit creation and beyond. Since 
our ultimate goal is to analyse the evolution of money and banks during transition, the 
discussion of the chapter will be of paramount importance in understanding the time- 
consuming nature of the institution-building process during transition.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 we will start our analysis 
with basic theoretical arguments on the facilitating role of finance in development. In 
Section 3.3 we will briefly and critically review McKinnon and Shaw framework on 
finance and development. Section 3.4 is the most important part of the chapter in that 
it deals with the stages of banking sector development. In our discussion in Chapter, 
we took the stages of banking development for granted and assumed the precedence 
of investment over saving. The fact, however, is that this becomes possible only after 
the banking system undergoes a certain stage of development. The discussion of the 
role of finance in the economic process would not be complete without mentioning 
unstable character o f finance associated with uncertainty and liquidity preference. 
Using Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, we will discuss this issue in Section 
3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 summarises main findings of the chapter.
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3.2 Finance and Development
The emergence o f property rights and thus the development of money and monetary 
economies greatly enhances opportunities for exchange and trade, which in turn 
translates into division o f labour and economic efficiency. In a monetary economy 
agents are able to measure the relative worth of any good in terms o f a specific good 
with stable value, i.e. money. In order to carry out any exchange transaction they use 
money as a unit o f account and means of exchange to effect payment. Because money 
is convenient to carry and is a good store of value it can be readily used to buy goods 
and services at any time and any place}  As a unit of account and means of exchange 
money reduces uncertainty across space, while as a store of value it reduces 
uncertainty across time and space. This we already discussed earlier in Section 1.5.1 
and noted the latter characteristic of money as its finance feature. The finance feature 
of money is in fact a hidden potential, which, if  used effectively, can greatly enhance 
the production possibility of the economy even further. What brings this hidden 
potential into effect, then, is the establishment of financial institutions.
In the absence o f financial institutions and thus financial intermediation the 
‘finance’ feature o f money can still be at work, but it is used inefficiently. Money still 
helps entrepreneurs to keep their purchasing power from eroding through the mere 
passage of time until they accumulate enough resources to start/enlarge their 
businesses. However, under these circumstances it takes a great deal o f time for 
worthwhile projects to be realised, if they are realised at all.
In general, the facilitating role of financial deepening can be easily shown using 
the following example (Coghlan, 1980). Investment can be financed from two
In modern times specific national currencies serve as a legal tender within a specific geographic area, 
i.e. national states.
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sources: internal finance, i.e. the entrepreneur’s own resources; and external finance -  
from borrowing. If there are no financial intermediaries then, no matter how profitable 
the investment project might be, the chance of financing this investment decision is 
limited to investor’s own saving. In case the entrepreneur decides to undertake any 
new investment he must wait until he accumulates enough resources for this purpose. 
Depending on the scope of the project the waiting period can be long. Therefore, the 
cost of internal finance is waiting and postponement of investment until sufficient 
resources are accumulated. When financial intermediaries do not exist, attracting 
external finance directly from surplus units is still possible. However, the process is 
prohibitively costly due to information and transaction costs for searching surplus 
units. In fact, in this particular case the cost of external finance may be higher than the 
cost of waiting and accumulating the required amount from investor’s own earnings.
In a market with comparatively developed financial intermediaries and limited 
borrowing and lending opportunities, the cost of external borrowing is lower 
compared to that o f internal finance, but the situation can be further improved with an 
even more developed financial system. The evolution of financial intermediaries will 
gradually increase availability of external finance and reduce its cost.
In short, the process of moving to financial intermediation can facilitate the 
economic process in several ways (Dow, 1998: 19). Firstly, by offering a return on 
saving it encourages saving. As a result, this creates greater access to external finance, 
increases its availability and reduces its cost discounted for risk. Second, the 
allocation of finance becomes more efficient. As specialised institutions financial 
intermediaries improve the process of selection of borrowers according to their credit­
worthiness. Third, by increasing the stock of financial assets, financial intermediation
86
encourages further financial development. Fourth, for an individual economy 
financial development may open the doors to international capital markets.
Banks emerged as one of the first and most important financial intermediaries. 
They accept short-term liquid deposits against which they advance long-term loans 
for businesses. Borrowing short to provide liquidity for savers and lending long to 
finance business decisions -  “maturity transformation” - is one of the important 
functions of these institutions in facilitating growth. By successfully managing the 
payment mechanism of the economy and reducing time and energy spent on exchange 
of goods and services the banking sector indeed can facilitate trade, increase 
efficiency in production and sale, and thus the total productivity of the society. (See 
Gerschenkron, 1962 and Cameron, 1967.)
These are the functions of banks commonly acknowledged in the mainstream 
literature on banking. However, modem banks achieved these developments already 
in their early stage o f evolution. After a certain stage of development banks learn to 
create credit ahead of saving. Banks create financial resources to finance business 
decisions and simultaneously offer their depositors liquidity and return. Since the 
analysis of institutional evolution is of paramount importance in understanding the 
complex nature of transition, we will discuss this process in more detail in Section 
3.4.
The issue of economic growth has been the centre of attention of research 
scholars for many years. Many voluminous books and lengthy articles with 
complicated mathematical models and policy prescriptions have been devoted to the 
issue. However, in most of the work undertaken in this direction the role of finance in 
facilitating economic growth has been undermined or not been taken seriously.
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In some ways this is not a surprise because in the analysis of the classical 
economic thought before Keynes and afterwards in the studies of their successors — 
the neoclassical thinkers -  very little role is given to money in the economic process, 
if given at all. In mainstream economic models money is seen as a technical input 
with no real influence on economic activity. In other words, money is a ‘veil’ that 
‘wraps’ the real economy. That is why, not only money’s but also the financial 
system’s role in facilitating economic growth is seen as insignificant. In these models 
‘capital markets are perfectly efficient and all agents have lull information, so there is 
no important function served by financial intermediaries’ (Beim and Calomiris, 2001: 
69).
Hence, due to methodological reasons orthodox classical theories gives only a 
limited role to money and finance. In this regard it would be true to note that the 
attempt to explain the logic of the association between financial development and real 
economic growth in a systematic way is a relatively new phenomenon in the 
mainstream economic literature (Drake, 1980). In other words the research interest in 
the subject revived not long ago after the pioneering works notably by Schumpeter, 
Goldsmith, Gurley, McKinnon, Shaw, Patrick and others (Fry, 1995). The particular 
role of banks in economic development was discussed in Cameron (1967) and 
Gerschenkron (1962) among others.
Indeed, the existence of an interrelation (not necessarily of exact causation) 
between financial deepening and economic growth cannot be denied as is elegantly 
shown in Goldsmith’s (1969) financial interrelation ratio (FIR). Goldsmith constructs 
his financial interrelation ratio by dividing the total value of all financial assets by the 
total value of tangible assets plus net foreign balance. His analysis showed that the 
FIR rose with the country’s economic growth and eventually levelled off at a value of
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greater than one, meaning that the financial structure grew faster than the real 
economy. So the FIR depends on the level of country’s income. The FIR is higher for 
developed countries and lower for underdeveloped countries. However, it is also true 
that the existence of an interrelation between financial development and economic 
growth does not necessarily prove which way the causation goes: from finance to 
growth or otherwise. Goldsmith himself was aware of this too (Goldsmith, 1969: 
409). Since the pioneering seminal works of Goldsmith (ibid.) and later McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) the issue of a correlation between financial development and 
economic growth has attracted considerable attention: different theoretical approaches 
have been developed and many empirical works have been carried out.2
Interestingly, empirical results seem to be of mixed nature. For instance, while 
Benciventa and Smith (1991), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Thakor (1996), 
King and Levine (1993a and 1993b), Levine (1997), Choe and Moosa (1999), Tsai 
and Wu (1999) and some other empirical works find support in favour o f financial 
development leading to economic growth, Demetrides and Hussein (1996), and 
Ireland (1994) suggest that causation goes the other way around. According to these 
works it is income that drives financial development. There also exists some empirical 
support for “bi-directional” causation. It can be found in Luintel and Khan (1999) and 
Al-Yousif (2002).
Although the empirical findings on finance and development appear to be of 
mixed nature, the theoretical underpinnings for the ‘finance leading’ approach appear 
stronger than others. As Levine (1997: 688) put it ‘although conclusions must be 
stated hesitantly and with ample qualifications, the predominance of theoretical
The mainstream literature on finance and development can be divided into several streams, e.g. 
structuralists led by Goldsmith (1969), repressionists led by Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973), and 
the second generation financial growth models developed in the framework o f  endogenous growth 
models highlighted by King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), and Pagano (1993) and others. Fry (1995) 
gives a nice summary review for all o f  these schools.
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reasoning and empirical evidence suggests first-order relationship between financial 
development and economic growth’ and ‘broad cross-country comparisons, individual 
country studies, industry level analyses, and firm level investigations point in the 
same direction: the functioning of financial systems is vitally linked to economic 
growth’ (ibid.: 689-90).
The fact, however, is that it is not very easy simply to conclude whether 
financial development leads to economic growth or it is the otherway around. In 
general, a more cautious suggestion is that economic development can occur without 
financial deepening, and financial development may not always lead to economic 
development. The former centrally planned economies of the socialist camp reached a 
considerable degree of economic development without any financial deepening. 
Whereas, although some offshore centres have developed sophisticated financial 
systems, economically they are still underdeveloped economies (Dow, 1998: 19 and 
Beim and Calomiris, 2001: 71).
3.3 Theories in Finance: McKinnon and Shaw Framework
Now, taking into account the fact that most of the academic discussions on the issue 
of financial deepening leading to economic development were concentrated around 
the influential theory developed by McKinnon and Shaw in the early 1970s, we find it 
necessary to note certain special characteristics of this approach.
The basic problems faced by financial superstructures o f most of the less 
developed countries in the 1970s and the 1980s were high inflation, low (even 
negative at times) real interest rates, high reserve requirements, dual or multiple 
exchange rates and so on. In many instances these policies were deliberately
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employed by the authorities to promote industrialisation and thus economic growth. 
McKinnon and Shaw criticised these policies and convincingly argued that these 
conditions in fact would hinder the effective mobilisation of scarce financial resources 
and therefore would hamper economic growth. In their analysis they referred to these 
economies as financially repressed economies. McKinnon and Shaw demonstrated 
that in financially repressed economies agents would not save in inside money, i.e. 
banking liabilities, due to low rates of interest on deposits.3 Instead the surplus 
economic units would store their savings in outside money in the form of 
unproductive assets such as cash, gold, jewellery and other precious metals. Therefore 
a sizeable part o f the aggregate saving in the economy would leave the active 
circulation and be kept idle as a ‘dead stock’. This in turn would imply a wasted 
opportunity, which less developed countries could not afford.
McKinnon and Shaw argued that financial liberalisation policies (such as setting
higher real interest rates, lowering reserve requirements, and abolishing multiple
exchange rates) were the right remedy to treat this pathology. For instance higher real
interest rates would discourage surplus units form saving in outside money. This
policy would create an incentive for surplus agents to keep their savings in banks.
This of course would increase banks’ cost of borrowing as well as lending. On the
other hand, dropping the rate of reserve requirements on deposits would lower the
cost of attracting funds to a certain extent thus giving more flexibility to the banking
sector in their lending decisions. In a nutshell, financial liberalisation policies would
stimulate financial intermediation and increase efficiency in the process of
mobilisation of finance. As a corollary, on aggregate more loanable funds would be
available for new investment purposes and thus would foster economic growth.
The general implication o f  the argument was that all o f  the above mentioned repressive policies 
would weaken confidence o f  agents in inside money. This in turn would worsen conditions for 
financial intermediation.
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Due to its straightforward policy implications, the McKinnon and Shaw thesis 
gained much popularity throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, with the support of 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank the theory was put into practise 
in many less developed countries. Regrettably, however, the theory failed in the 
majority of the countries that tried to implement policies highlighted in the McKinnon 
and Shaw theory. Since then their approach has been widely criticised (for general 
criticisms see Taylor, 1983, Arestis and Demetriades, 1993, Fry, 1995; for more 
fundamental (yet implicit) criticisms from the standpoint of agriculture dominated 
economies see Bhaduri, 1977 and 1983, Coats and Khatkhate, 1980, and Basu, 1984). 
The McKinnon and Shaw school deserves credit for having identified some of the 
basic problems faced by many less developing countries. However, it should also be 
noted that the policy proposals of the approach could not make the grade. Even if  the 
critique of this theory is not the focus o f this research, we would like to note several 
important issues that have direct relevance for our future analysis.
First, in contrast to the McKinnon and Shaw thesis, there is weak empirical 
support for the claim that allowing higher real rates of interest leads to substantially 
increased saving (Beim and Calomiris, 2001: 71). Moreover, since the real rate of 
interest can be seen as ‘a good proxy for the efficiency of capital accumulation’ (de 
Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995: 436-37), one must be careful not to confuse it with the 
marginal efficiency of capital (Chick, 1983: 207 and 2000).
In this regard, if  we accept the argument that the real rate of interest is indeed a 
good proxy for the efficiency of capital accumulation, then we can suggest that the 
increased saving may in fact be the outcome of a higher level o f capital accumulation, 
not a higher level of financial intermediation. Furthermore, as was discussed in 
Chapter 1, modem money and thus the entire financial superstructure is built upon the
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notion of confidence. If confidence in central bank money, for instance, falls, then 
there is a danger that the entire inverted pyramid of private financial sector (liability 
of which is inside money) may collapse. In this sense in the case of less developed 
countries, if agents do not have confidence in inside money, the size of the inverted 
pyramid (which is a proxy for financial development) will not expand regardless of 
the level of return promised on these assets. Therefore, raising the rate of interest is 
not a sufficient tool to attract idle savings into the formal financial system to boost 
financial intermediation. Policies directed towards building confidence in inside 
money, and its issuer - the private financial sector, may play an important role as well. 
In addition, if  saving in inside money is a new ‘culture’ for the agents, then, naturally 
the confidence-building period may take even longer time.
Second, the McKinnon and Shaw model is based on a loanable funds theory. 
(We already discussed the drawbacks of this approach earlier in Section 2.4.) This 
approach does not take into account the distinctiveness of contemporary banking 
business. Banks are distinct from the rest of the financial institutions in that their 
liabilities are accepted as money. In this sense, as will be discussed in the next 
section, after a certain stage o f banking development banks can finance investment 
prior to saving. (See for example Chick and Dow, 1988). This means that that the 
loanable funds theory cannot capture the credit creating potential o f the contemporary 
banking system.
Another drawback of the McKinnon and Shaw approach is that the model is 
based on an implicit assumption that the financial systems of developing countries are 
perfectly competitive (Arestis and Demetriades, 1993: 291-2). The corollary of this 
assumption, then, is that all agents possess collateral and thus have access to credit 
markets. High interest rates on loans in informal credit markets reflect the direct
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consequence of repressive redistributive polices undertaken by authorities. Therefore, 
ineffective informal credit markets will fade away shortly after liberalisation policies 
are carried out. This analysis, however, undermines the real economic structure of 
many developing countries.
The fact is that in most of the less developed countries the agricultural sector 
plays a predominant role. In this part of the economy both poverty and income 
inequality are equally appalling. In other words, in the agriculture sector subsistence 
production is evident. Therefore, the agricultural sector o f the economy is a dual 
economy (in the sense that a substantial part of the production in the sector is non­
monetized). The term monetization implies the enlargement of the use of money in 
the economic process through the absorption of the non-monetized sector 
(Chandavarkar, 1977: 714). One of the main reasons for the existence of a non­
monetized economy in the subsistence sector of many industrially backward modern- 
day dual economies could be the fact that individuals receive a sizeable part of their 
income in kind and production for own consumption is dominant In this sense, the 
unique nature of the economies of less developed countries necessitates employment 
of different techniques that take into account these peculiarities.
For instance, Bhaduri (1977 and 1983) drew attention to a peculiar 
characteristic of the informal credit markets in the backward subsistence agricultural 
sector. In contrast to the conventional literature on the issue, Bhaduri approaches the 
problem from the point of view of borrower's risk. Bhaduri reminds us o f the essence 
of two major problems that exist in informal credit markets o f less developed 
countries.
The first issue is that financial liberalisation alone might not be a sufficient 
recipe to eliminate informal credit markets. In a backward agriculture rural
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households borrow money mostly in small amounts predominantly for consumption 
purposes. A future crop, a small piece of land and even future labour commitments 
are offered as collateral. Most of this collateral, however, cannot be accepted as 
pledges by formal credit institutions. Since the informal local moneylenders have 
better knowledge about the ‘creditworthiness’ of their customers, they accept these 
and other types of unconventional collaterals. In short, this line o f reasoning implies 
that as long as the backward agricultural sector remains a subsistence sector and so 
long as production in this sector of the economy is not fully monetized and 
commercialised4, the informal moneylenders’ business will not vanish. Formal credit 
institutions will not be able satisfy rural households’ credit demand simply due to the 
quality of the collateral offered by rural households.
The second issue at stake is the excessively high rates of interest charged on 
loans in informal credit markets. Bhaduri (ibid.) argues that because of their 
monopolistic position informal lenders may severely undervalue the price of an asset 
offered as collateral. If the market price of the collateral sufficiently exceeds the 
lender’s valuation of an asset, then the lender is better off if  the loan is not repaid. 
Indeed, he makes a profit if the borrower defaults. Therefore, it makes sense to 
suggest that in the informal credit market lenders have an incentive to set the rate of 
interest on loans very high making it nearly impossible for borrowers to repay the 
loan. These circumstances necessitate the use o f a different approach to the analysis 
borrower’s risk and lender’s risk. In backward agriculture where subsistence 
production dominates it is the borrower’s risk rather lender’s risk that may deserve 
special attention. This, however, is not to suggest that the borrower's risk theory be 
used as an alternative dual to the lender's risk theory. Rather, it is to remind us that
As defined in Section 1.4 earlier.
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depending on the structure of the economy in question the analyst might consider in 
his analysis, the techniques put forward by both of the approaches.
In this regard if  we take into account that the agriculture sector is still 
paramount in the Uzbek economy5, and also consider the fact that both poverty and 
income inequality have risen equally disappointingly during the transition, we may 
expect the emergence o f subsistence production in the agricultural sector. However, in 
this work the focus o f our analysis will be on the activity of commercial banks, i.e. the 
formal credit market, in the transition economy of Uzbekistan. Therefore, while 
bearing this problem in mind, we may leave it for our future research.
3.4 Stages of Banking Development Framework
In our discussions in the previous chapters, and in the earlier sections of this chapter, 
in several occasions we made references, sometimes explicitly and sometimes 
implicitly, to the stages o f banking development framework, but did not discuss it in 
detail. Finally, in this section we will discuss the evolution of banks and their peculiar 
role in a market economy.
Our discussion will be based on the stages of banking development framework, 
which was originally developed by Chick (19926 and 1993). Further developments 
and different applications of the theory can be found elsewhere (Chick and Dow, 
1988; Dow, 1998 and 1999). The theory focuses on the evolution of the English 
banking system and succinctly and successfully summarises the main developments 
and changes in banking institutions and their behaviour.
Agricultural production accounts for more than one third o f  the GDP and employs more than 40 
percent o f the total labour force.
The original date o f  publication o f  this paper is 1986.
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This approach captures changes in the nature of banking business in capitalist 
economies through the passage of time. It distinguishes the evolution of banks in 
terms of special particularities of the development achieved by the system. The theory 
has profound implications for the theory of saving, investment and interest (Chick, 
1992) as well as for the conduct of monetary policy (Chick, 1993). In other words, on 
the one hand the theory settles an old argument between the loanable funds theory and 
Keynes’s (1970) theory of saving and investment on causality in the saving- 
investment nexus. It proves Keynes’s theory to be true. At the same time, however, it 
warns that Keynes’s theory ‘should not be seen as correct theory in triumph over error 
but as a change in what constituted correct theory due to the development o f  the 
banking sector’ (Chick, 1992: 194, emphasis added). On the other hand, the theory 
gives plenty of useful insights about the changes in the conduct of monetary policy 
necessitated by innovative developments in the banking sector. Moreover, in contrast 
to free banking theory and other mainstream theories that predict the gradual 
disappearance of the distinctiveness of banks, the theory shows that as long as there is 
a need for a safe asset in an economy and as long as bank liabilities are a generally 
acceptable means o f exchange, thus performing the safe asset function, banks will 
retain their distinctiveness among the sundry financial institutions.
The framework identifies seven stages of banking development. That is to say 
the theory tries to capture the main characteristics of the evolution o f banking by 
dividing the entire process of development into seven notional stages. The last two 
stages were added only in Chick’s second paper, 1993, which indicates that the 
process of evolution is still in progress. Below we will discuss the evolution of 
banking in a market economy, in the example of the English banking sector, in a
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chronological order. The main characteristics of the different stages are summarised 
in Table 3.4.1 (Dow, 1998 and 1999).
Table 3.4.1 The Stages of Banking Development_______________________________________
Stage 1: Pure financial intermediation____________________________________________
• Banks lend out savings
• Payment in commodity money
• No bank multiplier
_• Saving precedes investment________________________________________________
Stage 2: Bank deposits used as money____________________________________ _______
• Convenient to use paper money as means of payment
• Reduced drain on bank reserves
• Multiplier process possible
• Bank credit creation with fractional reserves
_•_____ Investment can now precede saving_________________________________________
Stage 3: Inter-bank lending_______________________________________________________
• Credit creation still constrained by reserves
• Risk of reserves loss offset by development of inter-bank lending
• Multiplier process works more quickly
_•_____ Multiplier larger because banks can hold lower reserves______________________
Stage 4: Lender-of-last-resort facility_____________________________________________
• Central bank perceives need to promote confidence in banking system
• Lender-of-last-resort facility provided if inter-bank lending inadequate
• Reserves now respond to demand
_•_____ Credit creation freed from reserves constraint________________________________
Stage 5: Liability m anagem ent___________________________________________________
• Competition form non-bank financial intermediaries drives struggle over market 
share
• Banks actively supply credit and seek deposits
• Competition over deposits pushes up interest rates, adding to cost-push 
inflation and encouraging industrial concentration as marginal firms fail cover costs
_•_____ Credit expansion diverges from real economic activity________________________
Stage 6 : Securitisation_____________________ ______________________________________
• Capital adequacy ratios introduced to curtail credit
• Banks have an increasing proportion of bad loans because of over-lending in
Stage 5
• Securitisation of bank assets
• Increase in off-balance sheet activity
• Drive to liquidity
• Bank are now highly vulnerable to market fluctuations in value of securities as
well as in capacity to raise capital___________
Stage 7: Market structural diffusion _______________________________________
• Trend to universalisation in financial services: diffusion between retail and
investment banking
• Competitive pressure due to deregulation
• Increased emphasis on services requiring increased on marketing
• Structural regulation being replaced by supervisory re-regulation, addressing
moral hazard issues, off-balance sheet activities, global diffusion______________________
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Stage 1. Pure Financial Intermediation. In the first stage of banking 
development commodity money is widely used as a means of exchange. Surplus units 
find it attractive to deposit their hoards in banks as a relatively safe way of saving. 
However, since there is not much confidence in the reliability of banks, the general 
public does not yet acknowledge the receipts on deposits, i.e. bank liabilities, as a 
generally acceptable means of payment. Deposits at this point represent savings and 
therefore transaction balances almost do not circulate through banks. Banks run their 
business independently from each other because they still do not know the advantages 
of working together as a united system. In other words, at this stage unit banking 
prevails; branch banking is not developed yet. Banks do conduct lending activities but 
in order to stay trustworthy they should back up their liquidity position with new 
deposits in the form of liquid reserves. In this sense banks’ lending activity is 
dependent upon the availability o f reserves, which in turn depends upon new deposits. 
In short, denoting R -  reserves, L -  loans or advances, and D -  deposits the causal 
chain can be shown as follows:
AD => AR => AL.
Hence in this stage of development banks merely act as financial intermediaries 
between savers and investors. Reserves are not yet fractional and the bank multiplier 
process is still non-existent. Financing of new investment decisions is strictly 
constrained by the availability of loanable funds. That is to say, saving simply 
precedes investment. In this respect the loanable funds theory is applicable only to 
this stage.
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It can be suggested that Stage 1 captures a comparatively long period of time in 
early banking history -  from the beginning of banking business to the early years of 
the Industrial Revolution. The process, however, was not static; developments 
occurred continuously. Two main distinctive developments in this stage obviously 
occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They were the transformation of 
goldsmiths, prosperous shopkeepers and merchants into bankers and the foundation of 
the Bank of England (Pringle, 1973: 16-20). The Bank of England was established 
with a Royal Charter in 1694 (ibid.) as a joint stock company. It is interesting to note 
that the Bank of England was a private commercial institutions and the immediate 
purpose behind the establishment of the bank was to raise money from the rich 
London merchants to finance the war against France. It is also worth noting the role of 
the legislature in the development of the banking business. Although the Bank of 
England was a commercial bank, laws were passed increasingly in favour of the bank. 
The trend can be explained by the existence of a special relationship established from 
the outset between the bank and the government. For instance, an Act of 1697 
prevented establishment of any more joint stock banks by Act o f Parliament. An Act 
of 1709 placed a limit to the issuance of notes by the joint stock type of banks. Pringle 
(ibid.) suggests that this legislation could have slowed down the process of banking 
development to a certain extent.
Stage 2. Bank Deposits Used As Money. In the second stage, the practice of 
banking, as we know it today, emerges from pure financial intermediation. Banks 
demonstrate their viability and win the public’s confidence. Convenience of the use of 
paper money is acknowledged. Bank liabilities (e.g. claims on deposits and bank 
notes) are increasingly used as a means of exchange. The most important condition 
here is the existence of the general public’s confidence in banks’ ability to convert
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their liabilities to coins upon first demand. Since the confidence in banks tends to rest 
on local knowledge, at this stage the use of titles to deposits as a means of exchange, 
unit of account and a store of value seem to be limited to the local geographic area 
(Dow, 1999: 37).
The development of branch banking and the consolidation of clearing 
arrangements promote the general public’s confidence and play an encouraging role 
in the use of bank liabilities as a means of payment. As confidence grows, there will 
be less need to for cashing in deposits. Bank liabilities soon become such a 
convenient means of payment that the public starts using them progressively more in 
a large part of their monetary transactions, coins being left for only the smaller kind of 
transactions. Consequently, banks became braver and started issuing notes in excess 
of the coins actually held with them. Hence banks learned to ‘create money’ (see 
Wilson, 1986: ch.l).
In general, acceptability of claims on deposits as money is of crucial importance 
at this stage o f banking development. The implication of this process is that now 
deposits represent not only saving but also transaction balances financing expenditure. 
Consequently, deposits may move from one bank to another but not leave the system 
as a whole to a significant extent. Mainly for this reason the redeposit ratio from bank 
lending will be high. Now, the primary constraint on lending is reserves, not deposits 
as it was in the first stage. Therefore, the causal chain takes the following form:
AR=> AL => AD.
That is to say if reserves go up (regardless of their source whether they are 
coming from new deposits - ‘primary deposits’, capital inflows or open market
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operations) banks as a whole can lend out a multiple of this amount. By doing so 
banks create secondary deposits as they finance new investment, which in turn 
generates income and the required saving (Chick and Dow, 1988: 231). In other 
words, the bank deposit multiplier theory is relevant at this stage. Banks now can 
create credit with fractional reserves. In general the extent of the credit creation 
depends upon the degree of centralisation of banks as a system. The more coherent 
the system is, the higher the credit creating capacity will be. Since loans made by 
banks tends to return to the banking sector as a deposit, for the system as whole, 
deposits will tend to increase, or to decrease, more or less to the same extent as loans 
(Wilson, 1986: 9). However, by convention, habit or some other force banks create far 
less credit than their theoretical limit allows them (Chick, 1992: 196).
Credit creating ability o f banks implies that now it is possible for investment to 
proceed without the need for prior saving, which in turn opens the way for Keynesian 
income multiplier (Chick, 1983 and Chick and Dow, 1988). Hence banks gain 
considerable experience in this stage that plays an important role in their further 
development.
Stage 3. Inter-bank Lending. Although in Stage 2 banks are already capable of 
creating credit, this activity is still constrained by the supply of coinage, which is 
required as reserves o f the banks, as well as the trust of the public in the soundness of 
banks. In Stage 3 banks learn to evolve techniques to ease these constraints. They 
realise ‘that it is in their mutual interests to develop a system o f  inter-bank lending 
(Dow, 1999: 38, emphasis in the original). Individual banks can extent credit in 
excess of the initial increase in reserves because now they are confident that they can 
borrow the required amount o f reserves from other banks, which have excess reserves. 
This means that in Stage 3 banks finally develop into a coherent system. Credit
creation is still constrained by the availability of reserves, but because of the 
development of inter-bank lending banks can now hold less reserves. The process of 
the deposit multiplier is quicker and credit creation is likely to reach the limits of the 
deposit multiplier. Increased availability of finance pushes its cost down. 
Consequently, the process facilitates economic growth.
Banks also learn that lack of trust of the public in the soundness of the banks is 
subject to contagion. If one bank fails, news quickly spreads and confidence in other 
banks may suffer as well. Therefore, maintenance of confidence is vital for the 
viability and further development o f the banking system. Because o f the importance 
of the banking system in the economic process, the authorities are also concerned 
about its feasibility and thus try to support the banking system. Therefore at this stage 
of banking development there may be a deliberate move by the authorities to create a 
central bank (Dow, 1999: 38). If this is not the case, then, the private sector itself may 
create a central bank to meet the needs of the banking system. Dow and Smithin 
(1999) prove the latter argument in terms of the experience of the Scottish banking 
system. Hence normally by Stage 3 of banking development the central bank is 
established. Liabilities of the central bank in the form of banknotes will add to the 
stock of reserve coinage, which in turn allows further expansion of the monetary base 
(Dow, 1999: 38).
Stage 4. Lender o f  Last Resort Facility. In the fourth stage, the central monetary 
authority starts taking an even more important role in banking business. It accepts 
responsibility for the stability of the financial system. As a lender of last resort the 
central bank commits itself to lend to any bank that finds itself in crises. This 
development is of critical importance because now the level of reserves becomes 
responsive to the demand of banks for reserves. Availability of the lender of last
!resort facility encourages banks to overlend because they know that if  they are short 
of reserves, in the worst scenario the central bank will come to rescue. ‘Banks 
collectively expanding credit can now do so without the risk o f  being caught short o f  
reserves, fo r  they will reliably be supplied by the authorities' (Chick, 1993: 83, 
emphasis added).
The only problem will be at what cost these funds will be supplied by the 
central bank. Even if  reserves are supplied at higher interest rates, banks may still 
create credit beyond the reserve capacity of the system. However, they will only 
deliberately do so if  they expect the expansion to be profitable. If the central bank has 
a stable interest rate policy and does not charge a penalty rate, the willingness of 
banks to expand will be greatest. If the central bank is pursuing the latter type of 
policy it can be said to be acting as a lender offirst resort (ibid.). Under this scenario 
reserves become endogenous to the banking system. The supply of bank credit 
becomes fully demand determined, and the supply of deposits simply follows.
In short, in the fourth stage, the central monetary authorities take full 
responsibility for promoting confidence in the banking system. The central bank does 
this primarily by providing the lender of last resort facility if inter-bank lending and 
other sources are insufficient to meet demand. Reserves become demand responsive 
and credit creation is no longer constrained by them. The causal chain appropriate for 
this stage can be described as follows:
ALd = AL => AD => AR,
where Ld means demand for loans and L is the actual volume of new loans.
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Stage 5. Liability Management. In previous stages of development changes in 
banking activity took place primarily on the asset side of the bank balance sheet. In 
Stage 5 banks enter the new phase in their development, liability management. As the 
public’s confidence in banks grew and bank liabilities were increasingly being used as 
a means of payment, the role of banks in the economic process grew in importance. 
The capacity o f the banks to create credit was further augmented by the enlargement 
of the supply of reserves made available by the central bank, which now performed 
the function of lender o f last resort. Since NBFIs use the liabilities of banks as their 
reserve base, this process stimulated a strengthening and spreading of the activity of 
NBFIs. As a corollary, banks found themselves in a position facing strong 
competition from NBFIs.7 The 1971 policy of ‘Competition and Credit Control’ 
further tightened conditions o f competition. It extended reserve requirements to a 
wide range of bank type of institutions. This in fact was an advantage for banks as 
they were no longer penalised by controls levied only on them. However, banks also 
had to abandon their cartelised lending and deposit rates. All conventions linking 
commercial bank lending and deposit rates to other interest rates were abolished. Thus 
banks were thrown into open competition among themselves and with other NBFIs.
The main objective behind the 1971 policy of the authorities, o f course, was an 
attempt to control the supply of money. The growth of money supply is affected 
mainly by the increase in bank lending either to the private sector or to the 
government. Since in both cases bank deposits are created, the supply of money will 
increase. In a way, the best choice for controlling the supply o f money would be to 
induce banks to cease lending and the general public to invest in government 
securities. However, since the new policy encouraged setting interest rates freely, the
Already in the end o f  1971 deposits o f  only three types o f  NBFIs, namely Building Societies, Saving 
Banks and Finance Companies, attracted from the UK residents stood at £15,590 million against 
£16,965 million o f  the banking sector (Pringle, 1973: 131, Table 1).
only way of achieving it would be to raise the yield on government securities and to 
let the rate of interest on bank loans rise in the hope that this would decrease the 
demand for and supply o f credit (Pringle, 1973: 112-130).
The banks’ response to the new policy changes, however, was totally different 
from what the monetary authorities had expected. Individual banks, facing strong 
competition from other banks as well as NBFIs, became increasingly concerned about 
their market position and took a much more pro-active stance in their business 
activities. Rather than just waiting for new loan requests, as they would have done in 
the past, now banks aggressively sought new lending opportunities. To match these 
new loans, then, banks had to compete with NBFIs for deposits. (This is where the 
terms liability management comes from.) This put upward pressure on interest rates 
on deposits. As a corollary, the cost of lending went up as well. Despite this fact, 
however, the supply o f and demand for loans did not shrink. The money supply kept 
growing at an unprecedented rate (Pringle, 1973: 126). There is reason to suggest that 
in the 1970s demand for loans seemed to be interest inelastic (Chick, 1993: 89).
The interesting point is that conventional belief would suggest that higher 
interest rates on loans would decrease demand for loans and in this way would allow 
only the most productive projects to be carried out. Stage 5 of banking development 
proved this belief inaccurate. The aggressive expansion of bank lending in Stage 5 
fuelled the financing of speculative activities, leaving the financing of real economic 
activity well behind and increasing the fragility of the overall economy. Hence in this 
stage of banking development availability of finance for investment or for any other 
purpose became a market phenomenon which in turn depended on bankers’ 
expectation and cost of funds (Chick, 1993: 84). In a nutshell, as the importance of the
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banking system in financing economic growth grew, the instability of the system also 
increased.
Stage 6. Securitisation. At the outset of Stage 6 banks have an increasing 
proportion of bad loans due to the fact that the excessive credit expansion of the 
1970s was not supported by real economic activity. The monetary authorities now 
realised that the supply o f reserves had become an endogenous variable to the system. 
(In fact, as we noted earlier, the supply of reserves had already become endogenous in 
Stage 4 of banking development with the establishment of the lender of last resort 
facility.) As a corollary, they turned to capital adequacy requirements in an effort to 
constrain both the volume of credit and excessive risk taking by banks (Dow, 1999: 
39 and Gardener, 1993: 120.). From the point of view of supervisory control, capital 
adequacy requirements were designed to restrain an excessive risk taking by 
individual banks and thus to maintain confidence in the entire banking system. This 
policy obliged banks to raise additional capital if they were to expand credit beyond 
the level allowed by their current capital holdings. In this sense the policy affected not 
only banks’ risk exposure but also their profitability and competitiveness (Gardener, 
1993: 120 and Heffeman, 2005).
In this regard the development of securitisation was a direct consequence of the 
afore-mentioned changes in banking environment. Gardener (1988: 16) defines 
securitisation as ‘the transformation of financial assets into securities that can be sold 
in capital markets’. Since capital adequacy requirements obliged banks to keep a 
percentage of their assets as capital, the securitisation technique helped them to 
bypass this constraint to a certain degree. Banks learned to transform their illiquid 
loans in their balance sheet into tradable securities. Usually, the loans initiated by 
banks are held as securities by NBFIs. The value of these securities, then, fluctuates
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with the market rate of interest for them. This may have a serious effect on banks, 
since the higher rate of interest reduces the capital value of banks (Chick, 1993: 90). 
In short, in Stage 6 banks are generally more vulnerable to market fluctuations in 
terms of both raising capital and variability of the value of securities.
Another distinctive characteristic of Stage 6 is the rise in off-balance-sheet 
activities. In this stage, banks became more and more involved in arranging 
syndicated loans, providing insurance, letters of guarantees, consultancy and advisory 
services and so forth. An interesting piece of research found that almost half of all the 
revenue of the leading 25 largest US banks in the late 1990s was generated by these 
forms of non-interest income (Radecki, 1999 in Hawkins, 2000: 73). Indeed, banks 
found these activities increasingly important in raising their profitability without 
violating capital adequacy regulations. However, off-balance-sheet exposures were 
also duly taken into account in later capital adequacy requirement regulations 
(Gardener and Molyneux, 1993: 57 and Heffeman, 2005).
Stage 7. Market Structural Diffusion. In Stage 7 of their development the 
distinctiveness o f banks among other financial institutions appears to be fading away. 
Due to deregulation, competitive pressure, technological change and innovation there 
is a trend of universalisation o f functions of banks and NBFIs. Traditionally banks 
used to hold assets of long-term maturity against sight liabilities. Banks were able to 
do so because their liabilities were of a peculiar character; they were accepted as a 
means of payment. The development of securitisation techniques is reducing the 
peculiarities of banks on the asset side, whereas liabilities of some of the NBFIs 
(building societies and money market mutual funds for instance) are increasingly 
being used as a means of payment. Some (the New Monetary Economists for 
instance) argue that legislation and regulations are the primary reasons behind the
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!distinctiveness o f banks. Therefore, on these grounds they suggest that as time passes 
and regulations erode, banks will no longer be the distinctive part of the financial 
system. The financial system then simply plays the role of intermediation thus 
eliminating the need for money in the form of bank deposits (Dow, 1996 and 1999).
However, the logic behind the Chick framework proves this suggestion wrong 
(Dow, 1999). It is true that traditional banking business is declining in relative 
importance within the financial system. Nevertheless, it will continue to play its 
fundamental role in providing the money base upon which the entire financial 
pyramid is built. This is explained by the role and importance of money and 
uncertainty associated with it in the economic process. As was argued in Chapter 1 
the successful working of the modem capitalist economies requires the existence of a 
liquid asset, which is a good store of value and whose unit serves as denominator of 
contracts. Although, in times of economic growth and prosperity other assets will 
increasingly be used as money, as uncertainty increases agents turn to an ultimate 
source of liquidity, which in modem economies by definition is the liabilities of banks 
and the central bank. And it is on this liquid base that the entire financial system is 
built.
Hence our analysis of the stages of banking development framework showed 
that ‘the banking system evolves, not only to satisfy the transactions and credit needs 
of the economy, but also to satisfy the need for a safe asset, money. The satisfaction 
of these needs is interdependent: only safe assets are generally acceptable in payment, 
and it is the fact that bank deposits circulate as means of payment which allows them 
the scope to create credit in anticipation of redeposit’ (Dow, 1998: 25).
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I3.5 Minsky’s Analysis and Instability of Finance
Our discussions so far in this chapter focused on the facilitating role o f finance in the 
economic process. We showed that the main channel through which financial 
institutions facilitate economic activity is through the mobilisation o f idle financial 
resources in the early stages of financial development, and creation of new credit after 
the banking system reaches the necessary maturity.
The weakness of this type of approach, however, was that it left the destructive 
role of finance unnoticed. In fact, as we have already shown in our first two chapters, 
the very financial feature of money can well explain to us why the financial system 
and thus the overall economy can become vulnerable at times. To put it in a few 
words, agents’ preference for liquidity rises as their anxiety about the uncertain future 
increases. As a corollary, the money rate of interest can exceed the marginal 
efficiency of capital well before the economy reaches its full employment level. In the 
previous two chapters we showed the validity and applicability of Keynes’s original 
arguments to a contemporary world.
The role of finance in Keynes’s monetary theory was further explicated by 
Minsky. Inspired by Keynes’s works Minsky (1975 and 1982) developed his own 
theory of investment (or financial instability hypothesis as Minsky referred to his 
theory). Minsky’s main contribution to the theory of monetary analysis is that 
capitalist markets are inherently unstable and financial instability is an inevitable part 
of it. According to this theory, general financial conditions, i.e. finance, plays a 
crucial part in determining the level of investment, employment and thus total output. 
The object of Minsky’s analysis, similar to that of Keynes, is the working of a 
capitalist market economy in its advanced stage of development. As Keynes noted in
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one of his post General Theory articles, in an advanced capitalist economy 
mobilisation o f finance in the sense of financial deepening is not a major problem. 
Rather financial conditions in general, and the instability of finance in particular are 
the issues at stake. In other words, in Minsky’s analysis finance is potentially 
available but because o f the existence of uncertainty as such it is inherently unstable. 
Below we will discuss this theory in brief (for details see Minsky, 1975 and 1982). 
Figure 3.5.1 will help us to underline the main essence of Minsky’s argument.
Following Keynes’s (1970: 144) distinction between borrower’s risk and 
lender’s risk, Minsky gives special attention to these two notions in his analysis. 
Investment can be financed either from internal sources (retained earnings) or from 
external sources (bank credit). Firms finance their new investment decisions partially 
by their own funds and partially by borrowing from outside sources. Since finance is 
potentially available, profit maximising firms make complete use of different types of 
financial instruments (loans, bonds, shares, etc.) in their everyday economic activity. 
Consequently, firms are bound by financial contracts to redirect a part of their current 
profits to discharge loans attracted from external sources.
The potential availability of finance implies that lack of finance is not a major 
problem for new investment, rather terms and conditions of forthcoming finance is an 
issue. In this regard, ‘... the fundamental speculative decision by a firm is how to 
finance control over its needed capital assets: how much by the fir m ’s own resources 
and how much by borrowed resources’ (Minsky, 1975: 107, emphasis added). This 
decision in turn determines not only the firm’s size but also growth of its capital 
assets and profit. Minsky discusses this issue in an example of a representative firm. 
Figure 3.5.1 below attempts to illustrate the theory.
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Figure 3.5.1. Financing Conditions and Investment
A profit maximising firm’s planned investment depends, among others things, 
upon the expected value o f new investment (Pk), its cost (Pi) and the terms and 
conditions of finance to be attracted from banks. Although finance is not scarce, its 
terms and conditions depend on both the lender’s and the borrower’s perception of 
risk attached to the successful realisation of the project in question. In this regard, 
finance is not infinitely responsive to demand. The firm can finance new investment 
up to the point I from its own resources. At this point firm’s retained earnings (Q) (the 
rectangular hyperbola QQ in the diagram) equals the cost of investment (Pi) times 
amount of investment (I), i.e. Q=PiI. As long as Pr exceeds Pi the firm expects to 
make profit from new investment activity and thus will be willing to borrow. The 
expected profit to be earned from new investment activity, then, is n=(Pk -Pi)Ij. If 
making profit from each and every new investment were certain so that the only 
sacrifice required from the firm were the devotion of an honest effort for a certain
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!period of time to implement the project successfully, then the demand for credit (with 
respect to the cost of borrowing) would be infinitely elastic. However, in the real 
world agents operate in an uncertain world where they face unquantifiable risk 
attached to any project involving time. Under these circumstances the notion of 
borrower’s risk becomes essential. Borrower’s risk ‘arises out o f doubts in his own 
mind as to the probability o f his actually earning the prospective yield for which he 
hopes’ (Keynes, 1970). Therefore, the borrower’s perceived risk increases as the 
amount of new investment, and thus the amount of outside borrowing, goes up. In 
other words, borrower’s demand for credit decreases as his perceived risk increases. 
This is shown as the DPk curve in Figure 3.5.1. Perceived borrower’s risk is the 
distance between the Pk curve and the DPk curve.
Similarly, for the same reasons discussed above the supply of credit is not 
perfectly elastic all along Pi. The slope of SPk depends, among other things, on bank’s 
confidence in the profitability of investment (Pk). Lender’s risk rises as ratios for 
firm’s debt to equity financing or committed cash flows to total prospective cash 
flows rise. This will be reflected in ‘higher interest rates, shorter terms to maturity [of 
loans], a requirement to pledge specific assets as collateral, and restrictions on further 
borrowing’ (Minsky, 1975: 116). The intersection of the SPk curve and the DPk curve 
determines the level of externally financed new investment (Ij - 1).8 Future profit from 
the new investment, (I, - I)(Pk - Pi), will be shared by the borrower and the lender 
alike. The lender gets his share in the form of interest rate cost.
Both borrower’s and lender’s confidence in the profitability o f investment plays 
an equally important role in determining the level of new investment. In Figure 3.5.1 
the SPk(b) curve and the Pk(b) curve represent a boom in the business cycle. Usually
g
In the original analysis Minsky uses marginal supply curve. For the sake o f  simplicity o f  exposition 
we didn’t go into details.
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Iduring the boom expectations about the future yields are high. Therefore, ‘the popular 
estimation of the magnitude of both these risks, both borrower’s risk and lender’s risk, 
is apt to become unusually and imprudently low’ (Keynes, 1970: 145). As a result, 
during the boom credit supply and credit demand curves tend to be flatter. In our 
particular example at the intersection of these two curves Ii amount of new 
investment takes place.
During a slump in business cycle expectations about the future yield on new 
investments tend to become very low. Thus steeper credit demand and credit supply 
curves, the DPk(S) curve and the SPk(S) curve respectively, represent lower expectation 
on future profit prospects which usually occurs during the downturn in business cycle. 
Under this scenario only h  amount of new investment takes place.
Figure 3.5.1 shows the above-mentioned two cases only. In fact, depending 
upon general economic conditions and thus terms and conditions of finance, the 
expected profit margin from new investment (Pk - Pi) and retained earnings may 
shrink. In its extreme case Pi may well exceed Pk so that no new investment takes 
place.
Minsky (1982) develops this microanalysis into a macro theory by identifying 
three types of financial ‘postures’ in terms of cash flow analysis. He argues that firms’ 
leverage may increase due to two major reasons. First, profit maximising firms’ are 
always looking forward to making profit from any and every opportunity. In this 
sense they take advantage of the availability of finance and readily go into debt today 
for the sake of future profit that involves unquantifiable risk. Second, if they are 
already engaged in external financing schemes, then if the interest cost on existing 
loans goes up unexpectedly, they may be forced to go further into debt in order to 
honour interest payments on outstanding debt.
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Given these conditions, and assuming Pk>Pi, firms may use three types of 
financing schemes in their economic activity.
- Hedge finance. This is a healthy financing scheme. Under this method of 
financing firms’ current earnings from past projects are expected to exceed current 
cash commitments on outstanding debts.
- Speculative finance. Under this scheme of financing firms’ current earnings 
may or may not be sufficient to cover interest costs. Therefore, the viability of firms 
depends on higher capital gains from new investment and lower interest costs on 
outstanding debts in the future. In normal cases, firms are confident that in the worst 
scenario they can borrow short-term loans to pay the difference they are not able to 
make from their investments.
- Ponzi finance. Under this financing posture current earnings are not 
sufficient to cover interest cost on outstanding debt. Therefore, firms using Ponzi 
financing scheme can meet their payment obligations on outstanding debt only by 
borrowing.
Firms running their business under speculative and, even more so, Ponzi 
financing postures are heavily exposed to the risk of default. This is just because their 
expected earnings from new investment are not certain. During the upturn in the 
business cycle usually capital assets are priced high. Since the perception of 
borrower’s risk and lender’s risk tends to be low during the upturn, finance is 
available at cheaper cost for new business decisions. Therefore, overoptimistic firms 
engage themselves in excessive external borrowing. More and more firms now take 
speculative and Ponzi financing positions making themselves financially vulnerable to 
fluctuations on the rate of interest on loans. The increasing use of loans for financing 
speculative activities leaves the financing of real economic activity well behind and
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Iintensifies the fragility o f overall economy. Thus in the upturn the entire financial 
structure becomes fragile.
When the downturn in business cycle starts, interest rates start rising, whereas 
price of capital assets falls. Both the perception of borrower’s risk and lender’s risk go 
up. Although demand for credit to finance new investment goes down, cash-strapped 
firms’ demand for credit to pay interest commitments on loans goes up. The rate of 
interest on loans rises and new investment decisions will be postponed. As a 
corollary, unemployment rises. Under these circumstances the financial condition of 
all three ‘financing postures’ deteriorates. While the position of the hedge financing 
units becomes more like speculative or Ponzi, speculative and Ponzi financing units 
may in fact go bankrupt. Finally when this happens, demand for credit falls and thus 
interest rates fall as well. With lower interest rates business activity, however, does 
not revive at once. Rather it may take some time for the business confidence to 
recover. Hence in short, Minsky’s analysis shows that finance might have both 
creative as well as destructive effects on economic activity.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we extended our analysis to the role of finance in economic 
development. In a market economy the cost and availability of finance set the pace of 
new investment and thus economic growth. Since financing decisions necessarily 
involve time, the cost of finance reflects not only the scarcity of financial resources 
but also the degree of confidence about the uncertain future.
Among financial institutions banks play a special role in facilitating economic 
activity. The main contributions o f the banking sector to financial development are
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Iprovision of a safe asset in terms of which contracts, price lists and debt instruments 
are denominated; organisation of the payment system of the entire economy by 
serving as a clearing centre; and satisfying the credit demand of the economic system. 
As banks evolve the importance of these functions grows in vitality. After the second 
stage of banking development banks are capable of removing the constraint of 
‘priority of saving’ over investment. Also in the later stage of banking development 
bank liabilities are used not only as a means of payment but also as reserves by 
NBFIs. In this way banks play an even more important role in facilitating financial 
deepening in market economies.
In general, we can say that the nature and essence of the role of finance in the 
economic process is revealed through the functions the financial system performs. If 
we can summarise these functions, then, the financial system provides: opportunities 
for transferring economic resources through time and across space; prospects for 
managing risk; ways o f maturity transformation; ways of clearing and settling 
payments to facilitate trade; and last but not least opportunities to carry out new 
investment decisions by creating credit well before the actual saving takes place.
To summarise the main points of this chapter, we discussed the role of finance 
in the economic process. We noted two aspects of finance in the economic process: 
facilitating and hindering. The development of financial institutions and thus financial 
intermediation and credit creation will undoubtedly foster economic growth. At the 
same time, however, the inherent instability of the financial superstructure implies 
that potential vulnerability of the overall economy may grow as the degree of 
financial deepening increases. As Minsky (1975: 130) put it ‘it is finance that acts as 
the sometimes dampening, sometimes amplifying governor of investment. As a result, 
finance sets the pace for the economy’. Therefore, as has been suggested elsewhere
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(Minsky, 1982) the working of advanced capitalist economies necessitates cautious 
and prudent management of money and financial systems.
Hence, this chapter concludes the analysis of the working of a monetary 
economy and the role and importance money and financial institutions play in it. The 
conclusions drawn from the first three chapters will be of crucial importance to our 
analysis of the working o f a centrally planned economy in the next chapter, and the 
process of transition thereafter. Since the economic structure of transition economies 
is gradually to take the shape of the monetary economy, the framework of modem 
monetary economies will be used as a benchmark in our analysis of the working of 
the transition economy of Uzbekistan in the chapters to follow.
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4. Money and Banking in the Centrally Planned Economy 
of the Former Soviet Union
Moziyga qaitib ish ko'rishni xairlik deydilar.
(It is virtuous, it is said, to start your work by revisiting the past.)
A . Qodiriy (1926)
4.1 Introduction
In the previous three chapters we discussed the role of money, finance and banks in a 
market economy. In a market economy money represents a universalised title to tradable 
goods and services. As a unit of account money is an active and inseparable ingredient of 
the process of production. Money and liquidity preference associated with it play a 
peculiar, facilitating and constraining, role in the economic process. Money and general 
conditions of finance can play a paramount importance in determining the level of output, 
investment and thus employment. In a capitalist economy money and finance does not 
passively accommodate real economic activity. They play an active role and set the pace 
of investment.
In Chapter 3 we also gave special attention to the role of banks in the economic 
process. Banks have very special place in market economies. After the second stage of 
development banks collectively can create credit independently of the level of saving in 
the economy. That is to say in a market economy with an advanced banking system, it is 
actually investment that determines the level of saving through changes in income. In 
advanced market economies banks create credit endogenously. However, since banks 
themselves have liquidity preference, the supply of credit is not always fully responsive
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to demand. Moreover, banks’ special role in the system is not limited to the credit 
creating function. Since liabilities of banks are used as money and are kept by other 
NBFIs as reserves, banks play the role of the source of liquidity for the entire financial 
system.
Now, since this study investigates evolution of money and banking in Uzbekistan 
under transition from a historical point of view, before starting the analysis of the 
transition economy of Uzbekistan, we will look at the organisation, role and importance 
of money and banking in the traditional economy of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The 
rationale behind this exercise is to provide us with a clear idea about the initial 
background from which the economics of transition took off.
The role of money and banking were different under central planning. These 
institutions were designed to play only an accommodative role in the economic process. 
To understand why these institutions were designed to function differently, we have to 
understand the very philosophical foundations of centrally planned economies. Therefore, 
Section 4.2 starts our investigation by discussing the theoretical and philosophical 
foundations of central planning. We will briefly discuss Marx and Lenin’s view on both 
money and the design of a communist economy. Next, in Section 4.3, we look at the role 
of money in two distinctive periods of change in soviet economic history, namely War 
Communism and New Economic Policy. We will also discuss early dilemmas on the 
speed of industrialisation and the method of central planning. Effects of these choices on 
the role and design of money and banking will be discussed in Section 4.4, which covers 
the period of ‘classical’ planning, i.e., the period leading up to the beginning of the 
process of fundamental reforms known as perestroika (restructuring).
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4.2 Marx and Lenin on Money, Banks and Planning
As is the case with works of many great economists, Marx’s writings are interpreted in 
many different ways. One interpretation of Marx that dominated in the FSU was that of 
class struggle between the working class and capitalists. The underlying assumption of 
this interpretation then was that a capitalist economy was not capable of achieving 
objectives of social ‘justice’ such as full employment, equal distribution of income, 
opportunities, etc.
A capitalist economy’s organisational structure and design were blamed for such a 
failure. Marx’s teachings, especially the soviet interpretation of them, implied that direct 
human interference in terms of planning all economic decisions in advance was necessary 
for the stability of the system. In other words, the way in which capitalist economies 
worked was the result of human action, but human beings did not specifically design the 
process. Therefore, it was argued that under socialism human action should be given an 
active role in managing the economic system so that it purposefully determined the 
design of society. Construction of a centrally planned economy in the FSU was, by and 
large, a fruit of this line of reasoning. (See Ellman, 1989: 10 and Temkin, 1994: 197-8 
among others.)
Marx believed that one of the reasons why a capitalist economy was inherently 
unstable was the anarchy of production. Capitalist overproduction or crisis was seen as a 
result of a class struggle associated with the lack o f organisation and planning in the 
economic process. As an alternative to this economy Marx advocated a communist 
economy, in which the anarchy of production would be replaced by central planning so
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that it would become an organised and orderly system (Temkin, 1998: 308).1 In other 
words, the commodity exchange system of a capitalist economy would be replaced by 
production for use, not for exchange (Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, 1994: 28). 
Centralisation of the entire process of production, in turn, would imply elimination o f the 
market from the system. One of the drawbacks of this process, however, was that any 
such centralisation would inevitably end up having ‘a multilevel, hierarchically organised 
plan-bureaucracy as its functionally inescapable accompaniment’ (Nove, 1991: 63).
One of the important aspects in Marx’s analysis of a capitalist economy was the 
role of money in the economic process. In the writings of the classical economists prior to 
Marx, money was seen as a neutral link, merely connecting transactions of purchase and 
sale. In their analysis, all transactions were ‘spot transactions, taking place -  somehow! -  
simultaneously’ (Hicks, 1989: 47). Money was seen only as a means of facilitating 
exchange. As once noted by Ricardo ‘Productions are always bought by productions, or 
by services; money is only the medium by which the exchange is effected’ (quoted in 
Sardoni, 1987: 16). In other words, money was never kept idle and this was a 
fundamental assumption of the classical school, rejection of which would mean that 
Say’s Law would not hold.
Marx did not accept this assumption. Referring to Ricardo’s above-mentioned 
statement, Marx said that it was ‘the childish babbling’ of Say ‘but unworthy of Ricardo’ 
(quoted in Sweezy, 1970: 137). Marx disagreed with this point on the following grounds. 
Commodities (C) are directly exchanged for commodities, i.e. C-C, in a simple barter 
economy without money. Here a person who is selling his commodity is concurrently 
involved in buying somebody else’s commodity. That is to say acts of purchase and sale
Temkin (1998: 308) suggests that actually Marx borrowed these ideas from Saint-Simon.
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are necessarily inseparable, which in turn implies that supply creates its own demand. 
Hence, theoretically a barter economy is an ideal environment for Say’s Law to hold.
Marx argued that in a commodity production economy, where money is employed 
to effect exchanges, Say’s Law does not necessarily hold true. To explain this process 
Marx uses the metamorphosis ‘C-M-C’, where M stands for money. He shows that when 
money is used in an exchange transaction, the act of sale and purchase for an individual 
trader does not necessarily have to be simultaneous. When the trader sells his commodity 
for money, money enables him to postpone the act of a new purchase. In Marx’s own 
words ‘The purchaser has the commodity, the seller has the money.... No one can sell 
unless someone purchases. But no one is forthwith bound to purchase because he has just 
sold’ (quoted in De Brunhoff, 1976: 42). Hence money separates the transaction in time 
and space, i.e. C-M and M-C are separate transactions now. As a result, when hoarded, 
money holds effective demand back and thus creates the possibility for general 
overproduction and thus crisis. (See De Brunhoff, 1976, Sweezy, 1970 and Sardoni, 
1987.)
The nature of a commodity production economy is that the exchange values of C at 
the beginning and C at the end are identical. The only reason for an individual to engage 
in trade is to gain a higher use value. That is to say in this economy production is for 
consumption. This implies that the crisis of overproduction is unlikely to occur in this 
economy.
The case is much more serious in the case of a capitalist economy, in which the 
driving force of production is profit, not consumption. In a capitalist economy the 
dominant form of circulation is in the form of M-C-M'. That is to say, capitalists spend 
their money on labour and other means of production to start the process of production.
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After the completion of a production cycle, they convert newly produced commodities 
back into money (M'). Unless M' is expected to be greater than M, capitalists do not start 
up their business. It is more likely that overproduction and thus crisis can occur in this 
economy. If capitalists think that the rate of profit is not high enough to lure them to 
throw their capital into circulation, they may decide to hoard, i.e. keep their capital in 
monetary form. As a result, some of the goods already produced will not be sold due to 
the lack of effective demand. The result is the crisis of overproduction; the coexistence of 
stocks of unsold commodities and unsatisfied wants.
All in all, Marx was well aware that the mere existence of money in a capitalist 
economy would make crises possible (De Brunhoff, 1976: 40) and the contradiction of 
capitalist production could turn this possibility into reality (Geraschenko, 1970: 117). 
Interestingly enough, in many ways Marx’s analysis of a capitalist economy and his 
rejection of Say’s Law is similar to Keynes’s analysis of an entrepreneur economy and 
his rejection of the same law (discussed in Chapter 1). Sardoni (1987), however, 
convincingly argues that although Keynes and Marx made similar conclusions about the 
non-neutrality of money in a capitalist economy, their approaches were completely 
different from each other methodologically.
Now, Marx also believed that money was a means by which the bourgeois class 
thrived by parasitically sucking the ‘blood’ of the working class. Since money served as a 
means of accumulation of capital, it was seen as a necessary evil and therefore relevant 
only to a capitalistic mode of production. Thus in a communistic society, Marx had in 
mind, there would be no room left for capitalist money. Marx was very clear about this in 
his famous work Capital:
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In the case o f  socialised production the money-capital is eliminated. Society distributes labour- 
power and means o f  production to the different branches o f production. The producers may, for 
all it matters, receive paper vouchers entitling them to withdraw from the social supplies o f  
consumer goods a quantity corresponding to their labour-time. These vouchers are not money. 
They do not circulate.2 (Marx, 1893: Ch.18)
Lenin readily borrowed the idea of a moneyless society from Marx. In his the State 
and Revolution, commenting on Marx’s Critique o f the Gotha Programme and describing 
the attributes of the communist society, Lenin wrote:
The means o f  production are no longer the private property o f  individuals. The means o f  
production belong to the whole society. Every member o f  the society, performing a certain part 
of socially-necessary labour, receives a certificate from society to the effect that he has done 
such and such an amount o f  work. And with this certificate, he draws from the social stock o f  
means o f consumption, a corresponding quantity o f products. After deduction o f  the amount o f  
labour which goes to the public fund, every worker, therefore, receives from society as much as 
he has given it. (Lenin, 1938: 96)
Marx and Lenin’s conclusion in favour of a moneyless economy was not 
unthoughtful. They rightly concluded that the very existence of money explained the 
inherent instability o f a capitalist mode of production. According to them money that 
serves as a unit of account, a means of exchange and a store of value was the cornerstone
In his other work, Critique o f  the Gotha Programme, one can find words with exactly the same spirit. We 
quote: “Accordingly the individual producer receives back from society — after the deductions have been 
made — exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it is his individual amount o f  labour. For example, 
the social working day consists o f  the sum o f the individual labour hours; the individual labour time o f the 
individual producer is the part o f  the social labour day contributed by him, his share in it. He receives a 
certificate from society that he has furnished such and such an amount o f labour (after deducting his labour 
for the common fund), and with this certificate he draws from the social stock o f  means o f consumption as 
much as costs the same amount o f  labour. The same amount o f  labour which he has given to society in one 
form, he receives back in another” (Marx, 1938: 11-12).
125
of a capitalist economy based on a decentralised exchange system.
In a nutshell, an economy advocated by Marx and Lenin had to be free from any of 
the instability that is seen as an inherent feature of a capitalist system. It is because the 
instability of an economy and the cyclical character of unemployment was unacceptable 
in a communist economy. To look at the issue from a different perspective, theoretically, 
centralisation of the entire process of production and distribution would imply 
elimination of capitalist uncertainty, which is embedded in the very structure of a 
decentralised capitalist economy. Moreover, in an economy where the entire process of 
production and distribution is centrally planned from above there is no need for capitalist 
money anyway.
Capitalist money as such plays a crucial role in an economy based on private 
property rights. In a capitalist economy decision-making is carried out in a decentralised 
way by millions of individual private proprietors. It is a free market response to 
uncertainty (which in itself is an inherent feature of a decentralised economy) that gives 
money its peculiarity and thus non-neutrality in the economic process (Rousseas, 1992). 
In this sense central planning can be seen as a socialist response to uncertainty. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to see rejection of money in a socialist economy.
Essentially in a socialist economy central planning takes over the role of money to 
deal with uncertainty in the process of production. Thus, generally speaking, by means of 
planning the process of production and distribution, fluctuations in effective demand are 
removed and the problem of chronic unemployment is eliminated. Theoretically, then, in 
an economy organised in this way there would not be any uncertainty associated with a 
capitalist mode of production.
To summarise, Marx and Lenin advocated an economic system where the process
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of production and distribution would be planned. They also agued that in an economy 
organised in that way there would be no need for money, except perhaps for its use as a 
means of exchange.
The reason why we touched upon Marx’s and Lenin’s views on money and 
planning in this section was to show that it was on these very foundations that the soviet 
economic theory was built. We would like to indicate that, although extremely general, 
the very idea of economic planning and abandoning money from the economic process 
became a dogma of the soviet ideology and as such remained as a constraint in economic 
thinking at least until the perestroika reforms began.
Now, in the next section we will start our discussion of the organisation of the 
soviet economy. We decided to begin our analysis from the very outset of the 
establishment of the soviet economic system. The rationale behind this is very simple, yet 
important. This method enables us to observe not only the evolution of soviet economic 
theory through time in the face of practical difficulties associated with its 
implementation, but also the very fundamental reason why money and banks were 
passive ingredients of the system. Hence the main purpose in the next section is to 
examine two contrasting approaches towards money and banks during the period of war 
communism and the NEP.
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4.3 Money and Banking during the Early Years of the Soviet Economy
4.3.1 Money and Banks during the period o f War Communism
War communism is ‘the name commonly given to the period of extreme communization’ 
(Nove, 1992: 39.). During this period trade was replaced by a coercive exchange system 
maintained by administrative and military measures (Kuschpeta, 1978: 26). The war 
communism, full of chaos, combat, anarchy, and, of course, revolutionary romanticism, 
lasted for only about three years, from 1918 to 1921. Nevertheless, it was one of those 
decisive moments in soviet economic history that had a great impact on the future of the 
monetary-financial system of the soviet economy. The period of War Communism gave 
the Bolsheviks a unique chance to implement Marxist ideas about a communist economy.
After the revolution Lenin’s view on the moneyless, marketless character of a 
socialist economy was still very strong. He went so far in advocating this theory that he 
included the following paragraph in the 1919 Draft of the Russian Communist Party 
(RCP): ‘The R.C.P. will strive as speedily as possible to introduce the most radical 
measures to pave the way for the abolishing o f money’ (quoted in Temkin, 1998: 313, 
emphasis added).
Indeed, the idea of abolishing money was so widespread that it was treated as an 
unquestionable attribute of an economy the Bolsheviks wanted to build. In one of the 
first economics textbooks on a socialist economy, the ABC o f Communism, Bukharin and 
Preobrazhensky (1994) described a socialist economy as a moneyless economy. 
Summarising the debate on this issue, Yurovsky (1994) also noted that this matter was 
n°t just an intellectual debate among curious communist economists. It definitely had
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practical implications. Several special study groups were set up to study practical 
problems associated with establishing a moneyless economy. Some later generation 
soviet economists (Geraschenko, 1970: 108 and Shenger, 1984: ch.l) also admit that 
demonetisation of the economy was a purposeful attempt by the authorities to establish a 
moneyless economy, inspired by Marx and Lenin’s thoughts on the issue.
As to banks, Lenin understood their role to be of high importance in successful 
completion of the revolution and regulation of the economic life. In line with Marxist 
teachings, he maintained the opinion that the banks had to be nationalised. As recently as 
on the eve of the revolution he said that ‘a single state bank, the largest of the large, with 
branches in every parish and factory would already mean nine tenths of the socialistic 
apparatus’ (Lenin, 1938: 96). However, in an economy advocated by Lenin, the functions 
of banks would be completely different from those in a capitalist economy. They would 
be limited mainly to accounting and control. Although banks would become an important 
mechanism of the system, their role as a financial institution would be passive and 
accommodative.
In this sense, the Bolshevik government’s sending of the Red Guards to occupy the 
Gosbank (the State Bank) within the first few days of the revolution was not a surprise. 
Already in November 1917 all private banks were closed, the management of the 
Gosbank was replaced with soviet commissars and further steps were taken towards the 
unification of the banking system into a single body. Within a few months the Gosbank 
was renamed Narodny Bank (People’s Bank) and the whole banking system was declared 
to be a state monopoly and thus nationalisation of the banking system was complete. In 
short, in the last two months of 1917 all major banks were liquidated and merged with 
Narodny Bank.
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The centralisation of the whole banking system in one single body, as Lenin 
advocated in the beginning of the revolution, gave the young soviet government a great 
advantage in the manipulation of the entire financial system according to their needs. At 
the start of its activity Narodny Bank was the clearing centre of the economy and also 
was authorised to be in charge of money-issuing activity. In addition, the bank was 
engaged in providing short-term credits to the economy. However, the credit activity of 
the bank lost its importance after it was decided that all financing decisions would be 
taken through the State Budget. Centralisation of financial decisions in the hands of the 
Commissariat of Finance had two important implications. First, it was a prelude to giving 
crucial importance to physical distribution, which inevitably downgraded the role of 
money and banks in the economic process. Second, provision of enterprise finance by the 
centre in the end created the problem of ‘soft budget constraints’.
Nationalisation of the industrial sector after the revolution implied that the soviet 
industry headquarters -  the VSNKh (the Supreme Council for National Economy) -  was 
now in charge of production and supply of industrial products. Centralisation of the 
process of production in the industrial sector gave the government the opportunity to 
deliver raw materials for enterprises free of charge and thus enabled her to distribute 
produced goods accordingly at her sole discretion. In other words the VSNKh effectively 
became an official central body in charge of organising moneyless exchange transactions 
in the socialised sector of the economy, which at this stage mainly consisted of the 
industrial sector.
As a result of these policies, not only the concept of loss and profit but also the 
notion of market-determined price became irrelevant (Kuschpeta, 1978: 27). Now, 
economic relations among state enterprises were brought about predominantly in physical
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terms, i.e. tons, meters, litres, etc. Starting from 1919, money accounts of the enterprises 
ceased to be important. That is to say, accounting for the passage of goods from a state 
enterprise to a state enterprise in their various stages of manufacture, and their final 
transfer to the individual consumer, was done in physical terms. (See Davies, 1958: 38-9 
for details.)
In addition, in cities some services were provided free of charge. It is reported that 
towards the end of 1920 steps were deliberately taken to abolish monetary charges for the 
use of a number of services: postal, telegraph and telephone facilities; water and 
electricity supply; housing accommodation in municipal dwellings; railway travel; supply 
of basic food rations, etc (Dobb, 1966: 106 and Geraschenko, 1970: 32). It is reported 
that, at the beginning of 1921, 93% of all wages were paid in kind against 7% in money 
(Geraschenko, 1970: 31 and Kuschpeta, 1978: 28).
Thus during the first three years of governing the country, the soviet government 
effectively transferred the economy from a monetary economy into a ‘glorified’ barter 
one. Taxes and wages were paid in kind. In cities most of the products and services were 
provided free of charge.3 More importantly money and credit ceased to play a connecting 
role in inter-enterprise relations. These policies downgraded the role of the monetary 
exchange system even further.
As the role of monetary exchange steadily declined, so did the importance of the 
Narodny Bank in serving the interests of the soviet government. High inflation and a 
seriously demonetised economy deprived Narodny Bank of accomplishing its credit- 
extending function and it became only a de facto Central Clearing Office of the soviet
Presumably, it was assumed that workers were getting their share o f output from the social fund, to the 
formation of which they already contributed in the form o f working hours.
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economy. As a result, on 19 January 1920 Narodny Bank ‘was liquidated and its assets 
and liabilities were transferred to the Central Budgeting and Accounting Department o f  
the Commissariat o f  Finance' (Baykov, 1946: 35, emphasis added).
Within the first couple of years of ruling the country, the Bolsheviks seriously 
demonetised the economy and put an end to the banking sector. Thus the existence of 
both a firm theoretical background and the gradual development of the events in 
accordance with it show that the period of war communism was the very time for the 
Bolsheviks to experiment with their ideas of a moneyless and marketless society. 
Nonetheless, we should also note that it is possible that some of the decisions made by 
the authorities during this period could have been necessitated by the emergency situation 
(most probably it might have been true with regard to agriculture, where the private 
sector still dominated production).
The experiment, however, turned out to be a disaster. When finally the civil war 
ended in 1920, the total production of the country was well below its pre-war 1913 level. 
By the end of 1920 industrial output was equal to only one fifth, agricultural production 
to almost two thirds, and transportation to a little over one fifth of their pre-war levels 
(Gregory and Stuart, 1998: 48). As a result, the political situation was getting 
unfavourable to the new government. It was again Lenin himself who assessed the 
situation correctly with his intelligent and pragmatic approach and completely changed 
the course of events by announcing the New Economic Policy (NEP).
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4.3.2 Money and Banks during the NEP
As a pragmatic leader, Lenin was among the first to note the impracticability of 
abolishing money within such a short period of time. Already in May 1919 Lenin 
asserted that ‘immediate abolition of money is not possible. In order to abolish money, it 
is necessary to organise distribution of commodities for hundreds of millions of people. It 
is the work of many years’ (quoted in Geraschenko, 1970: 32).4 In his April 1921 article 
on food tax Lenin also noted that ‘War Communism was thrust upon us by war and ruin. 
It was not, nor could it be, a policy that corresponded to the economic tasks of the 
proletariat. It was a temporary measure’ (quoted in Dobb, 1966: 123).5
The NEP was to develop a mixed economy with the elements of state socialism and 
a free market. Therefore, sometimes it was referred to as ‘state capitalism.’ Private 
entities were permitted to engage in both wholesale and retail trade. In the agricultural 
sector compulsory requisitioning was replaced with an in-kind food tax. In the industrial 
sector the government kept control over the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy, 
which included military production, metallurgy, transportation, foreign trade and 
banking. In the industrial sector only small-scale production entities were transferred to 
private hands.6 Thus the state control over the production and distribution of goods 
among different sectors of the economy, except for the ‘commanding heights,’ was 
partially replaced by free market forces,
j Author’s translation.
Based upon this quote many commentators argue that the economic policies which severely affected 
money and banking during war communism were never intentional. However, as was argued above, there 
seems to be theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting the purposeful character o f the attempts to 
abolish money and banks during this period. Moreover, as an extraordinarily intelligent man and a crafty 
Politician Lenin, with hindsight, might have easily branded his war communism policies concerning money 
and banks as ‘temporary ’
By the decree o f 17 May and 10 December 1921 all enterprises with less than 20 workers reverted to their 
previous owners or leased to new ones.
With the restoration of the importance of private property rights7 and revival of 
trade and thus monetary transactions in the economy, the necessity of banking services 
was reconsidered too. The Gosbank was re-established in October 1921 and began its 
business in November 1921. The purpose of establishing the Gosbank was ‘to assist the 
development of industry, agriculture and trade as well as to concentrate monetary 
transactions and apply measures aimed at the establishment of a sound monetary 
circulation’ (Baykov, 1946: 83). The Gosbank was allowed to extend short-term as well 
as long-term credits not only to the state but also to private and co-operative legal 
entities. Besides that, the bank carried out all other standard banking operations.
Abolition of the economic order based on barter exchanges and restoration of 
monetary transactions required the introduction of a stable currency. However, to control 
inflation during the first two years of the NEP proved to be impossible. In October 1922 
the Gosbank was awarded the right to issue the new stable currency -  the chervonets 
(equal to 10 pre-war golden roubles). This was a preliminary step undertaken towards the 
stabilisation of the rouble. In order to promote confidence in the new currency it was 
decided that chervonets would be backed 25% by gold and foreign currency, and 75% by 
readily marketable goods.
Besides the Gosbank, a number of other specialised banks and credit institutions 
were created in 1922 and the following years of the NEP.8 The Savings bank was
Private property rights were revitalised mostly in the agricultural sector and to a limited extent in the 
industrial sector.
In February 1922 the Consumers’ Co-operative Bank (Bank Potrebilskoy Kooperatsii, or iPokobank>) 
was set up for the purpose o f  satisfying the growing need o f the consumers’ co-operatives. In January 1923 
Pokobank was reorganised and renamed the All-Russian Co-operative Bank ( Vserossiyskiy Kooperativeniy 
Bank, or ‘Vsekobank’). Vsekobank provided all ranges o f  standard commercial bank services including 
extending long-term credits. In December 1922 agricultural credit societies were created. The Commercial 
Industrial Bank (Torgovo-Promyshlenniy Bank, or 'Prombank ’) was set up to support the industrial and 
transport sectors o f the economy. Prombank granted short and long term credits to the above-mentioned 
sectors of the economy. In reality, Prombank provided mainly short-term credit and 80% of these credits
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established in December 1922. It started its business in the beginning of 1923. At the 
beginning the bank operated only in Moscow and Leningrad. Only later it gradually 
opened its business throughout the country. Even according to soviet standards the 
Savings bank was a quasi bank because it only concentrated in attracting deposits from 
the population and was not directly involved in credit-extending activities. It was under 
the direct administration of a specific department of the Commissariat of Finance.
In short, during the first three years of the NEP a varied and widespread system of 
banking and credit institutions emerged. By the end of 1923 there were more than 150 
main banks and credit societies with over 750 branches and over 2500 Savings bank 
offices in the country.
The NEP brought changes to the state-owned industrial sector too. The basic 
market principles of profit and loss were reintroduced. The relationships between 
enterprises and central regulating state bodies were reorganised. Economic units became 
more or less autonomous. Although enterprises were given financial autonomy to some 
considerable degree, the regulatory influence was still kept with the central 
administration. Enterprises were required to organise their business under economic 
accounting {khozaistvenniy raschet or khozraschet) principles, which meant enterprises 
were to operate and finance their business out of sales on cost accounting principles. Now 
they had to go to the market to procure raw materials and sell their products on their own. 
Rationing was abolished and thus workers were again paid money wages.
were extended to industry (Kuschpeta, 1978:34). Bank Elektrocredit was established for financing projects 
of electrification in agriculture. Later Elektrocredit was reorganised and renamed Elekrobank, whose main 
function now was to finance electrification projects in general. The Russian Commercial Bank (Rossiyskiy 
Kommercheskiy Bank, or ‘Roskombank') was set up in October 1922. Later Roskombank was reorganised 
and renamed Bank for Foreign Trade (Bank Vneshney Torgovli, or '‘Vneshtorgbank’). At this time 
Vneshtorgbank provided the full range o f  commercial bank services, but the main concentration o f its 
activity was directed towards financing o f  foreign trade.
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The main tasks of the banking system during the first half of the NEP were: to 
achieve monetary and financial stability; to provide mainly short-term credits and other 
financial support for economic units to facilitate their economic activity and trade. 
During this period credits were available not only to the socialised sector, but also to the 
private sector. But since banks were under the direct control of the state they 
discriminated against the private sector. The credit policy of the banks was much more 
favourable to state-owned enterprises (Banerji, 1997).
The 1927-8 banking reform was a step taken towards the preparation of the banking 
sector for a planned economy. With this reform the banking system became more 
centralised. The Gosbank was given indirect control over banks and became the only 
bank to provide short-term credits. Prombank and Electrobank were merged into one 
single body and renamed Bank for Long-term Credit for Industry and Electrification 
(.BDK). BDK carried out its activity in accordance with an annual credit plan based on the 
production plan and financing plan (promfinplan) of the industrial sector.9 All budget 
grants, funds deducted from profits of enterprises and other sources were centralised in 
BDK. Some of these resources were allocated as non-refundable grants, and some part of 
it was extended as loans bearing arbitrary interest rates.
As to the determination of the interest rate, it did not depend on demand for and 
supply of credit in the market. Making profit was not the main task of the banking 
system. Therefore, the interest rate was arbitrarily determined by the central 
administration to cover the costs incurred in connection with carrying out the usual 
business activities of banks. Any profit generated by the banking sector would be further 
re-distributed for financing the economy. Preobrazhensky’s following words describe the
The nature o f credit planning will be discussed in the next section.
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basic philosophy of interest rate determination and banking policy in the soviet economy.
[0]ur socialist state, i f  we may in this connexion make the relevant comparison with capitalist 
relations, is in the position o f  an entrepreneur who works with his own capital and does not pay 
interest to himself, though he may, for the salving o f his book-keeping conscience, attribute 
some interest to himself and his ledgers. (Preobrazhensky, 1966: 213)
The decision to industrialise the economy put more emphasis on the role of the 
banking system during the NEP. Now besides carrying out its previous functions it had to 
attract and accumulate every possible free resource of the economy and re-distribute them 
mostly towards the expansion of the industrial sector.
The state budget and the banking system generated and attracted badly needed 
resources for investment purposes through several channels. By legislation economic 
units were ordered to deposit their free resources in the banking system. Savings of the 
population were attracted into the savings banks, or attracted by the sale of state bonds. 
The income of the population and all legal entities was taxed. Loanable funds 
accumulated in this way were spent to finance industrial expansion. And of course, 
investment was partly financed by money-issuing.
Hence, the NEP was developed to revive the economy tom apart by the civil war 
and radical changes brought into the economy by the Bolsheviks during the period of 
War Communism. In many sectors of the economy private ownership of production was 
re-introduced. Those enterprises which were kept under the direct control of the 
government were also encouraged to operate their business strictly under the principles of 
profit and loss. As a result, the process revived trade, which in turn necessitated
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restoration of money and banks. These reforms restored confidence and helped the 
economy to grow. However, the NEP was only a ‘temporary retreat’ from comprehensive 
central planning; it did not last even a decade. Towards the end of the 1920s the NEP 
was abolished, collectivisation of agricultural farms was initiated, and the further policies 
towards central planning and industrialisation of the economy were launched.
Hitherto we have discussed the theoretical foundations of the central planning and 
practical problems associated with it. Two mutually interconnected points were 
emphasised. First, originally the idea was to build a stable economic system, free from 
recessions and cycles, as an alternative to an inherently unstable capitalist system. 
Although the organisation and structure of this system was not thought out in detail, by 
and large this economy was imagined to be a moneyless economy in which the entire 
process of production would be planned. The directive central planning theory was 
developed only in the late 1920s. And in the early 1930s it was chosen as an appropriate 
model for the Soviet economy and became benchmark of a traditional soviet economy. 
The detailed discussion of why and how directive central planning was preferred over 
indicative planning can be found in Appendix 4A.
Second, money was seen as irrelevant to a socialist economy. However, as will be 
clear in this chapter this goal was achieved only partially. Initially it was suggested that 
money would be eliminated from the economic process as early as during the 
construction of communism. Nonetheless, later Stalin extended the lifespan of money by 
saying that money would remain in a socialist economy until full communism was 
reached. After Stalin, the issue of eliminating money from the economic system was 
never discussed seriously again. The matter was left to be resolved in due course, when 
the due time came.
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In short, this section showed the foundations upon which centrally planned 
economies were built. In the next section we will extend our analysis to the discussion of 
a traditional centrally-planned economy. In other words, we will examine the 
organisation of the economic process in the traditional or ‘classical’ centrally planned 
economy of the FSU. We will show that although nominally there were such notions of 
money and banks in the traditional planned economy of the FSU, they were in fact 
nothing more than ‘poor imitations’ of the money and banks of a capitalist system.
4.4 Money and Banking Under ‘Classical’ Central Planning
4.4.1 Superstructure and Economic organisation o f  the ‘classical’ soviet economy
The classical Soviet economy can be best described as a centrally planned and 
bureaucratically administered system. State ownership of the means of production, 
political dictatorship, a mono-hierarchical system, and directive planning in physical 
terms are the main features of the classical model (Ellman, 1989: 19). We can also add to 
this list the following system-specific attributes: soft budget constraints, sellers’ market, 
weak responsiveness to prices, quantity-driven economy with plan bargaining, chronic 
shortages (including labour), full employment economy (unemployment on the job) 
(Komai, 2000: 29), and absence of innovations particularly in the field of consumption 
goods (Aganbegyan, 1988). Since the focus of this chapter is on the role of money and 
banking in the traditional soviet economy, below we will be selective in the discussion of 
these issues. In other words we will discuss only those issues that are most relevant to the 
subject of our analysis.
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In the classical Soviet economy, in one way or another, industry and agriculture, 
wholesale trade and transportation, construction and mining, health and education, 
research and development, in short almost all productive resources belonged to the state.
The cooperative sector functioned alongside the state sector. This sector included 
consumer cooperatives, which dealt with retail trade in consumer goods, and collective 
farms {kolkhozes). Kolkhozes were one of the two main economic entities in the 
agricultural sector, the other main agricultural entity being state farms {sovkhozes). By 
definition sovkhozes were state property. Kolkhozes were not classified as state property 
because they belonged to kolkhoz members. The fact, however, was that in essence the 
role and functioning of consumer cooperatives and kolkhozes in the economic system did 
not differ much from those of state enterprises and farms. Thus although there was a 
separation between state and quasi-state ownership, de facto all productive resources 
were state-owned. Therefore, all productive sectors of the economy together, whether 
state-owned or collectively-owned, were referred to as a ‘socialised’ sector (Ericson, 
1991: 12).
Because in the traditional soviet economy virtually all means of production 
belonged to the state, the share of the socialised sector in total production was immense. 
In this economy employment of a person by another was illegal. Therefore, theoretically 
there was no private production as such in this type of economy. However, in a small 
scale, individuals did produce goods and rendered services - a phenomenon known as ‘a 
second economy’ (Grossman, 1981, and Katsenelinboigen and Levine, 1981). Because 
the household sector was seen as a supplier of labour, exchanging their ‘product’ with 
that of a socialised sector, it can be best described as a personal sector in such a system.
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As far as the industrial sector is concerned, individuals were not allowed to be involved 
in private production.
However, some small-scale agricultural activities (family plots) were permitted; 
other services such as those of construction workers to build and repair private houses, 
services of repairman to fix consumer durables (including automobiles) and some other 
professional and personal services were tolerated. In short, there was a ‘second 
economy,’ where small scale private production persisted. (For details see Grossman, 
1981, and Katsenelinboigen and Levine, 1981.)
Figure 4.4.1 in the next page is an attempt to capture a simplified institutional 
structure of the Soviet economy. The figure also explains the process of planning. (See 
Kuschpeta, 1978, Ellman, 1989, Ericson, 1991 and Gregory and Stuart, 1995 and 1998.) 
From the very beginning the soviet economy was an ideology-driven system. Therefore 
at the top of the system stood the sole monopolistic political leadership -  the Communist 
Party -  represented by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Although the 
party was formally outside the executive apparatus, in fact there was no clear-cut 
separation between the party and the government. From top to bottom in a vertical 
hierarchy central, republican, regional and local party organs could influence economic 
decisions at the enterprise level to a considerable extent (Bomstein, 1985, and Gregory 
and Stuart, 1995 and 1998).
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Figure 4.4.1. Simplified p ic tu re  o f the institutional structu re of the classical soviet economy
Council o f  Ministers
Communist Party
All-Union
Ministries
Union Republican 
Ministries
Enterprises
Trusts
Gosplan
Republican
Ministries
 ► Control figures or initial plans
 ► Process o f plan bargaining
 ► Approved and binding plans
Source: modified from Gregory and Stuart, 1995 and 1998.
Formally the highest executive organ of the system, responsible for managing the 
working of the entire economy, was the Council of Ministers. It stood at the top of the 
executive superstructure. Below the Council of Ministers in the hierarchy were Union 
Republican Ministries, All-Union Ministries and several specialised State Committees. 
Because of the large number of enterprises in each ministry, ministries were in turn 
divided into special ‘main departments’ called ‘glavkV. These departments coordinated
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and supervised specific sectors of the economy by output type and geographical 
location.10
The FSU was formed as a federation of fifteen national republics.11 The structural 
organisation of central ministries was duplicated in each of these constituent republics. 
Republican Ministries, which were direct subordinates of Union Republican Ministries, 
were divided into separate glavkis of their own. Unlike Union Republican Ministries, All- 
Union Ministries had no similar subordinate ministries at the republican level of the 
hierarchy. All-Union Ministries directly coordinated and controlled, without any 
substantial involvement from republican authorities, activities of strategic industries of 
national importance such as heavy metallurgy, precious metals industry, military related 
industries and so on. The Union Republican Ministries chain took into account local 
factors. Although Republican Ministries possessed substantial control over respective 
industries at the local level, Union Republican Ministries had ultimate authority over 
major decisions.
Next in the hierarchical pyramid were usually the so-called trusts (trests). Trusts 
were special administrative bodies that supervised activities of enterprises with similar 
production orientation within a specific sector of the economy. They were subordinated 
either to Republican Ministries or directly to All-Union Ministries depending upon the 
importance of the industry they represented. The last in the chain were enterprises 
(predpriyatiya) and associations (obyedininiya). These were the end organisations, which 
ultimately produced goods and rendered services for the whole economy and upon them 
the entire hierarchical pyramid was built. In 1986 there were approximately 46,000
Since the early 1970 various ‘glavkis’, especially in industrial ministries, were renamed ‘industrial 
associations’ (Bornstein, 1985: 191).
These were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyztan, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldavia, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
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industrial enterprises, 23,000 state farms, 27,000 collective farms, 17,500 interfarm and 
associated enterprises, 1000 agro-industrial associations, 47,000 construction 
organisations, and almost a million wholesale and retail organisations in the FSU 
(Ericson, 1991: 14).
In addition to All-Union Ministries and Union Republican Ministries, the Council 
of Ministers had several specialised State Committees. Although State Committees were 
equal in rank with ministries and had ministerial status, they were assigned to deal with 
very specific functions in the economic process. These committees were not designed to 
be involved directly in the production process. They were specifically established to deal 
with organisational issues. For instance, Gosplan (State Planning Committee) was in 
charge of economic planning, Gossnab (State Committee for Material and Technical 
Supply) dealt with materials and equipment supply, Goskomtsen (State Committee for 
Prices) was responsible for prices, Goskomtrud (State Committee for Labour) was 
responsible for labour issues, Goskompriroda (State Committee for Environment) was 
responsible for environmental issues, the Gosbank dealt with monetary issues, Ministry 
of Finance was responsible for public finance and so forth.
Thus the soviet economic system was a very complex bureaucratic pyramid, the 
functioning of which required tremendous effort. To put it in Ericson’s words, ‘Central 
control and the priorities of the political leadership are maintained through a vast and 
complex structure of overlapping administrative hierarchies that gather information, 
disseminate instructions, coordinate interactions, manage change, and monitor and 
enforce commanded performance’ (Ericson, 1991: 13).
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Economic Planning. In the previous sections we have seen how the theory of 
economic planning was developed in the FSU. Now, we will discuss how planning 
worked in the classical soviet economy.
The political leadership undertook all long-term decisions as well as influencing 
major short-term decisions. The ‘economic cabinet’ of the system, that is the Council of 
Ministers, was responsible for other central decisions. Gosplan and other respective state 
committees acted as an advisory to the ‘economic cabinet’. Various ministries were 
responsible for the implementation of the ‘wishes’ of the centre. To put it differently, 
ministries and state committees administered and supervised the implementation of plans. 
(See Davies, 1979 and 1981.)
Planning is a very broad phenomenon. It is a complex and continuous process. It 
covers almost every single sector of the economic process. Planning involves direct 
arrangements in the sphere of production, distribution, investment and even consumption. 
Unlike in some simplified models of a command economy in which there is a single 
‘planning board’ that plans every single aspect of economic life, in the classical soviet 
economy planning is carried out by many specialised agencies responsible for different 
aspects of economic activity. For instance, Gosplan deals with output and investment 
plans. Gosplan is given special responsibilities and authorities so that it stands at the core 
of the entire process of planning. Gossnab deals with allocation and supervision of 
materials and technical supply. The Gosbank plans and supervises money flows among 
enterprises, and also between enterprises and households. (See Bomstein, 1985.)
Usually there were five-year plans and annual plans. Five-year plans were much 
less detailed than the annual ones. As a generalised framework, five-year plans served as
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guidance in the construction and implementation of much more detailed annual or 
‘operational’ plans. Therefore, for practitioners annual plans were essential.
Now, a few words on the modus operandi of annual plans. The preparation of 
annual plans involved three different stages: the initial plan or control figures; plan 
bargaining; and approved and binding plans. Figure 4.4.1, that was presented earlier, 
captures not only the simple institutional structure of the classical soviet economy but 
also tries to capture the process of planning. We have indicated initial plans with dotted 
arrows. Regular arrows indicate the process of plan bargaining, while bold arrows mean 
plan assignments are approved and have become binding on enterprises.
Usually at the beginning of the current year the political leadership established 
aggregate growth targets for the main types of production and other activities. These 
targets were based on the actual performance of the economy in the past and determined 
what was achievable in the next year or so. The latter was usually based on Gosplan’s 
assessments. These major decisions also affected the goals of five-year plans.
On the basis of these directives from the political leadership, Gosplan, together 
with other central committees, constructed a set of ‘control figures’ for annual plans 
(dotted arrows in Figure 4.4.1). Control figures were initial plan assignments for 
respective ministries and they could be negotiated. In the early summer ministries 
disaggregated preliminary plan assignments among respective departments. Departments 
in turn distributed assignments among trusts, associations and enterprises. Once 
enterprises and associations knew what their tasks were for the next season, they 
calculated how much input was needed to achieve these output targets. These calculations 
then formed enterprise requests for necessary inputs, which at the end were passed onto 
higher bodies.
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Once enterprises knew what their preliminary production targets were, and the 
authorities also knew tentatively how much inputs were needed to achieve plan targets, 
the process called ‘plan bargaining’ would begin (regular arrows in Figure 4.4.1). As a 
rule enterprises and lower bodies in the administrative hierarchy wanted easier plans, 
while central authorities wanted to impose more ambitious plan targets. Enterprises 
usually asked for more inputs relative to targeted outputs and could even hide their true 
production capacities so that they could fulfil plan targets with minimum effort.
When bargaining was over, the Gosplan and other respective central agencies 
prepared revised output plan assignments and input authorisations for the entire economy. 
This was usually done in the autumn. Later revised plans were submitted to the Council 
of Ministers for final approval. At the end of the year the final plans, approved by the 
government, would be sent back to ministries. Ministries would send them to 
departments, departments to associations and enterprises. Once approved, plans became 
binding assignments for enterprises for the next year (bold arrows in Figure 4.4.1).
Another special moment in the process of planning that needs our particular 
attention is the so-called ‘material balances.’ (For details see Ellman, 1974, Davies, 1979, 
and Bomstein, 1985.) One of the biggest challenges for planners was to maintain internal 
consistency between planned demand for inputs and their planned supply. To achieve this 
consistency a large number of material balances were constructed for variety of raw 
materials, intermediate goods, fuel, machinery and equipment, etc. For example, a 
material balance for a product X would give information about all possible sources of 
supply of this product (including imports and stocks from previous years) and its final 
distribution for variety of uses (intermediate use, final use, exports, and excess stocks). 
Each balance was expressed in material units such as metal in tons, electricity in
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kilowatt-hours, cloth in square meters and so on. Again, the emphasis was on physical 
flows; the financial matters played only an accommodating role in the entire process of 
planning of the economic process. Hence, at the core of classical soviet planning the 
focus was on material or physical flows rather than on financial ones.
Prices. It is through prices that the physical world of the economy was connected 
with that of the financial world. By and large, we can say that in a capitalist market 
economy prices reflect relative scarcities of goods and services. Any change in relative 
prices gives entrepreneurs a signal to increase or decrease supply of a particular set of 
goods and services. As Hayek (1985: 36) argued, to understand the real function of the 
price system we must look at it as ‘a mechanism for communicating information’. This 
means that prices play an important role in the economic process; they are driving force 
of production and determining force of consumption. However, this simple yet 
fundamental logic does not apply to traditional centrally-planned economies. (See 
Bomstein, 1974 and 1985, Ellman, 1989, IMF et al., 1991, Ericson, 1991 and McKinnon, 
1991 and 1993.)
Contrary to the situation described above, in the classical soviet economy prices did 
not have any importance in the economic process in terms o f affecting demand and 
supply. More importantly, they did not represent relative scarcities of goods and services 
and thus did not independently affect resource allocation and production decisions. 
Therefore, they were not a key tool for enterprises in their decision-making. Again, this 
was due to the system-specific attributes of the economy in which planning in physical 
terms was of paramount importance.
The main function of prices under central planning was to serve as a means of 
aggregating physical data for the purpose of accounting and control (Ellman, 1989: 30).
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For soviet theoreticians constant prices were one of the greatest achievements of the 
socialist system. According to them inflation was only relevant to a capitalist mode of 
production. For this reason, in the textbooks on money, banking and credit no particular 
attention was given to the problem of inflation.
Wholesale prices, which reflected priorities of planners, were set by Goskomtsen, in 
association with other central organs, on cost-plus bases and were held unchanged for a 
long period (Bomstein, 1974 and 1985). Retail prices, which were administered as well, 
were prices of consumer goods. Households received money wages in cash money for 
their labour contributions and they had sovereignty over their decisions on what and 
when to spend. In this sense prices and thus money had some meaning only in the 
household sector’s decision making process. Although the authorities planned and 
controlled the distribution and supply of consumer goods, they could not perfectly predict 
consumer tastes and preferences. To prevent any systematic mismatch between supply 
and demand, turnover taxes were automatically included in retail prices to approximate 
‘market clearing’ prices (Bomstein, 1974 and 1985).
In a nutshell, in the classical soviet economy the price mechanism was not 
important. Prices reflected planners’ priorities about types of goods and sectors of 
production. The price mechanism was necessary for planners to express complex input 
and output targets for enterprises in some sort of a value term. Having a common 
denominator for physically different units of raw materials, labour, capital and 
consumption goods enabled the planners to better evaluate, assess and control activities 
of enterprises. Now, our succinct discussion of prices was a prelude to the financial world 
of the traditional planned economy. Next we will discuss financial aspects, i.e. the role 
and organisation of money and banking in the traditional soviet economy.
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4.4.2 Financial Aspects
Money. Unlike in market economies, there was a strict distinction between cash money 
and non-cash money in the FSU. The term cash money (or nalichnie den’gi) implied 
currency outside the banking sector such as coins and notes, while the term non-cash 
money {beznalichnie den’gi) referred to bank deposits. Since households used cash 
money and enterprises non-cash money in their everyday economic activities, some 
authors (Garvy, 1977 and Zwass, 1979) used the terms household or private money to 
imply cash money and enterprise money to imply non-cash money.12 Saving deposits of 
the household sector with the Savings bank were also included in the non-cash money 
category.
Figure 4.4.2 in the next page illustrates the dual nature of cash money and non-cash 
money circuits. As we can see from the figure, the non-cash money circuit and the cash 
money circuits were semi-independent. Cash money and non-cash money were not freely 
interchangeable. Non-cash money was exchanged for cash money only through payroll 
withdrawals, and sundry transfer payments to the household sector. Non-cash money was 
exclusively used as a payment instrument by enterprises, organisations and other 
economic entities in their everyday economic activity through their bank accounts.
We opted to use the terms ‘cash money’ and ‘non-cash money’ simply because these are derived from 
word-by-word translation o f  the terms used in the Russian literature.
Figure 4.4.2. Dual nature of cash money and non-cash money circuits in the 
traditional soviet economy
Social and government consumption
Income taxes, savings
Financing the national economy
Collective 
farm market 
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Payments through bank accounts (non-cash money circuit)
Cash payments (cash money circuit) 
Source: Green and Petrick (2002: 3)
There was a strict limit to the use of cash money by enterprises. Besides paying 
wages in cash, enterprises were permitted to pay cash money to settle accounts only if the 
amount of the transaction did not exceed one hundred roubles.13 The scope of the use of 
non-cash money was limited to organised markets, which included a wholesale market 
for raw materials and intermediate goods, as well as a retail market for consumer goods.
Cash money was used in both organised and non-organised markets. Non-organised 
markets consisted of a market for goods and services traded among individual groups of
13 About a hundred US dollars.
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the population, a black market for various kinds of goods and services, and a kolkhoz 
market, a market for agricultural goods produced in kolkhozes and family plots. Although 
non-organised markets grew in importance after the 1970s (Grossman, 1981), their size 
was much smaller than that of organised markets. Households spent their cash money 
earnings in organised markets to buy consumer goods from retail trade organisations, as 
well as in non-organised markets (‘a second economy’) to purchase consumer goods and 
services.
Non-cash spending by enterprises was under the direct control of the authorities. 
Enterprises were able to use their funds in bank accounts to pay for goods and services 
within the limits o f  their material input plans. I f  enterprises were entitled to buy goods 
according to their input plans but were short o f money, then money would be 
automatically supplied by the banking sector. On the other hand, enterprises could not 
spend their extra money holdings if they did not have an authorisation to buy. 
Nevertheless, since some manoeuvring was possible within administratively set plan 
targets, enterprises would convert their redundant non-cash balances into inventory 
(Garvy, 1977: 42). In other words, enterprises would prefer to stick to inventories rather 
than non-cash money to deal with system-specific uncertainty associated with the 
planned supply of production inputs.
This behaviour is explained by the fact that the nature of production plans set by the 
authorities made enterprises output maximising institutions, not profit maximising ones. 
As a result, the theory of liquidity preference, as we understand it, was not relevant to the 
enterprise sector. Finance was only of secondary importance for enterprises. If enterprises 
managed to get their material input plans authorised, then finance would be forthcoming 
from the banks.
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Since non-cash money was designed to follow passively the flow of goods and 
services stipulated in material plans, extra non-cash money balances not envisaged in 
material plans did not have purchasing power of their own. That is to say, non-cash 
money was not freely convertible into goods and services (McKinnon, 1991 and 1993). 
Therefore, it was argued that excess non-cash money holdings of enterprises would not 
have any inflationary effects. (See Geraschenko, 1977: 136-37, and Zwass, 1979: 10). 
The sequence of payments and clearing methods developed for effecting payments in the 
non-cash money circuit reflected the inactive character of non-cash money.
Sequence o f payments. As the only clearing institutions of the economy, banks had 
to follow an established sequence of payments in clearing claims on enterprise accounts. 
Usually two types of payment sequence were employed in former socialist economies: 
chronological and purposeful. According to the chronological sequence for payments, if 
several claims were made in relation to a particular enterprise account, banks effected 
payments in a chronological order, i.e. on a first-come-first-serve basis, independent of 
the nature of the claim. Contrary to this, in the purposeful sequence for payments, the 
chronological order of claims was not given any attention. Here the nature and purposeful 
character of payments were given priority. Banks could honour a claim first or last taking 
into account the nature and purpose of the claim. The date of its arrival did not play a 
significant role.
Until 1954 the following order was used in payments: first the enterprise’s own 
claim on wage payments were honoured; then payments to the state budget were effected; 
next interest payments on bank loans were deducted; then contributions to depreciation 
funds were deducted; and last payments for goods and services were made. After 1954 
the authorities made a slight amendment to the described sequence of payments. Now
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payments for goods and services were to be made after wage payments and payments to 
the state budget.
Some more slight addenda were made to regulations in 1983. Now payments were 
divided into five separate groups depending upon their nature and importance: i) wage 
payments, payments of fees for state social insurance, payments for state budget, and 
payments for obligatory state insurance; ii) payments for goods and services (suppliers’ 
claims), and payments for different types of depreciation and capital construction funds; 
iii) payment of fees and fines for the failure of fulfilling obligations under specials 
agreements and arrangements; iv) payments of credits borrowed from banks (except for 
credits extended to meet suppliers’ demands, which were included in ii.); v) all other 
payments.
It was also decided that payments within one group would be made in accordance 
with the chronological order of arrival of payment claims or arrival of due dates for 
payments. This meant that the payment sequence used after 1983 was a hybrid of 
chronological and purposeful sequence payments. (For more detailed discussion please 
see Lavrushin, 1984: 55-56.)
Clearing methods. The authorities developed special clearing methods of effecting 
payments from a buyer’s account to a seller’s account too. The main methods of 
payments used in the traditional soviet economy were bank collection (or acceptance), 
payment order (money order), check, letter of credit (or accreditiv) and some others.14 
The evidence suggests that from 1961 to 1980 almost 90 percent of all payments were
u,
As a general rule, bank collection would be used if  both suppliers and buyers were located in different 
cities. If both sellers and buyers were in the same city or locality, payment order would be used. Checks 
were usually used to settle transactions between enterprises and transport firms. (For more detail on this 
P ease see Geraschenko and Lavrushin, 1982, Lavrushin, 1984 and Zwass, 1979.)
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made using only the first two methods (Zwass, 1979: 84, and Geraschenko and 
Lavrushin, 1982: 38).
The necessary condition of each clearing method was that it had to be consistent 
with the planned flow o f  goods and services. Therefore, each payment necessarily 
involved the use of the particular method of clearing, which in turn required presentation 
of corresponding payment invoices. Banks were obliged to verify invoices of suppliers’ 
claims. A claim not supported by a respective invoice would not be considered. As a rule, 
until the claim was cleared, enterprises would be granted a bank credit with the tenure of 
no more than ten days.
The special design of the sequence of payments and clearing methods in this way 
implies that soviet enterprises did not have the sole authority over their funds in their 
bank accounts. They could not dictate to banks which payment should be made first, and 
which one next. Now, although the passive character of non-cash money was not a 
novelty to western writers, Wiles (1964) was one of the first to make the explicit 
distinction between the active character of cash money and the passive nature of non-cash 
money.
Organisation o f  the cash money circuit. The cash money circulation was organised 
on the basis of Marx’s simple law of metallic money flow. In principle the flow of cash 
money can be described as follows: Gosbank production units household units 
trade and commercial organisations -> Gosbank. When cash money was hoarded or spent 
in the non-organised market, it would leak out of the banking sector.
Graphically it can be presented as in Figure 4.4.3 below. Cash money enters the 
currency circulation only through the bank. As was already noted, non-cash money held
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in bank accounts did not have a universal purchasing power. Moreover, there was a strict 
limit to the degree of converting this neutral or passive money into active cash money.
Gosbank
Households
Savings bank 
and Post
Production sectorOrganised 
market: retail
Non-organised
market
Cash hoards
1 -  Injection o f  cash from the Gosbank
2 -  Payment o f  wages
3 -  Consumption expenditure in organised market
4 — Flow o f  savings, pensions, and other cash transfers
5 -  Hoarding (dishoarding)
6 -  Income and expenditure in non-organised market
7 -  Return o f  cash to the Gosbank
Figure 4.4.3 Circulation o f cash money under central planning
When wages became due, enterprises would request banks to convert their non­
cash money in their accounts into cash money to pay wages of their employees. If 
enterprises did not have a sufficient amount of non-cash money in their holdings, they 
could always ask for credit to pay. So, cash money could also be released from the 
Gosbank as credit.
Once wages were paid, households could freely decide how to spend their money. 
Households could, for example, buy sundry consumption goods from retail trade and
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commersial organisations in the organised sector. They could also deposit their money at 
the savings bank to earn interest income. Whenever households used these two channels 
to spend their wage earnings, cash money would return to the banking sector and 
automatically would take the form of non-cash money again.
Households could also hoard (or dishoard) their cash earnings from time to time as 
they found it appropriate. When cash money was hoarded or was used in the non- 
organised market, it would leave the banking sector. Consequently, cash money outside 
the reach of banks would create a potential threat to the stability of prices in non- 
organised markets only.
Since households had full control over their spending decisions, in some sense the 
theory of liquidity was relevant to the household sector. Moreover, because households’ 
spending desires were limited by the amount of income they earned, they, unlike socialist 
firms, faced hard budget constraints (Komai, 1979: 816). However, since the traditional 
socialist economy was inherently a shortage economy (Komai, 1979 and 1982), where 
production of consumer goods was deemed to be of secondary importance,15 excess 
effective demand of the household sector would be constrained by a shortage of 
consumer goods leading to involuntary savings. Because most of this was kept in the 
form o f ‘liquid’ cash money, the situation was described as a ‘monetary overhang.’ (See 
among others IMF et al, 1991: ch. III.3.) This, combined with fixed prices, implied that 
money did not affect invetsment decisions and any inflationary pressure in organised 
markets was in supressed form.
Cash money could also create inflationary pressures and instability in non- 
organised markets in the following instances: a failure to fulfil material plan targets by
This especially applies to consumer durables (Kornai, 1979: 802).
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enterprises; a failure to fulfil planned targets for rendering servces; a failure to fulfil 
planned production targets in agriculture due to bad weather; payment of wages for 
employess in excess of the limits envisioned in plan targets, etc.
To prevent any instability created by an excess supply of cash money and to 
monitor its movements, special mechanisms and techniques were developed. The Cash 
Plan of the Gosbank was one of these mechanisms. The Cash Plan involved planning of 
all possible sources of cash money flowing in and out of the Gosbank. Figure 4.4.3, 
presented earlier, approximates (excepting for the Cash Hoards and Non-organised 
Market parts) the sphere of cash planning. Enterprises, trusts, and supervisory ministries 
were involved in the process of planning the cash money circuit.
Initially, enterprises would submit applications to the relevant Gosbank branch, 
where they had their account, indicating their cash money proceeds and spendings. Then 
these plans would be passed to the regional offices of the Gosbank, which in turn would 
check if these plans were in conformity with metarial production plans. Drafts of the 
plans would go through republican offices and the central office of the Gosbank before 
they were submitted to the Council of Ministers for affirmation.
Under the rules of the Cash Plan, retail trade organisations were allowed to keep in 
their vaults only a mimimum necessary amount of cash money needed for their daily 
activities. The rest of the cash money received from the sale of goods would have to be 
placed in their bank accounts, meaning automatic conversion of cash money into non­
cash money. Cash money holdings of the savings bank would also become non-cash 
money in that they would be used as credit resources of the Gosbank.
According to the soviet literature, the role of the savings bank was to attract idle 
resources of the household sector, which then would be re-allocated by the Gosbank to
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finance economic activities. Although this interpretation is technically true, essentially 
Gosbank’s credit activities were not constrained by the availability or cost o f  credit 
resources. Since liabilities of the Gosbank were ‘non-cash money’ used by enterprises, it 
would be automatically forthcoming whenever there was a demand for it. The true role of 
the savings banks under these circumstances was to stabilise effective demand of the 
household sector and to facilitate in preventing any inflationary pressures.
Now, in order to summarise our analysis on the role of money in the traditional 
soviet economy, we would like to compare the fundamental characteristics, functions, 
and motives for demanding money in the two different economic systems: a capitalist 
free market economy and a socialist centrally planned economy. (See Table 4.4.1 below.)
Table 4.4.1 Characteristics of Capitalist Money and Socialist Money Compared
Types of Functions Motives for Demanding Fundamental
monev Characteristics
1. Capitalist ■ Unit of account ■ Transaction ■ Universal
money ■ Means of motive purchasing power
exchange ■ Precautionary ■ Non-neutral. Affects
■ Store of value motive investment
■ Speculative decisions
motive
■ Finance motive
II. Socialist
monev:
a. Cash ■ Unit of account ■ Transaction ■ Limited purchasing
money ■ Means of motive power
exchange ■ Precautionary ■ Neutral. Does not
■ Store of value motive (to a very affect investment
limited extent) decisions
b. Non-cash ■ Unit of account ■ Transaction ■ Lack of universal
money ■ Means of motive purchasing power.
exchange ■ Finance motive (in Accounting tool only
■ Store of value restrictive sense) ■ Neutral. Does not
affect investment
decisions
Note: The table is modified from Petrick (1998)
The first striking difference between capitalist money and socialist money is that 
the latter is composed of two separate and semi-independent money circuits, each with its
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own characteristics and peculiarities. Therefore, they are compared to capitalist money as 
separate categories. In terms of the general functions they perform, and the motives for 
demanding them, capitalist money and socialist money does not differ considerably. The 
specifics of the differences are revealed when we look at the fundamental characteristics 
of both capitalist money and socialist money.
The most fundamental characteristic of capitalist money is that it is a generally 
accepted universal title for all tradable goods and services, which makes it the most liquid 
of all assets. The main functions of money are unit of account, means of exchange and 
store of value. Agents have different reasons to demand money. It can be demanded for 
transaction purposes, precautionary purposes, speculative purposes and finance purposes. 
Money affects investment decisions and plays a peculiar, enabling and constraining, role 
in the economic process.
As to socialist money, cash money had some attributes of universal purchasing 
power, but only to a limited extent. Cash money could be used as a medium of exchange 
within the supply limits of consumer goods and services set by authorities. It can also be 
used in non-organised markets. However, prohibition of private production implied that it 
could not be used to purchase capital goods. Moreover, since the supply of consumer 
goods and services, as well as their prices, were arbitrarily set by the authorities from 
above, cash money, and thus liquidity preference of the household sector, could not affect 
investment decisions of the corporate sector. In this sense although cash money 
performed all three functions of money, its ‘moneyness’ had some limitations. It was 
aeutral in the economic process.
The ‘moneyness’ of soviet money weakens even further when we look at the 
qualities of non-cash money. First and most importantly, non-cash money does not
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possess the quality of universal purchasing power. Non-cash money can be used only for 
specific tasks as decided by the authorities. That means extra non-cash holdings of 
enterprises do not have the purchasing power of their own. Non-cash money is neutral in 
the economic process and thus can be seen as an accounting tool only. Nevertheless, non­
cash money is demanded by enterprises for transaction purposes (because for accounting 
purposes the transaction of purchase and sale is not complete without it) and finance 
purposes (because although secondary and accommodative in the transaction, to complete 
the transaction enterprises need it).
Taking these traits of soviet money into account Heinsohn and Steiger (2000: 70) 
rightly referred to cash money and non-cash money as ‘anonymized ration cards’. 
According to them these cards ‘did not give an absolute command over resources but 
functioned as an entitlement to obtain the centrally-planned and produced goods. Thus, 
these cards had nothing whatsoever to do with anonymized titles to property that are the 
money of property-based societies’ (Heinsohn and Steiger, 2000: 70).
All in all, under central planning the role of money was reduced to the function of a 
‘numeraire’ so that money and liquidity preference not only ceased to be constraints in 
the economic process, but also they were irrelevant to the system. Money simply did not 
affect such vital macro-variables of the system as prices, investment, output and 
employment. As Komai once put it elegantly ‘It is clear that in the traditional form of the 
socialist economy ... financial accounting of the firm’s trade transactions takes place. 
Despite that, this sphere is only monetized in appearance’ (Komai, 1982: 8-9). 
Nevertheless money was a vital part of a centrally planned economy, which was too 
complex for direct distribution of goods to consumers via a voucher system as was 
advocated by Marx and Lenin.
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Banking. The role of banks in the economic process was passive. One of the main 
functions of the banking sector was to provide the authorities with all necessary 
information about the flow of real transactions. Banks extended credits in accordance 
with credit plans, which in turn were constructed in line with general economic plans. 
Concepts of collateral and analysing financial viability of enterprises to assess their 
creditworthiness were irrelevant to soviet banking practice. More importantly, similar to 
soviet enterprises banks were not profit maximising entities. Enterprises were allowed to 
borrow even if they did not repay previous loans. In short, banks were ‘a mixed breed of 
accountants and public notaries’ (Calvo and Coricelli, 1993: 32).
The evolution of the mono-banking system in the traditional soviet system can be 
divided into four stages.16 (See Poskonov, 1967, Garvy, 1977, Kuschpeta, 1978, Zwass, 
1979 for the first three stages. For the last one see Abdullaeva, 2000: 192.) Since we have 
already discussed the first stage of banking development that took place during the 
periods of War Communism and NEP, we can skip its discussion here. }
The second stage of banking development is associated with the replacement of the 
NEP with directive central planning. To be more precise, it started with the Credit 
Reform of 1930-32. This was an attempt to adjust the banking sector to the needs and 
requirements of central planning. The further reforms brought only slight improvements 
to the system established by this reform.
Perhaps we should be careful with the use o f the world ‘evolution’ here. Because, the soviet banking 
evolution was an artificial development which reflected central planners’ desires about the shape and form 
of banking. Moreover, as was evident from our discussions so far, the centrally planned economy itself was 
a big experiment without a proper theoretical model. So, although we are using the term evolution, we 
would like to note that our use o f  the term ‘banking evolution’ in this context reflects only technical 
changes in the nature o f  soviet banking through time, and o f course through fundamental economic reforms 
purposefully carried out by the authorities.
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The reform was carried out in several steps. The process was a natural outcome of 
the ‘improving by experimenting’ approach. In the first phase of the reform, inter­
enterprise commercial credits were outlawed.17 Enterprises were prohibited from 
engaging in trade credits when selling goods and rendering services to each other. 
Commercial credit was substituted by direct bank credit. That implied increased 
responsibility for banks in facilitating as well as monitoring economic activities of 
enterprises. To manage the system better, the short-term credit activity of the banking 
sector was centralised so that only one bank, i.e. the Gosbank, would take over all short­
term credit activities of all other specialised banks. Moreover, the Gosbank effectively 
became the sole clearing centre of the economy. Almost all non-cash transactions of 
enterprises would be cleared by the Gosbank. The foundations of the traditional soviet 
monobank system were laid down during this period.
One more important moment in the first phase of the reform was an experiment of 
‘credit automatism’ or ‘automatism of accounts’ (Poskonov, 1967: 40-48). This meant 
that the Gosbank paid a seller on behalf of a buyer without buyer’s authorisation whether 
buyer had enough funds in its account or not. This meant the Gosbank was effectively 
covering all expenditure of an enterprise in excess of its proceeds even if this was 
happening due to bad management. Therefore, once its inefficiency was duly noted, 
credit automatism was soon abandoned.
In the second phase of the reform, responsibilities of the Gosbank were further 
clarified. Now, the Gosbank would effect any payment from a buyer’s account if the 
amount of the transaction did not exceed the buyer’s own funds plus an amount of credit 
previously agreed by the bank in the credit plan. More importantly, now a necessary
This legislature remained valid until the perestroika reforms.
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condition of effecting any payment would be the buyer’s prior authorisation. In addition 
to this method of payment, letters of credit and some other special forms of payments 
were put into practice during this time.
In the third phase of the reform, a special regulation on the working capital of state 
enterprises, trusts and other economic entities was adopted. According to the new rule, 
economic entities would be provided with their own working capital in an amount which 
was just enough to cover expenses for generating the minimal necessary stock of 
production inputs. This regulation became a rule of thumb in the traditional soviet 
economy until Gorbachev’s perestroika reform.
The final phase dealt with the reorganisation of specialised banks into banks for 
financing long-term investment programmes. Four big specialised banks responsible for 
long-term financing of the economy were Prombank (reorganised from BDK) - 
responsible for financing industrial and electricity sectors; Torgbank (reorganised form 
Vsekobank) - responsible for financing construction projects in the production sector; 
Selkhozbank responsible for financing agricultural sector; Tsekombank - responsible for 
financing construction of apartments and houses for households.
In the next, the third stage of banking development, fundamental changes did not 
take place. In accordance with the Reform of 1959 Selkhozbank and Tsekombank were 
liquidated and their functions were taken over by the Gosbank and Prombank. Moreover, 
in 1961 the savings bank system was incorporated into the Gosbank. After the 1959 
reform there were only three banks in the economy: the Gosbank, Prombank and Bank 
for Foreign Trade (Vneshtorgbank). Other than that, the banking system remained 
unchanged - the Gosbank performing main functions, and Prombank and Vneshtorgbank 
with narrower specialised functions. The fact is that the foundation of banking business
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set forth during the Credit Reform of 1930-32 remained effectively unchanged until 
1988. (See Garvy, 1977: 31, and Abdullaeva, 2000: 192.)
The fourth stage of banking development started in 1988. The well-known 
perestroika economic reforms can be seen as a prelude to the transition banking in all 
formerly soviet constituent national republics of the FSU. Having this in mind, and also 
taking into account the fact that in this section we are discussing only the classical soviet 
economy, we would like to leave the discussion of this stage to Chapter 7 where we will 
discuss the evolution of banking in Uzbekistan during transition.
Credit Planning. (See Garvy, 1977, Kuschpeta, 1978, Zwass, 1979 and Lavrushin, 
1991: 113-118.) Since credit was one of the main sources of working capital financing 
for enterprises, the process of credit planning played an important role in the organisation 
of the non-cash money circuit.
Under central planning, credits were designed to finance planned needs of 
enterprises for generating sufficient stocks of inputs. In other words, credit planning was 
closely linked with material input plans. The process of credit planning in the classical 
soviet economy, which was effective until 1988, was organised as follows. Similar to 
material planning of the economy, ministries, main departments (glavkis) and other 
superior central authorities actively cooperated with the Gosbank in the process of credit 
planning. In accordance with the affirmed credit plan, credits were distributed among 
different ministries and main departments, which in turn passed this information to their 
subordinated enterprises in local levels through local bank branches. Bank branches were 
advised about the credit limits for each borrower, and sometimes for each project. It was 
deemed that planning credit resources in this way was a rational form of distribution.
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Moreover, it was also recognised that short-term credit planning would be of help in 
preventing disproportionalities in the process of production.
Enterprises could use either their own resources or short-term bank credits to pay 
for goods and services. Soviet enterprises were supplied with only a minimum amount of 
necessary working capital, which made their activities dependent upon bank credits. This 
formula was a purposeful design by planners. The reason for such an organisation was to 
give banks an opportunity to monitor day-to-day activities of enterprises associated with 
plan fulfilment, the process known as ‘control by the rouble’. Komai (1979, 1982, and 
1986) used the term ‘soft budget constraint’ to capture organisation of enterprise finances 
in centrally planned economies in this manner.
As a rule, the start-up fixed capital and working capital of enterprises were supplied 
by the State either from the central budget or from a higher economic authority to which 
they were subordinated. Working capital in turn was divided into own resources and 
borrowed ones. Any need for additional working capital during the process of production 
would be readily supplied by banks. If there was a need to increase the amount of 
working capital, funds would be injected from the state budget or from special funds of 
the respective ministries. Table 4.4.2 in the next page shows that in 1980 own resources 
of enterprises comprised less than a quarter of the total working capital. (For information 
on earlier years please see Zwass, 1979: 85.) In 1982 working capital of the industry was 
only 32% (Sichev, 1982: 53).
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Table 4.4.2. Structure of enterprise working capital in the FSU, in 1980.
National
economy Industry Agriculture* Trade
Own resources 24.0 33.0 22.8 28.0
Bank credits 46.3 50.2 55.7 56.6
Other 29.7 16.8 21.5 15.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
‘ excluding kolkhozes
Source: Geraschenko and Lavrushin, 1982: 20
The seeming importance of credit in the economic activities of soviet enterprises 
does not mean that money and credit played an active and important role in the economic 
process. In the traditional soviet economy banks were not profit-seeking institutions. In 
such an economy a higher volume of credits could simply indicate imbalances in the 
process of production unforeseen in the plan. Therefore, in essence the role of credit was 
passive and accommodative.
As was repeatedly noted above, the traditional soviet economy was a quantity- 
driven system. The role of credit in this economy was to maintain consistency in material 
plan implementation and therefore had to be drawn taking into account primary material 
plans. In other words, credit planning was strictly connected to other material plans and 
thus reflected their imperfections (Lavrushin, 1991: 110 and Garvy, 1977: 106). This 
implied that banks created credit endogenously, albeit passively, in response to the needs 
of the economy. Since the concept of liquidity preference was irrelevant to the banking 
sector, this credit endogeneity can be seen as fully responsive to demand.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter dealt with the role of money and banking in the FSU under central planning. 
The importance of the analysis of this chapter is that on the one hand, it was a prelude to 
our discussion on money and banking during transition which will be the subject of 
chapters to come. On the other hand, it gave us an opportunity to compare the functions 
and working of these instituions in a centrally planned econmy and in a market economy.
Marx, Lenin and other founders of a communist economy were aware of the fact 
that money was non-neutral in the capitalist economic process. They knew well that the 
argument of classical econmists about the neutrality of money and thus the stability of a 
capitalist economy was fallacious. This argument was built on the assumption that acts of 
purchase and sale, in which money merely connected the transaction,were inseperable. 
Contrary to this, Marx argued that as a store of value money would give its holders an 
opportunity to hoard, which meant money could separate acts of purchase and sale in 
time and space. As a result, in a capitalist economy demand would not necessarily create 
its supply simultenously. This implied that money would create the possibility for 
overproduction and thus economic crisis. The existence of money explained why 
fluctionations in effective demand were likely to happen in a market economy.
A centrally planned economy, then, was developed as an alternative to a capitalist 
one. To prevent overproduction and cyclical crises communist theorists advocated to 
replace decentalised markets with central planning and to abolish money from the system 
altogether. Unlike in a capitalist mode of production, in a communist economy 
uncertainty would be dealt with by planning the working of the entire economy. The 
economic relations among enterprises would be planned so precisely that theoretically
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there would not be any production failures in the process of production. In theory, 
planning would enable enterprises, economic entities and households alike to anticipate 
future events with perfect foresight. In this regard, the ‘skilful hands of soviet planners’ 
would be seen as capable of reducing capitalist uncertainty into socialist certainty. There 
would be no need for capitalist money in such an economy.
However, practical difficulties associated with the abandoning money from the 
economic process proved that the idea of establishing a moneyless voucher exchange 
system was unimaginably difficult and thus infeasible. As a result, money and banks 
were reintroduced to the system. Following Lenin’s later encouragement regarding the 
use of money during the first stage of communism, a later generation of soviet authors 
clarified that the functions of money in the soviet economy were quite different from 
those of a capitalist money (Atlas et. al., 1967, Lavrushin, 1984, and Shenger, 1983). The 
functions of money were no longer of ‘capital’ but rather that of a planned and managed 
economy (Kuschpeta, 1978: 13).
Hence in the classical centrally planned economy, the neutrality of money was 
achieved by (i) planning the entire process of production and distribution, (ii) fixing 
prices for goods and services, and (iii) separating the supply of money into two semi­
independent circuits - the cash money circuit and the non-cash one. As a result, capitalist 
money and liquidity preference associated with it were irrelevant to this economy. No 
longer could they affect investment and production decisions, and no longer could they 
constrain the process of production.
Non-cash money was neutral by definition because it passively followed the flow 
of goods and services envisaged in the plan. Cash money had some attributes of money 
because it could be used by households freely at their discretion. However, since prices
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were fixed and the process o f production as well as distribution was planned from above, 
it could not affect either production or investment decisions of enterprises. Under this 
regime, any excess cash money holdings of the household sector would represent a forced 
saving or a monetary overhang because a central economy was a shortage economy by 
definition.
Mobilisation of resources from one sector of the economy to another was carried 
out through the price mechanism. Therefore, the start-up capital of new enterprises or 
new investment expansion in existing ones would be financed from the state budget as 
non-repayable grants and long-term soft loans.
As to banks, they were designed to facilitate the process of planning and 
production. Banks pumped short-term credit to the enterprise sector endogenously to 
facilitate inter-enterprise trade as well as to smooth imperfections unforeseen in planning. 
They functioned as if they were a finance department of a big company. Since all 
enterprises held their accounts with banks, banks controlled their financial flows, 
monitored their performance, and supplied all necessary information to the authorities. 
Notions such as market-determined interest rates, liquidity preference, cost of funds, 
collateral and creditworthiness were irrelevant to the soviet banking practice. Under this 
regime money and banks played passive and accommodative role in the process of 
planning and production. Interestingly enough, because the supply of credit was almost 
perfectly responsive to changes in the real economic activity, the non-cash money supply 
curve could be depicted as a horizontal line. Since the rate of interest did not have any 
real economic meaning, graphically, the vertical axis of the diagram would represent real 
economic activity and the horizontal one would represent the supply of money.
170
The soviet planners always argued that perpetual full employment was achievable 
only under central planning. In some ways the working of the soviet type of economy can 
be likened to Keynes’s co-operative economy, discussed in Chapter 1. The means of 
production belongs to the proletarian government and thus the output is generated by 
‘collective efforts.’ Because money per se was not employed in this economy, there could 
be no room for fluctuations in effective demand and no room for chronic, as distinct from 
temporary, unemployment. The role of the planning authorities in the process of 
production and redistribution can be seen such that continuous full employment becomes 
attainable unless authorities make some ‘stupid miscalculations.’ In a nutshell, the 
centrally planned economy of the FSU was monetized only in appearance. In fact, the 
institutions of money and banks were passive and accommodative tools that were used to 
facilitate the smooth accomplishment of production plans.
Therefore, since transition implied transformation of this economy into a monetary 
economy, for the sake of clarity we can call this economy a barter-like economy. In other 
words, we will look at the process of transition as transition from a barter-like economy 
into a monetary economy, which will be the subject of our discussion in the next three 
chapters.
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5. The Analysis of the Uzbek Economy: Transition Path, Structure and 
Performance
... more than ten years after the collapse o f  the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan still has an 
information environment based on a presumption o f  secrecy rather than a presumption o f  openness, the 
hallmark of transparent and accountable government.
(World Bank, 2003a: 19)
5.1 Introduction
The notion of economic transition is a historically unique phenomenon. It reflects the 
process of transition form one mode of production into another. One of the major 
arguments against centrally planned economies (CPEs) was their inefficiency. Indeed, 
the ultimate incentive behind transition into a market economy, after all, is the belief 
that a market economy provides the right structure to use economic resources 
efficiently and thus facilitates to achieve a better prosperity.
This chapter deals with the analysis of the Uzbek economy during transition. 
We will discuss the transition path, structure and performance of the Uzbek economy 
during transition from a barter-like centrally planned economy into a monetary 
production economy. Building a successful monetary economy requires 
accomplishment of comprehensive reforms in a range of areas such as decentralisation 
of the economic process, liberalisation of prices, encouraging competition through 
privatisation and new entry, improving corporate governance, and building market- 
oriented banking sector and abolishing soft financing, putting up an end to resource 
allocation through non-market mechanisms, centralised and directed credits, budget 
subsidies and tax exemptions.
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However, since it takes time for institutions to evolve, these changes should 
only be seen as precondition to building a monetary production economy. The 
socialist economic infrastructure inherited by transition countries from the past was 
not built overnight. Therefore, it would be rather naive to expect to successfully 
replace the infrastructure o f CPEs with that of a market economy within a short period 
of time. Obviously, the major problem in the process of transition is not to simply 
imitate institutions and other components of a market economy. Rather the issue at 
stake is establishment of market institutions and creation of right conditions for their 
successful functioning and further development.
This task, in turn, necessitated accomplishment of structural changes and 
improvements simultaneously in both directions: establishment of right institutions as 
well as development of market skills and knowledge, both of which were absent under 
central planning. This means that only through the thorough analysis of the working 
of both socialist and capitalist systems can one find right solution to the problem, 
which in the end should lead to coherent policy conclusions. Because our ultimate 
goal is to analyse development of the banking sector during transition, we will be 
selective and discuss only those aspects of the economic transformation that have 
direct relevance to our study.
As was argued in the previous chapters, the real and financial sectors of the 
economy are inseparable, inter-connected and interdependent elements of a single 
system. Since changes in one of these sectors will not happen without affecting the 
other, they ought not to be analysed separately. In this sense, it should be duly noted 
that the main purpose behind the study of the chapter is to show that, without proper 
understanding of the peculiarities of the current structure of the economy and its
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functioning, one cannot comprehensively and successfully analyse the issue of money 
and banking in the country.
Building our analysis on the background of the arguments we put forward in the 
previous chapters, we will discuss the following issues in turn. In Section 5.2 a 
general overview o f transition will be discussed succinctly. The most important 
changes that are needed in order to transform a classical centrally planned economy 
into a market one will be discussed here. In Section 5.3 we will examine initial 
conditions of the Uzbek economy before transition. Section 5.4 briefly discusses 
factors that have affected reform choice, and current structure of the economy in 
Uzbekistan. Along the lines of these arguments, then, in Section 5.5, we will pay 
attention to the current structure and functioning of the economy and discuss some 
important issues such as resource allocation, price distortions, and degree of 
centralisation in the economic process. A summary and conclusions of the chapter 
will be presented in Section 5.6.
5.2 General Overview of Transition
Many theoretical and empirical works on transition have emerged since the process of 
the transition took off in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s in former CPEs. 
Theoretical models developed during the early stages of transition seemed to have a 
generalised understanding of the basic problems of the CPEs on the basis of which 
reform ‘packages’ were developed. However, unprecedented output fall in almost all 
former CPEs during the transition proves that initial reform packages based on 
neoclassical orthodox theory were flawed. Persistent output decline, high inflation, 
aggravation of the problem of unemployment and the resulting fall of living standards
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of households were common to almost all transition economies of Eastern Europe, 
and Commonwealth o f Independent States (CIS) during transition. Although it was 
predicted that, as a consequence of decentralisation of the economic process and 
broad macroeconomic reforms, output would fall and the problem of unemployment 
would be exacerbated at the start of transition, the true extent of the production 
decline and its persistence was largely unanticipated.
The major ex post criticism of these reform packages is that early models of 
transition gave little or no weight to the role of institutions (Stiglitz, 1999, Kolodko, 
2000a and 2000b, Havrylyshyn, 2001, Roland, 2001, and Marangos, 2001) .1 In this 
study we will argue that this applies especially to the role and importance of money 
and banking in the economic process. (See Marangos, 2001, Ould-Ahmed, 2003, 
Petrick, 1998, and Green and Petrick, 2001.)
Now, speaking retrospectively, transformation of CPEs had to bring major 
changes into the system that would facilitate establishment of a market-based 
economy. First and foremost, directive central planning, which had transformed the 
economy into the net o f intertwined relationships among enterprises, had to be 
abolished altogether. This implied that enterprises and other economic agents in the 
system were to be given real autonomy over their economic decision-making so that 
they could freely decide on their own what to produce, for whom to produce, how 
much to produce and how much to invest.
Moreover, in order to increase competition among enterprises, which was 
deliberately suppressed as a harmful feature of a capitalist economy, reforms had to 
be directed towards making state-owned enterprises (SOEs) work as market-oriented
The view o f  Jeffrey Sachs, one o f  the designers o f  the Polish economic reforms, represents one 
extreme example o f  this ‘time and institution free’ approach. He has argued that ‘markets spring up as 
soon as central planning bureaucrats vacate the field’ (quoted in Green and Petrick, 2002: 205).
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firms would do -  the process known as marketisation and commercialisation of SOEs 
(McKinnon, 1993 and Lavigne, 1999). Although setting up legal foundations for free 
entry of new firms was seen as a way to increase competition, it was argued that a 
faster and more effective way of doing this would be through reorganisation and 
restructuring of SOEs via privatisation (Komai, 1990 and 1995).
As has been discussed by Komai (1980 and in other numerous cases) enterprises 
in CPEs face soft budget constraints.2 Enterprises were eligible to borrow from banks 
regardless of their economic viability; credit was created endogenously by the 
monobank sector on ‘soft’ conditions. (This we already discussed in detail in Chapter 
4.) The implication of this phenomenon is that, under the conditions of administered 
prices, centralised output planning and endogenously created credit to facilitate 
fulfilment of these plans, enterprises ultimately reduce their responsibilities to use 
resources efficiently. That is to say, the soft budget constraint syndrome breeds 
inefficiency and resource waste in the overall economy, which was the main criticism 
of CPEs.
Contrary to this, agents in monetary economies operate under market- 
determined prices, which signal relative scarcity of goods, scarce money supply 
associated with liquidity preference, and hard budget constraints; these are 
fundamental conditions to provide efficiency in the system. In other words, in a 
market economy ‘scarce money steers the allocation of resources and, above all, 
holding money scarce limits the input of resources and therefore makes a surplus of 
prices above costs possible, which forms interest income. Scarce money thereby
brings about the trinity o f cost-recovery, prices reflecting scarcity and buyers’
2
Szego (1991) notes that the term ‘budget’ constraint is built on the assumption that saving is prior to 
investment. She argues that priority o f  investment over saving and endogenous creation o f credit in a 
monetary economy implies that the constraint firms face is a finance constraint not a budget one. (See 
nlso Kraft, 1993.) Having this caveat in mind, we use the words ‘finance constraint’ and ‘budget 
constraint’ interchangeably to imply one and the same thing -  finance constraint.
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markets, which are pivotal for the efficiency of a monetary economy’ (Riese, 2004: 
177).3 At the same time we have also to note that efficiency of a monetary economy 
comes at a cost: instability is its fundamental and inherent feature.
Under central planning enterprises’ goal was to maximise their output, not their 
profit. That meant prices did not (and need not) make any economic sense. Therefore, 
unless inefficient prices, which were fixed by authorities and did not reflect relative 
scarcities of goods and services, were liberalised, the true market incentive system 
would not be established in transition economies. Then again, price liberalisation 
alone would not suffice to make enterprises carry out their activities efficiently. 
Therefore, parallel to price reforms, concurrent reforms had to be carried out in the 
financial sphere as well. Komai (1995 and elsewhere) argued that unless budget 
constraints were hardened properly, liberalised prices would not bring any efficiency 
into the system simply because under the conditions of soft budget constraints 
enterprises would not ‘react strongly to the signals of relative prices, and make no 
great effort to reduce their costs’ (Komai, 1995: 22). In this sense, price liberalisation 
and hardening of soft budget constraints were argued to be complementary reforms 
(Fischer and Gelb, 1991: 96-7).
Hardening of finance constraints through creating a market-oriented banking 
system and establishing financial discipline among enterprises would in turn naturally 
imply liquidation o f inefficient and loss-making enterprises. Inefficient SOEs would 
go out of business for the following basic reason. Under the previous regime both 
effective and ineffective SOEs benefited from soft credits generously created by the 
monobank system. Under the new regime, only commercially viable and creditworthy 
enterprises would have access to bank credit. Since the working capital of SOEs was
The idea o f scare money supply, which is associated with liquidity preference, does not necessarily 
contradict to the theory o f  endogenous money creation as argued by the structuralist endogenous 
Money school discussed in Chapter 3.
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purposefully kept at minimal levels under central planning, inefficient enterprises 
would not survive that long without external finance.
This in turn would imply output loss and aggravation of unemployment. Since 
these outcomes were politically sensitive issues, there was a possibility that the 
authorities might be forced to return to the vicious circle of soft budget constraints 
syndrome by imposing upon the banking sector to extend credit to troubled 
enterprises in order to maintain production and employment.
Building a monetary production economy would mean that condition of hard 
budget constraints would apply to the state budget as well. This implied the use of 
alternative means o f financing the budget deficit such as borrowing from the private 
sector or raising taxes. It also would mean abolition of government support 
programmes such as budget subsidies, directed low-cost credits and tax exemptions to 
support enterprises, and monetisation of the budget deficit (Havrylyshyn, 2001: 54, 
and Herr and Westphal, 1991).
All in all, policy packages developed during the early stages of transition 
advocated implementation of reforms simultaneously in a wide range of areas: 
abolishing directive central planning, increasing competition through both new entry 
and privatisation of existing SOEs, price liberalisation, establishing a well-functioning 
market-oriented financial system, setting up a legal environment to protect property 
rights, etc.
The fact, however, is that market institutions do not emerge spontaneously in a 
short space of time. Institutional evolution is a time-consuming process. Therefore, 
these important reforms can be seen only as a precondition to building a monetary 
production economy. Moreover, the uniqueness of the situation under transition is that 
h requires understanding of both the importance of the time needed for the evolution
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and further development o f market institutions and also the possible reaction of old 
institutions to new changes.
Now, the main rationale behind discussing the initial conditions, transition path, 
and current structure o f the Uzbek economy in the following sections is to examine 
the degree of success in carrying out the above-mentioned important reforms, which 
constitute the foundation for establishing a monetary production economy, during 
transition.
5.3 Initial Conditions
Uzbekistan, home to the Great Silk Road cities of Samarqand, Tashkent, Bukhara and 
Khiva, occupies the heart o f the area of Central Asia historically known as Turkistan. 
Three independent khanates, centred in Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand had dominated 
Turkistan between the 16th and 19th centuries before the region was occupied by 
Russia by the end of the 19th century. Having ousted the Tsar and taking over the 
power in Russia, the Bolsheviks set up socialist republics in former Russian colonies. 
Uzbekistan was created in the early 1920s as part of a ‘national delimitation’ that re­
divided Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva into new national republics.
Uzbekistan’s experience with central planning lasted for more than seventy 
years. Among the national republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU), Uzbekistan 
ranked third in terms o f population and fifth in terms of territory. From the economic 
development point of view, it was the least industrialised of all the union republics. 
Industrial production accounted for only one-third of the country’s total output . For 
comparison, in Russia and Ukraine industrial production accounted for 48 percent and
Agriculture also accounted for one-third, and services for another one-third o f  the total output in 1990 
(Asian Development Bank, 2004). Note: Further in the text will use the appreviataion ADB to imply 
the Asian Development Bank.
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44 percent of national output respectively. (For this and some other initial conditions 
statistics for a range of comparable economies please see Table 5.3.1.)
______________ Table 5.3.1 Initial Conditions in the FSU Members
National
Republics
Population
(million)
1989
Years
under
Central
Planning
Share 
of 
Industry 
in GDP, 
1990
Income
per
capita*,
1988
Poverty** 
(% of pop) 
1989
Natural
Resource
Endowment
Russia 148 74 0.48 110 5.0 Rich
Ukraine 51.8 74 0.44 96 6.0 Moderate
Belarus 10.3 72 0.49 102 3.3 Poor
Estonia 1.6 51 0.44 133 1.9 Poor
Latvia 2.7 51 0.45 123 2.4 Poor
Lithuania 3.7 51 0.45 114 2.3 Poor
Moldova 4.4 51 0.37 84 11.8 Poor
Georgia 5.5 70 0.43 108 14.3 Moderate
Armenia 3.3 71 0.55 86 14.3 Poor
Azerbaijan 7.1 70 0.44 71 33.6 Rich
Kazakh. 16.7 71 0.34 93 15.5 Rich
Kyrgyz R. 4.4 71 0.40 72 32.9 Poor
Tajikistan 5.2 71 0.34 54 51.2 Poor
Turkmen. 3.6 71 0.34 71 35.0 Rich
Uzbekistan 20.3 71 0.33 62 43.6 Moderate***
*As percentage of the USSR average.
‘ ‘ Households with gross per capita income less than 75 roubles per month.
‘“ Although labelled ‘moderate’ along with Ukraine and Georgia, Uzbekistan is far 
richer in natural resources than these countries. Uzbekistan is a net exporter of energy 
resources.
Sources: Columns 2 and 5 are from IMF et al (1991).
Columns 3, 4 and 7 are from IMF (2000a). Column 6 is from Pomfret (2003: 43).
Although moderately endowed with natural resources, Uzbekistan was the 
second poorest after Tajikistan in terms of per capita income; Uzbeks earned only 62 
percent of the USSR average. Moreover, about 44 percent of the population earned 
income below the poverty line.5 Depressed prices for the Uzbek-made agricultural 
goods and other raw materials implied that in real terms Uzbekistan contributed more 
to the all-union fund6 than it received from it (Plyshevski, 1995: 86).
6 defined as those whose gross per capita income was less than 75 roubles (Pomfret, 2003:43). 
The central budget o f  the USSR.
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The Uzbek economy was specialised in agricultural production.7 Agriculture 
accounted for more than one-third of the country’s total production in 1990. Cotton, 
referred to as ‘white gold,’ was the primary agricultural crop and the entire system 
was geared for its production. The country produced more than 61 percent of the
n
Soviet Union’s cotton fabric.
The common formula o f the soviet-style development, i.e. emphasising the 
production of non-consumption goods over consumption goods, applied to the Uzbek 
industry too. Branches of heavy industry accounted for almost half of industrial 
production; light industry and the food processing industry accounted for 36 percent 
and 14 percent of the total respectively. In addition, it has been suggested that the 
Uzbek ‘industry’s production potential was on the whole more oriented towards the 
satisfaction of its own needs than was the case in other union republics’ (Plyshevski, 
1995: 87). That is to say chemical fertilisers and machineries produced in the country 
were mostly for domestic use in the agricultural sector.
As to the inter-republican aspects of trade, Uzbekistan ran a trade deficit in 
consumption goods, machinery and fuel, and ran a trade surplus in agricultural 
production and light industry. This is shown below in Table 5.3.2.
Table 5.3.2 Uzbekistan: Inter-republican Trade Balances. Selected Items, 
__________________  1988. (Million Roubles) __________________
Electric Oil and Machine Food Light
power Gas Chemicals Building Processing Industry Agriculture
-11 -349 -163 -1949 -649 1786 469
Source: IM F e ta l, 1991: 228
In 1989 about 40 percent o f  the employed worked in agriculture, 44 percent in services, and only 
about 16 percent worked in industry (ADB, 2004).
Uzbekistan still remains one o f  the largest producers, the fifth largest producer after China, the USA, 
India, and Pakistan, and the second largest exporter after the USA, o f  cotton in the world (Baffes, 
2004).
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Although the country was rich in natural resources, including gas, oil and gold, 
this industry was underdeveloped and its potential was not fully realised. Under 
central planning there was no pressure on the Uzbek government because there was 
no real economic burden from running an inter-republican trade deficit.
There were two implications of this type of industrial organisation. On the one 
hand, it made the country heavily reliant on the import of consumption goods, which 
proved to be costly for the economy during the initial years of transition. On the other 
hand, the natural resource endowment and industry geared to the production of goods 
mainly for domestic use meant that, unlike many other union republics, Uzbekistan 
was potentially less vulnerable to outside shocks. Indeed, as will be mentioned later, 
these two facts, combined with good management and a relatively low level of 
industrialisation, not only affected the choice of reform policy but also explained the 
relatively better performance of the Uzbek economy during the first ten years of 
transition.
5.4 Transition Path and Recent Developments
When Uzbekistan became independent towards the end of 1991, the Uzbek authorities 
announced their adherence to market-oriented reforms, the process already underway 
under perestroika. Although at the beginning no official argument was made about 
the model of economic development to be chosen, the authorities were clear from the 
onset that the ‘big bang’ or ‘shock therapy’ approach to transition would not be 
acceptable for the country (Karimov, 1995 and 1998).
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This meant that the Russian model^ of immediately rejecting the management of 
the economy through central planning in favour of decentralised management through 
indirect monetary policy and fiscal policy tools, which in fact destabilised the 
economy and proved to be costly, could not be considered. Besides the Russian 
model, there were several alternative models of development on the agenda at the 
beginning of transition: the South Korean model of export-oriented growth, the 
Turkish model o f active state support for the development of entrepreneurial activity, 
and the Chinese model of gradual reforms that started with agricultural reforms and 
extended to industry. Yet, none of these models was adopted in the end.
It was argued that the Uzbek model of transition and economic development had 
to take into account national peculiarities and socioeconomic conditions. Heavy 
dependence on the import of consumption goods,10 combined with the high share of 
low-income population, implied that any attempt at rapid transformation of the 
economy would affect the lives of millions, which consequently could lead to social 
unrest. Moreover, although the country was abundant in energy resources, their 
production was still well below the level of self-sufficiency. This especially referred 
to the production o f oil products because at the beginning of transition the country’s 
economy was already more or less self-sufficient in electricity and natural gas 
production.
Hence, the peculiarities of the structure of the economy and concerns about 
socioeconomic conditions formed the basis upon which the Uzbek model of transition 
was formulated. This model, according to the authorities, was built on five
In the early 1990s Uzbekistan adopted a more or less ‘wait and see’ approach to transition. When the 
country seriously considered transition reform after 1993, the Russian model o f  transition was one o f  
the cases to review.
Technical crops, crops that cannot be immediately consumed without first being industrially refined, 
such as cotton dominated agricultural production. Wheat was usually supplied to the country from 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
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fundamental principles, which duly reflected national conditions and peculiarities. 
These were the priority o f  economics over politics, the guiding role o f  the state during 
the transition, the rule o f  law, strong social protection, and the gradual and 
evolutionary transformation o f the economy into a market one (Karimov, 1995 and 
1998).
The choice o f the Uzbek reform path, however, was not influenced, as argued 
by the government, solely by socioeconomic conditions. Alternative theories also do 
well in explaining why a particular country might choose a gradual or slow transition 
method. The choice o f reform is likely to be constrained by initial conditions, notably 
history and geography (de Meto et al, 2001). The longer is the exposure to central 
planning, the greater are macroeconomic distortions and thus the less is the incentive 
for rapid reforms. On the other hand, proximity to a large dynamic market economy 
encourages trade and institutional spillovers and positively affects political and 
economic reform (Kopstein and Reilly, 2000). Abundance of natural resources may 
also play a role (Auty, 2003). Resource abundance is likely to ease pressure for 
economic and political reform, and perpetuate cumulative misallocation of resources 
(Esanov et at., 2001 and Auty, 2003). For these reasons, it might be true that a 
lengthy history with central planning, an awkward geographical location11, and a rich 
natural resource base might have influenced the pattern of Uzbek reform to a certain 
degree.
After independence Uzbekistan had to pay for imported goods, including energy 
products and consumption goods, at the ‘world market prices’. And this was the 
moment when the country felt the real burden of running a trade deficit in
Apart from being far from a dynamically growing market economy, Uzbekistan is one o f the only 
hvo doubly landlocked countries in the world, making it an awkward destination for transportation. 
(The CIA World Factbook. Available on http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uz.html.
Accessed 17 September 2005.)
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consumption goods and energy products. During the initial years of transition, 
annually the country had to spend more than one billion US dollars for the import of 
wheat and energy products alone, which together accounted for about 40 percent of 
the country’s total import bill (Mullajonov, 2001: 69).
Therefore, there was an urgent need to develop the country’s own potential in 
these areas to achieve ‘economic independence’. The initial policies were targeted at 
reducing dependence on the import of consumption goods and energy products by 
increasing their production at home. As Figure 5.4.1 indicates, from 1991 to 2003 
wheat production was increased by more than five times. This, however, was 
achieved at the cost of a reduction in cotton production. During this period wheat 
imports were reduced from more than 3.8 million tons per year to negligible amount. 
The level of self-sufficiency in wheat production was reached by 1998 (World Bank, 
2003a: 2). Production of other major agricultural crops such as rice, com, barley, 
potatoes, and vegetables remained relatively stable.
Figure 5.4.1 Production of Major Agricultural Crops during Transition.
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The same strategy was applied to oil and gas extraction. The country managed 
to increase production of energy resources significantly after independence, with the 
exception of coal production (Figure 5.4.2). This, however, came at a great cost. The 
development of oil and gas fields required importation of modem technologies and 
know-how mostly from western countries. Since independence, a total of more than 
1.8 billion US dollars was borrowed from foreign donors under sovereign guarantee to 
finance projects in the energy sector (World Bank, 2003b: 36). Heavy investments 
paid off quickly and the country reached self-sufficiency in energy by 1995. 
Petroleum imports were reduced from 475 million US dollars in 1992 to zero in 1996 
(World Bank, 2003a: 2).
Interestingly enough, these two examples show the textbook advantage of 
administrative central planning in achieving certain ambitious targets in the shortest 
possible time, no matter how draconian and costly they might be. Through centralised 
decision making and collective efforts Uzbekistan managed to reach a self-sufficient 
level of production in energy and wheat within a short period of time.
Figure 5.4.2. Production of Coal, Crude Oil and Natural Gas during 
Transition.
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By and large, Uzbekistan s reform path can be divided into three distinct 
phases: the period o f slow and limited reforms (1992-93), the period of accelerated 
reforms (1994-96), and the period of stalled reforms (1996-present) (World Bank, 
1999 and Pomfret, 2000). Indeed, Uzbekistan’s inconsistency in its gradual reform 
strategies earned it the name ‘inconsistent gradualist’ (Pomfret and Anderson, 1997). 
During the first stage of reform state-owned housing as well as small and medium size 
state enterprises operating in retail trade, services and light industry were successfully 
privatised. The initial price liberalisation policies were carried out in 1992. However, 
to prevent any negative impact of price liberalisation on living standards, the 
government kept control over the prices of energy products and a number of 
consumption goods. As to the large-scale privatisation and introduction of effective 
corporate governance no reforms were initiated at this stage.
During the second stage, consumer prices and trade were further liberalised. 
More importantly, centralised planning of agricultural production, except for cotton 
and wheat, was eliminated. The process of institution building in the financial sector 
was re-emphasised. A Stock Exchange and a National Share Depositary were 
established. An innovative programme of privatising state-owned enterprises through 
privatisation investment funds (PIFs) was initiated.
The last stage, which is still ongoing, is the period of limited reform. Reforms 
came to an abrupt end when the country introduced exchange and other trade 
restrictions on the economy in the mid 1990s in response to large current account 
deficits. The only distinctiveness of this period perhaps is that reforms have been 
reactive rather than based on a coherent strategy (Pomfret, 2000 and 2003). 
Privatisation has never been truly extended to large state-owned enterprises; price 
distortions still remain important in agriculture as well as in industry; no attempt has
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been made to introduce efficient corporate governance in the enterprise sector, which 
is still dominated by state-owned entities; and finally no decisive attempt has been 
made to reform the banking sector.
5.5 Analysis of the Structure and Performance of the Economy
With all the shortcomings in reform, Uzbekistan has done surprisingly well in terms 
of macroeconomic performance.12 Figure 5.5.1 compares relative performance of 
Uzbekistan during transition to that of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, as well as to the average performance of all transition economies, and the 
CIS countries. Real GDP declined continuously in the CIS from 1991 to 1996. 
Although in 1997 positive output growth was reported for the first time, in 1998 
production growth was negative again. Positive growth has been persistent only since 
1999.
Individual performance of the CIS countries differs from each other 
substantially. For instance, economic powerhouses of the CIS - Russia and the 
Ukraine — have shown persistent real output growth starting only from 1999 and 2000 
respectively. Although Armenia was the first CIS country to report positive real 
output growth in 1994, output decline a year before that date was reported to be 
almost 42 percent (EBRD, 2000). Unlike any other transition economy, Uzbekistan 
did not suffer from heavy output loss at the beginning of transition and was amongst
There is a concern about the reliability o f  Uzbek data due to methodological and other deficiencies in 
assessing national accounts statistics (Taube and Zettlemeyer, 1998). Although this still remains an 
issue, these shortcomings have been somewhat improved with the guidance o f  international institutions 
(IMF, 2000b). Taking these shortcomings into account, international financial institutions usually give 
their own independent estimate o f  Uzbek macroeconomic data. The data used in this work come 
mostly from these independent sources. However, the banking sector data we use in our analysis come 
mostly from the Uzbek monetary authorities and commercial banks. The banking sector data are 
unlikely to suffer from the above-mentioned problems because they are based on balance sheet
information.
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the first to report positive output growth (Figure 5.5.1). Uzbekistan’s positive 
economic growth was reported for the first time in 1996; it has been persistent since 
then. Although the rate o f growth was moderate, it was sufficient to surpass the 1989 
GDP level by 2001. In fact, Uzbekistan was the only CIS country to achieve this 
result by 2001 (Figure 5.5.1). The worst performers among the CIS countries were the 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. They did not reach even half of the 1989 output level 
in 2002, reaching only 47 percent, 39 percent and 38 percent of the 1989 GDP level 
respectively (EBRD, 1995, 2000, and 2004).
All in all, Uzbekistan has performed better than any other CIS country during 
transition. This extraordinary performance, known in the literature as the ‘Uzbek 
Puzzle’, was explained by the initial favourable economic conditions (dominance of 
agricultural production, low level of initial industrialisation, and rich natural resource 
base) and to a lesser extent good policy and public investment (Zettlemeyer, 1998, 
and Taube and Zettlemeyer, 1998). Although deficiencies in data compiling also 
played a role, it was not significant to cast a shadow on the final conclusion (ibid.).
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Moreover, the country did relatively well in socioeconomic terms as well. 
Despite economic difficulties, the country remained committed to providing a social 
safety net, alleviating poverty and limiting spending cuts in education and healthcare 
(Pomfret and Anderson, 1997, Pomfret, 2000, and Esanov et al, 2001). Although not 
emphasised in these works, the central management of the economy played a strong 
role in maintaining production in the enterprise as well as the agricultural sectors of 
the economy. As will be discussed in the next two chapters, centralised credits were 
made easily available to enterprises by the monetary authorities, as in the good old 
days, to prevent unemployment and output loss.
Output recovery was not the only sphere where Uzbekistan’s economic 
performance was better than the CIS average. Table 5.5.1 and Figure 5.5.2 compare 
Uzbekistan’s selected transition performance indicators to those of the CIS and 
Central Eastern Europe and Baltic States (CEEBS). Uzbekistan reached 
macroeconomic stability by the mid 1990s. In key macroeconomic issues such as 
output, current account deficit, inflation and government deficit, Uzbekistan has 
outperformed the CIS average. Interestingly, Uzbekistan’s output and government 
deficit indicators were similar to those of the advanced transition economies of the 
CEEBS. Yet, in terms of reforming the economy the country is still lagging far 
behind, which is reflected in a lower ranking in the EBRD’s overall transition index.13
J The overall transition indicator used here is the average o f  nine transition indices, arge sea e 
privatisation, small-scale privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, price l era isa ion, 
trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate l era isa ion, 
securities markets and non-bank financial institution, and infrastructure reform. T e measuremen 
scale for each o f  these indices ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents no or little c ange om 
centrally planned economy and a 4+ represents a standard typical o f  an industrialised market economy. 
Pluses and minuses represent the borderline between two categories and are given t e va ue o 
example, numerically a 4- means 3.7, whereas a 4+ means 4.3 (EBRD, 2000).
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Table 5.5.1 Uzbekistan, the CIS, and CEEBS: Selected Transition 
___________Indicators Compared. (1994-2004 Average)__________
CEEBS* CIS Uzbekistan
Output Level (1989=100) 119 75 107
Overall Transition Index 3.61 2.53 2.1
Inflation (%) 48.38 303.24 195.19
Government Deficit (% of GDP) 3.15 3.75 2.95
Current Account Deficit (% of GDP)** 4.64 6.45 0.09
*Central Eastern Europe and Baltic States. 
**1993-2004
Source: EBRD (1995, 2000, 2004)
Figure 5.5.2. Uzbekistan and the CIS: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators
Compared.
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As was discussed above, from the very beginning of transition the Uzbek 
authorities pursued policies aimed at substituting imported goods with domestically 
produced products. After achieving self-sufficiency in wheat and energy production, 
the Uzbek government took a much more ambitious stance in steering the economy. 
In the next stage of development they sought to modernise the economy by increasing 
the share of industrial production in total output. That is to say, the country ‘adopted 
an import substitution development strategy that was intended to transform the
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economy from heavy dependence on agriculture and natural resources to a modem 
industrial economy’ (World Bank, 2003a: i).
Industrialisation through import substitution policies is the classical problem of 
the developing world.14 In the case of Uzbekistan, however, history was just 
repeating itself. Indeed, as will become evident from our discussion below, in many 
ways Uzbekistan’s industrialisation policy resembles that of the FSU. When the 
policies of industrialisation were undertaken during the early years of central planning 
in the FSU, it was the agricultural sector from where resources were intended to be 
allocated to industry. To achieve this goal the soviet government used coercive 
methods of redistribution before the collectivisation and price discrimination 
afterwards. In the end, however, these policies proved to be costly in the short as well 
as in the long run because they involved great social costs and reduced incentive 
mechanisms in agriculture. Consequently, the agricultural sector became inefficient; 
instead of serving the government’s industrialisation policies, it became dependent on 
state subsidies. (See among others Dobb, 1966 andNove, 1992.)
Likewise Uzbekistan sees both the agricultural and energy sectors as a potential 
source to finance its industrialisation objectives. We focus first on the agricultural 
sector. The government actively pursues ‘interventionist policies, primarily in the 
cotton sector, to redistribute income from agriculture to develop industries producing 
import substitutes’ (World Bank, 1999: 51). The government redistributes income 
generated in the agricultural sector to develop its industrial base mainly by two 
channels: its price policy in purchasing cotton and wheat products and an overvalued 
exchange rate, which are indirect tools of taxation.
Adopted by many o f  the Latin American countries in the 1970s, these policies proved to be futile.
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The government buys wheat and cotton from farmers at multiple prices.15 As a 
rule a percentage o f wheat production is procured at ‘state order’ prices, and another 
portion at ‘negotiable’ prices. The rest of production is left at the discretion of 
fanners to sell at market prices. The average of these two government purchase prices 
for wheat usually does not exceed the half of the market price.
A similar procedure applies to cotton procurement. (For the organisational 
structure of the sector see Baffes, 2004.) A percentage of the production is procured at 
‘state order’ prices and the rest is left at the discretion of producers to sell at market 
prices. However, cotton is considered as a ‘strategic good’ and the private sector 
cannot buy it. As a corollary, cotton producers have no other choice than to sell the 
remainder of their product at the state-owned cotton marketing chain at a higher than 
state-order price but still much lower than the world market price. Another 
peculiarity of cotton production is that, as in the old days, the state still sets 
production targets for farmers. Producers who do not meet their targets cannot sell 
any part of their product at a ‘market’ price.
Usually cotton procured at state-order prices accounts for more than half of total 
production. Cotton farmers usually get less than half of the world market price. 
According to the World Bank (1999: 50) in 1998 Uzbek cotton farmers received 
approximately 775.00 US dollars per ton of their product from the government, 
whereas the Chinese cotton farmers were able to sell their cotton at well over 1300.00 
US dollars at the farm gate. Although the situation has marginally improved since 
2000, farmers still get only one-third of the export price for cotton (Baffes, 2004).
The government has recently officially abolished these policies (Government o f  Uzbekistan, 2002a 
nnd 2002b). It does not use price discrimination in cotton and wheat procurement any more. Yet, from 
interviews with cotton producers we found out that, in practice farmers have seen little or no change in 
government’s policy. The essence o f  the problem remains unaltered because the state is the only buyer 
°f cotton and sets prices monopsonistically. Unless structural reforms are undertaken in this sector, the 
essence of the problem remains the same. Also see Baffes (2004) for the structural organisation o f the 
sector and the nature o f  the problem.
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Meanwhile, Table 5.5.2 shows that the total transfer extracted from agriculture 
by these means constituted more than 10 percent of GDP in the late 1990s (World 
Bank, 1999). If we recall the fact that agricultural production accounts for one-third 
of GDP, the true nature o f this distortion becomes evident. The table also shows that 
although part of these resources returned to agriculture in the form of subsidies and 
cheap credits to finance next year’s crop, the net annual transfers from agriculture 
remained high and on average constituted about 4 percent of GDP.
Table 5.5.2 Uzbekistan: Net Resource Transfer in 
____________ Agriculture, % of GDP___________
1996 1997 1998*
Subsidies 10.35 7.08 6.18
of which credit subsidies 
(rescheduling/write offs) 3.58 1.84 1.84
Taxation through price gap 6.96 6.34 4.18
Cotton 4.77 5.11 3.86
Wheat 2.19 1.23 0.32
Taxation through foreign 
exchange gap 7.69 3.93 6.28
Cotton 2.33 3.17 5.01
Wheat 0.54 0.76 1.27
Total transfer 14.65 10.27 10.47
Net transfer 4.30 3.20 4.29
‘ Estimate.
Source: World Bank (1999)
Moreover, it is still the case that only a tiny proportion of resources extracted 
from agriculture is reinvested in the sector. As Table 5.5.3 in the next page reveals 
from 1996 to 1999 only about 5 percent of total investment was directed to 
agriculture. During the same period about 40 percent of all investment was directed 
to the industrial and energy sectors of the economy.
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Table 5.5.3 Uzbekistan: Structure of Economic Investment,
1996-99. (%of Total.)
1996 1997 1998 1999
Agriculture
Industry
Energy
Transport and
Communication
Other
Total
5.2 5.2 4.9 4.7
24.8 24.4 21.6 22.4
18.4 13.8 12.2 15.8
17.5 19.8 18.1 18.2
34.3 36.7 43.3 38.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Ghaybullaev (2000)
The government’s policies in the agricultural sector hinder incentive 
mechanisms, breed inefficiency and thus are not sustainable in the long run. 
Moreover, since these policies redistribute income from agriculture, they lead to a 
deterioration of living standards in rural areas. For instance, only between 1991 and 
1995 agricultural wages decreased from 15 percent above national average wages to 
70 percent below (Klugman, 1996, in Pomfret and Anderson, 1997: 15).
Unfortunately, agriculture is not the only sector of the economy being sacrificed 
for the promise of a better future in the modem industrialised country foreseen only 
by the country’s policy makers. A share of the burden is bome by the energy sector 
too. Uzbekistan is rich in natural energy resources such as oil, coal, and gas. It is the 
third largest natural gas producer in the CIS and among the top ten gas-producing 
countries in the world. (For details please see World Bank, 2003b.) Oil, coal and gas 
products are sold in the local market at a fraction of world market prices. This policy 
was especially prevalent until 1995 when the state provided highly subsidised energy 
to the entire economy — industry, agriculture, transportation and households (Esanov 
etal. 2001).
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As indicated in Table 5.5.4 below from 1992 to 2000 the average of domestic 
consumer subsidies constituted about 28 percent of GDP. After the mid 1990s slowly 
but gradually energy product prices have been liberalised.16 As a result, at present 
most of the rent generated in the energy sector is left with the domestic producer; this 
figure was about 26 percent of GDP in 2000. Since almost all domestic producers are 
state-owned entities, the rent accumulated in the sector is effectively left with the 
authorities to use at their discretion. Given the commitment of the government to 
industrialisation, it is not difficult to predict where these funds will be directed. (For 
the detailed discussion of this issue please see Auty, 2003 and Esanov et al. 2001.)
Table 5.5.4 Energy rents in Uzbekistan, 1992-2000, in 
_____________ percent of GDP__________________
Export rent
Domestic 
producer rent Total rent
Domestic
consumer
subsidies
Average for 1992-2000
5.7 5.6 39.5 28.2
2000
6.3 26.2 36.4 3.9
Source: Esanov et al. (2001)
Notes: Export rents = actual export revenues -  transport 
costs -  production costs.
Total rents = total output times export price - transport 
costs -  production costs.
Domestic consumer subsidies = domestic consumption 
times the difference between domestic price and import 
price.
Domestic producer rent = total rent - export rent - 
domestic consumer subsidies.
Ironically, despite the significant appropriation of rent from the agricultural and 
energy sectors, the investable surplus generated by the authorities was not sufficient to 
finance the government’s ambitious development programme. Thus the government 
resorted to considerable external borrowing and since independence borrowed about 7
Nonetheless, underpricing o f  energy products still remains an issue. (See World Bank, 2003b.)
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billion US dollars from abroad. As will be discussed later in our case study of the 
National Bank o f Uzbekistan, almost all of these funds were borrowed by the bank 
under sovereign guarantees and were on-lent to local enterprises17. On the whole, 
from 1999 to 2002 more than half of the total financing of fixed capital formation 
came from the state budget, external borrowings and foreign direct investments18 
(Makhmudov and Isaqov, 2004).
Although singled out and nurtured by the government, the industrial sector has 
its own serious problems which result from the government’s unwillingness to 
liberalise the enterprise sector. Little has been done to change the organisational 
structure of the sector since independence. Although reform policies during transition 
have been aimed at the gradual decentralisation of the economy by dismantling 
industrial ministries and converting large stated-owned enterprises into joint-stock 
companies, the government has been able to maintain control over the process of 
production through the chain of trade associations and holding-like structures, most of 
which turn out to be former industrial ministries.
These associations and holding-like structures have controlling power over 
enterprises’ decision-making regardless of whether they have a controlling stake in 
their stock or not. In the enterprise sector, as in the old days under central planning, 
there seems to be no clear distinction between the state as a business, the state as an 
owner, and the state as a manager. (For details please see Broadman, 2000.) In this
Unfortunately, many o f  these ‘show-case’ enterprises were not successful. For instance, the car plant 
Uzdaewoo operates at 20% o f  capacity, the tractor plants Uzcasetractor and Uzcasemash operate at 
27% and 5% respectively, the new Bukhara and the modernised Ferghana oil refineries are operating 
well below capacity as well (World Bank, 2003). . . , .  . .
As a rule when indicating sources o f  finance o f  investment projects, official statistics com ine 
foreign borrowing and foreign direct investment Uzbekistan, however, has been amongst the least 
successful transition countries in attracting foreign direct investment ($3 per capita). (See bBKU, zuu 
among others.)
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sense, in a relatively recent paper on the structure of the Uzbek economy, the World 
Bank observed the following:
The enterprise sector is little exposed to competition: it functions under centralised 
production targets an d  state distribution systems, little import competition, extensive price 
regulations, and soft budget constraints. Industry is to a large extent still subject to central 
planning through the system o f  “value and material balances” for industrial associations and 
enterprises o f  all forms o f  ownership ... (World Bank, 2003a: 11. Emphasis in the original)
Price distortions and lack of incentive mechanisms are postponing market- 
oriented corporate governance in the sector. Uzbekistan started price reforms back in 
1992 when it was still a member of the rouble zone. Reforms were accelerated after 
the introduction of the national currency in 1994. After the abolition of profit margin 
regulations and a shift to full-cost recovery pricing by state enterprises, the IMF 
(1996) concluded that price liberalisation was completed by 1995. The truth, 
however, is that hitherto most prices for goods and services are still pretty much 
administered.19
Selected transition indices in Table 5.5.5 in the next page provide information 
on these issues. The first two rows are on price liberalisation, the next three rows are 
on enterprise privatisation and restructuring, the last row is on private sector’s share in 
GDP.
As the first two rows of the table reveal, the price system still remains distorted. 
The EBRD’s price liberalisation index of 2.7 indicates that although substantial 
progress has been made in terms of liberalising prices, state procurement in non-
Some of the prices are depressed directly by the State Anti-Monopoly Committee (based on the 
efinition o f market share o f  producers), whereas some are depressed indirectly through import or 
exPort bans.
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market prices remains substantial.20 Moreover, the EBRD (2004) also estimates that 
the share of administered prices in the consumer price index (CPI) exceeded more 
than 50 percent each year from 1999 to 2004.
Table 5.5.5 Uzbekistan: Selected Transition Indicators, 1996-2004.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
■ W J  ■ W W W
2002 2003* 2004“
Price
Liberalisation
Index 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Share of 
Administered 
Prices in CPI, % Na Na 53.0 60.0 53.0 53.0 53.0 53.0 53.0
Small-scale 
Privatisation Index 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Large-scale 
Privatisation Index 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Enterprise Reform 
Index 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Private Sector 
Share in GDP, % 40.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0
‘ Estimate
“ Projection
Source: EBRD (2000, 2004)
The next three rows of the table show that although small-scale privatisation has 
been in principal completed, there has not been much progress in terms of privatising 
large-scale enterprises and achieving effective corporate governance. The small-scale 
privatisation index o f 3.0 implies that a nearly comprehensive privatisation 
programme has been implemented, which we already noted earlier. The large-scale 
privatisation index of 2.7 indicates that only about one-fourth of large-scale 
enterprises have been privatised, and major unresolved issues remain regarding 
corporate governance. The enterprise reform index was 2.0 from 1996-1999. In 2000 
it was downgraded to 1.7. It has not changed since then. The index of 2.0 implies that 
moderately tight credit ad subsidy policy, weak enforcement of bankruptcy 
legislation, and weak corporate governance. The score of 1.7, which is the borderline
20
Full information on the implication o f the four indexes in Table 5.5.5 is given in Appendix 5A.
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between the scores 1.0 and 2.0, implies that very little progress has been made in 
terms of hardening budget constraints and improving corporate governance since 
transition began.
Hence, our arguments so far show that the Uzbek government is still heavily 
involved in maintaining centralised management over the key sectors of the economy. 
It allocates resources based on detailed planning and control over the process of 
production. Little progress has been made in terms of enterprise restructuring, and 
hardening soft budgets constraints. Although significant reforms have been made in 
terms of liberalising prices, the price system still remains distorted.
All of these criticisms and shortcomings of reforms, however, should not create 
an impression that the Uzbek economy remains a completely centrally planned 
economy as it was in 1991. Reforms have been much more productive and fruitful at 
the small and medium-sized business level, in which the private sector is thriving. As 
the last row of the table indicates, the share of the private sector in GDP has increased 
from almost zero at the start of the transition to 45 percent in 1997, although it has 
remained unchanged since then. Likewise, as recognised by the international 
financial organisations, small-scale privatisation has been fast and successful. By and 
large, privatisation o f small enterprises was completed as early as in 1995 (IMF, 
2000b).
Hence, the analysis shows that one can draw a neat line that divides the 
economy in terms of ownership into two separate sectors: the centrally-planned state- 
owned sector and the decentralised private sector. Slow progress of reforms in areas 
of price liberalisation, resource allocation, soft budget constraints, as well as 
privatisation and corporate governance means that preconditions for building an 
mcentive-based monetary production economy are only partially met. Moreover, since
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continuance of the policy of resource allocation through distorted prices, subsidies 
and lax credit policy has direct relevance to the monetary and banking sectors of the 
economy; we expect to see some distortions in these sectors too.
Hence, the implication o f this conclusion for money and banking is that the dual 
nature of the Uzbek economy with its embedded structural problems creates 
unfavourable conditions for the healthy development of a market-oriented banking 
sector. In fact, the afore-mentioned policies are likely to create system-specific 
problems in the monetary and banking sectors of the economy, which will be the 
subject of our next two chapters.
5.6 Conclusion
To summarise the main points of the chapter, we have touched upon several issues 
that have direct relevance to the subject of our study. These were the choice of a 
gradual reform path with its own particular policies of price distortion, resource 
allocation and import substitution.
We showed that after more than ten years of transition the Uzbek economy still 
suffers from some degree of centralisation; the basic preconditions for building a 
monetary production economy are not still met. As mirrored in the government’s 
resource allocation and industrialisation policies, the central planning type of 
management is still prevalent in the Uzbek economy. This especially refers to large- 
scale enterprises functioning in the key sectors of the economy. Prioritisation of the 
administrative methods o f macro and micro management negatively affects the 
evolution of a monetary economy. As a result, this process undermines the
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importance of financial intermediation and thus inhibits the healthy development of 
money and banks.
The government uses prices as a means of extracting resources from one sector 
of the economy and reallocating into another and by doing so severely discourages 
market production incentives in both the private and public sector production. Price 
distortions inhibit incentive mechanisms and lead to a misallocation of resources.
Maintaining strict control over the key sectors of the economy, combined with 
reallocation of resources from one sector to another through distorted prices, lax credit 
and subsidies, and other administrative means, leads to misallocation of scarce 
resources, damages private property rights, and reduces the market incentive 
mechanism, which in the end breeds inefficiency. As a result, the process of 
evolution of true market institutions is slowed down.
Although the implications of this type of economic organisation for the issue of 
money and finance will be the focus of our discussion in the next two chapters, based 
on the analysis of this chapter we can already make some preliminary suggestions. In 
the previous chapters we have suggested that money would evolve in a property-based 
economy as a universalised title for goods and services. A unit of account function 
expands the use of money from simple exchange transactions to financial contracts in 
which money is used as a common measure of wealth. Respect for private property 
rights and the effectiveness legal system then ensures that titles to real assets become 
acceptable as collateral. Although banks still need to assess the quality of collateral, 
there is no longer any need for them to possess collateral physically. This in turn 
reduces transaction costs, improves financial intermediation, and thus increases both 
availability of credit and access to credit.
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Now, as we analyse the transition economy of Uzbekistan we find that there are 
too many missing links in the ‘property rights -  rule of law -  money -  banks -  
financial intermediation’ chain. Continued control over the key sectors of the 
economy, combined with distorted prices, damages private property rights and 
reduces the market incentive mechanism. Consequently, the Uzbek economy 
becomes one of the least attractive environments for the healthy development of 
money, banking and finance. Weak property rights, allocation of resources through 
distorted prices, soft budget constraints, and more importantly state-directed lending 
and pervasive government interference inhibit the development of banks as effective 
financial intermediaries between savers and borrowers and as allocators of new credit. 
We will discuss these and some other issues in more detail in the next chapter.
^  ^  , * S '  ■* V » *  '  . » 4
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6. Reforming Money and Banks during Transition
6.1 Introduction
Along with the most essential reforms, such as the abolition of administrative central 
planning, liberalisation o f prices, and privatisation of state-owned entities, the process 
of transition also necessitated the introduction of important changes in the financial 
sphere as well. Basically, these changes would involve putting an end to the formal 
distinction between the cash money and non-cash money, and establishing the market- 
oriented two-tier banking sector. Since we have discussed the significance of some of 
these issues already in the previous chapter, in this chapter we deal with the 
development of money and banks during transition.
In centrally planned economies strict control over enterprise activity, 
administratively fixed prices, and the distinction between the cash money and non­
cash money circuits made it possible that changes in one sector would not affect 
another. Because non-cash money was used only as a unit of account, and flowed 
strictly through the lines determined by the central plan, it did not create fluctuations 
in effective demand. Moreover, since it did not represent universalised title, it did not 
create any problem of inflation either.
On the other hand, cash money, which to a limited extent had the attributes of 
market money, potentially could create imbalances. However, since prices were 
administratively fixed and production of goods and services depended more on the 
central plan rather than household demand, increased cash money balances of the 
household sector could either create queues in retail outlets or turn into a monetary 
overhang but not affect production decisions.
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As far as long-term investment projects are concerned, they were financed 
directly through the state budget. The monobank system’s role was limited to the 
organisation of the payments system for the enterprise sector, monitoring financial 
flows in enterprises’ bank accounts, and creating short-term credit endogenously to 
meet the demands of the enterprise sector for trade. An inevitable feature of this 
system was that, as was argued by Komai on numerous occasions, the enterprise 
sector did not face market-type financial constraints.
The decentralisation o f the economic process, the imposition of hard finance 
constraints, and the introduction of reforms towards market-oriented corporate 
governance mean that each and every individual enterprise has to organise the process 
of production independently. Naturally, organisation of the process in this manner 
reinforces the importance of debt instruments and contracts, which are denominated 
and discharged in money. The use of money as a universalised title for all tradable 
goods and services, and as a unit of account in debt contracts underlines the 
importance of money under a market-based economy.
As a result, agents hold money during times of increased uncertainty, which is 
an inherent feature of a decentralised market economy. What is more important is that 
the entire financial superstructure of market-based economies is built upon the 
existence of strong trust in the institution of money.
Under the new regime the banking sector had to take on the role of allocating 
resources among millions of autonomous entities by acting as an intermediary 
between surplus units and deficit units. In this sense, the role of the banking sector in 
the new environment would be immense. Furthermore, as our arguments on the stages 
°f banking development shows, after reaching a certain stage of development, we 
Would expect the banking sector to be able to free the enterprise sector from the 
loanable funds constraint.
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Now, the questions whether transition banks would be able to create credit as a 
mature market banks would do, and whether transition banks would be able to fill the 
gap left by the monobank system in their infant stage of development will be the focus 
of our analysis in this chapter.
In Section 6.2 we will discuss the issue of reforming money and banks in 
transition economies. In this section we will demonstrate that, although in some 
respect transition banking can formally take off from the fourth stage of banking 
development, they cannot use the potential of this stage of development to full effect 
without the necessary build-up of confidence in new institutions. We will argue that 
the time-consuming nature of institutional development explains why the banking 
sector fails to satisfy enterprises’ demand for credit. We will also explain why the 
reliance on cash increases and the importance of banking decreases during the early 
years of transition. In Section 6.3 we will look at the basic indicators of the 
development of money and banking across different countries. In this sense, the 
analysis of this section simply complements that of Section 6.2. In Section 6.4 we will 
attempt to explain the emergence of non-monetary transactions using this institutional 
framework and try to interpret the process as a development of a monetary economy. 
Finally, in Section 6.5 we will summarise our major findings and conclude the 
chapter.
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6.2 Reforming Money and Banks
In Chapter 4 we showed that the role of money and that of banks in CPEs were 
passive. These institutions were purposefully designed to facilitate the economic 
process, which was modelled as a barter-like economy. Activities of enterprises in 
CPEs were not inhibited by monetary constraints; rather their activities were 
constrained by the availability of real resources in the system. In this sense, CPEs 
were classified as supply-constrained systems (Komai, 1979). Organisation of the 
economic process by means of central planning, combined with the accommodative 
character of money in the process of production, distribution, and resource allocation, 
meant that the cohesion o f the system was established by the institution of planning.
Since money did not represent universal purchasing power, it was not the most 
desirable asset to hold. For instance, to deal with any uncertainty unforeseen by the 
plan, enterprises would accumulate real resources, but not money. In the household 
sector accumulation and hoarding took place in two forms: voluntary and involuntary. 
Voluntary hoarding occurred by saving in non-monetary assets, such as commodities 
and foreign currencies. Involuntary saving was in monetary form. However, it was 
forced in nature because it was the result of a short supply of goods. According to one 
estimate, the share of forced saving in total monetary saving of the household sector 
in the FSU increased from 9 percent in 1965 to 42 percent in 1989 (Kim, 1999: 605).
Contrary to this, in market economies money has stable value and represents 
title to all tradable goods and services. This makes money the most liquid of all assets 
and this is the reason why wealth formation takes place in monetary form. One of the 
fundamental features o f market economies is that the entire process of production is 
built upon monetary matters; the economic process is organised on the basis of sundry 
debt contracts, in which money is used as a unit of account; that means money
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facilitates the economic process. In this sense, Riese (2004: 178) argued that in a 
market economy the cohesion of the system was established by the institution of 
money.
In the meantime, however, being the most attractive asset to hold, especially in 
times of increased uncertainty, money is capable of constraining aggregate effective 
demand. Hence, the role o f money in the economic process, and liquidity preference 
associated with it, implies that market economies are demand-constrained systems. 
(See also Komai, 1979.)
Now, as was noted in Chapter 5, in orthodox theory decentralisation of the 
economic process, price liberalisation, privatisation, and restructuring the banking 
sector by copying the blueprint of the banking sector in advanced countries, were seen 
as a sufficient condition to guarantee the success of the process of transition. 
However, since the transformation would require a complete change from one mode o f  
resource allocation into another, these nominal changes would not suffice. Rather the 
evolution and gradual maturity of vital market institutions such as money, banks and 
other financial institutions would be required for a smoother transition. Taking this 
caveat in mind, we will take an alternative view and attempt to analyse the process 
using the Post Keynesian approach, which emphasises institutional evolution.
Now, to transform a supply-constrained centrally planned economy into a 
demand-constrained monetary one, it is essential that (i) wealth formation and thus the 
habit of hoarding must shift from goods to money (Engerer, 2001: ch. 3), (ii) the 
banking sector has to be reorganised and restructured, and (iii) banking habits must 
evolve. To achieve these objectives, first of all, money had to become a universalised 
title for all tradable goods and services; so that it becomes a generally acceptable 
uieans of payment, store of value, and more importantly standard of denominating and 
discharging debt contracts. In other words, money has to become an active ingredient
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in the economic process. Establishment of trust in money is important for the quicker 
development o f the banking sector simply because the entire financial superstructure 
of a market economy is built upon trust in money. Let us discuss these issues in more 
detail in turn.
First of all, the legal and practical separation between cash money and non-cash 
money circuits had to be abolished altogether. As in a market economy, money had to 
represent universalised title to all tradable goods and services. This especially referred 
to non-cash money. Enterprises were to be given the right to spend their financial 
resources freely. ‘Other than auditing against fraud, what they did with their owned 
cash balances -  including deposit money -  for new investments or the purchase of 
supplies would be unrestricted’ (McKinnon, 1993: 247). Carrying out these basic yet 
fundamental reforms was a precondition for transforming the financial sector of the 
economy.
Second, there was a need to build a market-oriented banking system. The 
monobank sector had to be dismantled and replaced by the two-tier banking sector 
consisting of the central bank and commercial banks. Broadly speaking, the central 
bank would be in charge of monetary policy and supervision of commercial bank 
activities, whereas commercial banks would be in charge of, and therefore had to be 
capable of, allocating and channelling financial resources into productive businesses 
strictly on the basis o f financial viability (Gowland, 1992, Calvo and Coricelli 1993, 
Rostowski, 1995, and OECD, 1997).
Under the new regime, the banking sector had to abandon certain functions 
relevant only under central planning such as granting soft loans, collecting taxes on 
behalf of the government, and revealing information on customers’ accounts to the 
authorities or any other third party. The only aspect of banking under central planning
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that could be relevant under the new regime would be the role of banks as payment 
clearing centres.
Reforming the banking sector was necessary for the following reason. As was 
shown in Chapter 4, under central planning, economic rent generated in various 
sectors of the economy was appropriated by means of distorted prices and other 
administrative methods of planning. These resources then were allocated to the 
enterprise sector in the form of non-refundable grants, subsidies, and soft credits 
through the banking sector. The banking sector was used as an effective but neutral 
conduit in the government’s resource allocation policy. (As was shown in Table 4.5.2 
enterprises heavily depended upon bank credits to finance their working capital.)
Giving up administrative methods of planning, setting up market clearing prices 
that represent value and scarcity, and hardening soft finance constraints mean that 
under the new regime the financial sector will be responsible for allocation of 
resources from surplus units to deficit ones. As was discussed in Chapter 3, in a 
market economy economic growth is constrained by the cost and availability of 
external finance. In the absence of a well-functioning stock market, the banking sector 
is of paramount importance in meeting the enterprise sector’s demand for external 
finance. To increase availability of finance and reduce its cost, banks should act as 
effective intermediaries between lenders and borrowers at their earlier stage of 
development. As the general public’s trust in banks increases and agents start using 
bank liabilities as money, banks can then ease loanable funds constraints by being 
able to create credit ahead of saving.
Reaching this stage of development, however, depends upon how quickly and 
successfully institutions of money and banks, which played completely different 
factions under central planning, evolve during transition. Below we will discuss the
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evolution of these institutions by employing the logic of the stages of banking 
development framework discussed in Chapter 3.
In some respect, copying the blueprint of the banking sector in advanced market 
economies, the banking sector of the transition economies could be equipped with the 
following: (i) acceptability o f bank liabilities as payment instruments; (ii) fractional 
reserve banking; (iii) the lender-of-last-resort facility; and (iv) the inter-bank market 
for liquid facilities.
As was seen in our earlier discussions, at this stage of development banks are 
already in a position to ease financial constraints of the corporate sector by being able 
to create credit ahead of saving. However, the logic of the stage of banking 
development in advanced countries on the one hand, and the underdeveloped nature of 
the institutional structure inherited from the central-planning past on the other hand, 
prove that banks in transition could not use the potential of stage four to full effect 
without the necessary build-up of confidence in bank liabilities and gradual 
development of the banking habit o f the household sector. That is to say they had to 
start their way to the development almost from scratch.
We may, conditionally, describe the gradual rise of confidence in both cash 
money and bank liabilities (non-cash money) and thus the development of money and 
banking during transition as a five-phase process. Table 6.2.1 briefly summarises the 
main points of this process. Bearing in mind the distinctions made between cash 
money and non-cash money, as well as between corporate and retail banking services 
under central planning, we will look at the following issues in turn: (i) why cash- 
based transactions may increase during the early years of transition; (ii) how the 
modernisation of payments system and the gradual rise of confidence in banks can 
lead to internal convertibility between cash money and non-cash money; and (iii) how 
bank liabilities can gradually be accepted as money by the household sector.
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To describe the process succinctly, we use three columns labelled ‘retail 
banking’, ‘corporate banking’, and ‘money outside the banking sector’ in Table 6.2.1 
in the next page. This, from left to right, in a way reflects relative liquidity of 
household deposits, non-cash money and cash money respectively. In the end, this 
exercise will show how internal convertibility between these components of broad 
money can gradually be achieved and how these changes and developments can 
explain the ability of banks to create credit ahead of saving.
Phase One: The period under central planning. One of the particularities of 
banking under central planning was the separation of corporate banking from retail 
banking. As a rule, big specialised banks provided only corporate banking services. 
As was described in Chapter 4, by law enterprises were obliged to carry out their 
payment transactions almost exclusively in non-cash money via the banking sector. 
The important point, however, is that since non-cash money was seen as a mere 
accounting tool in the process of resource allocation, the issue of trust was not 
relevant here. (Please see Chapter 4 for the detailed discussion of the issue.)
Provision of retail banking services to households was Sberbank’s primary 
function. The pool o f funds Sberbank attracted from the population was sold as 
medium and long-term loans to other banks, which then on-lent these facilities to 
ultimate borrowers in the corporate sector of the economy. Although Sberbank also 
provided consumer credit services to the household sector, they remained 
underdeveloped mostly due to the shortage of consumer goods in the economy. No 
mechanism of clearing similar to cheque clearing was put in place and therefore titles 
to these deposits were not used to effect transactions. Unlike the enterprise sector, the 
household sector’s transactions were almost exclusively carried out in cash money.
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Retail Banking Corporate Banking
Money Outside the 
Banking Sector
Phase 1. Under Central Planning
w o p w u w    » v i i m v «  w u i g i w * Y  Q I I U  I 1 1 C  I l U U d C l l U l U  b C U l O l  S
currency at one-to-one ratio but ineffective payments clearing transactions are almost 
no clearing system exists. Bank system. Corporate deposits are exclusively carried out in 
x i_..i non-cash money by design. cash money.
Non-cash money is used by the 
enterprise sector alone.
deposits are savings but not 
money.
Phase 2. Early Years of Transition: Hyperinflation and Collapse of Confidence_________
Trust in banks erodes and the Weak trust in banks, payment Confidence in domestic
size of depositary base shrinks, delays associated with currency is lost. Savings are
inefficient payment system, kept in foreign hard
incentives to under-report currencies. Because it is
business dealings, and abolition legal tender, cash money is 
of distinction between cash demanded mostly for
money and non-cash money transaction purposes. In
result in lower demand for non- short, cash-based 
cash money. In the end this transactions have dominant 
leads to relative illiquidity of non- power, 
cash money.
Phase 3. Period of Moderate Inflation
Due to moderate inflation and 
positive deposit rate offered by 
banks, depositary base slowly 
increases. However, trust is still 
weak and deposits are not 
money.
Payments system is
modernised. Trust in banks, and Trust in national currency 
thus in bank liabilities, slowly gradually picks up. 
increases. Nonetheless, no 
significant increase in deposit 
based transactions yet. Non­
cash money might not be as 
desirable as cash money.
Households start using 
domestic currency as a 
store of value. Cash-based 
transactions still dominate.
Phase 4. Inflation is controlled and stability of national currency is achieved
Depositary base increases 
significantly. Payment-clearing 
mechanism is being introduced 
slowly. Deposits are still not 
money.
Confidence in banks is high.
Effective payments system. Stability of national currency
Non-cash money and cash is achieved. Wealth
money are equally liquid. Non- formation takes monetary
cash money transactions on the form. Some cash
rise. transactions are replaced
with non-cash ones.
Phase 5. Banks regain public's confidence. A market-type banking sector is established.
Depositary base increases Banks regain confidence, 
significantly. Effective payment Deposit-based transactions now
clearing system. Deposit-based have dominant power. As banks regain confidence,
transactions are on the rise. Now banks can create credit and efficiency of non-cash
Deposits are money. ahead of saving. transactions is realised,
cash-based transactions 
start declining considerably. 
Cash money is used only for
  small transactions. ______
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The underdeveloped nature of personal banking services also implied that the 
household sector saw their bank deposits only as a store of value. Despite this fact, 
however, the general public s confidence in Sberbank was high because it offered its 
depositors financial gain and readily exchanged deposits for cash money at a one-to- 
one ratio on demand. In this phase credit creation is endogenous in the system- 
specific sense.
Hence, three important things that we can note in this phase are the following: 
(i) corporate-banking is separate from retail-banking; the former is much more 
advanced relative to the latter; a well-defined but inefficient payments system is in 
place, which means the enterprise sector uses bank liabilities as money (in the system- 
specific sense); (ii) retail-banking services are extremely underdeveloped; no clearing 
mechanism is set up; household sector deposits are not money; (iii) cash money is 
used almost exclusively by the household sector, while non-cash money is used by the 
enterprise sector.
Phase Two: Transition - the period of hyperinflation and collapse of confidence 
in the domestic banking sector. The monetary overhang1 generated in the economy 
over the years under the previous regime represented suppressed inflation, which was 
contained by fixed prices, and the centralised and administrative nature of the process 
of production, distribution, and resource allocation. With the decentralisation of the 
economic process, liberalisation of prices, and accompanied output fall, the monetary 
overhang (combined with loose monetary policy) translated into hyperinflation. The 
annual rate of inflation for the fifteen former soviet republics averaged about 173 
percent and 1507 percent in 1991 and 1992 respectively (EBRD, 1995). This quickly 
wiped out the purchasing power of bank deposits and thus eroded the general public s
Kim (1999: 605) gives very detailed account o f  monetary overhang in the FSU.
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trust in the banking sector. As a result, household savings were held predominantly in 
foreign currencies and in kind in this period.
Hyperinflation also affected agents’ attitude towards the use of cash money and 
non-cash money. The abolition of the distinction between cash money and non-cash 
money meant that enterprises now could choose freely between cash money and non­
cash money to effect transactions. Weak trust in banks, the inefficient and sluggish 
payments system, and more importantly incentives to avoid taxes induced some 
businesses, especially small and medium-sized ones, to switch a certain part of their 
deposit-based transactions to cash-based ones. As a result, demand for non-cash 
money decreased, while demand for cash money increased.
The sudden upsurge of demand for cash money is also explained by the 
expansion of the retail trade sector during transition, which was suppresses under 
central planning. After the liberalisation of retail trade, the privatised retail sector 
expanded massively by new entrants such as private retail outlets and ‘shuttle 
traders2’. Consequently, the need for the use of cash money for transaction purposes 
became much higher compared to what it was during the pre-reform period.
Figure 6.2.1, below, helps us to explain better why demand for cash money goes 
up and why cash-based transactions increase subsequently during transition. It is 
important to note that the difference between Figure 4.5.3, presented in Chapter 4 that 
showed the circulation o f cash money under central planning, and Figure 6.2.1 is that 
the latter reflects fundamental institutional reforms that affected the circulation of 
cash money during transition. First of all, the monobank sector is replaced by the two- 
tier banking sector. Second, under the previous regime cash money was used by the 
household sector only in the retail sector of the organised market, and in the non-
individual entrepreneurs who, by law, are allowed to travel to foreign countries to bring consumer 
goods and sell them in the home market.
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organised market. Decentralisation of the economic process and abolition of the 
distinction between cash money and non-cash money implies that now not only the 
household sector but also the enterprise sector can use cash money to effect payments 
in the retail as well as wholesale markets (BIS, 2003a and 2003b). Third, the 
household sector can hoard their monetary savings or save them with commercial 
banks.
Central Bank
Households
Cash hoards
Production sectorRetail and 
wholesale markets
Commercial banks
1 -  Injection o f  cash from the Central Bank
2 -  Receipt o f  cash from commercial banks
3 -  Payment o f  wages (and dividends)
4 -  Consumption expenditure
5 — Saving (dissaving) with formal credit institutions
6 -  Hoarding
7 -  Return o f  cash to commercial banks
Figure 6.2.1 Uzbekistan: circulation of cash money during 
transition
Now, let us look at some of these changes in the example of our case study - 
Uzbekistan. During transition the structure of the Uzbek economy changed. As was 
discussed in the previous chapter, although the state still retains centralised control 
°ver large enterprises, privatisation of small and medium enterprises and retail outlets
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was largely completed by the mid 1990s. These changes, accompanied by the formal 
abolition of the legal distinction between cash money and non-cash money, meant that 
now small and medium enterprises, privatised ones as well as new entrants, were free 
to choose between using cash money and non-cash money to conduct their business in 
retail and ‘small wholesale’ markets. The incentive to hide some part of their income 
to evade taxes, combined with weak trust in banks and thus bank liabilities, implied 
that these enterprises naturally substituted some of their non-cash money transactions 
with cash ones.
As was mentioned earlier, another reason why enterprises may substitute some 
of their deposit-based transactions with cash-based ones is inefficiency of the payment 
clearing system. Indeed, the payment system inherited from the past was ineffective 
and extremely sluggish because payment clearing required the physical transport of 
paper documents (Balino et al, 1994 and 1996, and Bazarov and Rahimova, 2002). 
Differences in timing between crediting and debiting of accounts caused by delays in 
the transmission of payment information and in the subsequent registration of 
accounting entries has increased significantly from 1991 to 1993 in the CIS (Balino et 
al, 1994). Although rules and regulations stipulated that payments had to be effected 
within 3 working days, it was much worse and burdensome. In fact it would take 
from weeks to months to finally clear deposit-based transactions3 (Bazarov and 
Rahimova, 2002).
In short, collapse of confidence in banks, higher liquidity preference associated 
with increased uncertainty during transition, the sluggish and ineffective nature of 
deposit-based transactions, and incentives to underreport business dealings to avoid
Moreover, there would be cases when the entire package o f paper documents (called aviso) would be 
lost or some o f the documents would be reported missing. Under these circumstance banks had to 
present the duplicate o f  these documents to the supplier’s bank. (From an interview with the Senior 
Executive Director o f  a payments department who worked in the banking system for more than 20 
years.)
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taxes put upward pressure on the use of cash money and thus reduce the inflow of 
cash money into the banking sector. Cash money injected by the central bank into the 
system does not flow back to the banking sector. Rather cash money increasingly 
flows back and forth between the retail and wholesale markets, households, and cash 
hoards sections in the diagram. This shows that the economy’s reliance on cash money 
increases dramatically during transition.
In the meantime, excess non-cash money that has been accumulating in the 
banking sector (due to the monetary overhang and excessively created soft credits) 
and a complete collapse of trust in banks mean that under these circumstances 
achieving immediate convertibility between cash money and non-cash money may 
come at the cost o f undesirably high rate of inflation. In an attempt to restrain this 
excessive inflationary pressure the monetary authorities may restrict free 
convertibility of bank liabilities into cash money.
To do this, the authorities may simply refuse to inject new cash money into the 
circulation. The inability of commercial banks to raise cash money from the general 
public, then, automatically translates into restrictions on the free convertibility of bank 
liabilities into cash money. Household depositors lose immediate access to their 
deposits. Enterprises will be allowed to carry out non-cash transactions without 
restrictions. However, they may face difficulty in converting their deposits into cash 
money even for such basic need as paying wages of their employees. As a result of 
these restrictions, non-cash money becomes less liquid relative to cash money.
Cash shortages were reported to be a common problem throughout the FSU in 
the mid 1990s, which combined with the above-mentioned factors, then, resulted in 
the relative illiquidity o f non-cash money (Hardy and Lahiri, 1996 and Conway,
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1997). This suggests that the non-cash component of the broad money would not be 
as liquid as its cash component in this period. In other words, the internal 
convertibility of cash money and non-cash money would not be achieved during the 
early years of transition. The duration of this stage may vary from country to country 
depending upon the degree of success achieved in conducting consistent reforms and 
the speed of institutional developments. As will be shown later in due course, 
unfortunately this irregularity still holds true for the present Uzbek banking sector.
Now, as the economy’s reliance on cash money increases and the liabilities of 
banks becomes a less and less popular means of saving and payment, the banking 
sector’s ability to create credit will be severely affected. A collapse of confidence in 
banks and bank liabilities means that banks can hardly attract new deposits from the 
general public. As a result, unless the authorities come to the rescue and supply 
centralised funds to the banking sector, the size of bank credits shrinks considerably at 
this stage.
Phase Three: the period of moderate inflation. In this phase, a sound national 
currency is established, usually through currency reform and the maintenance of 
moderate inflation. Although the payments system is modernised in the corporate- 
banking sector, payment clearing is not yet introduced in the retail-banking one. 
Therefore, household deposits represent savings but not money.
Moderate inflation and the introduction of an efficient payment clearing system 
gradually promote confidence in bank liabilities (non-cash money) as a safe and liquid 
asset. There is an upward tendency in the corporate sector to use bank liabilities along 
with cash money for payment purposes. Despite these positive changes, however, 
entrepreneurs are not confident yet to increase their deposit-based transactions
It is a well-documented fact that non-cash money was widely traded for cash money at a discount 
during this time (ibid.).
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dramatically, and households savings with banks do not increase that much either. 
Therefore, the economy will be still highly reliant on cash money, which can be 
observed in the relatively high ratio of cash money to demand deposits (non-cash 
money). This, in turn, implies that the banking sector is still suppressed. This simply 
shows that trust in central bank (outside) money precedes trust in bank liabilities.
As to the issue of credit creation, the ability of the banking sector to create 
credit ahead of savings depends upon the acceptability of bank liabilities by the 
general public as money, which might be a slow and time-consuming process. The 
gradual increase o f trust in the banking sector in this stage slowly facilitates bank 
intermediation. However, banks’ ability to create credit depends heavily upon new 
deposits, which do not increase that much in this stage.
Phase Four: the period when inflation is controlled and stability of national 
currency is finally achieved. As was argued in the previous chapters, financial 
development presupposes the existence of sound outside money on the basis of which 
inside money system can develop. The existence o f confidence in money facilitates 
monetisation o f  wealth formation. Sound money also facilitates financial development 
and thus fosters financial intermediation. During the early stages of transition, 
building trust in outside money and creating the right conditions for the development 
of inside money and thus financial intermediation would be very important to prevent 
sharp output loss (Perotti, 1994).
In the retail-banking sector, the depositary base increases significantly. Banks 
start offering better personal banking services; the household sector’s banking habit 
gradually develops too. Households start converting their monetary savings into bank 
deposits, which then will be followed by a habitual voluntary saving. A payment- 
clearing mechanism is being introduced slowly. Banks start introducing plastic debit 
^  credit cards. Slowly but gradually retail outlets start accepting these cards as
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payment instruments. However, since this practice is not yet widespread and popular, 
household deposits are not yet money.
As far as corporate banking is concerned, public confidence in banks as an 
integral part of a new market economy gradually grows. This, combined with the 
stability of the national currency and the modernised effective payments system, 
induces entrepreneurs to reduce their reliance on cash money as a medium of 
exchange and increase their deposit-based transactions. As a result, some cash-based 
transactions are replaced with non-cash ones. Deposit-based transactions are on steep 
rise, but in general they are not still dominant.
As to the credit activity of banks, since bank liabilities have not yet been fully 
accepted as money, the banks’ role is still limited to acting as an intermediary 
between savers and borrowers. Banks can boost their credit activity only by attracting 
more deposits. In other words, at this phase this activity is still constrained by the 
availability of loanable funds.
Phase Five: the period when banks finally fully regain public confidence. In the 
retail-banking sector the depositary base increases significantly. In addition, the 
introduction of a payment clearing mechanism (such as an electronic clearing 
mechanism for plastic debit and credit cards, cheque clearing, direct debit/credit 
instruments, etc) implies that household deposits are now money. As banks regain 
public confidence and the efficiency of deposit-based transactions are realised, cash- 
based transactions start declining considerably in the corporate-banking services 
sector too. As acceptability of bank liabilities as money increases in the economy, 
agents minimise their cash-based transactions and increase their deposit-based ones. 
Finally in this phase, household demand deposits, enterprise demand deposits, and 
cash money are equally liquid.
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Hence, in the fifth phase trust in banks is firmly established and the public starts 
using bank deposits not only as a store of value but also as a means of payment. 
Finally, deposit-based transactions dominate. Bank liabilities are accepted as fully- 
fledged money by both the corporate sector and the household sector. This means that 
banks’ credit activity is no longer constrained by the availability of loanable funds. 
Banks now create credit endogenously ahead of saving. In other words, in the early 
years of transition the banking sector’s ability to create credit ahead of saving will be 
limited.
To summarise, the collapse of confidence in the banking sector during transition 
meant that the banking sector had to start from stage one. Another particularity is that 
due to the cash-based nature of the household sector transactions and deposit-based 
nature of the enterprise sector transactions, corporate sector banking reaches stage two 
earlier, while the retail banking sector development is going to be gradual and slow. 
Moreover, depending upon initial conditions, pace, consistency and success in 
undertaking institutional reforms, different transition economies can facilitate 
development of the banking sector and reach phase five at different times.
Below in Section 6.3 we will analyse some macroeconomic data in search of 
some empirical support for the arguments we put forward in this section.
6.3 Some observations on the importance of banking and reliance on cash across 
different countries
To see the differences o f development in banking habits across individual transition 
countries we can use several basic macro indicators. Before we start this exercise, 
however, it is important to note that the degree of acceptability of bank deposits as 
money, which is a distinctive feature of ‘stage two’, differs in advanced countries too.
The ratio of currency to demand deposits, which is a basic measure that indicates 
economy’s reliance on cash, shows that banking sector development is not the same 
across the individual members of the European Union (EU). According to Chick and 
Dow (1996 and 1997), in countries like the UK and Denmark, agents heavily rely on 
bank liabilities to carry out transactions; whereas in countries like Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, Germany and Ireland cash-based transactions are still high. According to the 
same source, in 1992 the ratio of currency to demand deposits was only 7.5 percent in 
the UK, 9.7 percent in Denmark, while it was 20.6 percent in Portugal, 30.4 percent in 
Germany, 35.5 percent in Spain, 42.1 percent in Ireland, and 83.5 percent in Greece. 
While wider use of cash in the southern countries of the EU might be explained by 
their comparatively large informal economies, the German case is explained by the 
dual nature of the banking sector in which industry and commerce is served by the 
universal banks, and the public by the savings and cooperative banks. Since savings 
and cooperative banks mainly focus on attracting savings, a large percentage of 
household transactions are carried out in cash (ibid.).
Table 6.3.1, in the next page, updates the above-mentioned information on 
advanced countries and attempts to compare reliance on cash and the importance of 
banking in these countries to those in transition countries. There are three sub-groups 
in the table: five transition countries from the CIS, three advanced transition 
countries, which are already members of the EU, from Eastern Europe, and seven 
countries from the EU to represent advanced market economies. Countries are placed 
in rank order, with respect to the degree of reliance on cash, within their respective 
sub-groups.
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Table 6.3.1 Reliance on cash and importance of banking in 
 ________ selected countries, 2003
Currency to 
demand 
deposits 
(1)
Currency to 
total deposits 
(2)
|  « W V V
Demand 
deposits to 
total deposits 
(3)
Total 
deposits to 
GDP 
(4)
Ukraine 166.0 54.0 33.0 23.0
Uzbekistan* 151.0 90.0 60.0 7.0
Russia 114.0 41.0 36.0 22.0
Kazakhstan 100.0 34.0 34.0 16.0
Belarus 71.0 24.0 33.0 11.0
Poland 59.0 15.0 30.0 37.0
Hungary 59.0 18.0 30.0 41.0
Czech R 30.0 14.0 46.0 63.0
Greece** 72.0 13.0 18.0 80.0
Spain 24.0 7.0 28.0 87.0
Portugal 20.0 8.0 38.0 100.0
Germany 20.0 6.0 30.0 98.0
Sweden 14.0 9.0 62.0 45.0
Denmark 10.0 6.0 61.0 50.0
UK*** 8.0 2.0 39.0 115.0
Notes: *1999.
* * 2000 .
***Data for demand deposits could be retrieved from the IFS.
Columns 1 and 3 are from (Chick and Dow, 1997: 257).
Source: IFS (IMF). Except Uzbekistan (ADB).
While Column 1 shows the use of bank deposits as a means of payment along 
with currency, Column 2 indicates acceptability of bank deposits as a means of 
payment and saving. In both cases, the higher is the ratio, the heavier is reliance on 
cash. Column 3 shows the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits. In advanced 
countries this ratio is expected to be higher because of the wide use of bank liabilities 
as money.
As far as transition economies are concerned, however, Column 3 should be 
interpreted cautiously. As was discussed earlier, due to hyperinflation and the collapse 
°f confidence in the banking sector, the size of both demand deposits and saving 
deposits would shrink initially. The important point, however, is that the size of 
saving deposits would decrease more relative to that of demand deposits. Firstly, it is 
because saving deposits, which almost exclusively belonged to the household sector,
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are indicators of trust, and thus with the collapse of trust in banks these deposits 
would reduce in size considerably. And secondly, as long as the banking sector 
performed the function of a payment clearing centre for the enterprise sector, 
enterprises would still be better off in using these services; carrying out large-value 
transactions in currency would be ineffective and costly for them. This means that 
although loss of trust in banks would likely reduce the size of demand deposits, the 
reduction would be smaller compared to that of time and saving deposits. Column 4 
shows the ratio of total deposits to GDP. In general terms this indicator measures the 
importance of banking sector as an intermediary.
As the table shows, with the exception of Greece in our sample, in advanced 
market economies reliance on cash-based transactions is low (Column 1). Another 
particularity of the development in advanced countries is that the northern countries of 
the EU rely less on cash-based transactions than their southern counterparts. 
Nonetheless, the general tendency is that the importance of banking in these countries 
is extremely high, which is evidenced by the low ratio of currency to total deposits 
(less than 10 percent for all of them, except for Greece) and the high ratio of total 
deposits to GDP (Columns 2 and 4 respectively).
As to the advanced group of transition countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland seem to have made better progress compared to the CIS countries. 
Although reliance on cash is still high in these countries (Column 1), importance of 
banking has surely increased (Columns 2, 3 and 4). The Czech Republic seems to 
have made particularly well: the ratio of currency to demand deposits is 30 percent — 
the lowest amongst the transition economies; and the ratio of bank liabilities to GDP 
is about 63 percent — the highest amongst the transition economies.
The faster progress of banking development in these countries can be explained 
by the fact that they had fewer years of experience with central planning and thus had
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less centralised economies and a less distorted financial sector. They started transition 
earlier and were more consistent reformists. And more importantly, they were closer 
to dynamically functioning market economies. It is important to note that these 
relative advantages made the Central and Eastern European countries very attractive 
for foreign bank entry, which in the end made institutional spillover easier and 
quicker.
Table 6.3.2, below, shows the share of foreign capital in total bank capital in the 
CEEBS. As we can see from the table, foreign banks play an important role in these 
countries. The share of foreign bank capital in total bank capital exceeded more than 
80 percent in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovakia. This 
figure exceeds well over 60 percent in countries like Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania. 
It has been argued that foreign banks brought market expertise and efficient corporate 
governance to these markets (Bonin, et. al., 2005). Entry of foreign banks increased 
competition, which made domestic banks cut costs and increase efficiency (Claessens 
et. al., 2001). Moreover, local banks also benefited from positive externalities such as 
technological and financial innovative spillovers (Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2005).
Table 6.3.2 The share of foreign capital in total banking capital in the CEEBS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Bulgaria Na Na 34.8 43.4 46.6 68.1 66.7 66.6 76.3
Czech Republic 22.8 24.1 29.5 38.7 48.4 54.5 70.0 81.9 84.9
Estonia 29.2 37.2 Na 55.5 62.2 83.9 85.7 86.7 85.7
Hungary 35.6 45.9 61.2 60.4 62.1 64.0 61.0 58.6 81.9
Latvia 27.7 55.6 67.7 66.2 69.8 69.8 67.7 54.3 53.9
Lithuania 16.0 25.0 32.0 41.3 45.3 59.9 82.3 88.0 88.0
Poland 19.2 29.8 41.5 49.7 56.0 56.6 61.3 63.2 63.3
Romania 14.1 12.8 24.5 35.8 41.8 53.8 60.6 64.9 66.3
Slovakia Na 39.6 39.2 37.3 24.6 28.1 60.0 85.3 Na
Slovenia 9.6 9.2 11.9 11.1 11.3 12.0 16.0 32.5 32.5
Source: Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2005)
226
Now, as far as the CIS countries are concerned they have not yet completely 
recovered from the shock of the phase two. They are still heavily cash-based 
economies. For a quick comparison, if  the ratio of currency to demand deposits is 
only about 8 percent in the UK, it is about 166 percent in Ukraine, 151 percent in 
Uzbekistan, 114 percent in Russia, and 100 percent in Kazakhstan. The ratio of 
currency to total deposits is also comparatively low. This shows that the CIS countries 
are still cash-based economies.
Uzbekistan’s indicator of reliance on cash is the second highest after that of 
Ukraine (Column 1). In fact, Uzbekistan’s case is unique because as indicated by the 
high ratio of both currency to total deposits, 90 percent, and total deposits to GDP, 7.0 
percent, the banking sector has not yet regained the general public’s confidence. As 
was noted earlier, the higher ratio of demand deposits to total deposits, which is 60 
percent in this case, does not mean that bank liabilities are a widely accepted means of 
payment; rather it indicates the failure of the banking sector to regain the general 
public’s confidence. As a result, the liabilities of banks are not yet accepted as a fully- 
trusted means of saving by the household sector.
Figure 6.3.1, in the next page, gives pictorial analysis and does a better job in 
comparing reliance on cash in transition and advanced countries. The vertical axis 
represents the ratio of currency to demand deposits and the horizontal axis represents 
the ratio of total deposits to GDP. Based on these measures, we would expect that 
countries with high reliance on cash and lower importance of banking will be placed 
°n the top left comer, while countries with lower reliance on cash and higher 
importance of banking will placed on the bottom right comer. Now, it is not 
surprising to see most o f the transition countries on the top left comer of the figure.
227
Figure 6.3.1 Reliance on cash in selected countries, 2003.
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
R ussia
Kazakhstan
B elarus Greece
4 a Hungary 
Poland
4 Czech F$
r Sweden . 
D e n m a r k
Sppln Qerm |^ 
Portu gal
 i..
0.20
 1..
0.40
— I " ....
0.60
 r...
0.80
1
1.00
iny
UK
T o ta  l_d e  posi ts_di vi d ed_by_G  DP Source: IFS (IMF), except for Uzbekistan (ADB).
Figure 6.3.2, in the next page, compares another basic measure of bank 
development. This time the vertical axis represents the ratio of currency to total 
deposits, while the horizontal axis represents the ratio of total deposits to GDP. While 
the former indicator shows reliance on cash, the latter measures popularity of bank 
liabilities as a means of saving and a means of exchange among the general public. As 
shown in the last two figures, according to these basic indicators Uzbekistan and 
Ukraine still rely most heavily on cash. In these countries, the liabilities of banks are 
of least importance for agents. Although in general terms, transition economies are 
still far behind, the three Eastern European countries in our sample have made much 
better progress compared to their CIS counterparts.
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Figure 6.3.2 Reliance on cash in selected countries, 2003.
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Now, since Uzbekistan and Ukraine show the worst two cases in our sample, we 
looked at the dynamics of banking development in these two countries.5 A more 
attentive look at the dynamics of banking development in Ukraine shows that in fact 
the country has overcome the peak of reliance on cash money. This is illustrated in 
Figure 6.3.3 in the next page. (The horizontal and vertical axes of the figure represent 
the same indicators as in Figure 6.3.2.) In Ukraine, from 1992 to 1997 the ratio of 
total bank deposits to GDP decreased and the country’s reliance on cash dramatically 
increased. Since 1998 the economy’s reliance on cash has slowly but gradually 
decreased, while the importance of banking has grown.
For a discussion o f  the similar experience o f  different transition countries please see Peachey and Roe 
(2001).
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Figure 6.3.3 Ukraine: Dynamics of reliance on cash, 1992-2003.
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As Figure 6.3.4 in the next page shows, Uzbekistan’s case is quite striking: the 
Uzbek economy is still heavily reliant on cash money. (Again, the horizontal and 
vertical axes represent the same indicators as in Figure 6.3.2.) Actually, the dynamics 
of monetization, from 1993 to 1999, shows that reliance on cash money started 
increasing sharply after the introduction of the national currency in 1994. In 1999 the 
ratio of cash money to deposits reached its peak and was about 90 percent6.
Although data were not available to analyse the subsequent years, the fact that 
the ratio of broad money to GDP was higher in 1999 than in any subsequent year up 
to 2003 suggests that the public’s confidence in the banking sector is still weak and 
therefore the economy remains heavily reliant on cash money.
6  ~ J  i  q q q  data for Uzbekistan. Although the data are
Due to the limited availability o f  data, we used TWhekistan make us believe that the picture
relatively old, the slow  and almost non-existent reforms i d b the iow level o f  the ratio o f
has not dramatically changed since then. This belief is also supported by 
broad money to GDP for the subsequent years leading up
Figure 6.3.4 Uzbekistan: Dynamics of reliance on cash, 1993-1999.
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Although inflation has been more or less controlled in the country since 1996 
(less than 50 percent per year, which is moderate by the standards of transition 
economies), the rate o f interest offered on bank deposits remained negative until 2002 
(IMF, 2000b, and EBRD, 2004). Despite the significant drop in the rate of inflation in 
2003 (less than ten percent per year) and the adoption of the law on household deposit 
insurance in 2002, the rise in household confidence has been slow and insignificant. 
The ratio of household deposits to GDP rose from 1.5 percent in 2000 to 2.5 percent 
in 2003. Similarly, in 2002 and 2003 the ratio of broad money to GDP was at its 
historic low, 11 percent and 12 percent respectively.
The fact that most transition countries have experienced a similar path of 
development shows that the collapse of confidence in the banking sector during 
transition meant that the banking sector had to start from stage one.
As far as our case study is concerned, again, the basic Uzbek data show that the 
pattern of development o f money and banking in the country is different from that of 
other transition economies. Although this underdevelopment might be partially
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explained by macroeconomic and other structural irregularities already discussed in 
the previous chapter, the detailed analysis of the issue will be carried out in the next 
chapter. Particular attention will be given to the institution-building process, current 
developments, and systems-specific micro and macro issues in more detail.
6.4 Rise of non-monetary transactions and development of a monetary economy
In the previous sections we discussed the evolution of money and banking during 
transition by emphasising the gradual character of the process. We suggested that, 
depending upon the initial conditions, pace and consistency of reforms, banking sector 
evolution could differ across individual countries. In our discussion, for the purpose 
of simplicity, we assumed that after the establishment of the two-tier banking sector, 
the central bank would work under market principles and act as a lender o f  last resort, 
which then would necessitate natural evolution of the banking sector as was 
speculated above. However, the evidence suggests that at least until the mid 1990s 
political concern about output loss and fall in employment induced many transition 
countries to make so-called ‘centralised credits’ available to state-owned and other 
enterprises in the priority sectors. Creation of credit in this way meant that the central 
bank was working more or less as a lender o f first resort (Perotti, 1994: 73 and Fan 
and Schaffer, 1994: 177).
The implication o f this evidence is that, although acceptability of bank liabilities 
would decrease and the banking sector’s depositary base would shrink in phase one, 
the banking sector’s credit activity would not decrease as much as we would predict. 
Centralised credits would be created somewhat endogenously to finance the 
politically ‘favoured’ priority sectors. Meanwhile, ‘the other’ sectors would face the 
market type of credit constraints. Weak bank intermediation in the early years of
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transition would mean that enterprises in the ‘other’ sectors of the economy most 
likely would face a credit crunch. Since the response of the latter sectors to this 
situation is of paramount importance in understanding the development of a monetary 
economy, we will discuss this issue in more detail.
As was discussed in Chapter 4, the policy of assessing creditworthiness of 
borrowers was not a common practice in soviet banking under central planning. The 
imposition of hard budget constraints would necessitate the development of these 
banking skills. However, as was argued extensively in the previous sections, the 
banking sector might not be able to allocate credit resources efficiently due to the lack 
of trust, as well as market expertise and knowledge. In other words, the competitive 
banking system does not evolve spontaneously.
This means that the complete reliance of investment financing upon banks, 
which are still in their early stage of development, could have some serious 
repercussions. The result could be either a credit contraction due to cautious approach 
of credit rationing by banks, or a worsening of overall balance sheets of banks due to 
the growth of the share o f non-performing loans in their credit portfolio, which would 
at the end indicate failure of banks to harden financial conditions sufficiently. As a 
result, in both cases financial crisis would hamper real economic activity either in the 
short run or in the longer run.
Indeed, the inability o f the banking sector to fill the gap left after the elimination 
of the direct credit policy of the monobank system, combined with the failure to build 
a robust monetary environment, gave rise to the emergence of a phenomenon known 
as barterisation of transactions in many transition economies. It is important to note 
that the use of the term ‘barter’ is inaccurate in this context because it does not imply 
direct exchange of goods for goods; rather it means the use of non-monetary debt 
instruments or money surrogates such as veksels (bills of exchange issued by
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corporations, banks, or local and regional governments) and off-sets (mutual write-off 
of debt) to effect transactions. (For details please see Commander et al., 2000, 
Ledeneva and Seabright, 2000, Commander and Mummsen, 2000, Carlin et al, 2000, 
Yakovlev, 2000, Kim et al., 2001.)
Although barter was observed in most of the transition countries, it was 
especially severe in Russia and Ukraine. For instance, in Russia barter transactions as 
a share of total industrial transactions increased from 9% in 1993 to 42% in 1997 
(Kim et al.: 2001). In 1998 monetary surrogates comprised over 50% of total 
industrial transactions (Litwack and Sutherland, 2000: 3).
According to the survey data provided by the Russian Economic Barometer, 
enterprise managers in Russia stated that one of the main reasons for using barter 
transactions was a shortage of working capital. From 1994 to 1998 number of 
respondents stating this to be the main reason increased from 47% to 61% 
(Aukutsionek, 1998: 181). Moreover, managers of enterprises noted that both the 
liquidity of their business partners and their own liquidity were amongst the most 
important reasons for using non-monetary transactions (Ivanenko and Mikheyev, 
2002: 409). The main reason for a liquidity shortage then was argued to be the 
inability of banks to satisfy the credit demand of enterprises. In other words, banks 
failed to fill the gap left by the monobank system. This evidence is consistent with our 
analysis.
The result is not surprising because under central planning the enterprise sector 
was designed to be heavily dependent upon bank credit so that the monobank sector 
could monitor and control the enterprise sector’s economic activity. Now, the time- 
consuming character o f the evolution of money and banking meant that the newly 
established two-tier banking sector was too immature and too weak to satisfy the 
enterprise sector’s demand for credit after the immediate dismantling of the previous
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monobank system.
As a result, faced with credit shortage firms resorted to trade credit. Not 
surprisingly, in Russia aggregate overdue payables or arrears, which increased from 
15% of GDP in 1995 to 60% GDP in 1998, were four times larger than bank credit to 
firms in the mid-1998 (Glaz’ev, 1998, and Commander et al., 2000).
In short, the literature on barter suggests three main explanations for the 
occurrence of this phenomenon. Namely, liquidity squeeze or credit shortage, 
decentralisation and network effects, and tax incentives. (See Ivanenko and Mikheyev 
2002, Glaz’ev 1998, Commander et. al. 2000, and Seabright, 2000, who edited and 
compiled most influential works in this topic.)
Yakovlev (2000) rightly argued that the major reason for the emergence of 
barter is the lack o f a competitive monetary system. According to him avoiding tax 
has been the outcome rather than the cause of the initial barterisation. Initially, 
enterprises used to have tax payments as their first priority. ‘Companies were ready to 
increase their payables to suppliers and wage arrears in order to pay taxes on time’ 
(ibid.: 285). However, non-payment of taxes became inevitable when total money 
revenues of enterprises were less than their tax liabilities. Hence when non-paid tax 
arrears increased substantially, enterprises changed their priorities. ‘Tax payments 
became the last priority, even for companies that could have paid taxes, as managers 
in healthy companies saw no reason to pay taxes if others were not doing so’ (ibid.: 
286).
Interestingly enough, although barter emerged partly as a response to the 
imposition of hard budget constraints and the failure of the banking sector to meet the 
corporate sector’s demand for credit, tolerance of late tax payments and non-monetary 
Payments in lieu of taxes to the tax authorities actually implied implicit subsidies and 
credit channels to firms by the authorities (Commander et al., 2000). This in turn
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means that the authorities were in fact creating credit endogenously, albeit implicitly. 
That means whether in the form of decentralised credits or in the form of implicit 
subsidies the authorities were creating conditions to support production.
What is more interesting, however, is that the possible reaction of old 
institutions to the imposition of changes had been discussed in the Post Keynesian 
literature long before the FSU seriously started reforming its economy. Unfortunately, 
this analysis was not given worthy attention at the time. Gedeon (1986) investigated 
the issue of money endogeneity in former Yugoslavia, the most decentralised of all 
CPEs. In Yugoslavia a two-tier banking system was established in the 1980s and there 
was an attempt to impose harder budget constraints on enterprises in the hope of 
increasing their overall efficiency. The intention was to extend credit on hard 
conditions on the basis o f commercial viability of investment projects.
However, in response to the policy of tighter credit, enterprises started using 
non-monetary surrogates such as bills o f exchange and promissory notes to continue 
the process o f  production. In addition, they behaved in a manner, which suggests that 
they anticipated what the ultimate response of the authorities would be; payment 
delays and even non-payments for the goods and services were more frequently 
observed during this time. Consequently, inter-enterprise credit in the form of arrears 
increased substantially within a short period of time.
In normal circumstances, the market solution to this problem would be to 
announce loss-making and debtor enterprises bankrupt. However, in the Yugoslav 
case enterprises belonged to the state. Moreover, since the state bore the sole 
responsibility to keep unemployment at low levels, shutting down inefficient 
enterprises was hardly an ideal and acceptable solution. So, in order to solve the 
problem the government required the banking system to monetise inter-enterprise 
debt, thus ultimately creating credit endogenously to maintain production and
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employment. Because banks initially did not take part in the process of credit creation, 
Gedeon (ibid.) calls this endogeneity non-bank credit endogeneity. In fact, because of 
the political nature of this endogeneity, this can be referred to as a political credit 
endogeneity.
Another application of endogenous credit creation, now in the context of 
transition economies, was carried out in mid 1990s. Norcic et al (1996) considered the 
case of Slovenia. They investigated the case by dividing the economy into two 
separate sectors: healthy and unhealthy. Healthy enterprises were those which 
operated under market principles without any direct recourse to subsidies and 
assistance from the government, whereas unhealthy enterprises were inefficient 
companies, maintenance of whose operation necessitated subsidies and soft credits. 
Although the government planed to shut down these companies in the long run, in the 
short run it had to support them to prevent loss of output and aggravation of 
unemployment.
They argued that in the transition economy of Slovenia there was a dual money 
endogeneity. In the healthy sector of the economy credit is created endogenously as in 
market economies - that is structural credit endogeneity is in place. In the unhealthy 
sector of the economy, political motives dominate the process of credit creation. 
Therefore, the second type of endogeneity is political endogeneity. (In another 
similar work Petrick (1998) found support for that this type of dual money 
endogeneity in Hungary and the Czech Republic.)
In a nutshell, the experience of most transition countries shows that when well- 
defined outside money is in scarce supply, and when the financial sector fails to 
develop sufficiently to satisfy the credit demands of enterprises, the enterprise sector 
itself is capable o f developing its own means of payment no matter how ineffective 
^ d  unstable it might be. In fact, these instruments are private or inside money
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because they represent liabilities of the private sector (Ould-Ahmed, 2003). The use 
of debt instruments in turn is of paramount importance for the development of a 
monetary economy. As Keynes (1971) noted a monetary economy evolves from a 
barter economy when people start using money as a unit of account in price lists and 
debt contracts. As was mentioned in the earlier chapters already, Davidson (1978 and 
1994), Wray (1991), and Heinsohn and Steiger (on numerous occasions) clarified 
even further why development of debt instruments was vital in a monetary production 
economy, in which the future was seen as uncertain and production took time.
In this sense, we can look at the process of barterisation of transactions in 
transition economies as a natural response of the corporate sector to the inability of 
the banking sector to create credit. On the other hand, since these trade instruments 
are debt instruments developed to maintain production in a completely decentralised 
environment, the process can be seen as a development of a monetary economy in its 
rudimentary form.
Finally, in a way the rise of non-monetary transactions explains endogenous 
credit creation too. Endogenous credit creation is present in two ways. First, trying to 
commit themselves to the tight monetary policy argument, in fact the authorities are 
providing implicit credit to enterprises in the form of late payments of taxes and non­
monetary payments in lieu of taxes. Secondly, enterprises are creating credit 
endogenously in response to their trade needs. Hence we are observing the dual nature 
°f endogenous credit creation. The first part can be interpreted as political 
endogeneity, and the second part non-bank structural endogeneity in its rudimentary 
form.
As far as the experience of Uzbekistan is concerned, however, surprisingly, 
barterisation of transactions has not become a big issue in the country during 
transition. In fact, an estimate of barter in industrial sales has decreased from 23.2 ^  in
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1996 to 12.5% in 1999 (Marin et al, 2000: 208). Our initial comparison of the general 
pattern of economic development in Uzbekistan shows that in almost every aspect of 
financial development the country’s experience is different from that of other 
transition economies.
These irregularities can be explained by macroeconomic and microeconomic 
factors. We have already touched upon some macro-issues in Chapter 5 and suggested 
that maintenance o f old-style resource allocation methods and lack of consistent 
reforms in the financial sector most likely would affect developments in the financial 
sphere. Finally, in the next chapter we will give a detailed explanation of all of these 
issues. We will discuss, for instance, why barter did not become a big issue as it has 
been everywhere else, why the Uzbek economy is still highly reliant on cash money, 
and which phase o f the proposed banking development framework the country’s 
banking sector development would fit.
6.5 Conclusion
As was discussed already in the previous chapter in detail, fundamental changes to the 
previously centrally planned economies such as the abolition of administrative central 
planning, liberalisation of prices, encouragement of incentive-based corporate 
management through privatisation of SOEs and new entry, and hardening of soft 
budget constraints were a necessary but not sufficient condition to guarantee smooth 
and successful transition to a monetary production economy. The success of all these 
reforms and the process of transition as a whole would indeed depend upon the speed 
°f institutional developments.
Building upon the theory of the stage of banking development in market 
economies, in this chapter we argued that as far as financial sector development is
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concerned the process o f evolution can be slow and time-consuming. Underestimation 
of this issue, which comes from not duly recognising the role and importance of 
institutions in the economic process, was tantamount to a wrong assumption that the 
banking sector in its infant stage of development was capable of accomplishing the 
tasks of a mature banking sector which has already become a vital part of the entire 
financial superstructure and thus was no longer constrained by the availability of 
loanable funds.
Our analysis shows that the banking sector of transition economies had to go 
through at least five different phases of development to reach the necessary maturity, 
and to gain full strength to create credit ahead of saving. It is true that in some respect, 
by copying the blueprint of banking development from market economies, transition 
banks could start with stage four of banking development, i.e. by design the banking 
sector could be equipped with fractional reserve banking, the interbank market for 
liquid facilities, the lender of last resource facility, and liabilities of banks being 
accepted as payment instruments. However, as we have shown, in practical terms 
banks could not use the potential of the stage four to full effect without the necessary 
build-up of confidence in bank liabilities and gradual development of the banking 
habit of the household sector.
In the early years of transition banks are weak and underdeveloped, and 
therefore their credit activity depends upon the inflow of new deposits. This task is 
not easy under the conditions of hyperinflation and the resulting monetary instability. 
However, once inflation is controlled, monetary stability achieved, and payments 
system modernised, banking habits develop and bank liabilities start being used more 
8nd more as money. Only then will banks be able to create credit ahead of saving.
The time-consuming nature of the institutional development shows the reason 
why the newly created two-tier banking sector could not fill the gap left by the entire
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apparatus of the previous monobank system. As a result, this created a credit shortage 
and negatively affected enterprises whose activities were designed to be heavily 
reliant upon bank credit under central planning.
However, faced with a liquidity squeeze, the enterprise sector, which now faced 
hard budget constraints and functioned under a market-based incentive system, 
created their own inside money endogenously. They resorted to trade credit and 
started using sundry debt instruments and monetary surrogates to effect payments. 
Although this phenomenon is known as barterisation of transactions in the mainstream 
literature, our analysis shows that this phenomenon could actually be interpreted as a 
development of a monetary economy. This suggestion is supported by the increased 
role of money in the economic process. In response to the failure of the banking sector 
to satisfy demand for credit, the enterprise sector created sundry debt instruments to 
carry out production.
As to the issue of the development of money and banking in Uzbekistan, our 
preliminary analysis shows that the Uzbek economy remains heavily reliant on cash 
money and that the importance of banking is still weak. As was shown in Chapter 5, 
the Uzbek authorities took a cautious approach to transition and undertook reforms 
gradually. This way they were able to prevent output fall, and maintain moderate 
economic growth. However, since this achievement was supported by the partial 
maintenance of the old-style resource allocation mechanism, reforms have always 
been partial. As a result, the role and importance of the financial institutions were 
undermined and the development of money, banks, and other financial institutions 
was inhibited. Hence, finally in the next chapter, we will carry out a detailed analysis 
of the evolution of money and banks in Uzbekistan and explain the particular pattern 
of evolution of these institutions in the country during transition.
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7. The Evolution of Money and Banks in Uzbekistan during Transition
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we argued that the evolution of money and banking during 
transition would be gradual and time consuming. The functions performed by these 
institutions under central planning were different than those accomplished by market 
institutions. The historical distinction between both cash money and non-cash money 
and corporate and retail banking, and hyperinflation in the early years of transition, 
implied that it would take time for banks to gain market experience as well as the trust 
of the general public. Our analysis showed that in order to be able to create credit 
ahead of saving, which is a hallmark of Stage Two, transition banks had to undergo at 
least five different phases of development and reconstruction of their own.
Now, finally in this chapter we will analyse the evolution of money and banks 
in Uzbekistan. Although the generalised pattern of evolution of these institutions 
developed in the previous chapter will be used as a benchmark in our analysis, the 
ultimate goal of the chapter will be far deeper than simply comparing the Uzbek 
banking sector’s development to any benchmark. In this sense, the chapter attempts 
not only to assess the current state of banking sector development, but also tries to 
identify major structural and system-specific problems that inhibit financial 
development in the country. In this way the chapter complements not only arguments 
developed in Chapter 6, but also those in Chapter 5.
As we argued in Chapter 5, because of the immediate availability of financing 
from different sources for investment projects, the government was not eager to 
hasten true market-oriented reforms in the banking sector. The possibility of
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reallocating resources from the agricultural and energy sectors through price 
distortions and other administrative methods, as well as the availability of foreign 
credits from international financial institutions and multinational banks, have made 
the role of the banking sector less important in terms of acting as an intermediary 
between domestic lenders and borrowers. Maintenance of the semi-centralised way of 
resource allocation undermined the role and importance of money and banks in the 
economic process and created some system-specific problems not observed in other 
transition countries. Hence, the role and importance of these and other relevant issues 
in explaining the banking sector development will be the main focus of this chapter.
Along with the publicly available macro data, and micro data from the 
commercial banks, we will use valuable first-hand information generated during our 
field trip to Uzbekistan at the end of 2004. The specificity of all the data used in the 
study will be briefly described in Section 7.2. The data collected through survey 
questionnaires and interviews with practitioner bankers will be extensively used 
throughout this chapter.
Next, in Section 7.3, we will present background information on the process of 
institution building in the banking sector during transition. We will make a general 
investigation into the nature of developments, including the technical development of 
the payments system, the state of concentration, and the ownership structure, in the 
banking sector. In this sense this section will be an important build-up for our further 
discussions.
In S ection  7 .4  w e  w ill  look  at financial deepening and bank interm ediation. 
Initially, w e  w ill  lo o k  at the issue by using  conventional m easures o f  financial 
deepening. N e x t , u sin g  the case study o f  the largest bank, the N ational Bank o f  
Uzbekistan, w e  w ill  try to  find  out w hether banks are su ccessfu l in attracting savings
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from the general public, and whether banks’ credit activity is affected by the 
economic priorities set by the government.
In Section 7.5, system-specific problems of the banking sector will be analysed. 
Discussing one o f the biggest irregularities, i.e. the failure of achieving internal 
convertibility between cash money and non-cash money and resulting relative 
illiquidity of bank deposits or non-cash money, some weaknesses of conventional 
measures of financial intermediation will be noted. Moreover, issues such as natural 
evolution of banking habits, soft budget constrains phenomenon, wage arrears, non­
monetary transactions, and the cash squeeze policy will be discussed in detail.
Section 7.6 concludes the chapter. We hope that by the end of this chapter we 
will be able to analyse successfully the current state of development in the banking 
sector of Uzbekistan.
7.2 Specificity of the data used in the study
Three main sets of different data will be used in the study. The first set of data relates 
to macro data on banking and financial sector development. This information is 
obtained from the Central Bank of Uzbekistan (CBU), and various international 
financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, 
and the EBRD. The second set of data comes from consolidated balance sheets and 
other publicly available financial statements of commercial banks in Uzbekistan. 
Since these two sets of data come in standardised form, we use their official 
definition.
The third and the most important set of data was collected through interviews 
3fld questionnaire surveys during a field trip to Uzbekistan from September 2004 to
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December 2004. The important particularity of the data is that they represent the 
viewpoint of practitioner bankers. The data were collected through (i) face-to-face 
interviews with twenty-one senior bank officers from various banks and three 
independent researchers, and (ii) a survey questionnaire among ninety practitioner 
bankers. Further specificity and particularity of interviews and questionnaires are 
discussed below in more detail.
Interviews
The method and design o f the organisation and sampling of the interviews were based 
on ‘networking’ as discussed in Bewley (1995). The essence of this method is that 
initial interviews are conducted through relatives, friends, and acquaintances. 
Respondents then can also help to arrange further interviews with other people. The 
organisation of interviews in this way enables an interviewer to work with 
respondents sampled through the network of connections. The main strength of this 
method is that, because the interviewer is not a complete stranger or an outsider to the 
network, respondents will be less suspicious and anxious and they might reveal more 
sensitive and personalised information than might be obtained through conventional 
random sampling. Using this method Bewley (1995 and 1999) was able to uncover 
empirically the circumstances that gave rise to the phenomenon of wage rigidity in a 
case study of the American labour market.
G iven the strong and persisting soviet-sty le  in form ation-censoring environm ent 
in U zbekistan, the m eth od  o f  netw orking w as o f  particular im portance for our case  
study. A s in  the o ld  days m o st data concerning econ om ic activ ity  are still considered  
to be o f  im portance to  national security and are not m ade p u blic ly  available in
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Uzbekistan.1 As a result o f this policy, respondents want to be on the ‘politically safe’ 
side and do not want to reveal information to outsiders and people they do not know 
closely.
Out of the total o f twenty-one interviews with senior bank officers, fifteen were
arranged through personal contacts and another nine were arranged with the help of 
* • 2 •intermediaries. Interviewees came from four geographical regions of the country: the 
city of Tashkent -  eleven interviews, the Qashqadaryo region -  five interviews, the 
Tashkent region -  two interviews, and the Samarqand region -  three interviews. 
Since all of the participants occupied senior positions in respective banks and thus 
were experts in their field, we believe that they gave a fairly representative view on 
issues that have been raised. More importantly, since participants considered us as a 
trusted insider to the ‘network’, they were able to express their views openly. As a 
result, much more transparent and genuine information was obtained. The interviews 
were conducted strictly under conditions of anonymity and therefore neither the 
names of interviewees nor the names of banks they are affiliated with are revealed in 
the study.
It is important to note that very valuable and detailed first-hand information, 
which reflects current problems and system-specific issues, was obtained during these 
interviews. In order not to sacrifice the quality and depth of the data, they are 
presented in Appendices 7C, 7D, and 7E of this chapter respectively. In short, while
1 On this we would like to quote from the World Bank: ‘While there are legitimate national security 
concerns that lead all countries to restrict access to some forms o f information, Uzbekistan defines an 
unusually broad range o f  information on economic and social development — with no c ear t reaj  t°  
national security -  as secret. D ata in such areas as macroeconomic performance, fiscal policy, 
banking and monetary statistics, foreign trade, debt, and poverty levels -  publicly availa e in most 
countries o f  the w orld  -  continue to be subject to secrecy provisions or limited circulation in 
Uzbekistan’ (W orld Bank, 2003: 18. Emphasis added). .
The author graduated from the Faculty o f  Credit and Economy o f the Tashkent Institute o f Finan , 
which primarily prepares specialists for the banking sector. Moreover, he worked for more than two 
years in one o f  the largest banks in the country. During this time he also worked as a part-time lecturer 
ln the Department o f  M oney and Banking o f the Tashkent Institute o f Finance. This played a very 
anportant role in organising these interviews.
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discussing the results and analysis of these interviews in this chapter, reference will be 
made to appropriate appendices whenever necessary.
The Survey
Although the survey methodology does not differ from the conventional one in terms 
of sampling and representativeness, it does have some particularities, which need to 
be mentioned. The survey respondents were bankers who were enrolled in a 
specialised part-time executive programme organised by one of the local universities.
Bank employees are required to have an academic degree or other equivalent 
training in banking and finance. Those bankers who do not have degrees in banking 
and finance join part-time executive degree programmes run by universities 
specialising in banking and finance. This type of programme is also run by the 
Tashkent Institute of Finance, which is one of the most important and leading 
institutions that prepares specialists in this filled. Practitioner bankers enrolled in the 
part-time executive degree programme of this institution participated in our survey.
The total o f 125 questionnaires were distributed among the survey participants. 
For one reason or another, some chose not to collaborate and 30 questionnaires were 
returned unanswered or answered but unsuitable for use. The particularly high 
response rate (76 percent) is explained by the fact that the timing of the survey was 
scheduled in advance to coincide with the usual five-week study period of bankers in 
the autumn semester 2004. We met with the respondents and asked for their 
collaboration in face-to-face conversation; individuals who agreed to cooperate got
3 The excellent cooperation and support o f  the former colleagues from the Department o f  Money and 
Banking o f the Tashkent Institute o f  Finance in conducting the survey is duly recognised and highly 
appreciated. Special thanks go to Professor Abdullaeva, the Head o f Money and Banking Department, 
for her invaluable assistance in organising meetings with several groups o f  stu ents enro e in 
specialised degree programmes.
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together in one of the auditoriums of the institute to take part in the event. Three 
different classes of students - fourth, third, and second-year students enrolled in the 
part-time executive programme - participated in the survey. Before handing out the 
questionnaires, respondents were given an explanation of the goal of the research and 
the content of the questionnaire, as well as generalised instructions on how to 
complete them.
By and large, the sample was fairly representative. Almost half of the 
participants came from the capital city and the rest came from different regions of the 
country. In terms of banking experience, 22.5 percent of the respondents had more 
than 8 years of experience, 38.2 percent of them had between 4-7 years of experience, 
about 34.8 percent o f them had between 2-3 years of experience, and only 4.5 percent 
of the respondents had less than 2 years of banking experience. Although the results 
of the questionnaire will be used extensively in this chapter, their full analysis and 
complete interpretation can be found in Appendix 7B. The questionnaire format is 
given in Appendix 7F.
Hence, we will use all three sets of data extensively in the study to support our 
arguments. While relevant figures and tables with appropriate referencing may appear 
in the main body o f the text, some of the important but rather lengthy information 
obtained through interviews and questionnaires will be given in separate appendices.
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7.3 Initial Steps to Institution Building. Background Analysis
Unlike its many European counterparts in transition, Uzbekistan did not have a proper 
banking system prior to the adoption of central planning.4 As an integral part of the 
centrally planned economy of the FSU, it inherited the kind of monetary and banking 
system which was described in Chapter 4. The functional structure of this banking 
system was considerably reorganised during the years of perestroika, which in the end 
turned out to be the fourth and last stage of banking reform/development under central 
planning. The reform was a part of the comprehensive economic reforms of the 
period, which envisaged the gradual imposition of harder budget constraints on 
enterprises by reducing the availability of direct long-term financing from the state 
budget.
The reform was unique compared to the previous ones because it formally 
replaced the monobank system with the market style two-tier banking system. The 
Gosbank was assigned the tasks of safeguarding the payment system, providing 
liquidity to the banking sector and monitoring the activities of the specialised 
commercial banks; no longer was it allowed to grant credits directly to the enterprise 
sector. Now only specialised banks, the number of which was increased by another 
two, Agroprombank and Zhilsotsbank, were responsible for long-term as well as 
short-term financing of enterprise activities. Thus after the reform the total number of
4 Uzbekistan’s experience with market-type banking was very short-lived in history. In fact the 
business of banking was imported from abroad. Strong religious opposition against banking business 
on moral grounds (Islam denounces usury) and the backwardness o f  the economy (a feudalist*; mo
of production) might have prevented the natural evolution o f banking in this region. e irs ’
branch of the Gosbank, was established in the country only in 1874 by the f e r i a l  governm enof  
Russia. Although the first private bank was set up only in 1890, by 1913 there were a rea^  y 
banks functioning in the territory o f  today’s Uzbekistan. However, almost a o ese p 
belonged to Russian capitalists. (See Ozerova, 2003, for details.)
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banks in the second tier of the banking system reached five; PYomstYoibank; 
Vnesheconombank; AgYopYombank; Zhilsotsbank; and Sbevbank.
By design all o f these banks were highly specialised: PYomstYoibank in charge 
of financing industrial reconstruction, Vnesheconombank -  financing foreign 
economic activity, AgYopYombank in charge of financing agriculture, Zhilsotsbank -  
financing real estate and other social spheres, Sbevbank (Savings bank) -  attraction of 
household deposits.
As was mentioned in Chapter 4, traditionally the main task of the specialised 
banks was to serve the needs of the enterprise sector by providing payment clearing 
services and short-term working capital financing. The failure of the peYestYoika 
reforms to change the structural rigidities of the centrally planned system implied that 
the 1987-88 banking reform could not, and as a matter of fact did not, change patterns 
of bank financing either. In other words, short-term financing retained its importance 
in banking activities, comprising almost 80 percent of total bank loans (Abarbanell 
and Meyendorff, 1997: 67).
The current Uzbek banking system was formed on the basis of the regional 
branches of the Gosbank and the afore-mentioned specialised banks located in the 
country, after Uzbekistan had gained its independence. The legal foundation for 
banking activities in the country was laid down with the adoption of the law ‘On 
Banks and Banking Activity’ in February 1991. This formally opened the door to the 
first wave of the institution-building process in the financial sector of the country 
during transition.
The Tashkent branch of the Gosbank, which had already enjoyed some 
monetary autonomy from the centre as a result of the afore-mentioned reforms, 
became the Central Bank of Uzbekistan. Specialised banks of the system were
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reorganised and sometimes renamed. Yet, they all retained their area of 
specialisation. The government’s privatisation policies did not yet apply to the 
banking sector at this stage and therefore these banks remained state-owned and state- 
controlled.
In a nutshell, in the first wave of the institution-building process, the 
institutional functioning and governance of banks were not altered; only the shape of 
banking business changed, not its essence. Hence, although the country started the 
transition with a de jure  market-based two-tier banking system, de facto it was only a 
little different from the soviet monobank system. Banks still continued policies of 
soft financing. This was especially true until 1994, the year in which the national 
currency was formally introduced. Until 1994 the CBU pursued old-style monetary 
management when Uzbekistan was still in the rouble zone. According to 
Nurmuradov6 (1998: 223) during this time the CBU extended centralised credits7 to 
finance both working-capital needs and start-up capital of enterprises in strategic 
sectors of the economy.
The second wave of the institution-building process took place during 1994-96. 
Several more specialised banks were established in the banking sector during this 
time: Asaka bank (specialising in finance for enterprises in the automobile industry); 
G allabank (specialising in finance for wheat-producing farms); Tadbirkorbank 
(specialising in finance for entrepreneurs in micro, small and medium businesses), etc. 
All the specialised banks established during these years were set up at the initiative of
5 The savings bank became Xalq  Bank (People’s Bank), and Vnesheconombank was renamed the 
National Bank for Foreign Economic Activity o f the Republic o f Uzbekistan (NBU). Promsroibank 
kept its name (only in Uzbek now - Sanoatqurilishbank) while Agroprombank was later given a new 
name Paxta Bank (Bank for Cotton). ,
To emphasise the strength o f  this source perhaps we have to mention that Dr. Nurmuradov was e 
Deputy Chairman o f  the Central Bank o f Uzbekistan at the time he wrote this article. Later he was 
promoted to the position o f  the Minister o f  Finance.
Centralised credits are purposeful credits that are extended by the CBU to commercia an s, w ic 
m turn on-lend these facilities to designated enterprises on soft conditions.
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the government. Their capital was either directly injected from the state budget or 
provided by state-owned enterprises, which naturally became majority shareholders of 
the banks. Sometimes existing banks also contributed to the start-up capital of newly 
formed banks.
Not only were new banks established during this time, but also banking 
legislation was further refined. The new law ‘On Banks and Banking Activity’ and 
the law ‘On the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan’ were adopted in April 
1995 and December 1995 respectively. According to the law ‘On the Central Bank’ 
the CBU is economically independent from the government and reports only to the 
Oliy Majlis (the Parliament) of the country. However, as our discussion in the course 
of this section will show, decisions of the CBU are still influenced and shaped in 
accordance with the economic priorities of the government.
Modernisation of the payments system was also initiated during this time. 
Banking reform also necessitated the establishment of a well-functioning payments 
system. The introduction of an efficient system of processing the debits and credits 
arising from deposit-based transactions facilitates transfer of ownership claims in the 
financial sector and thus fosters the corporate sector’s trust in banks. Gradual 
computerisation of the payment system was initiated from the very beginning of 
transition. To facilitate the process, in 1994 the government announced a four-year tax 
holiday for all commercial banks regardless of their ownership structure.8 Under the 
conditions of the regulation, banks were to use these resources only towards the 
technical development o f the sector.
For further details on this tax holiday please see the Resolution o f the Cabinet o f  Ministers o f the 
Republic o f Uzbekistan No 362 dated 13 July 1994 ‘On measures to provide financial support for the 
development o f  the banking sector o f  the Republic o f Uzbekistan.’
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As a result, the payments system was modernised amongst the first in the CIS 
(Mullajonov9, 2004: 3). From 1991 to 1994 the average time spent on clearing 
payments was reduced from 90 days to 2 days; this was reduced to an hour towards 
the end of 1995. To decrease the exposure of the system to operational risk an 
automated backup system with secure software and hardware was put in place in 
1997. Currently the payments system functions on a near real-time basis (Bazarov and 
Rahimova, 2002). The authorities are planning to take further steps to modernise the 
system in the near future so that all electronic transactions can be settled on a real­
time basis (Jumagaldiev, 2004: 8).
As far as retail-banking services are concerned, however, these remain 
underdeveloped. Consumer credits are still a rarity. Although banks have recently 
started offering various deposit plans and plastic debit cards, they are not popular with 
the general public for two basic reasons. First, the general public’s trust in the sector 
is still low. And second, there is a need to develop a unified clearing system for retail 
transactions.10
The monetary authorities affirm that, since 1994, directed and centralised 
financing from the central bank has been abolished (Mullajonov, 2001). Nonetheless, 
the evidence suggests that the policy of soft financing has not been completely 
abandoned. According to the World Bank (1999: 47) even in 1996 the CBU was 
involved in extending centralised credits. For instance, in 1996 the CBU extended 
credits (worth about 3.6 percent of GDP) to agriculture to finance arrears in payments 
and pre-financing of the 1997 crop. The same source, which provided a systematic
The Chairman o f  the Central Bank o f Uzbekistan.
The new way o f  promoting banking habits among the population, which envisages payment o f  wages 
to employees’ bank accounts and issuance o f personalised plastic debit payment car s, as een 
initiated recently by the authorities. However, this initiative is limited mostly to the capital city. 
Moreover, due to the persistent shortage o f  cash money in commercial banks, as well as the absence or 
a well-developed chain o f  retail outlets that can accept cards, it is unrealistic to expect that plastic debit 
cards will become popular.
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and comprehensive analysis of the economy up to 1999, reported that accumulated 
debts and arrears o f the agricultural sector were periodically written off or 
rescheduled. It also reported that annually, in agriculture, payables in excess of 
receivables amounted to about 20 percent of the gross value of output. Moreover, in a 
similar but more recent work the World Bank noted that the enterprise sector still 
Junctions under ... soft budget constraints' (World Bank, 2003: 11, emphasis in the 
original). This implies that the government has not put an end to the practice of soft 
financing.
The gradualist approach taken by the authorities to economic reforms also 
implied a cautious approach to novelty and innovations. Under the scenario of semi­
centralised economic management, anything new to the system created suspicion that 
it might generate instability. This of course could not leave the banking sector 
unaffected. In this sense, it is natural to see more conservative methods and a stricter 
approach taken by the central bank in licensing private banks. This meant that, unlike 
in some other transition countries, small private banks and quasi-banking institutions 
did not mushroom in Uzbekistan throughout the years of transition.
As Table 7.3.1 in the next page shows, during the entire period of transition, the 
number of commercial banks never reached forty. Despite this fact, however, the 
Uzbek banking sector has a moderate level of branch penetration11 -  about 800 
branches (approximately 31000 people per branch) and approximately the same 
number of mini-banks.12 The table also shows the EBRD’s index of banking 
reform.13 A score o f 1.7 for the Uzbek banking sector indicates that, since the
12 T° compare to other transition economies please see Jaffee and Levonian (2001).
A mini-bank is a small bank office with no more than 5 employees. It is usually set up in remote
*^ rv! *° a^ ac* additional customers.
he indicator provides a ranking o f  liberalisation and institutional reform in the banking sector on a 
scale of 1 to 4+. A score o f  1 represents little or no change from a socialist banking system, except for 
1 e formal establishment o f  two-tier banking system. A score o f 2 indicates establishment o f internal
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establishment of the two-tier banking system, not much progress has been made in 
terms of liberalising policies of credit allocation, directed credits and interest ceilings. 
Unfortunately, the issue o f development of the banking habits and savings behaviour 
among the general public, and how they build trust in bank liabilities do not feature in 
the EBRD’s (2000: 15) transition indicator for banking reform and interest rate 
liberalisation.
Table 7.3.1 Uzbekistan: the Banking Sector
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Number of Banks 29 31 29 30 33 35 34 37 na 28
(of which foreign-owned) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) (2) (4) (4) (5) (6) (6) (na) (5)
EBRD index of banking
sector reform 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Source: EBRD (2000 and 2004), except for 2001, which comes from CBU (2001) and
Mullajonov (2001)
Although there are some foreign banks in Uzbekistan, their influence and
impact on the banking sector is nowhere near the standards enjoyed by the banking 
sectors of more advanced transition economies such as Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech Republic.
Appendix 7A presents detailed information on the market share of 37 individual 
commercial banks in terms of assets and capital, ownership structure, founding date,
currency convertibility and significant liberalisation o f interest rates and credit allocation. A score o f 3 
weans that a country has made significant progress in developing prudential regulation and 
supervision, and hardening budget constraints on banks. A score o f 4+ means a banking standard 
typical of an industrialised market economy, represented, for instance, by the Basel Committee s ore 
rinciples on Effective Banking Supervision and Regulation (EBRD, 2000 and 200 ). ( ee a so ries 
undTaci, 2001.)
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and relevance to the previous banking system.14 We can see from the appendix that 
the market share o f foreign-owned banks is of marginal importance in the country. 
Moreover, not surprisingly, banks owned by the state directly or indirectly account for 
more than 90 percent of the total banking sector assets. (See also EBRD, 2004.) 
Although compared to previous years the number of private banks has seen an upward 
trend in recent years, their share in the banking sector and influence in the economy 
remain very weak.
It is true that in a way the conservative policy of bank licensing prevented the 
formation of pyramid schemes that flourished in some transition countries, the 
collapse of which severely shattered confidence in their financial system. (See Jarvis, 
2000, for the Albanian case and Rock and Solodkov, 2001, for the Russian case.) 
However, there exists a mountain of doubt that this was the ultimate objective of the 
authorities.
As was discussed in Chapter 5, the possibility of allocating resources from the 
agricultural and energy sectors by means of price regulations and other administrative 
methods reduced the government’s dependence on household and institutional savings 
to finance investment projects. This meant that reforming and developing the banking 
sector, so that it was capable of acting as an intermediary between savers and 
borrowers, and a creator of new credit, was not on the top of the government’s reform 
agenda. As a result, the lack of restructuring of state-owned banks discouraged the 
development of a competitive environment in the banking sector. Consequently, the 
current banking sector is extremely concentrated - the state directly or indirectly 
owning majority stakes in most of the commercial banks.
14 The data are not for the end o f 2001 and they come from two different sources, i.e. CBU (2001) and 
Mullajonov (2001).
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Of course, the concentration of the banking sector need not necessarily be such 
a bad thing. Unlike any other sector of the economy, the banking sector’s success 
depends upon the general public’s confidence. Because larger banks have more 
widespread network of branches and can offer a richer menu of services, they tend to 
give more confidence to the system, and thus will be able to attract more deposits. In 
this sense, it is not surprising to see that in some advanced countries like Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden the largest five 
banks control more than 80 percent of the market (Cetorelli and Gambara, 2001: 625).
Nonetheless, it is also true that high concentration gives banks monopolistic 
power. As a result, as profit maximising institutions, banks gain a stronger negotiating 
position in terms of rationing credits, and may set higher prices for banking products 
and services, which in the end may create inefficiency (Poloucek, 2004: 56). 
However, the state ownership of the largest banks may actually solve these problems. 
If the authorities’ goal is to promote financial and economic development, they may 
intervene and prevent banks from acting monopolistically.
In Uzbekistan, however, the development of a market-oriented banking sector 
does not seem to be the authorities’ main concern. Lack of fundamental reforms in 
terms of changing the old-style resource allocation mechanism indicates that the 
banking sector still might be used as a neutral conduit for channelling soft credits and 
budget subsidies to enterprises in the priority sectors of the economy. When a few 
large state-owned banks control the banking sector, it is most likely that their credit 
activity will be tuned to the priorities set by the authorities. In this sense, in 
Uzbekistan, state ownership and high concentration may actually play a constraining 
role in financial development. Therefore, we have to have this caveat in mind when 
looking at the dynamics of the banking sector concentration in Uzbekistan.
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Table 7.3.2 below compares the dynamics of banking sector concentration in 
Uzbekistan and selected transition countries using the Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI).15 As can be seen from the table, the Uzbek banking sector is highly 
concentrated by this measure. Moreover, over the years of transition the HHI has 
increased from the already high value of 2405 in 1996 to even higher value of 5197 in 
2000. One more caveat we need to mention here is that it is most likely that the HHI 
for Uzbekistan is underestimated. This is due to the fact that large state-controlled 
banks are sometimes shareholders of smaller, not necessarily private, banks.
Table 7.3.2 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the 
Banking Sector in Selected Transition Countries
 (Calculated by multiplying by 10,000.)______
Poland Czech R. Slovak R. Uzbekistan
1996 788.0 1019.2 1261.4 2405.2
1997 758.0 969.2 1084.6 3220.0
2000 834.0 1036.4 1132.5 5197.9
Source: Author’s calculations and Poloucek (2004)
Moreover, by looking at the market shares of largest one, three, four, and five 
banks Table 7.3.3 in the next page gives an even better picture of bank concentration 
in the country. According to the information presented in the table the assets of the 
largest 5 banks in the country account for more than 90 percent of the total banking 
sector assets. The largest three banks control more than 80 percent of banking 
business in Uzbekistan. However, it is important to note that what makes the Uzbek
The HHI measures absolute concentration and is a commonly-accepted measure o f  market 
concentration. The HHI takes any value between zero and one. As a rule, the value o f the HHI is 
multiplied by either 100 or 10000. The higher the value, the more concentrated is the banking sector. 
If the value is less than 10 or 1000 respectively, the banking sector is considered to be a competitive 
marketplace. If  the value is between 10 and 18 or 1000 and 1800 respectively, then the banking sector 
is considered to be a moderately concentrated marketplace. If  the value exceeds 18 or 
respectively, the banking sector is considered to be highly concentrated. As a general rule mergers 
that increase the HHI by more than 1 point or 100 points respectively in concentrated markets raise 
antitrust concerns. (See Poloucek, 2004.)
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banking sector special is the dominating market power of a single bank: the assets of 
the single largest state-owned bank -  the National Bank of Uzbekistan (NBU) -  
accounted for more than 70 percent of the total banking assets in 2000.
Table 7.3.3 Dynamics of Concentration in the Uzbek Banking
Sector
 (In percentages of the banking system's total assets)
Year NBU 3 Banks 4 Banks 5 Banks
1996 39.6 76.0 87.6 90.4
1997 n.a. 75.0 82.0 87.0
2000 71.3 83.5 87.7 90.5
Source: 1996 and 2000 author’s calculations. 
1997 from the World Bank (1999).
In a nutshell, this section presented a background analysis of the initial 
institution-building process in the country. Our discussion so far shows that the 
authorities have undertaken a lot of positive changes in terms of legal, regulatory and 
technical developments of the sector since independence. However, the banking 
sector is still dominated by large state-owned banks. Although the practice of 
extending grants from centralised funds and soft loans from the state-owned banks has 
been formally abolished, the current organisational structure of the Uzbek banking 
sector still allows the government to carry out centralised financing of the economy. 
The state can easily manipulate the banking sector by making them finance priority 
sectors of the economy.
Now, building upon the discussions of this section, in the following section we 
will discuss financial deepening and bank intermediation in more detail.
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7.4 Financial Deepening and Banking Intermediation
As a rule the ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP, sometimes referred to as measure of 
monetisation16, and the ratio o f banking sector assets to GDP, are used to proxy bank 
intermediation and financial deepening. As far as banking sector development is 
concerned, however, these ratios might have some shortcomings.
For instance, broad money, which consists of currency outside the banking 
sector, demand deposits and quasi money, does not differentiate between whether the 
liabilities are those of commercial banks, the central bank or other financial 
intermediaries and as such it cannot give a clear picture of banking sector liabilities. 
At the same time, it assumes that the liquidity of broad money is the same in all 
countries regardless of the degree of institutional development. As was already 
discussed in Chapter 6, depending upon the degree of progress in the banking sector 
development, the liquidity of the components of broad money may differ from 
country to country.
Now, as to the banking sector assets, since this indicator does not show sources 
of funds, it does only a half of the job in explaining bank intermediation. As will be 
shown in the example of Uzbekistan later in this chapter, the higher ratio of bank 
assets to GDP does not necessarily connote a better-developed banking sector and 
thus better banking intermediation.
16 The term monetisation is subject to different interpretations in the literature. As a rule two concepts 
can be understood by monetisation: enlargement o f the monetary economy through the substitution o f  
monetised transactions for non-monetised ones; and financial deepening, which indicates increased 
economic and thus financial activity in the already monetised sector (Chandavarkar, 1977 and Ghosh, 
1986). Under central planning subsistence production was almost non-existent and all the pro uction 
in the agricultural sector was monetised (but not necessarily commercialised). Deterioration o f  
economic conditions in this sector during transition has changed the situation and now it is possible to 
observe the problem o f  subsistence and de-monetisation in agriculture in the former sense o f  the term. 
While recognising this issue, we will focus our analysis on the formal sector, and as such by 
monetisation we imply effective use o f  bank liabilities in the already monetised sector.
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Having this caveat in mind, we will start our analysis by looking at the 
monetary liabilities of the financial system in selected transition economies. Figure 
7.4.1 below gives a general picture of financial deepening in selected countries for 
2003, the year for which the most current data were available for all countries in the 
sample.17 In 2003 Uzbekistan ranked last among the nine transition countries in our 
sample; the ratio of broad money to GDP in the country was only about 12 percent.
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Table 7.4.1 in the next page shows broad money as a share of GDP for a 
selection of transition countries for the period 1995-2003. Monetary liabilities of the 
financial sector were comparatively high in the Czech Republic and remained stable 
at around 70 percent of GDP from 1995 to 2003. Hungary and Poland experienced 
slower but consistent growth in their monetary liabilities during this period. Although 
the degree of financial deepening looks high in these three central European countries, 
it is still very low when compared to that of advanced countries.
17These countries are divided into three groups: the first group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland) represent advanced economies in transition, the second group (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) 
and the third group (Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan) are grouped m _hne wi 
regional considerations. Belarus, Russia and Ukraine represent European members o f the CIS, wnne 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan represent neighbouring and non-European members 
°fthe CIS.
Figure 7.4.1. Broad Money (M2) in Selected Countries 
(% of GDP 2003). Source: IFS (IMF), ADB, EBRD.
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Table 7.4.1 Broad Money (M2) in Selected Transition Countries
____________________ (% of GDP, 1995-2003)___________________
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Czech
Republic 75.3 70.6 72.5 65.3 67.8 68.8 68.9 68.2 69.7
Hungary 41.9 48.1 46.5 43.4 44.5 43.1 44.7 45.1 46.2
Poland 36.1 38.6 40.3 40.4 43.7 42.2 43.8 41.6 42.0
Belarus 15.0 14.8 15.8 30.9 16.7 17.2 15.2 15.0 17.2
Russia 15.5 14.4 16.0 17.0 14.6 15.7 18.0 19.7 24.2
Ukraine 12.7 11.5 13.4 15.0 16.6 18.5 22.1 28.5 35.8
Kazakhstan 11.4 9.5 10.3 8.6 13.6 15.3 17.7 20.3 21.8
Kyrgyz
Republic 17.1 14.3 13.6 14.4 13.5 11.3 11.1 14.6 17.6
Uzbekistan 17.7 21.0 17.5 15.4 13.6 12.2 12.4 10.6 12.1
Source: IFS (IMF); the Uzbek data are from ADB and EBRD.
The macroeconomic instability and high inflation that persisted for almost a 
decade in many post-soviet countries severely shattered confidence in their respective 
financial systems. As a result, all of the CIS countries still suffer from a relatively 
low level of financial intermediation. For instance, the ratio of broad money to GDP 
was only eight and a half percent of GDP in Kazakhstan in 1998. Since then this has 
changed and the financial sector liabilities of the Kazakh economy have steadily 
increased reaching about 22 percent of GDP in 2003, which, however, still remains 
very low compared to that of more advanced transition economies.
As Figure 7.4.2 on the next page reveals, Uzbekistan started the transition with a 
moderate level o f financial sector liabilities. This was partly explained by a monetary 
overhang associated with repressed inflation, which sharply eroded after the 1992 
price reform and subsequent hyperinflation. From 1993 to 1995 the ratio of broad 
money to GDP declined from more than 50 percent to less than 20 percent. The 
particularly rapid decline of this ratio in 1993-1995 was associated with rapid 
reduction of financial claims due to high inflation, the large transfer of wealth from 
creditors to debtors and the loss of confidence in the banking system (World Bank, 
1999: 33).
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Figure 7.4.2 Broad Money (M2) in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and 
the Kyrgyz Republic (% of GDP, 1993-2003).
Source: IFS (IMF), ADB, EBRD.
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Bank assets exceed national output in most advanced countries. As illustrated 
in Figure 7.4.3, bank assets were about twice the size of national output in Germany, 
and more than one and a half the size of national output in France and Japan. In the 
UK the ratio of bank assets to national output is even bigger -  about three times the 
size of the national output.
7.4.3 Bank Assets in Selected Countries (% of GDP, 2003). 
Source: IFS (IMF), ADB, EBRD
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Transition countries are lagging far behind in this respect too. The notable 
exception is, again, the Czech Republic in this sample, whose bank assets are about to 
exceed its GDP.18 Table 7.4.2 shows the dynamics of bank assets to GDP for a 
selection of transition countries for the period 1996-2003. Bank assets have been 
steadily increasing in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan recently. In Kazakhstan the 
ratio of bank assets to GDP increased from about 9 percent in 1996 to about 40 
percent in 2003. Russia and Ukraine are about to reach similar levels of bank assets 
to GDP.
Table 7.4.2 Bank Assets in Selected Transition Economies
(% of GDP; 1996-2003)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Czech Republic 92.9 100.5 95.1 95.6 91.3 89.8 88.5 86.9
Hungary 56.9 58.5 58.6 59.7 61.1 61.6 61.8 67.0
Poland 42.5 43.5 45.7 47.7 48.7 51.8 51.0 52.2
Russia 25.9 27.9 39.2 35.2 32.8 34.3 35.5 38.3
Ukraine 11.6 13.3 15.2 16.2 18.5 19.9 25.0 35.0
Belarus 18.2 21.5 46.0 23.3 24.2 21.2 21.1 24.5
Kazakhstan 8.6 9.2 9.6 14.9 18.2 23.4 29.1 36.2
Kyrgyz Republic 10.5 8.2 9.5 8.7 7.1 7.0 10.4 13.4
Uzbekistan 63.7 n.a. 45.2 44.7 51.6 64.9 52.6 45.7
Source: IFS (IMF), ADB, EBRD; Bank Assets for Uzbekistan 
of Uzbekistan.
-  the Central Bank
Since the ratio of broad money to GDP has been very low in Uzbekistan over 
the years of transition, one would naturally expect that the country’s ratio of bank 
assets to GDP would also be amongst the lowest. Surprisingly, however, the asset 
size of the Uzbek banking sector not only exceeds that of the Russian or Ukrainian 
hanking sectors, but also is comparable to that of advanced transition economies. 
(Please see Table 7.4.2 above and Figure 7.4.3 below.) In 1996 and 2001 the size of 
hank assets was equal to approximately two thirds of national output. Even though
18
Data on bank assets here were extracted from the International Financial Statistics o f the IMF. 
However, according to the data provided by Poloucek (2004: 7), the Czech Republic’s bank assets were 
well above its GDP even in 1996. In 2000 the ratio o f bank assets to GDP was about 129 percent.
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this ratio dropped down to about 46 percent of GDP in 2003, it was still larger than 
that of all the CIS countries in the sample.
In short, the extremely low ratio of broad money to GDP in Uzbekistan 
indicates that after more than ten years of transition the banking sector has not 
regained the general public’s confidence. Therefore, bank liabilities still remain 
unpopular. Despite this fact, however, the ratio of bank assets to GDP is 
comparatively high. In a way, this anomaly may indicate that the banking sector might 
be using centralised credits and some alternative source of finance, such as foreign 
credits, to grant loans.
However, at this point it is too early to jump to conclusions. In order to 
understand the true nature of the issue, we need to identify the current stage of 
banking development in Uzbekistan using the theoretical framework developed in 
Chapter 6. To do that, we will approach the matter from a micro perspective. First we 
will consider the case study of the largest bank of the country -  the NBU. We will 
look at a number of relevant issues such as the structure of the bank’s assets and 
liabilities, the share o f centralised and government-guaranteed loans in bank’s loan 
portfolio, etc. In addition, in the next section we will also analyse system-specific 
problems and current obstacles existing in the banking sector using the data generated 
through interviews and questionnaires.
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The Case o f the National Bank o f Uzbekistan
The National Bank o f Uzbekistan19 is the biggest and the most important bank in the 
country with monopolistic powers. Its assets and loans account for more than 70 
percent of the banking sector assets and loans respectively. The bank was established 
in 1991 on the basis o f the former Vnesheconombank. Originally, the NBU was set up 
as a specialist bank (i) to serve business needs of enterprises engaged in foreign trade, 
and (ii) to act as the financial agent of the government in the international financial 
markets.
With the adoption of the ‘universal banking’ approach towards the second half 
of the 1990s, which coincides with the second wave of institution-building reforms, 
special treatment of the bank in dealing with foreign currency-related transactions was 
formally abandoned. Nevertheless, the role and importance of the bank only increased 
since then. At present it controls well over two-thirds of the banking market in the 
country.
The bank is fully state-owned. The authorities have been reiterating their 
commitment to privatising state-owned banks, including the NBU, since 1998. The 
government plans to do this by selling up to 50 percent of its shares to strategic 
foreign investors. However, all of these numerous announcements have so far failed 
to translate into action. As far as the NBU is concerned, privatisation reforms have 
never advanced beyond the stage of due diligence to prepare the bank for 
restructuring, which was undertaken by Deutsche Bank Consulting in 2001. Below, 
we will analyse selected financial indicators of the NBU in the hope of finding 
answers to some o f the questions raised earlier.
19 The full official name o f  the bank is the National Bank for Foreign Economic Activity o f the 
Republic o f Uzbekistan.
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Table 7.4.3 below shows the dynamics of selected items of the balance sheet of 
the NBU for the years 1993-2003. These items are total deposits, current account 
deposits, foreign credits, total assets, and total loans extended.
Table 7.4.3 Se ected Financial Indicators of the NBU, 1993-2003
Years Total Deposits
Curren
De
t Account 
posits Foreign Credits*
Total
Assets Loans Extended
Million As % of Million
As % of 
Total Million As % of Million Million As % of
USD Liabilities USD Deposits USD Liabilities USD USD Assets
(1) _ (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1993 253 56.0 138 54.5 126 27.9 452 324 71.7
1994 784 58.8 332 42.3 138 10.3 1334 452 33.9
1995 898 47.6 363 40.4 307 16.3 1885 615 32.6
1996 928 27.1 572 61.6 609 17.8 3427 1142 33.3
1997 589 17.3 534 90.7 768 22.6 3402 1456 42.8
1998 623 17.2 453 72.7 1075 29.6 3629 1884 51.9
1999 659 16.0 497 75.4 1222 29.7 4119 2078 50.4
2000 440 11.2 343 78.0 1450 37.1 3913 2227 56.9
2001 387 10.2 324 83.7 1543 40.6 3799 2223 58.5
2002 389 12.5 320 82.3 1538 49.6 3102 2166 69.8
2003 442 14.4 362 81.9 1622 52.9 3064 2358 77.0
‘ Foreign credits represent loans that have been made available to the bank by foreign 
export-credit agencies, banks and international financial institutions mostly under 
the sovereign guarantee of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
Source: NBU’s Annual Reports, from 1993 to 2003.
According to Column 1 of the table, from 1996 onwards the total deposits of the 
bank gradually decreased. What is more important, however, is that, as Column 2 of 
the table reveals, starting from 1994 the ratio of total deposits to total liabilities started 
to decrease. In 1994 the ratio stood at about 60 percent and in 2003 it was only about 
14 percent. Now, Column 4 of the table, which decomposes total deposits into the 
current account deposits of the enterprise sector and the term and savings deposits of 
the general public, reveals that the share of savings and term deposits in total deposits 
also shrank during this period. For instance, if in 1993 the share of savings and term 
deposits in total deposits was more than 50 percent, in 2003 the figure was only about
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18 percent. Given that the absolute value of current account deposits were also 
declining during 1996-2003, the decreasing share of these deposits in total deposits 
clearly indicates a gradual loss of confidence in bank liabilities.
It is important to note that these findings are not unique to the NBU. When we 
observe the analogous indicators in other banks, we find very similar results. For 
instance, in other big banks, such as Sanoatqurilishbank, Asakabank, Tadbirkorbank, 
Xalq Bank and Turonbank, the share of current account deposits in total deposits was 
70.0 percent, 74.0 percent, 73.7 percent, 81.4 percent and 75.7 percent respectively.20 
(The data refer to 2003 except for Xalq Bank and Turonbank whose data refer to 2002 
and 2001 respectively.)
Current account deposits represent the enterprise sectors’ liquid assets (non-cash 
money), and enterprises have no other option than to keep these resources with banks. 
In this sense, the volume of these deposits does not indicate agents’ trust in banks. 
What signals the public’s confidence in the banking sector, however, is the volume of 
term and savings deposits, which are of longer maturity and as such are one of the 
main sources of loanable funds for banks. As was discussed in Chapter 6, during the 
early two phases of banking development during transition, the volume of both 
savings deposits and current account deposits would decrease. However, as long as 
the banking sector performed the function of payment clearing centre, the enterprise 
sector would be better off using banking services; carrying out large-value 
transactions would be awkward and costly. Hence, the fact that less than one-fifth of 
total deposits was term and savings deposits in 2003 shows the collapse of confidence 
in bank liabilities.21
21 Annual financial reports o f  these banks.
Again, similar figures were reported in the annual report o f Sanoatqurilishbank, the second biggest 
bank in terms o f  bank assets. In 2001 77 percent of total deposits came from enterprises and
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Now, despite the declining popularity of bank liabilities among the public, the 
bank does not seem to be constrained by the availability of the stock of domestic 
loanable funds, loans and other assets of the bank gradually increased over the years. 
As Column 7 o f Table 7.4.3 shows, total assets of the bank consistently increased 
from about USD452 million in 1993 to about USD4119 million in 1999. Although 
total assets have been slowly decreasing since then, it was still more than USD3000 
million in 2003. Moreover, as Column 9 of Table 7.4.3 shows, after the initial decline 
in 1994, the share o f loans in total assets increased from about 34 percent in 1994 to 
about 77 percent in 2003.
Another interesting piece of information we can derive from Table 7.4.3 is that 
foreign credits and sources other than deposits attracted from the general public were 
the main sources o f the growth of the bank’s loan portfolio.22 Column 6 of the table 
shows that from 1993 to 2003 the amount of credits attracted from abroad increased 
about 13 times. The share of foreign credits in total liabilities was about 53 percent in 
2003.
The bank’s own capital was one of the important sources of growth too. The 
bank, being 100 percent state-owned, was generously capitalised from the start: equity 
capital of the bank was USD200 million in 1992. Since then almost every year 
additional capital has been injected; in 2003 total equity capital of the bank stood at 
USD400 million. This process can actually be seen as another technique of 
legitimising the policy of granting centralised and directed credits to the economy. In 
short, according to the financial report of the bank for 2003, the sources of funds for 
lending (i) in foreign currency were generated by attracting foreign loans (86.1%) and
organisations, 19 percent was attracted from the population, and the rest came from other sources
(Sanoatqurilishbank, 2002: 16).
Foreign credits represent loans that have been made available to the bank by foreign export-credit 
agencies, banks and international financial institutions mostly under the sovereign guarantee o f the 
Republic o f Uzbekistan.
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the bank s own capital (13.9/6), and (ii) in domestic currency by the bank’s own 
capital (68.0%) and the resources attracted from various other sources (32.0%) (NBU, 
2004: 19).
In addition to supplying the bank with necessary capital injections and 
centralised credits, the authorities also guarantee the bulk of the bank’s loan portfolio. 
Table 7.4.4 shows this and some other financial indicators, which reflect the breath of 
the authorities’ political influence in the banks’ activity. As Column 3 of the table 
shows, well over 80 percent of total loans were guaranteed by the state during 1998- 
2003. An extraordinarily high share of state-guaranteed loans in the bank’s total loan 
portfolio also indicates the degree to which the bank’s credit policy is affected by the 
economic priorities o f the government.
Table 7.4.4 Centralised Credits, State-Guaranteed and Other Loans
in the NBU’s Balance Sheet, 1998-2003
Years
Total
Loans
State-Guaranteed
Loans* Other
. w w w  —
Loans Centralised Credits**
Million
USD
(1)
Million
USD
(2)
As % of 
Total 
Loans 
(3)
Million
USD
(4)
As % of 
Total 
Loans
(5)
Million
USD
(6)
As % of 
term 
deposits 
(7)
1998 1884 1663 88.3 221 11.7 80 47.1
1999 2120 1840 86.8 262 12.4 103 63.6
2000 2268 1968 86.8 300 13.2 95 97.9
2001 2276 2005 88.1 271 11.9 67 106.3
2002 2336 1993 85.3 343 14.7 43 62.3
2003 2537 2126 83.8 411 16.2 37 46.3
* Includes foreign credits and all other loans guaranteed by the government 
and government related agencies.
** Centralised credits are funds received from the CBU that are used by the 
bank to provide lending to targeted industrial enterprises.
Source: NBU’s Annual Financial Reports, from 1998 to 2003.
Another important source of bank credit that we have to mention is the so 
called’ centralised credits received from the CBU. The bank on-lends these credits to 
targeted industrial enterprises under specialised state programmes. As Column 6 of 
Table 7.4.4 shows when compared to the size of the bank’s total loans, the size of
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centralised credits looks pretty small. However, it is interesting to see in Column 7 of 
the table that the size of these funds was comparable to the size of term and savings 
deposits the bank managed to attract from the general public in 2000 and 2001 
respectively.
When we look at the distribution of the loans by ownership structure of 
borrowers and by economic sector, the government’s influence in the bank’s credit 
activity becomes even clearer. Table 7.4.5 below shows that from 1998 to 2000 about 
three-fourths of total credits were granted to state agencies and state-owned 
companies; the rest were directed to finance the activities of private companies. 
Starting from 2001, the share of private sector financing began to increase, but it still 
remains very low -  only about one-third of the loan portfolio.
Table 7.4.5 Distribution of the NBU Loans by Ownership Structure 
__________________ of Borrowers, 1998-2003__________________
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
State Agencies* 3.3 3.9 8.2 6.3 6.2 4.2
State-owned Companies and Agencies 74.9 71.7 68.4 61.5 56.9 59.2
Private Companies 21.8 24.4 23.4 32.3 36.9 36.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* Ministries and Associations.
Source: NBU’s Annual Financial Reports, from 1998 to 2003.
As to the sectorial composition of loans, they are almost entirely directed to the 
industrial sector o f the economy, which is not surprising given that the country 
pursues intentional industrialisation policies as was already discussed in Chapter 5. 
Table 7.4.6 on the next page represents the cumulative amount of all credits extended 
by the bank to different sectors of the economy during 1993-2003. It appears that 
more than 77 percent of all bank loans were directed to financing projects in the 
industrial sector. Despite its strategic importance and the urgent need for its
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modernisation, the agricultural sector accounted for only about 12 percent of the loan 
portfolio.
Table 7.4.6 Distribution of the NBU’s Loans across the Sectors of 
___________ the Economy. Cumulative, 1993-2003.
Sector
Number of 
Projects 
Financed 
(1)
Total Cost of 
Projects, 
Million USD 
(2)
NBU Loan 
Amount, 
Million USD 
(3)
Share in 
Total Loan 
Portfolio, % 
(4)
Industry 129 5503.5 3670.8 77.1
Agriculture 22 636.9 584.4 12.3
Services and
Tourism 15 559.3 397.5 8.3
Other 3 117.1 110.6 2.3
Total 169 6817 4763.5 100.0
Source: NBU’s Annual Financial Report for 2003.
All in all, our analysis so far shows that the government uses the banking sector 
to on-lend state-guaranteed loans to finance its investment projects mostly in the 
industrial sector. Moreover, it is likely that some of these loans are granted to finance 
non-competitive and non-viable enterprises to prevent unemployment and output loss. 
According to the World Bank (2003) state-guaranteed foreign loans account for about 
70 percent of the banking sector loan portfolio, most of which is concentrated in the 
NBU.
However, the most important thing is that, even without the role and impact of 
foreign credits and domestic deposits, the banking sector’s ability to create credit is 
not constrained by the availability of deposits. This is explained by a number of 
factors such as easy access to centralised and directed credits , the injection of
On this we also learned from senior employees o f the NBU the following. Usually export credit 
agencies guarantee no more than 85 percent o f the amount o f an individual investment project and this 
is the maximum amount o f  foreign credit domestic banks can attract to finance any single prqject. t is 
Possible to finance the remaining part o f the project by attracting foreign credits guaranteed by private 
credit insurance companies. However, since Uzbekistan’s sovereign credit rating is among thejowest, 
this type o f financing w ill be prohibitively expensive. Therefore, to finance the remaining pa 0 ®
Project the authorities supply centralised credits to the banking sector, which then on-lendthese 
facilities to ultimate borrowers. Now, about the legitimacy o f this practice, ince oreign cr 
require issuance o f  sovereign guarantees, the government usually issues a resolution outlining
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additional capital by the authorities, the availability o f the lender-of-last-resort 
facility, etc.
In a nutshell, despite the lack of faith in both banks and bank liabilities among 
the general public, the volume of banking sector credits to the economy remains 
comparatively high in Uzbekistan. It is primarily the current organisational structure 
of the banking sector that allows the banks to create credit independently of both the 
stock of available loanable funds and the necessary advancement in bank 
development. In other words, this type of creation carries the trademark of political 
credit endogeneity. The difference between this type o f credit creation and credit 
creation in market economies, discussed in the earlier chapters, is that here the causal 
chain of credit creation starts form the government sector, not from the private sector. 
In other words, the process is not the result o f gradual evolution o f banking sector as 
such, rather enforced form above. The nature of political credit endogeneity and 
system-specific problems associated with it will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter.
financing scheme o f  an investment project. And usually the authorities include a ‘confidential clause’ 
in the text o f the resolution, the content o f  which w ill not be revealed to the general public. In this 
clause the central bank w ill be authorised to extend centralised credit to the bank, which in turn will 
refinance these facilities to the end user.
The use o f centralised credits is also recognised by the NBU in its annual financial reports. In 
the bank’s annual report for 2003 , w e can find the following words: ‘During the period 1993-2003 
National Bank of Uzbekistan in the framework o f  foreign credits lines, centralised  and own resources 
financed 169 large investment projects’ (N B U , 2004: 21. Emphasis added).
273
7.5 Current Issues and System-specific Problems. Explaining Lack of Trust in 
Bank Liabilities
We have discussed a number of important issues in the previous sections. Our 
discussions showed that the banking sector remained extremely centralised with state- 
owned banks controlling the banking sector. Although the payment system of the 
country was successfully modernised, the banking sector failed to regain the public’s 
confidence. Moreover, continuance of the old-style credit endogeneity, which is a 
hallmark of the soft budget constraints phenomenon, implied that the banking sector’s 
credit activity was not constrained either by the availability of loanable funds, or by 
the technical advancement of banks. As will be argued below, political credit 
endogeneity combined with some other system-specific issues explains the 
distinctiveness of Uzbek banking sector development.
Like every key sector of the economy in Uzbekistan, the banking sector suffers 
from extreme centralisation and excessive government intervention, which inhibit 
financial development and thus undermine the public’s confidence. Hitherto 
Uzbekistan has not abandoned some of the old-style practices of monetary 
management. Under the current banking regulations, banks are obliged to control 
timely payment of taxes to the budget by enterprises.24 Banks must withhold any 
outstanding amount of tax and similar payments owed by enterprises to the budget. 
Interestingly enough, when doing so banks do not need to get prior permission from 
the account holders. The function of collecting data on enterprise activities is also
----------------------------------------   / 't thP Decree o f the President o f the Republic o f
24 For these regulations please see, among others, to (a) mechanisms o f  settlements an
Uzbekistan dated 4 February 1998 ‘On ™ f ” f ^ f h ° Instruction o f  t h e  CBU dated January 
stimulation o f  payments to central and local bu ge s entrepreneurial agents.’
1999 'On the writing o f f  cash amounts from bank accounts ot entrep
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envisaged in the banking regulations. Banks collect information on their clients’ 
financial transactions and report them to the tax authorities and any other relevant 
local and central government bodies.
According to the IFC s 2003 survey of business environment in Uzbekistan, in 
which 1500 independent entrepreneurs, micro, small and medium businesses 
participated, more than 50 percent of the questionnaire respondents said that (a) banks 
disclosed information on accounts of enterprises to outside parties (91 percent of 
respondents specified the tax authorities), and (b) banks required businesses to 
provide statistical information on their economic activity (IFC, 2004).
The majority o f the bankers we interviewed indicated that direct and indirect 
interventions by the authorities in everyday bank activities were preventing banks 
from working as profit-oriented market institutions. In other words, the banking sector 
was forced to perform two conflicting functions, i.e. acting as a financial 
intermediary, and working as a finance department of the government. Indeed, 
complaining about these practices and excessive intervention of local governing 
bodies in everyday bank activities, a branch manager of a regional bank said that ‘i f  
the definition o f  an institution is based on the functions it performs, then the w ord  
‘bank” has to be rep laced  with the word “branch o f  the Cabinet o f  Ministers in 
Uzbekistan. ’
In short, the banking sector is still used by the government as a tax collector, 
and a statistical organ to collect various financial data on enterprise activities. This 
hampers the enterprise sector’s confidence in banks and makes bank liabilities a less 
desirable asset to hold. As a result, the economy’s reliance on cash money increases.
25 Please see the Instruction o f  the CBU ‘On organising cash flows o f enterprises,’ registered with the 
Ministry o f Justice as o f  10 December 1998 and amended on 27 October 2001 and 18 July 2002.
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Unfortunately, the list o f system-specific problems does not end with these 
obstacles. Another important issue to consider is the practice of the ‘cash plan’. The 
cash plan is the old-style control over the supply of cash money. Under new 
circumstances it implies putting limitations on free convertibility between cash money 
and non-cash money. It should be duly noted that recently the authorities have passed 
several resolutions to abolish this practice.26 However, these regulations changed very 
little if anything at all.27
Although a generous credit policy has been helpful in preventing unemployment 
and output loss, it naturally led to the excess supply of non-cash money in the 
economy. The fact that ‘excess non-cash liquidity has been accumulating in the 
banking sector’ over the years is recognised by the EBRD too (EBRD, 2003: 212). 
However, allowing free convertibility of non-cash money into cash money in this 
situation would result in an undesirably higher rate of inflation.
In this sense it is not difficult to see that in a way the cash plan was employed to 
deal with the inflationary side-effects of political endogeneity. Banks were allowed to 
convert non-cash money into cash money only to pay wages, pensions, and other 
immediate expenses such as business travel expenses. In fact, however, enterprises 
started having difficulties in converting their non-cash money into cash money not 
only for usual transaction purposes but also for paying wages and similar payments to 
their employees. Household sector depositors were affected too. They could not freely
The essence o f  the cash plan under central planning was discussed in Chapter 4. For regulations on 
the current situation please see, among others, (a) the Resolution o f the Cabinet o f Ministers No 280 
dated 5 August 2002 ‘On measures to decrease further the circulation o f cash money outside the 
banking sector,’ (b) the Resolution o f  the Cabinet o f Ministers No 63 dated 4 February 2003 On 
measures to improve mechanisms o f  regulating monetary-credit indicators, and (c) t e ecree o e 
President o f the Republic o f  Uzbekistan dated 5 August 2005 ‘On guaranteeing uninterrupted payment
of cash money from deposit accounts held with banks.’ , . . .
Indeed, during interviews bankers said that despite the adoption o f these egrees an reso u ions 
ending the cash plan and the formal distinction between cash money and non-cash money the problem 
still remains the same. ‘What the regulations changed is just to replace the word con ro 
word “forecast.” Essentially, however, nothing has changed,’ said one the branch managers we
interviewed.
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convert their deposits into cash money on demand. As a result, the public’s trust in 
banks and bank liabilities further weakened and this led to the emergence of the 
difference between the values of cash money and non-cash money. Non-cash money 
started selling at a discount to cash money, as if cash money was in short supply.
The IFC’s (2004) survey of the business environment in Uzbekistan for 2003, 
which represents the viewpoint of entrepreneurs, found that the systematic shortage of 
cash money in banks and difficulty in obtaining cash money from banks were the two 
top problems in operating business accounts with banks. As Figure 7.5.1 below 
shows, if in 2002 more than 50 percent of the respondents acknowledged that 
converting non-cash money into cash money was problematic, in 2003 more than 60 
percent of respondents indicated this to be the single most important problem.
Figure 7.5.1 Difficulties of operating business accounts with banks.
(IFC, 2004:74.)
Control over payroll fund 
Sluggishness of non-cash transactions
High cost of operating business accounts
Multiplicity of bank requirements for non-cash 
payment transactions
Bank bureaucracy 
Systematic shortage of cash money 
Difficulty in obtaining cash money
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
% of business account holders who faced these problems
The results o f conducted interviews and questionnaires, which reflect the 
viewpoint of practitioner bankers on the issues, also confirm the severity of the
02002 02003
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problem. When asked about the enterprise sector’s ability to convert their non-cash 
money into cash money when needed, the majority of bankers acknowledged that this 
still remained a big problem. Table 7B.5 of Appendix 7B shows the survey results on 
this question. About 68 percent of the respondent bankers who answered this question 
said that enterprises could not convert their non-cash money into cash money when 
needed on first demand.
As Table 7B.2 of Appendix 7B shows, bankers agree that the nature of non-cash 
money (i.e. its moneyness) has improved during transition; the majority of the 
respondents (64.3%) believe that, on average, there was a positive change. 
Nonetheless, bankers also confirm that because of the above-mentioned shortcomings 
the public does not yet rate cash money and non-cash money equally liquid. As Table 
7B.3 of Appendix 7B reveals, about 78 % of bankers who participated in the survey 
opined that, on average, the public values non-cash money at least 11-15% less than 
cash money. The result of the table is also shown in Figure 7.5.2 below.
Figure 7.5.2 The difference between the values of cash 
money and non-cash money
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As to the possible explanations of the emergence of the difference between the 
values of cash money and non-cash money, bankers were asked to rate several 
important factors on the scale of 1 to 5, 1 being of no importance and 5 being very 
important. The results, which are presented in Table 7B.4 of Appendix 7B, show that 
existence of the shadow economy on the one hand, and incentives to avoid taxes on 
the other hand, put upward pressure on the demand for cash money. In the meantime, 
the excessive supply of non-cash money and low interest paid on bank deposits make 
holding non-cash money less desirable.
Inflationary pressure coming from political credit endogeneity and the resulting 
difference between the values of cash money and non-cash is also reflected in the 
persistently higher rate of inflation in wholesale market prices, which are 
predominantly in non-cash money, relative to that in retail market prices, which are in 
cash money. Since the consumer price index (CPI) measures prices of cash-based 
transactions and the producer price index (PPI) measures prices of non-cash based 
transactions, the rate of inflation measured in these indices can also approximate the 
relative illiquidity of non-cash money. As Table 7.5.1 shows, during 1995-2002 the 
rate of inflation measured in PPI has consistently been higher relative to that 
measured in CPI.
Table 7.5.1 Inflation measured in CPI and PPI.
% chanqe. annual average
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
CPI 304.6 54.0 70.9 29.0 29.1 25.0 27.2 27.6
PPI 499.0 107.0 52.0 48.4 38.0 61.1 42.2 46.0
Source: EBRD, 2004
N ow , a lth ou gh  the private sector does not value non-cash m oney as being  
equally liquid to  cash  m o n ey , as a legal tender by law  they should be treated the same. 
Moreover, accord in g  to  the current rules and regulations, entities that sell goods and
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provide services in cash money have to return their cash money proceeds to the 
banking sector at the end o f each business day. Failure to do so will result in huge 
fines and other disciplinary penalties.28
However, the opportunity of making extra profit by ‘selling’ the cash money 
proceeds, which otherwise would be returned to the banking sector for no explicit 
financial gain, to entities which are desperately in need of cash money induces cash- 
abundant entities to innovate and find loopholes in regulations. Interviews with 
practitioner bankers revealed that agents use various methods to convert non-cash 
money into cash money. Detailed discussion of a few of these methods are presented 
in Appendix 7C.
One of the many side effects of the cash squeeze policy is that due to the 
systematic shortage of cash money in banks, enterprises will find it increasingly 
difficult to convert their non-cash money into cash money to pay wages on a timely 
basis. Table 7B.6 and 7B.7 of Appendix 7B reflect bankers’ viewpoint on this 
problem. As Table 7B.6 shows, when asked about this, 93 percent of the respondents 
said that at least a quarter of enterprises that held business accounts with their banks 
were not able to pay wages on time. The percentage of those participants who said 
that about every second enterprise faced this problem was close to 50 percent. In 
addition, when asked about the length of the wage payment delays, about 70 percent 
of respondents said that it was between 1 and 2 months (Table 7B.7).
To deal with the problem the government has recently introduced several 
regulations that hold banks responsible for the control of cash money circulation in
_______________-  . . jsa dated 22 June 2001 ‘On
28 See among others the Resolution o f the Cabinet o f an(j t0 increase responsibilities o f
additional measures to improve the circulation cash money -  ^  ^  5 Aug„st 2002 .0 n
commercial banks’ and the Resolution o f the Ca • j  banking sector.’
measures to decrease further the circulation o f cash money outside the g
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the economy including timely payment of pensions and wages.29 In particular, banks 
are held strongly accountable for the timeliness of wage and other similar payments to 
civil servants, pensioners, and employees of state-owned and state-related enterprises 
in priority sectors.30
However, since the real cause of wage arrears in Uzbekistan is the restrictions 
imposed on the free convertibility between cash money and non-cash money, these 
measures do very little to change the situation. As we learned from senior bank 
officers, under the current regime, paradoxically, banks have to engage in illicit 
transactions in order to fulfil the legal and regulatory responsibilities imposed on 
them. One of the examples of these transactions is selling foreign exchange in the 
black market to generate cash money, which will be used to pay wages, pensions and 
other similar payments.31 The technical details of the process are discussed in 
Appendix 7D. (We have already discussed several other similar cases earlier.)
29 (i) The Resolution o f  the Cabinet o f  Ministers No 504 dated 17 November 1999 ‘On additional 
measures to increase responsibilities o f ministries, organisations and economic units for timely 
payment o f  wages.’ (ii) The Resolution o f the Cabinet o f Ministers No 264 dated 22 June 2001 On 
additional measures to improve the circulation cash money and to increase responsibilities o f  
commercial banks.’ (iii) The Resolution o f  the Cabinet o f Ministers No 88 dated 19 March 2002 On 
additional measures to organise timely payment o f wages.’
3°‘It does not matter how we find cash money. We have to make timely payment o f pensions o f retired 
people and wages o f  state-related organisations; private enterprises are not big concern. Once or twice 
a month we sell hard currency in the black market to generate cash money. I know that this is the case 
with most banks nowadays across the country’ said the Head o f a regional branch o f a commercial 
bank during an interview.
31 Squeezing o f  the supply o f  cash money is not only helpful to keep control over inflation, but is also o f  
assistance in suppressing the household sector’s demand for foreign exchange in the country. After a 
short period o f  liberal exchange rate policies following the introduction o f the national currency, the 
government introduced exchange control in the early 1997. The primary intention behind this policy 
was to subsidize priority sectors o f  the economy. Industrial companies, which imported technologies 
and whose investment projects were financed by foreign credits, could convert their national currency 
earnings into the currency o f  import contracts and foreign credit agreements at a privileged exchange 
rate. Entities producing for export were in clear disadvantage, whereas the household and small-scale 
private entrepreneur sectors did not have a free access to foreign currency from official sources such as
commercial banks. . . . .
During this period the black market exchange rate for the US dollars was about two times higher 
than the office exchange rate. Since 2002 the government, under the IMF s staff monitored 
Programme, gradually abandoned multiple exchange rate policy and removed ^ lctl0"s a^ CeS.Sc 0 
foreign exchange for current account transactions (Government o f  Uzbekistan, 2002a and 2002b). As a 
^sult, from the beginning o f  2003 foreign exchange became available to the enterprise sectoras well as 
the household and private entrepreneur sectors. Due to increased avai^a l lty o 
shortage o f cash money, the US dollar exchange rate fell from about 1500 so ms per dollar
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Now, under the persistent shortage of cash money, and all the difficulties 
associated with it, one would expect that enterprises and companies would choose an 
easier option and start paying wages in kind or in hard currency. However, although 
payment of wages in kind can be observed in some sectors of the economy, it has not 
become a popular practice. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, payment of 
wages in kind is prohibited by law. Regulations, however, allow agricultural entities 
to pay wages in kind provided that these goods are either from their own produce 
(wheat, fruits, vegetables, etc) or originated from own produce (flour, cooking oil, 
juice, etc). Therefore, only in agriculture are wages paid predominantly in kind. 
Secondly, enterprises are to pay wages only in the national currency. Moreover, 
although foreign exchange restrictions are lifted, neither commercial banks nor the 
monetary authorities are in a position to satisfy foreign exchange demand in large 
scale.
In addition, besides indirect costs of negotiations with banks and other agents, 
enterprises actually do not share the cost of the lost purchasing power of employee 
deposits. The cost will be borne solely by wage earners. In fact, when employers are 
too sluggish in paying their wages, employees may approach third parties, i.e. 
arbitrageurs, to convert their non-cash earnings into cash money. Mirzoeva (2004) 
discusses how this is done in large enterprises. Employees open bank accounts and 
ask their employers to transfer their wages to these accounts. Next, they issue power 
°f attorney to arbitrageurs and authorise them free access to these deposits. 
Arbitrageurs convert non-cash money into cash money using one of the many possible 
methods of conversion discussed above and pay the wages to the employees.
1000 so'ms per dollar. During the last 2 years the black market exchange rate has been lower than the
exchange rate offered by commercial banks.
Please see the Resolution o f  the Cabinet o f Ministers No 88 dated 19 March 2002 ‘On additional 
measures to organise timely payment o f  wages.’
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Naturally, the cash value of wages will be reduced in accordance with the incurred
costs and the profit premium of arbitrageurs.
Our discussion so far shows that most of the problems that exist in the financial 
sector of Uzbekistan are system-specific. This also refers to the issue of non­
monetary transactions. Unlike in many other transition economies, barterisation of 
transactions has not become a major issue in the Uzbek economy (Carlin et al, 2001). 
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, unlike Russia and Ukraine, or any other 
transition country which experienced a rise in non-monetary transactions, Uzbekistan 
has kept centralised control over production in key sectors of the economy and its 
banking sector generously supplied credit to the enterprise sector, including 
subsidised credits to the agricultural sector. Secondly, the use of non-monetary 
transactions, including bills of exchange (veksels), was officially banned since the mid
331990s. And thirdly, in addition to the general credit policy, the government 
successfully initiated specialised programmes, the so-called ‘credit schemes,’ to deal 
with inter-enterprise payment arrears, which is thought to be one of the factors that 
prompt barter transactions.
Indeed, along with the above-mentioned measures, credit schemes play a very 
important role in preventing the development of non-monetary transactions in the 
economy. Appendix 7E draws the picture of how the ‘credit scheme’ programme is 
carried out. Primarily, schemes are used to prevent inter-enterprise payment arrears 
from becoming a payment crisis for the entire economy. When the problem of inter­
enterprise payment arrears among several enterprises is discovered, the authorities 
take the initiative and try to solve it as soon as possible. As a rule, the authorities 
extend centralised credit to the banking sector, which then on-lends it to troubled
33 Please see, among others, the Resolutions o f the Cabinet o f Ministers No 204 and No 452 dated 2 
June 1995 and 24 September 1997 respectively.
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enterprises at concessionary interest rates. The flow of the credit facility then will be 
monitored continuously until it is paid back to the banking sector. Because of the 
centralised and purposeful nature of this type of loan, it is referred to as ‘dead’ money 
in the jargon o f practitioners. The reason for this is that non-cash money created by 
the authorities circulates only along the predetermined lines of the scheme and flows 
back to its origin.
All in all, because of the excessive interventions from the authorities and the 
inappropriate functions imposed on banks, the Uzbek banking sector is still struggling 
to go beyond phase three of the evolutionary path proposed in Chapter 6. In other 
words, although moderate level of inflation has been achieved and the payments 
system has been modernised, banks have failed to regain the general public’s 
confidence, which had collapsed as a result of hyperinflation in the early years of 
transition. As a result, despite these changes the size of the depository base remains 
very low.
It is unfortunate that after more than ten years of transition, the basic 
precondition for financial development, that is, the internal convertibility between 
cash money and non-cash money has not been achieved. The core of the problem of 
less-than-perfect-substitutability of non-cash money to cash money is explained by 
the excessive supply o f soft credits and the concomitant restrictions imposed on the 
free convertibility o f non-cash money into cash money to suppress inflation. Because 
these restrictions make enterprises and households unable to convert their non-cash 
money holdings into cash money on demand, and thus hold back their purchasing 
power, they create a condition for forced saving.34 The cost of suppressing inflation
Attempting to control inflation through cash squeeze is not a new phenomenon. Cash shortages had 
been a common problem throughout the FSU prior to the introduction o f national currencies in the ex­
soviet republics (Hardy and Lahiri, 1996). Due to the inefficiency and sluggishness o f the non-cash 
Payment system and the uncertainty associated with it, enterprises’ demand for cash money increased
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under this regime then is the collapse of confidence in the banking sector and the 
resulting illiquidity of bank liabilities.
7.6 Conclusion
To summarise, there have been a lot of positive changes in terms of reorganising the 
banking sector o f Uzbekistan during transition. The two-tier banking sector has 
replaced the monobank system. Relevant laws were passed clarifying functions and 
responsibilities o f banks in each tier of the sector. After the introduction of the 
national currency in the second half of 1994, inflation has been more or less moderate. 
The banking sector has a moderate level of branch penetration with about 800 
branches (approximately 31000 people per branch) and approximately the same 
number of mini-banks. Moreover, the deposit insurance fund has been set up to foster 
the household sector’s faith in banks. Although the old-style cash plan was not 
completely abandoned, the enterprise sector was allowed to choose between cash 
money and non-cash money. The authorities were particularly keen in reorganising 
and modernising the payment system. Banks were exempted from paying taxes to the 
budget for four years provided that they used freed resources for the modernisation of 
the system. As a result, the transformation of the manual paper-based clearing system 
into a computer-based electronic one was achieved within a short period of time.
significantly throughout the FSU. In the meantime, due to the semi-autonomous credit policies o f  the 
semi-independent central banks o f  ex-soviet republics, the supply o f  non-cash money considerably 
increased during this tim e. The reluctance o f  the central bank o f  Russia, which was m charge ot 
monetary policy in the rouble zone, to increase the supply o f  cash money contributed to the cash 
shortage phenomenon. A s a result, banks became increasingly unable to convert agents deposit money 
into cash m oney to pay w ages and pensions. In the end, the policy o f  squeezing t e supp y  o currency 
was aimed at restraining inflation by holding back purchasing power o f  house o s. n is sense 
Conway ( 1997) argued that the phenomena o f  monetary overhang and cash shortage were the same 
thing.
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Despite all o f these positive changes, however, the general public’s trust in 
banks and bank liabilities remains weak. Most importantly, free convertibility 
between cash money and non-cash money, which is one of the preconditions of the 
monetisation of wealth formation and financial development, is not still met. A closer 
look at the balance sheets of the major commercial banks revealed that about four- 
fifths of the total deposits of banks are current accounts of enterprises.
In short, the analysis of the chapter shows that the Uzbek banking sector is still 
stmggling to go beyond phase three of the evolutionary path suggested in Chapter 6. 
In other words, although moderate level of inflation has been achieved and the 
payments system has been modernised, banks have failed to regain the general 
public’s confidence, which had collapsed as a result of hyperinflation in the early 
years of transition. Due to the lack of trust in banks and bank liabilities, banks find it 
increasingly difficult to attract term and savings deposits from the general public. In 
other words, the household sector barely keeps their savings with the banking sector. 
In this sense, it is not surprising to see that the Uzbek economy is heavily dependant 
upon cash money and the ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP in the country is the 
lowest amongst the CIS countries we considered.
More importantly, the discussion of the chapter also shows that the explanations 
for this unique situation can be found in system-specific issues, which reflect the 
specificity of the current structural organisation of the economy. In fact, this 
suggestion is not the fruit of this single chapter. While discussing the transition path 
and current structural organisation of the Uzbek economy in Chapter 5, we have 
already made some preliminary predictions that maintenance of the old-style resource 
allocation mechanism might undermine the importance of the banking sector and 
hinder its development.
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Indeed, the main concern of the Uzbek authorities during transition was the 
prevention o f output loss, and the aggravation of unemployment, and also 
modernisation o f the economy through strengthening the industrial sector. To finance 
new investment projects in the industrial sector by simultaneously maintaining 
production in ailing enterprises, the government needed considerable financial 
resources, which were partially and endogenously created by the state-controlled 
banking sector, and attracted from abroad. In addition to this, considerable amounts of 
resources were reallocated from the agricultural and energy sectors to the priority 
sectors of the economy through the old-fashioned price controls and other 
administrative methods. As a result, the main role of banks in this environment was 
again limited to the organisation of the payments system and channelling centralised 
credits and credits attracted from abroad to the state-controlled enterprise sector. The 
market type intermediary function of the sector was seen of secondary importance.
Generously created credit, which can be classified as political credit 
endogeneity, resulted in an overexpansion of the supply o f non-cash money.35 Under 
this scenario, allowing free convertibility of non-cash money into cash money would 
trigger inflation, which was an undesirable outcome for the monetary authorities. As 
a result, the authorities opted for the policy of restricting free convertibility between 
cash money and non-cash money in order to suppress inflationary pressure. In a way, 
a soft credit policy prevented inefficient non-monetary transactions, credit crunch and 
the resulting output loss, but it also inhibited the development of money and banks.
Moreover, the maintenance o f the old-style practices such as the cash plan and 
the excessive government intervention in everyday bank activities, including tax and 
I data collector function imposed on banks, severely weakens the general public’s trust
This was described as ‘excess liquidity’ in the EBRD (2004: 212).
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in bank liabilities. As a result, this hinders development of a market-oriented banking 
sector and thus hampers financial intermediation. In short, the current semi­
centralised structure of the economy and the system-specific issues associated with it 
explain not only the current state of development of money and banking but also why 
the development of a market-oriented banking sector has been slow in Uzbekistan.
In a nutshell, our findings clearly show that generalised measurements of 
financial development, such as the EBRD’s index of banking sector reform and the 
basic measures of monetisation and banking intermediation, cannot capture some of 
issues raised in this study and as such overestimate the current stage of the 
development of money and banking in Uzbekistan. For example, the EBRD’s index of 
banking reform for Uzbekistan does account for problems associated with free 
convertibility o f non-cash money into cash money and the resulting illiquidity of non­
cash money. Therefore, this measure understates the importance of this phenomenon 
in explaining weak trust in banks and slow development of banking habits.
8. Summary and Conclusions
Using the Post Keynesian theory of monetary production, this study investigated the 
development of money and banks during transition. We wanted to show that since 
money and banks played only a passive and accommodative role under central 
planning, their evolution into market institutions would be complex and time- 
consuming. Taking Uzbekistan as a case study, we also wanted to explain that the 
evolutionary path o f these institutions could not be analysed successfully unless we 
took into account special particularities such as history, pattern of reform policies, 
institutional factors, and the structure of the economy in question. Below we will 
briefly summarise the main findings and conclusions of the study.
First we discussed the role and importance of money and banks in both a market 
economy and a centrally planned economy. And only then did we start discussion of 
the development o f these institutions during transition. This way of approaching the 
issue enabled us to unveil not only the complex character of the transition process, but 
also the time-consuming nature of institutional evolution.
A market economy is an incentive-based, decentralised system in which 
production takes time and the future is uncertain. Incentives are reflected in terms of 
prices, which mirror relative scarcities of goods and services. Successful functioning 
of this system depends upon institutions and conventions. Contracts, debt instruments, 
and price lists are vital in reducing uncertainty and thus facilitating the economic 
process. Because these institutions are denominated and discharged in money, money 
becomes an integral and inseparable part of production and facilitates the economic 
process.
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In a market economy wealth formation takes place in monetary form. It is not 
desirable for agents to accumulate their wealth in the form of a stock of goods and 
inventories simply because their maintenance and upkeep involve huge costs. Since 
money represents universalised title to all tradable goods and services, it is the most 
liquid of all assets. Therefore, during the time of increased uncertainty agents hold 
their purchasing power in money. This in turn translates into lower demand for goods 
and services. As a result, aggregate effective demand decreases and this negatively 
affects output and employment. In short, since money plays both a facilitating and a 
constraining role, it is non-neutral in the economic process. Taking this into account 
Post Keynesians refer to a market economy as a monetary economy.
The role of bank lending is no less important than that of money in a market 
economy. The monetary nature of the process of production means that the pace of 
investment and thus economic growth is dependent upon the availability and cost of 
external finance, which in turn necessitates financial development. Amongst different 
financial institutions banks play a special role in this process. The first two stages of 
banking development are of paramount importance in understanding the nature and 
importance of banking development in a market economy, which also has clear 
implications for transition banking.
In stage one all exchange transactions are carried out in commodity money. 
Banks are in the process of gaining public’s confidence. Since banks do not yet work 
as a united system, bank deposits represent savings and transaction balances do not 
circulate through banks. Banks do engage in lending activities but these are 
constrained by the availability of loanable funds. In other words, in this stage banks 
work merely as intermediaries between savers and borrowers.
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In stage two banks establish themselves as a viable market institution and thus 
gain the general public’s confidence. Slowly but gradually branch banking develops. 
Banks also initiate integration of clearing arrangements. These play an important role 
in the use of bank liabilities as money. As a result of these developments, credit 
creation will be possible with fractional reserves. It is important to note that gaining 
the public’s confidence and organisation of clearing arrangements are of paramount 
importance in the acceptability of bank deposits as money and as such can be seen as 
a precondition to the banking sector’s ability to create credit ahead of saving.
Hence in stage two the banking sector will gain the necessary confidence and 
experience to be able to free the economy from the loanable funds constraints. In 
other words, in stage two banks learn to create credit endogenously. The implication 
of this is that now investment determines the level of saving through changes in 
income. In the later stages of development this function only gets more refined and 
reaches its perfection. Like money, however, banks do not always play a facilitating 
role in the economic process. They may contribute to the instability of the system as 
well. This is explained by the liquidity preference of banks.
During the downturn in the business cycle liquidity preference of different 
groups of economic agents will be high. Higher liquidity preference of consumers 
leads to lower sales and thus negatively affects firms’ retained earnings. Although 
cash-strapped firms change their expectations and may reduce their demand for long­
term credit to finance new investment decisions, their demand for short-term credit to 
finance working capital may go up. For instance, they might be forced to borrow 
short-term credits to pay interest commitments on already borrowed loans. 
Unfortunately, when the corporate sector needs to borrow so badly, bank credit will 
not be forthcoming easily. Since liquidity preference of banks will also be high during
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the downswing, banks raise interest rates on loans. Banks even may decide to ration 
credits, granting them only to the most established and financially sound firms. As a 
result, this leads to lower output and higher unemployment.
The role and importance of money and banks were completely different in 
centrally planned economies. Discussion of the theoretical foundations of a centrally 
planned economy showed fundamental reasons for such a distinction. Marx, Lenin 
and the other founders of a communist economy were well aware that money was 
non-neutral in a capitalist economy. Marx was also aware that money would separate 
acts of purchase and sale in time and space. As a result, demand would not 
automatically create its supply and this could lead the economy to possible 
overproduction and crisis.
In a nutshell, a centrally planned economy emerged as an alternative to a market 
economy. To prevent overproduction and cyclical economic crises communist 
theorists proposed to replace decentralised markets with central planning and to 
abolish money and banks from the system altogether. Although there were genuine 
attempts to build a moneyless and marketless economic system during the early years 
of central planning, practical difficulties associated with its organisation proved it to 
be infeasible. As a result, money and banks were reintroduced to the system. 
However, all necessary steps were taken to make sure that these institutions played 
only a passive and accommodative role.
The neutrality o f money was achieved by planning the entire process of 
production and distribution, fixing prices of goods and services, and last but not least 
separating the supply of money into two semi-independent circuits — the cash money 
circuit and non-cash money circuit. Both cash money and non-cash money could not 
uffect investment decisions independently because mobilisation of resources was
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carried out through administratively set prices. The start-up capital of new enterprises 
and expansion o f the existing ones would be financed from the central budget as non­
repayable grants.
Non-cash money did not have universalised purchasing power. It played a 
passive and accommodating role in the process of planning and production. Once 
material plans were confirmed, non-cash money would be readily supplied by the 
banking sector to facilitate the process. Because the supply of non-cash money was 
almost perfectly responsive to changes in the real economic activity, the money 
supply curve could be depicted as a horizontal line. (Since the rate of interest did not 
have any real economic meaning, graphically, the vertical axis of the diagram would 
represent real economic activity and the horizontal one would represent the supply of 
money.)
As to the role of banks, they were also designed to facilitate the process of 
planning and production. Banks supplied short-term credits to the enterprise sector 
endogenously to facilitate inter-enterprise trade. Banks were authorised to monitor 
enterprises’ performance, control their financial flows, pay taxes on their behalf, and 
supply all necessary information to the authorities. Notions such as market- 
determined interest rates, liquidity preference, cost of funds, collateral and 
creditworthiness were irrelevant to the soviet banking practice. Perhaps the only 
function of banks under central planning that could be relevant during transition was 
the organisation of the payments system.
In a nutshell, the centrally planned economy of the FSU was monetised only in 
appearance. In fact, the institutions of money and banks were passive and 
accommodative tools that were used to facilitate the smooth accomplishment of 
production plans. Therefore, we called this economy a barter-like economy and
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suggested that the process o f transition should be understood as transformation of a 
barter-like economy into a monetary one.
The process o f transformation would require a number of fundamental and 
structural changes such as the abolition of central planning, liberalisation of prices, 
privatisation of SOEs, abolition of resource allocation through distorted prices, soft 
credits and budget subsidies, restructuring the banking sector by copying the blueprint 
of the banking sector in advanced market economies, establishing legal institutions to 
protect private property rights, etc.
Since orthodox theoreticians do not take the role of institutions, including 
money and banks, seriously, they argued that these changes would guarantee the 
success of transition. Therefore, in almost all policy packages developed in the early 
1990s emphasis was placed on these reforms. Contrary to this, we have shown that 
these reforms could be seen only as a precondition to establishing a monetary 
economy and that the success of the process would depend upon the speed of 
institutional development. Indeed, ignorance of the time-consuming nature of 
institutional evolution made the process of transition painful. Persistent output fall, 
macroeconomic imbalances, and deteriorating living conditions were observed in 
almost all transition countries. As a result, the general public lost confidence in new 
market institutions, which in turn further delayed the process of institutional 
evolution.
Since transformation would imply a complete change from one form of resource 
allocation into another, the evolution and gradual maturity of market institutions such 
money, banks and other financial institutions would be required for a smoother 
transition. Achievement of internal convertibility between cash money and non-cash 
m°ney was of first and foremost importance. If money became a perfectly liquid asset
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that represented unconditional title to goods and services, this would foster 
monetisation of wealth formation and lead to financial deepening.
Although the blueprint of the banking sector could be readily copied from 
advanced market economies, it would be impossible for transition banks to 
immediately master the functions performed by mature market institutions that 
experienced hundreds of years of evolutionary path. Our analysis, which was based 
upon our discussions about the role and importance of money and banks in a 
monetary economy and a centrally planned economy suggests that, to reach necessary 
maturity and to become effective financial intermediaries and creators of new credit, 
transition banks have to go through at least five different evolutionary phases. This 
was explained by the historical distinction between cash money and non-cash money, 
underdeveloped banking habits of the general public, slow and inefficient payments 
system inherited from the past, and more importantly hyperinflation during the early 
years of transition.
The speed o f this evolution can vary from country to country depending upon a 
number of important factors such as number of years spent under central planning, 
degree of centralisation of the economy, the starting date of reforms and their 
consistency, proximity to large and dynamically functioning market economies, and 
more importantly entry of foreign banks. Most of the Eastern European countries 
spent fewer years under central planning and had less centralised economies. They 
started transition earlier and were more consistent reformers. In addition, proximity of 
these economies to large market economies made them attractive to foreign bank 
entry. As a result, institutional and technological spillovers were made faster and 
easier. Unfortunately, most of the CIS countries, including Uzbekistan, do not have 
these comparative advantages.
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Our discussions show that Uzbekistan was very slow in reforming its economy 
and therefore is still far from developing into a market economy. After more than a 
decade of transition, some basic preconditions to building a monetary economy are 
not met. As a result, the banking sector is still struggling to go beyond phase two of 
the proposed evolutionary path. In spite of some positive changes undertaken during 
transition such as establishment of the two-tier banking sector, formal abolition of the 
distinction between cash money and non-cash money, modernisation of the payments 
system, control of inflation, and the establishment of the deposit insurance fund, the 
banking sector failed to regain the general public’s confidence.
As a result, bank liabilities have not become a popular means of saving and 
exchange. In 2003 the ratio of broad money to GDP was only about 12 percent -  the 
lowest indicator in the CIS. Moreover, the analysis of the activities of major banks in 
the country showed that term and saving deposits, which signal depositors’ 
confidence in banks, constituted only about one-fifth of total bank deposits. All in all, 
due to the lack of confidence in banks, the household sector does not keep their 
savings with banks. As a result, the economy remains heavily reliant upon cash 
money. Ironically, despite these facts the share of the total bank assets to GDP has 
been the highest amongst the CIS countries for the last 8-10 years. The current 
structural organisation of the economy was one of the main factors to explain this 
irregularity.
A semi-centralised way of managing the economy allowed the authorities to 
allocate resources in old-fashioned style through price distortions, soft credits and 
subsidies. This, combined with the availability of foreign credits from international 
financial institutions and multinational banks, made the role of banks less important in 
terms of acting as financial intermediaries in the market sense of the word. As a
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corollary, under this regime the main role of banks is again limited to organisation of 
the payments system and allocation of soft credits.
In addition to this, maintenance of the old-style practices such as restrictions 
imposed on the free convertibility of cash money and non-cash money, excessive 
intervention in bank activities, and tax and information collecting functions imposed 
on banks further weakens the general public’s trust in the banking sector and delays 
healthy development of money and banks.
Another particularity o f the current regime is that, although the generously 
created credit was helpful in preventing sharp output loss and the emergence of 
ineffective non-monetary transactions, it led to excessive creation of non-cash money. 
To control inflationary pressure coming from this source, the authorities imposed 
restrictions on the free convertibility of non-cash money and cash money. As a result, 
wage earners could not get their salaries when they were due (because enterprises 
could not convert their non-cash money into cash money immediately) and deposit 
holders could not convert their non-cash money into cash money on demand.
Interestingly enough in a way this shows that the authorities attempted to make 
bank liabilities less ‘liquid’ by restricting their purchasing power. That is to say, the 
authorities ‘forced’ non-cash money holders to postpone conversion of their non-cash 
money holdings into cash money, and made them delay cash money spending. As a 
corollary, agents found loopholes in regulations and used many different methods to 
convert their non-cash money holdings into cash money and willingly agreed to 
discount the value o f non-cash money in the process.
Now, this issue is the most worrying of all because having trust in the banking 
sector’s ability to exchange their liabilities for cash money when demanded is of 
Paramount importance. In fact, the entire financial superstructure is built upon the
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existence of confidence in unconditional convertibility o f bank liabilities into 
currency. If  for some reason agents lose confidence in banks, they run to banks and 
withdraw their holdings. As a consequence, this may result in the collapse of the 
entire financial system. Ironically, restrictions on the free convertibility between cash 
money and non-cash money and the resulting relative illiquidity of bank liabilities 
show that this basic but fundamental condition has not been met yet in Uzbekistan.
In a nutshell, the weak development of money and banking in Uzbekistan is 
largely explained by the current structural organisation of the economy and some 
sector-specific issues associated with it. As Uzbekistan intends to gradually transform 
its economy into a market one, the authorities should appreciate that in a market 
economy availability and cost of external finance play an important role in facilitating 
the enterprise sector’s drive to expand. Therefore, there is an urgent need to 
encourage development of money and banking.
The authorities have already taken some positive steps by modernising the 
payments system and establishing a special fund to protect household sector deposits. 
However, there are still many macro level and sector level problems that need to be 
addressed. First o f all, immediate measures have to be taken to promote the general 
public’s confidence in the banking sector. This should start with guaranteeing free 
convertibility between cash money and non-cash money. Excessive intervention in 
bank activities and tax and information collecting functions imposed on them can be 
seen as policing activities of both banks and enterprises alike. Abolition of these 
practices promotes confidence further.
Nevertheless, despite being of paramount importance in promoting confidence, 
these changes may not give the expected result unless the old-style resource allocation 
mechanism is brought to an end too. Abolishing allocation o f resources through
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distorted prices, soft credits and budget subsidies not only increases the importance of 
banks as financial intermediaries and creators of new credit, but also complements the 
confidence-promoting measures. The caveat, however, is that it takes time until banks 
reach the necessary maturity to be able to create credit ahead of saving.
To prevent an unnecessary output fall, without jeopardising the effectiveness of 
the measures aimed at promoting confidence in banks, these changes need to be 
carried out in several gradual steps. First, the authorities have to establish a 
provisional specialised bank, sort of a development bank, to take responsibility to 
supply credit to the economy. The importance of this bank should be gradually 
reduced taking into account the degree of progress achieved by the healthy developing 
commercial banks. Once the banking sector regains full confidence of the general 
public and starts working as an effective financial intermediary and creator of new 
credit, no longer will there be a need for this type of bank.
Limitations o f  the Study and Implications fo r  Further Research
One of the main shortcomings of this study was that it concentrated only on the 
formal credit markets and investigated the problems of monetary evolution from a 
much broader perspective. This means that a number o f interesting and important 
issues could not be discussed here. This especially refers to the activities of non- 
formal credit institutions such as moneylenders and usurers in the context of a dual 
economy. Since activities of these institutions are also important in understanding the 
true nature o f the process of monetisation of wealth formation, and thus the evolution 
of a monetary economy during transition, studying these issues will hopefully be our 
next challenge.
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Now, as far as the implications are concerned, by emphasising the role and 
importance of institutions in the economic process, this research shows that 
differences in history, geography, pattern of reform policies, and the structure of the 
economy play an important role in explaining the speed and possible evolutionary 
progress o f institutions during transition. In this sense, this method of analysis might 
be used in further studies to assess evolutionary differences o f institutional 
developments across different transition countries.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 4A
Debates on Industrialisation and Planning
Two alternative growth theories emerged after the revolution: the unbalanced growth 
theory and the balanced growth theory. Supporters of the unbalanced growth theory 
argued for a ‘big push’. They argued that the ultimate goal of rapid economic 
development would be achieved only through giving more weight to the production of 
investment goods. They saw the agricultural sector as a primary source of capital 
accumulation for financing industrial growth.
Contrary to this, advocates of the theory of balanced growth argued that the 
interdependence of agriculture and industry required adoption of balanced growth 
policies. According to this school maintenance of a balanced and gradual growth in all 
sectors of the economy was necessary to achieve harmonised and consistent long-term 
economic growth.
The balanced growth theory faded away from the scene along with its 
advocates, soon after the Stalinist ‘purges’ were initiated in the early 1930s. It meant 
that the theory of unbalanced growth was chosen as an appropriate theory to be 
implemented in the Soviet Union. The model of unbalanced growth was based on the 
theory of ‘primitive socialist accumulation’ developed by Preobrazhensky.
The accomplishment of ambitious investment decisions in the industrial sector 
would require accumulation of sufficient capital. Theoretically there wrere three 
sources from which the accumulation could be generated: surplus product created in
1 Here we decided to mention only the most influential model among the many alternative growth 
theories. For instance for the discussion o f similar growth models developed by Fel dman and 
Kovalevsky, please see Temkin, 1998: 315.
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the agricultural sector, any surplus generated in the industrial sector itself, and 
borrowing from abroad.
However, the last source was out of reach of the Soviet State. The politically 
unfriendly international environment and the 1917 declaration of default on all 
foreign debt borrowed by the previous government would hardly make it possible to 
borrow from abroad. The Soviet leadership was conscious of this fact. Even the 
radical left wing members of the party acknowledged that the source o f surplus capital 
had to be sought in agriculture and in industry itself. In this regard the prominent 
representative of left wing opposition Preobrazhensky noted the following:
This process o f  extending and consolidating the state economy can proceed both at the 
expense o f  its own forces and resources, that is surplus product o f  the workers in state 
industry, and at the expense o f  the private, including peasant (itself including middle 
peasant) economy. Can it be otherwise? To express the problem in most easily understood 
words -  can the burden o f  developing state industry and reconstructing its whole technical 
base be borne on the shoulders o f  our three million workers alone, or must our twenty-two 
million peasant households take a share in this too? (Preobrazhensky, 1966: 226)
Since 1925 the official line of the party was to give priority to industrialisation, 
putting special emphasis on heavy industry. At this point the discussion among party 
members was only regarding the tempo of industrialisation. Towards the end of the 
1920’s the decision was ruled in favour of faster industrialisation. Putting more 
emphasis on the production of capital goods implied that the number of employees in 
the non-consumption-goods sector of the economy would increase. Under this 
scenario the agricultural sector was to produce not only the ‘surplus’ for financing the
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expansion of the industrial sector, but also to provide extra food supplies (wage 
goods) for those employed in newly built industrial enterprises.
In addition, if  monetary stability, achieved with difficulty during the NEP, was 
to be maintained and inflation was to be avoided, the accumulation of resources had 
to be carried out by taxation, borrowing from the private sector and general 
population, or keeping the rate of productivity growth above the rate of growth of real 
wages in industry. A failure to provide the town with required extra foodstuffs from 
the village would create excess liquidity in towns not supported by the supply of 
goods and services and thus would result in inflation. Or the inability to generate 
sufficient capital accumulation for investment by the above-mentioned method, could 
tempt the authorities to use the Gosbank’s money printing services to finance their 
ambitious plans and thus revive the problem of inflation and budget deficit.
However, because of the artificially created unfavourable trade conditions 
between agriculture and industry, peasants were unwilling to supply their surplus to 
the market and instead preferred saving in kind. Meanwhile in 1925-6 wages of 
industrial workers increased more than the production capacity of the industrial 
sector. This meant that towns now had higher purchasing power and higher demand 
for agricultural foodstuffs. Although production rose faster than total wage bill in the 
consecutive years of 1927-9, it did not transform into the market as a decrease in 
purchasing power o f workers. Because the reduction in the real wage was offset by 
increased employment in the capital construction sector, it left total purchasing power 
of the town high (Davies, 1958: 90).
304
Appendix 4A
Hence, the government failed to take the necessary measures to increase 
production of consumer goods correspondingly in response to these changes. This, 
combined with wholesale price rigidities, created the problem of goods shortage and 
hence hidden inflation. This situation, also known as the ‘goods famine,’ augmented 
the reluctance of the peasantry to exchange their hard-earned grain for a currency in 
which goods could not be easily obtained in the market. As a consequence, the 
volume of total marketable agricultural production steadily declined during the period 
of suppressed inflation o f 1925-6.
The idea o f using the export proceeds of the agricultural sector to finance 
investment in the capital construction sector failed too. In the years 1925-9 total 
exports o f agricultural foodstuff never reached even half o f their pre-war level. Export 
of agricultural foodstuffs were equal to about 40 percent of its pre war level in the 
years 1926-7 and around 25-30 percent of its pre-war level in the following three 
years (Baykov, 1946: 76). In short, the government failed to attract the surplus 
product generated in the agricultural sector to finance its ambitious industrial projects.
These results convinced the authorities that it was impossible to carry out 
comprehensive industrialisation policies without reforms in the agricultural sector. 
The authorities were now sure that unless nationalisation policies were carried out in 
agriculture, private peasantry in agriculture would only be an obstacle to the 
ambitious rapid industrialisation plans. As a result, massive collectivisation polices 
were initiated in agriculture in the late 1920s. And by the mid-1930s collectivisation 
of agriculture was virtually completed. (See for instance Munting, 1982 and Gros and 
Steinherr, 1995, Gregory and Stuart, 1998.) As a result, by the end of the 1920s the
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NEP was formally abolished, and foundations for a centrally planned command 
economy were laid down.
As in the case of industrialisation debate, there was a debate among the 
Bolshevik economists about the nature of planning in the economic process. 
Teleologists (from ‘teleology’, goal-directed development) and geneticists (from 
‘genesis’, origin, evolution) represented two major alternative schools of central 
planning.2
Teleologists argued for directive planning. According to them plan targets had 
to be legally binding on enterprises. A model of planning advocated by teleologists 
reflected the soviet leaders’ goal of rapid industrialisation. According to this model, 
the working of the economy would be organised entirely from above. Teleologists 
rejected the idea of equilibrium among different sectors of the economy put forward 
by balanced growth theorists. Therefore, their model was not constrained by market 
forces. They argued that planners, or ‘social engineers’ as they called them, must 
dictate the direction of economic activity, not market forces. The only constraint of 
this model was the physical limits of the economy. One more special feature of this 
model of planning was that it took as a reference point Marx’s famous analysis of the 
economy where department I produced capital goods and raw materials and 
department II produced consumer goods. In an environment where everything that 
was of a ‘Marxian’ origin was glorified, Marxian reference played a very important 
role for the ultimate success of the directive planning theory over the alternative one.
2 Kondratiev, Bazarov and Groman were the main intellectual leaders o f  the teleologists. The main 
supporters o f  the latter school were Strumilin, Pyatakov, Kuibeshev and Feld man.
306
Appendix 4A
Geneticists supported indicative planning. They stressed the role of objective 
regularities in the economic process. Geneticists gave considerable importance to 
market forces. In this model consumer demand was seen as a driving force of the 
economy. It would indicate to the planners the direction of economy activity, which at 
the end would be taken into account by the authorities in further planning. In 
I indicative planning targets would be set in the hope of affecting economic outcomes 
by providing information external to the market. Plan targets would only be 
indicative, not binding, on enterprises. In other words, in general individual firms 
would not receive directives from planners (Gregory and Stuart, 1995: 119).
The geneticist approach was influential in the early attempts of central planning 
during the period of NEP. However, as the NEP policies became less and less popular 
towards the end of the 1920s, this approach fell out of favour too. The formal 
abolition of the NEP implied an inevitable victory for the teleologists.
Indeed, the main reason behind choosing the unbalanced growth theory, the 
theory of directive planning being its necessary complement, was the military needs 
and economic backwardness of the Soviet Union. The ambitious goal now was 
catching up with and surpassing the most advanced countries of the capitalist world.
One feature o f  the history o f  old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered for falling 
behind, for her backwardness. ... Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to ‘ 
lose its independence? If you do not want this you must put an end to its backwardness in 
the shortest possible time ... We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries.
We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us. (Stalin, 
quoted in Levine, 1974: 45)
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As debates around industrialisation and central planning were occupying the 
minds of Bolshevik theoreticians, thoughts on the role of money became a secondary 
issue. Nonetheless, there were strong expectations among party members that under 
‘marketless’ central planning money would also be eliminated. Indeed, this was a 
logical conclusion derived from Marxian teachings that under communism, including 
its first phase of development, a commodity exchange system would be replaced by a 
product exchange system. However, Stalin denounced this type o f interpretation as 
‘leftist nonsense.’ Speaking at the party congress in 1939 he declared that ‘Money 
will remain with us for a long time, until the completion o f the first phase of 
communism’ (quoted inTemkin, 1998: 316.).
The issue of abolishing commodity-money relations and thus money from the 
economic process was never fully resolved. Time and time again it was postponed to 
a later period. As the early attempts to get rid of all commodity-money relations failed 
during the period of War Communism, ‘there was a “temporary retreat” - a term used 
by Lenin as a justification for introducing the NEP’ (Temkin, 1998: 317). Now with 
Stalin’s clarification implementation of the idea of a moneyless society was 
postponed until communism was fully built. Later soviet theoreticians left the matter 
to be discussed in the future when appropriate time came.
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Appendix 5A
The EBRD’s Selected Indices of Transition Reform 
Price liberalisation
1 Most prices formally controlled by the government.
2 Price controls for several important product categories; state procurement at non-
market prices remains substantial.
3 Substantial progress on price liberalisation: state procurement at non-market prices 
largely phased out.
4 Comprehensive price liberalisation; utility pricing which reflects economic costs.
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies:
Comprehensive price liberalisation; efficiency-enhancing regulation of utility 
pricing.
Small-scale privatisation
1 Little progress.
2 Substantial share privatised.
3 Nearly comprehensive programme implemented.
4 Complete privatisation of small companies with tradable ownership rights.
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: no state
ownership of small enterprises; effective tradability of land.
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Large-scale privatisation
1 Little private ownership.
2 Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation; some sales completed.
3 More than 25 percent of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the 
process of being privatised (with the progress having reached a stage at which the 
state has effectively ceded its ownership rights), but possibly with major unresolved 
issues regarding corporate governance.
4 More than 50 percent of state-owned enterprise and farm assets in private ownership 
and significant progress on corporate governance of these enterprises.
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: more than 75
percent of enterprise assets in private ownership with effective corporate 
governance.
Enterprise reform index (Governance and Enterprise restructuring)
1 Soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies weakening financial 
discipline at the enterprise level); few other reforms to promote corporate 
governance.
2 Moderately tight credit and subsidy policy but weak enforcement of bankruptcy 
legislation and little action taken to strengthen competition and corporate 
governance.
3 Significant and sustained actions to harden budget constraints and to promote 
corporate governance effectively (e.g. through privatisation combined with tight 
credit and subsidy policies and/or enforcement of bankruptcy legislation).
4 Substantial improvement in corporate governance, for example, an account of an 
active corporate control market; significant new investment at the enterprise level.
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: effective
corporate control exercised through domestic financial institutions and markets, 
fostering market-driven restructuring.
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Appendix 7B
The Survey Results and Their Full Analysis and Interpretations 
Part A. Results
Table 7B.1. Popularity of alternative means of saving among households
(Percentage of respondents; number of responses are given in brackets)
M
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CD
Q1
5 4 3 2 1
27.4 36.9 14.3 17.9 3.6 3.67 1
Foreign currency (n=23 (n=31) (n=12) (n-15) (n=3) (n-84)
28.75 17.5 32.5 20.0 1.25 3.53 2
National currency (n=23) (n=14) (n=26) (n=16) (n=1) (n=80)
22.9 33.7 19.3 18.1 6.0 3.49 3
Precious metals and jewellery (n=19) (n=28) (n=16) (n=15) (n=5) (n=83)
15.7 39.8 30.1 6.0 8.4 3.48 4
Real estate (n=13) (n=33) (n=25) (n=5) (n=7) (n-83)
12.1 34.9 27.7 15.7 9.6 3.24 5
Livestock (n=10) (n=29) (n=23) (n=13) (n=8) (n-83)
11 29.3 29.3 21.9 8.5 3.12 6
Consumer durables (n=9) (n=24) (n=24) (n=18) (n=7) (n-82)
Table 7B.2. Perceived change in the nature of cash money and
non-cash money
________ (Percentage of respondents; number of responses are given in brackets)
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5 4 3 2 1
Did the nature of non-cash
money and cash money 8.0 47.1 9.2 23.0 12.6 3.1
changed during transition? (n=7) (n=41) (n=8) (n=20) (n=11) (n=87)
Table 7B.3. The difference between the values of cash money 
and non-cash money
(Percentage of respondents; number of responses are given in brackets)
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%
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-1
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5 4 3 2 1
On average, what is the 
difference between the values 
of cash money and non-cash 3.5 18.6 31.4 37.2 9.3 3.30
money? (n=8) (n=32) (n=27) (n=16) (n=3) (n=86)
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Table 7B.4. Most likely explanations for the emergence of difference  
between cash money and non-cash money
(Percentage of respondents; number of responses are given in brackets)
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5 4 3 2 1
43.2 32.1 9.9 12.3 2.5 4.01 1
Shortage of cash money (n=35) 3 ii l\D *0
00II (n-10) (n=2) (n=81)
Demand for cash money is 
high due to the shadow 38.5 23.1 17.9 15.4 5.1 3.74 2
economy (n=30) (n=18)
3ii (n=12) (n=4) (n=78)
Cash is dearer because it is 18.5 34.6 27.2 13.6 6.2 3.46 3
used to avoid taxes (n=15) (n=28)
c\TCMII (n=11) (n=5) (n=81)
Excessive supply of non-cash 10.3 38.5 25.6 20.5 5.1 3.28 4
money
ooII (n=30)
3CMII (n=16) (n=4) (n=78)
Cash is dearer because it is 
faster to effect transactions in 22.8 22.8 22.8 21.5 10.1 3.27 5
it (n=18) (n=18) (n=18) (n=17) (n=8) (n=79)
Interest rates on bank 14.3 31.2 22.1 28.6 3.9 3.23 6
deposits are too low (n=11)
3CMII (n=17)
3CMII (n-3) (n=77)
Table 7B.5. Ability of enterprises to convert non-cash money into cash
money
(Percentage of respondents; number of responses are given in brackets)
St
ro
ng
ly
ag
re
e
A
gr
ee
N
eu
tr
al
D
is
ag
re
e
St
ro
ng
ly
di
sa
gr
ee
M
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5 4 3 2 1
Do you agree that enterprises 
that hold business account 
with your bank can convert 
non-cash money into cash 3.4 9.2 19.5 41.4 26.4 2.22
money without any difficulty? (n=3) (n=8) (n=17) (n=36) (n=23) (n=87)
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Table 7B.6. Enterprises with wage arrear problem s
(Percentage of respondents; number of responses are given in brackets)
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em
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em
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em
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What proportion of 
enterprises that hold business 
accounts with your bank do 
not pay their employees' 
wages on time?
12.8
(n=11)
18.6
(n=16)
17.4 44.2 
(n=15) (n=38)
7.0
(n=6)
2.86
(n=86)
Table 7B.7. The length of wage arrears
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What is the length of wage 
payment delays?
2.4
(n=2)
67.5
(n=56)
25.3
(n=21)
3.6
(n=3)
2.4
(n-2)
3.67
(n=83)
Table 7B.8. Importance of Alternallive Sources of Bank Credit
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5 4 3 2 1
63.4 30.9 3.7 0 0 4 . 6 2
Own Resources (n=53) 3 n N
> (n=3) (n=0) (n=0) (n=81) 1
Deposits of Enterprises 29.6 42 16 9.9 2.5 3 . 8 6
(n=24)
M
-
C’OII (n=13) (n=8) (n=2) (n=81) 2
32.5 32.5 20 8.7 6.2 3 . 7 6
Household Deposits
S
'
CMII (n=26) (n=16) (n=7) (n=5) (n=80) 3
Loans from 26.4 32.4 10.8 14.9 13.5 3 . 4 7
International Financial
Institutions (n=21)
3CMII (n=8) 01=11) (n-10) (n=74) 4
11.4 19 29.1 25.3 15.2 2 . 8 6
Government Funds (n=9) (n=15) (n=23) 3 n IV
)
.o (n=12) (n=79) 5
3.8 25.3 26.6 32.9 11.4 2 . 7 7
Interbank Credits (n=3)
3CMII (n=21) (n=26) (n=9)
£ii 6
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Table 7B.9 Likelihood of obtaining bank credit for various enterprises
(Percentage of respondents; number of responses are given in brackets)1 j
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5 4 3 2 1
Majority shareholders of 37.5 38.9 20.8 0 2.8 4.08 1
banks (n=27) (n=28) (n=15) (n=0) (n=2) (n=72)
Creditworthy enterprises
regardless of size and 37.0 38.4 16.4 0 8.2 3.96 2
ownership structure (n=27) (n=28) (n=12) (n=0) (n=6) (n=73)
Large enterprises regardless 12.3 42.5 34.2 9.6 1.4 3.55 3
of their size (n=9) (n=31) (n=25) (n=7) (n=1) fn=73j
Small and medium
enterprises regardless of their 12.5 37.5 43.1 0 6.9 3.49 4
ownership structure (n=9) (n=27) (n=31) (n=0) fn=5j (n=72)
Private enterprises regardless 4.5 40.6 47.8 0 7.2 3.35 5
of their size (n=3) (n=28) (n=33) (n=0) fn=5j (n=69)
3 28 33 0 5 69
State-owned enterprises 5.6 32.4 45.1 15.5 1.4 3.25 6
regardless of their size (n=4) (n=23) (n=32) (n=11) (n=1) (n=71)
Table 7B.10. Bad Loans in Banks’ Loan Portfolio
(Percentage of respondents; number of responses are given in brackets)
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5 4 3 2 1
What is the share of bad
loans in your banks loan 26.3 51.2 13.8 6.2 2.5 3.93
portfolio? (n=21) (n=41) (n=11)
CMII ol
COII
317
Appendix 7B
Table 7B.11. Worst obstacles for banking business
(Percentage of respondents; number of responses are cjiven in brackets)
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5 4 3 2 1
Excessive intervention from 59.0 25.6 10.3 2.6 2.6 4.36 1
the authorities (n=46) (n=20) (n=8) (n=2) (n=2) (n=78)
Excessive intervention from 43.6 34.6 15.4 3.8 2.6 4.13 2
the monetary authorities (n=34) (n=27) (n=12) (n=3) (n=2) rn=78;
35.5 43.4 18.4 2.6 0.0 4.12 3
Imperfections in current laws (n=27) (n=33) (n=14) (n=2) (n=0) (n=3)
22.1 49.3 22.1 5.2 1.3 3.86 4
Banks lack market expertise (n=17) (n=38) (n=17) (n=4) (n=1) rn=77J
23.4 45.4 23.4 7.7 0.0 3.84 5
Distrust in banks (n=18) (n=35) (n=18) (n=6) (n=0) (n=77)
17.1 42.1 27.6 9.2 3.9 3.59 6
Corruption (n=13) (n=32) (n=21) (n=7) (n=76)
Crises in the local financial 20.3 47.3 21.6 10.8 0.0 3.45 7
market (n=15) 3 i^i co (n=16) (n=8) (n=0) rn=74)
Crises in international 11.3 28.2 26.8 26.8 7.0 3.10 8
financial markets (n=8) (n=20) (n=19) (19) (n=77)
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Table 7B.12. Importance of Factors that Foster Public’s Confidence in Banks 
(Percentage of respondents; number of responses are given in brackets)
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Ability of households to 
withdraw their deposits from 
their bank accounts on first 78.3 19.3 0.0 1.2 1.2 4.72 1
demand (n=65) (n=16) (n=0) (n=1) (n=1) (n=83)
46.2 34.6 14.1 3.8 1.3 4.21 2
Low Inflation (n=36) (n=27) (n=11) (n=3) (n=1) (n-78)
Ability of enterprises to 
convert their non-cash money 
into cash money upon first 53.1 25.9 9.9 7.4 3.7 4.17 3
request (n=43) (n=21 (n=8) (n=6) (n=3) (n=81)
Complete abolition of any 
separation between cash 47.5 28.8 12.5 8.8 2.5 4.10 4
money and non-cash money (n=38) (n=23) (n=10) (n=7) (n=2) (n=80)
Enhancing application of 
electronic means of payment 41.3 33.8 12.5 10.0 2.5 4.01 5
such as debit and credit cards (n=33) (n=27) (n=10) (n=8) (n=2) (n=80)
Enhancing telephone and 35.8 34.6 13.6 13.6 2.5 3.88 6
internet banking services (n=29) (n=28) (n=11) (n=11) (n-2) (n=81)
Less intervention from local 47.0 10.8 22.9 14.5 4.8 3.81 7
and central authorities (n=39) (n=9) (n=19) (n=12) (n=4) (n=83)
Higher rates on interest on 19.8 55.6 12.3 4.9 7.4 3.75 8
deposits (n=16) (n=45) (n-10) (n=4) (n=6) (n=81)
319
Appendix 7B
Part B. Full Analysis and Interpretation of the Results
Trust and Money -  Cash and Non-cash
As our discussions so far showed, the public’s trust in bank liabilities is still very low 
and the economy remains highly reliant upon cash money. Disapproval of bank 
deposits by the household sector, however, does not mean that the general public do 
not save. Furthermore, high level of reliance on cash money does not necessarily 
mean that all saving takes place in the national currency.
Lack o f trust in the national currency implies that households take a more 
cautious approach and keep their savings in alternative assets. The stability and 
instant liquidity offered by foreign currencies, such as US dollars and the euro, make 
them an attractive means of saving for the household sector. Some conservative 
savers may even turn to precious metals and jewellery. Other venturous savers, in the 
absence o f a well-functioning stock market, might decide to go after relative stability 
and return and thus might decide to keep their savings in real estate or livestock 
depending upon whether they live in urban or rural areas. However, since converting 
these alternative assets, including foreign currencies, into legal tender involves some 
transaction costs, short-term and small denomination savings will be kept in the 
national currency. In this sense, one would expect that demand for the national 
currency would be explained mostly by transaction motives for holding money.3
Table 7B.1 reveals the bankers’ viewpoint on this issue. The bankers’ 
indication that the national currency is only the second best means of saving tells that 
the national currency has not still gained the confidence of the general public.
3 For the payment o f  larger transactions such as purchase o f  cars and real estate, however, individuals 
still prefer to use foreign currencies (predominantly US dollars).
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Foreign currencies still remain people’s first choice as a means o f saving. Bankers 
also recognise that households save in other different means. Saving in precious 
metals and jewellery, real estate and livestock were ranked after foreign currencies 
and the national currency in the respective order.
The line of demarcation between cash money and non-cash money has been 
abolished during transition. In practical terms, bankers, too, agree that the nature of 
the problem changed towards a positive side (in the sense that ‘moneyness’ of non­
cash money has improved). The majority of the respondents (64.3%) believe that, on 
average, there was a positive change (Table 7B.2). Nonetheless, the public does not 
yet rate cash money and non-cash money equally liquid. As Table 7B.3 reveals about 
78 % of bankers who participated in the survey believe that, on average, non-cash 
money is at least 11-15% less liquid than cash money.
As to the possible explanations of the emergence of the difference between the 
values of cash money and non-cash money, bankers were asked to rate several 
important factors on the scale of 1 to 5, 1 being of no importance and 5 being very 
important. The results show that bankers agree that shortage of cash money is an 
important but not the single most important factor that explains the difference (Table 
7B.4). The results also show that existence of the shadow economy on the one hand, 
and incentives to avoid taxes on the other hand, put upward pressure on the demand 
for cash money; in the meantime, excessive supply of non-cash money and low 
interest paid on bank deposits make holding non-cash money less desirable.
All in all, the results indicate that when all the listed factors are ranked in terms 
of their importance in explaining the issue, shortage of cash money and existence of
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the shadow economy are the top two factors that explain the difference. About 75 and 
62 percent of the respondents said that shortage of cash money and the shadow 
economy phenomenon were important factors that explained the difference between 
the values o f cash money and non-cash money. (See Table 7B.4.)
As was discussed earlier, one of the effects of the cash squeeze policy is that due 
to the systematic shortage of cash money in banks, enterprises will find it increasingly 
difficult to convert their non-cash money into cash money to pay wages of their 
employees on a timely basis. When asked about the enterprise sector’s ability to 
convert their non-cash money into cash money when needed, majority of bankers 
acknowledged that this still remained to be a big problem. About 68 percent of the 
respondents said that enterprises could not convert their non-cash money into cash 
money on first demand when needed; only 13 percent of the respondents do not see 
this as a problem (Table 7B.5).
As for the problem of wage arrears, 93 percent of the respondents said that at 
least a quarter of enterprises that held business account with their banks were not able 
to pay wages on time; in particular about 50 percent of the respondents said that about 
half of the enterprises faced this problem (Table 7B.6). As to the length of the wage 
payment delays majority of respondents (about 70 percent) agreed that it was between 
1 and 2 months (Table 7B.7).
Credit Activity o f  Banks
On banks’ credit activity, we were interested in investigating three different 
issues: (i) the relative importance of alternative sources of bank credits, (ii) the
322
Appendix 7B
likelihood o f obtaining credit from banks for different enterprises; and finally (iii) the 
degree o f non-performing loans in the banks’ credit portfolio.
As far as the first is concerned, in the previous section we have already noted 
that the banking sector’s credit activity relied on their own resources (own capital), 
deposits from the enterprise sector, and credits from international financial institutions 
and banks. When asked about this issue, the overwhelming majority, more than 90 
percent, o f the respondents said that banks’ own sources (bank capital) was one of the 
most important sources of credit resources. Deposits of enterprises and households 
were also rated highly. In terms of overall importance, all the listed factors were 
ranked as follows: own resources; deposits of enterprises; household deposits; loans 
from international financial institutions; government funds; interbank credits (Table 
7B.8).
In terms o f enterprises’ ability to obtain bank credit, undisputed preference is 
given to the main shareholders of banks which are mostly state-owned institutions 
ranging from ministries and ministry like associations to small and medium sized 
enterprises (Table 7B.9). It was also interesting to see creditworthy enterprises, 
regardless o f their size and ownership structure, being rated so highly. 37.5 % and 
37% of the respondents respectively believe that main shareholders of banks and 
creditworthy enterprises are most likely to obtain credit from banks. The rest of the 
findings in the table simply indicate that neither the size nor the ownership structure 
of an enterprise can be as determining a factor as the above-mentioned two in 
increasing likelihood o f obtaining bank credit.
323
Appendix 7B
Now, the fact that banks also rate creditworthiness o f their clients highly, shows 
that a market-type structural credit endogeneity is in place in the economy. However, 
we have to emphasise that the structure and working of the economy indicate that on 
overall credit creation is mostly influenced by political factors.
Although there are no official data available on non-performing loans o f the 
banking sector, availability of politically-influenced soft and concessionary finance 
does signal the existence of this problem. To clarify the issue we asked bankers about 
the proportion of non-performing loans in their loan portfolio. Interestingly enough, 
more than three-fourths o f the respondents said that bad loans exceeded 10 percent of 
their loan portfolio. Whereas, only a little more than one quarter of the respondents 
said that they did not have bad loans in their loan portfolio (Table 7B.10).
The last two sets of questions, raised in Table 7B.11 and Table 7B.12, 
complement each other in the sense that the former is an obstacle inhibiting further 
development o f banking business, and the latter is about factors that will foster 
public’s trust in the banking sector. On the former issue, bankers indicated that 
interventions from the governing bodies and the monetary authorities were one of the 
biggest obstacles. Although imperfections in current laws, lack o f market expertise, 
and corruption were rated lower, on average, they remain one of the important 
problems to be tackled in the future (Table 7B.11).
As to the latter issue, bankers almost uniformly indicated (about 98% of the 
respondents) that creating conditions for households to withdraw their deposits from 
banks on first demand would be one of the most important factors in promoting public 
confidence in the banking sector. Lowering inflation and creating opportunities for
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enterprises to become the true owners of their financial resources were next important 
factors on the list. Bankers also feel that enhancing application of electronic means of 
payment such as debit and credit cards, as well as telephone and internet banking 
services, and offering higher interest on deposits will promote confidence in the 
banking sector (Table 7B.12).
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Examples of Converting Non-cash Money into Cash Money.
Example One
Figure 7C.1 below depicts one of the methods of converting non-cash money into 
cash money -  the process known as ‘obnalichka? in the jargon. A numerical example 
will be helpful here. Company A buys goods from Supplier A in the wholesale 
market and pays for each item 95 cash so 'ms. Company A sells these goods in the 
retail market and gets 100 cash so "ms for each item. Since Company A ’s intention is 
to make extra profit by selling the cash money proceeds, the transaction is not 
recorded in its book yet. In the next stage, Company A finds Company B, which is in 
need of cash money, and the parties agree to discount the value of non-cash money in 
line with cash money premium prevailing in the market. In order not to be caught by 
the regulators Company A and Company B enter into a formal contract, and Company 
A ‘delivers’ the goods, which have already been sold in the retail market and as such 
do not exist, to Company B. Company B pays, through its bank account, for each 
‘item’ 100 non-cash so'ms. In return Company A delivers cash money to Company 
B. (For instance, 80 cash so 'ms for 100 non-cash so 'ms.)
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MarketSupplier A Company A
I I
Company B
1 -  Company A buys goods from Supplier A in the wholesale market and makes the 
payment in non-cash money; Company A ’s bank account is debited and Supplier A ’s 
bank account is credited.
2 -  Company A  sells goods in the Market for cash money but does not record this 
transaction in its book, as if  Company A still holds the goods.
3 and 4 -  Company B, which desperately needs cash money, makes a deal with 
Company A  to ‘buy’ its cash money. Company B makes a non-cash payment to 
Company A ’s bank account. Now, the most interesting point here is that this payment 
is made for buying the goods which Company A  has already sold in the Market for 
cash money. And finally, Company A delivers the ‘real goods,’ i.e. cash money to 
Company B.
Figure 1C. 1 Converting cash money into non-cash money.
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Example Two
Let us have a look at another example. A company that needs one million cash so 'ms 
to pay wages o f employees finds out that its bank is short of cash money and the 
problem is most likely to persist. The only immediate solution to the problem is to 
sell bank deposits (non-cash money) at a discount. To do that the company (i) makes 
an informal agreement with its bank, which in turn may involve some financial cost, 
that any cash money the company attracts to the bank through third parties will be 
given to it, and then (ii) finds a depositor who is willing to deposit cash so 'ms. When 
the deal is struck with the bank, the company approaches a cash-abundant firm, like a 
petrol station for instance, and agrees a deal to pay a certain premium for cash money. 
If the value o f non-cash money is priced 15 percent lower than that of cash money in 
the market, then the petrol station deposits to its bank account only 850,000 cash 
so 'ms. However, the paperwork will be done for one million so 'ms; as if the petrol 
station put into its bank account one million cash so 'ms and exactly the same amount 
of money was withdrawn by the company from its bank account.
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Example Three
Another similar example can be the case when a company buys goods which do 
not exist, for non-cash money from a retail outlet. The retailer uses the non-cash 
money proceeds to buy consumer goods in the wholesale market, realises them in the 
retail market for cash money and only then returns cash money to the company. 
Again, from the accounting point of view the transaction is completed when the 
company ‘buys’ the goods and makes the corresponding payment. However, since 
the real intention from the transaction is to convert non-cash money into cash money, 
the deal is completed only when the retailer delivers the agreed of amount cash money 
to the company.
Example Four
The next example is a particular case of how non-cash money is converted into 
cash money by the official automobile dealers. Figure 7C.2 depicts this process. The 
official dealers, who can sell cars both in non-cash money and cash money, take 
advantage o f the difference between the values of cash money and non-cash money 
and make extra profit by selling cash money. For instance, if non-cash price of a car 
is 10,000,000 so 'ms, Dealer A offers the car to a Car Buyer A for 9,000,000 cash 
so'ms, provided the Car Buyer A agrees to collaborate in some additional paperwork. 
The extra paperwork involves the following. The Car Buyer A opens a bank account 
to which a third company, connected to the dealer, makes a non-cash payment of
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10.000.000 so ms; as if  the payment is made for the goods bought from the potential 
buyer of the car. Next, the buyer makes two payments to the dealer to get the car: (i)
9.000.000 cash s o 'ms, and (ii) 10,000,000 non-cash so 'ms, which actually does not 
belong to the potential buyer. The Dealer A keeps 10,000,000 non-cash so 'ms and 
delivers the agreed amount of cash money to Company B, the original owner of that
10.000.000 non-cash so'ms.
Hence, although the official dealers sell their cars for cash money, almost all 
transactions will be recorded as deposit-based transactions because cash money will 
be sold to third parties. According to some estimates, in 2003 official dealers’ sales 
figure reached 117.8 billion so'ms, of which about 77 percent was carried out in non­
cash money (Holiqov and Olimjonov, 2004).
Dealer A
Car Buyer ACompany B
1 -  Car Buyer opens a bank account to which Company A makes a payment o f
10.000.000 so'm s for the payment o f a fictitious contract.
2 -  Car Buyer pays 10,000,000 non-cash so'ms plus the actual payment o f
9.000.000 cash so 'ms to the Dealership and gets the car.
3 -  Dealership keeps non-cash money and delivers the agreed amount o f  cash 
money to Company A.
Figure 7C.2. Trading non-cash money for cash money in the car dealership
market.
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Generating Cash Money by Selling Foreign Exchange in the Black Market
Figure 7D.1 below shows how banks can generate cash money by selling foreign 
exchange in the black market. The process involves two transactions: the first 
transaction takes place just on paper for accounting purposes (A), and the second one 
is an actual transaction which generates cash money (B). The need for a third party’s 
(an Individual in the diagram) participation in the transaction is explained by the fact 
that the bank must keep a record of those who buy foreign exchange. Since the black 
market speculator does not want to have his name in bank records, the third person, 
usually someone connected to bank employees, agrees to do this job.
In the end, banks actually lose from this type of transactions. As the numerical 
example in Figure 7D.1 shows, the bank lost 20,000 so'ms from the transaction. The 
real burden of this cost, however, will be borne by those who finally convert their 
non-cash money into cash money. In other words, although enterprises acknowledge 
receipt of cash money at a one-to-one ratio, in fact the amount of cash money they 
receive from the banking sector will be reduced in accordance with the described 
costs incurred by banks when exchanging foreign currency to cash money.
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A B
Bank A Black MarketIndividual
2 4
Part A -  Transaction on paper.
1 -  Individual pays the bank 1,040,000 cash so'm s for US$1,000.
2 -  Bank delivers US$1,000 to the individual.
Part B -  Transaction in reality.
3 -  Bank delivers US$1,000 to the speculator in the black market.
4 -  The speculator pays the bank 1,020,000 cash so 'ms.
In the end bank loses 20,000 cash so'm s (1,040,000 -  1,020,000 = 20,000), which 
w ill be borne by those who want to convert their deposits into cash money.
Figure 7D.1. Another way o f  converting non-cash money into cash money
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The Scheme Programme to Deal with Inter-enterprise Payment Arrears
Company C
Company A
Bank
Company BCompany D
1 -  Bank grants credit to Company A.
2 -  Company A uses the credit to pay its debts to Company B.
3 -  Company B uses this money to close its indebtedness to Company C.
4 -  Company C uses this money to close its indebtedness to Company D.
5 -  Company D in turn uses the proceeds to close its indebtedness to Company A.
6 -  In the end Company A pays the loan back to the bank.
Figure 7E. 1. Preventing accumulation o f  payment arrears through the mechanism o f  
the scheme.
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The Sample of the Questionnaire Format
A SURVEY
ON THE ROLE OF BANKS IN FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN. A BANKERS’ PERSPECTIVE1
Main research objective:
To investigate nature of financial system development during transition in the 
economy of Uzbekistan with a particular emphasis on the role o f banks in facilitating 
financial intermediation; the issue will be examined from bankers’ perspective.
Department of Economics 
University of Stirling 
Stirling, FK9 4LA 
United Kingdom of Great Britain
Phone number: (44) 1786 467487 
Fax number: (44) 1786 4674 69 
Email: kr7@stir.ac.uk
4 The original was in Uzbek.
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Dear respondent,
This survey is a part o f  a project that investigates the evolution o f  money and banks in Uzbekistan 
during transition. Questions that may explain generalised pattern o f  the banking sector development are 
included in the questionnaire. We would like to ask you to answer these questions honestly based on 
your knowledge and experience.
Thank you for your cooperation.
I. General Questions
1. How many years o f banking experience do you have?________years.
2. In what area o f banking do you consider yourself to be most experienced?
Cash circulation department EH
Credit Department I I
Accounting Department EH
Securities Department EH
Deposit department EH
Assets and Liabilities Management Department I I
O ther*  EH
3. In which region of the republic is your bank located? 
(For instance, Samarkand, Bukhara, Tashkent, etc.)____
Please indicate the ownership structure of your bank. (Please choose only one 
answer.)
State owned EH
Joint Stock EH
Joint Stock with Foreign Participation EH
Foreign owned EH
Private EH
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II. Main Part
Q. 1. Which of the following is the most popular means of saving for households? 
Please choose one answer for each question and mark an appropriate number 
accordingly.
Most
popular
(1)
Popular
(2)
Somewhat
popular
(3)
Least
popular
(4)
Unpopular
(5)
National currency 1 2 3 4 5
Foreign currency (US 
dollars, British pounds, 
Russian roubles, etc.)
1 2 3 4 5
Consumer durables (TVs, 
VSRs, DVDs, Refrigerators, 
cars, etc.)
1 2 3 4 5
Real estate 1 2 3 4 5
Livestock (cattle, sheep, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5
Precious metals and sundry 
jewellery
1 2 3 4 5
Other* 1 2 3 4 5
* (Please specify any other activity that can be included in this list and rank them in order o f 
importance accordingly.)
Q.2. In your opinion has the nature of non-cash money and cash money changed 
following the process of transition? (In the sense that non-cash money has become 
freely convertible to cash money as well as to tradable goods and services.) Please 
choose only one answer and mark it accordingly.
1. A lot of positive change □
2. Somewhat positive change □
3. No change □
4. Little negative change □
5. A lot of negative change □
Q.3. Generally speaking, which of the following would best describe the average 
difference between the value of cash money and non-cash money over the years of 
transition? Please choose only one answer and mark it accordingly.
1. 0-5% □
2. 6-10% □
3. 11-15% □
4. 16-20% □
5. More than 20% □
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Q.4. Causes that are most likely to explain the reason for the emergence of the 
difference between the value of cash money and non-cash money are listed below. 
Rank them in order o f importance. Please choose one answer for each question and 
mark an appropriate number accordingly.
Most
important
(1)
Important
(2)
Somewhat
important
(3)
Least
important
(4)
Not
important
(5)
Shortage of cash money 1 2 3 4 5
Excess supply of non-cash 
money
1 2 3 4 5
Cash is dearer because it is 
used to avoid taxes
1 2 3 4 5
Cash is dearer because it 
is faster to effect payments 
in it compared to non-cash 
transaction through banks
1 2 3 4 5
Too low rate of interest paid 
on bank deposits 1 2 3 4 5
Due to the existence of black 
economy demand for cash 
money is higher which 
makes it dearer
1 2 3 4 5
Other* 1 2 3 4 5
* {Please specify any other activity that can be included in this list and rank them in order o f 
importance accordingly.)
Q.5. Please express your opinion on the following statement. Please choose only one 
answer and mark an appropriate number accordingly.
Strongly
agree
(1)
Agree
(2)
Neutral
(3)
Disagree
« )
Strongly
disagree
(5)
‘At present enterprises can 
freely convert their non­
cash money into cash 
money when and if they 
wish to do so. ’
1 2 3 4 5
Q.6. What proportion of enterprises that hold an account with your bank have the 
problem of late wage-payments? Please choose only one answer and mafk it 
accordingly.
1. All of them
2. About 75% of them
3. About 50% of them
4. About 25% of them
3. None of them
□□□□□
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Q.7. Among the enterprises that face late wage-payments problem what is the average 
length o f late payments? Please choose only one answer and mark it accordingly.
1. None Q
2. 1-2 months Q]
3. 3-4 months
4. 5-6 months Q
5. More than 7 months I I
Q.8. Below most important sources of bank credit are listed. Please rank them in order 
of importance as far as your bank is concerned. Please choose one answer for each
question and mark an appro]priate number accordingly.
Most
important
(1)
Important
(2)
Somewhat
Important
(3)
Least
important
(4)
Unimportant
(5)
Own capital 1 2 3 4 5
Free resources (deposits) of 
enterprises 1 2 3 4 5
Interbank loans 1 2 3 4 5
Household deposits 1 2 3 4 5
Central bank funds 1 2 3 4 5
Loans from International 
Financial Organisations 1 2 3 4 5
Other* 1 2 3 4 5
*(Please specify any other activity that can be included in this list and rank them in order o f  
importance accordingly.)
Q.9. Which of the following enterprises are most likely to obtain credit from banks? 
Please choose one answer for each question and mark an appropriate number 
accordingly. _______________________________________ _________ ______
Most
likely
(1)
Likely
(2)
Neutral
(3)
Unlikely
(4)
Most
Unlikely
(5)
State owned enterprises 
regardless of their size
1 2 3 4 5
Privately owned 
enterprises regardless of 
their size
1 2 3 4 5
Large enterprises 
regardless of the 
ownership structure
1 2 3 4 5
Small and medium 
enterprises regardless of 
their ownership structure
1 2 3 4 5
Enterprises which hold 
majority stakes in bank’s 
stock capital
1 2 3 4 5
Creditworthy enterprises 
regardless of their size and 1 2 3 4 5
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ownership structure
Q.10. Which o f the following would best describe the extent o f bad debt problem in 
your banks’ credit portfolio? Please choose only one answer and mark it accordingly.
1. No bad loans □
2. 10-20% of total extended credits are bad loans □
3. 25-30% of total extended credits are bad loans □
4. 30-40% of total extended credits are bad loans □
5. More than 50% of total extended credits are bad loans □
Q.l 1. Which of the following constitutes the worst obstacle for banking business? 
Rank in order of importance. Please choose one answer for each question and mark an 
appropriate number accordingly.
Most
important
(1)
Important
(2)
Somewhat
important
(3)
Least
important
(4)
Not
important
(V
Imperfect legislation 1 2 3 4 5
Too much intervention 
from authorities
1 2 3 4 5
T oo m uch regulation from  
m onetary authorities
1 2 3 4 5
Lack of banking experience 1 2 3 4 5
Mistrust in banks 1 2 3 4 5
Imperfection o f existing 
regulations 1 2 3 4 5
Other* 1 2 3 4 5
* {Please specify any other activity that can be included in this list and rank them in order of 
importance accordingly.)
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